

LUND STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 32  
Editors: Bengt Ankarloo, Sven Tägil and Eva Österberg

# Vision or Reality?

The Kurds in the Policy of the Great Powers,  
1941-1947

Borhanedin A. Yassin

Lund  
University  
Press

Lund University Press  
Box 141  
S-221 00 Lund  
Sweden

© 1995 Borhanedin A. Yassin  
Art nr 20368  
ISSN 0519-9700  
ISBN 91-7966-315-X Lund University Press  
ISBN 0-86238-389-7 Chartwell-Bratt Ltd

Printed in Sweden  
Team Offset  
Malmö

# CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS	15
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	16
<u>INTRODUCTION</u>	<u>17</u>
The Context and Aim of the Study	17
Theory and Method	20
Concepts and Definitions	25
Previous Research and Material	28
<u>THE KURDS: A GENERAL BACKGROUND</u>	<u>33</u>
The Kurds and Kurdistan	33
Kurds within the Ottoman Empire	39
Kurdish Nationalism	40
<u>THE KURDS IN IRAN UNTIL 1941</u>	<u>47</u>
The Kurds in Iran Prior to the Anglo-Soviet Occupation	47
The Anglo-Soviet Occupation of Iran	51
German Activities and the Kurds in Occupied Iran	55
The Kurds in Iran After the Occupation	57
<u>THE GREAT POWERS AND THE KURDS:</u>	
<u>THE FIRST PHASE 1941–1943</u>	<u>62</u>
Great Britain's Kurdish Policy	62
The Soviet Union's Kurdish Policy	62

Kurds, Iranians, and the Great Powers	70
The Kurds and the Relations among the Great Powers	78
<u>THE GREAT POWERS AND THE KURDS:</u>	
<u>THE SECOND PHASE 1944–1945</u>	<u>82</u>
The Origins of the Cold War	82
US Policy in Iran and the Kurds	84
The Irano-Soviet Oil Crisis	88
The Soviet Union’s Kurdish Policy	90
Kurds, Iranians, and the Great Powers	92
<u>THE KURDISH QUESTION IN IRAQ DURING</u>	
<u>THE SECOND WORLD WAR</u>	<u>93</u>
The Kurds in Iraq Prior to the Second World War	93
During the Second World War	96
The Mulla Mustafa Uprising 1943–1945	98
Further Negotiations with Mulla Mustafa	100
American Concerns	104
Political Options	107
Great Britain’s Cautious Kurdish Policy	109
Negotiations with Sherif Pasha	111
<u>THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF</u>	
<u>KURDISTAN 1946</u>	<u>113</u>
The Path to the Establishment of the People’s Republic of Kurdistan	113
<i>The Formation of Political Organisations</i>	113
<i>The Soviet Connection</i>	119
<i>The Proclamation of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan</i>	124
The Establishment of the People’s Republic of Kurdistan	125
Relations with the Central Government	133

The People's Republic of Kurdistan and the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan	134
The Policy of the Great Powers vis-à-vis the People's Republic of Kurdistan	136
<u>THE DEMISE OF THE REPUBLIC</u>	<u>145</u>
The Internal and Iranian Connections	146
The Iranian Diplomacy and the International Connections	149
The Aftermath	163
<u>CONCLUSIONS</u>	<u>169</u>
NOTES	176
BIBLIOGRAPHY	228

## ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Azerbaijan Democratic Party
ANA	Azerbaijan National Assembly
ARA	Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan
DSDF	Department of State's Decimal File
FO	Foreign Office
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party-[Iran]
KDP-I	Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iraq
Komala	Komala-y Zhianawa-y Kurd [ Association for the Resurrection of the Kurds]
MEI	Division of the Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs, The Department of State
NA	National Archives, Washington, D.C.
NE	Division of the Near Eastern Affairs, The Department of State
NEA	Office of the Near Easterns Affairs, the Department of State
PCP	Persian Communist Party
PGSC	Persian Gulf Service Command
PRK	People's Republic of Kurdistan
PRO	Public Record Office, London
RAF	Royal Air Force
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
USFME	United States Army Forces in the Middle East
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
SC	Security Council of the United Nations

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The road of this research has been long. Many people have helped me along the way. I am very much indebted to my supervising Professor, Sven Tägil. He has guided me throughout the work of this dissertation. He has provided me with indispensable comments on different versions of my manuscript. He has been admirably patient in connection with this study. Indeed, without his guidance, encouragement and support this dissertation would be impossible to be accomplished.

Professor Bengt Ankarloo, Eva Österberg, Dr. Othman A. 'Ali and Ph. D. Candidate Khalid Salih have read my manuscript, and have all given constructive suggestions. Their criticism and valuable insight are thankfully acknowledged.

I am also especially grateful to my colleague Jasmine Aimaq, who was reviewed my English and therewith improved my manuscript.

The final manuscript has been transformed into a book with the help of Viking Mattsson, to whom I am very much indebted. I am likewise grateful to Tomas Tägil for drawing up the maps.

Thanks also go to my many teachers and colleagues who, guided, advised, supported, and encouraged me over the years.

I also wish to acknowledge that during the last three years of my research, I have received great moral support from my wife Awat H. Afandi.

Lund, February 1995  
Borhanedin A. Yassin

## Chapter One

# INTRODUCTION

### *The Context and Aim of the Study*

The Kurdish question is one of the most complex and explosive issues presently confronting the Middle East, and ranks prominently among the many ethno-national problems of the post-war era. A solution to the Kurdish dilemma was in reach after the end of the First World War and immediately after the Second World War. Yet today, the Kurds remain the largest ethnic group in the Middle East not yet to have achieved any form of recognised statehood.<sup>1</sup>

The Kurds have sought control of their own destiny for several decades. Uprisings erupted in Turkey's Kurdistan<sup>2</sup> in 1925, 1927, 1928–1930 and 1937. Similar upheavals took place in Iraq. In 1919, Shaikh Mahmud Barzinji rose against the British. The Barzani tribe's revolt against the British and the Iraqi rulers in 1932 was followed by upheavals in 1943 and 1945. Each of these uprisings was suppressed.

Certain scholars have focused on the social and economic aspects of the Kurdish question, while others have stressed the ethno-political nature of the issue.<sup>3</sup> Although both of these dimensions are significant, the Kurdish question can best be illuminated by studying a variety of factors, some within the framework of the Kurdish community itself, others lying outside of it, i.e. in the policy of the states which confront the Kurdish question and in the wider international arena. The period 1941–1947 offers an interesting field of study, revealing a strong interactive relationship

between a number of factors with an emphasis on the international dimension.<sup>4</sup>

The Kurdish question has drawn increasing attention from the academic community since the close of the Second World War. This study seeks to place the history of the Kurds, particularly those of Iran, into the greater patterns of contemporary Middle East history as well as to link the Kurds to major developments in the period 1941–1947. The study will involve the local, national and international levels, with particular emphasis on the policy of the Great Powers towards the Kurds. Mehrdad Izady has claimed that the Kurds and their political fate in our century should be understood within the context of power politics.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, George Lenczowski has concluded that the question of Great Powers activities among the Kurds during the Second World War warrants a specific study.<sup>6</sup>

W. J. Argyle has applied the Weberian concept of “objective possibilities” to the subject of nationalist movements.<sup>7</sup> According to Argyle, it is not the absolute size and scale of a particular nationalist movement which determines the degree of its success in attaining its objectives. Rather, a movement may have more or less potential to succeed in relation to *particular circumstances* that exist at the time, and which either impede or facilitate the success of a nationalist movement. In particular circumstances, the movement may culminate in the formation of a nation-state. In other words, the criteria for the success of the movement lie largely in conditions outside of the movement itself, or in the “objective possibilities” found in the circumstances at a specific point in time. Thus, a nationalist movement may in a specific historical milieu achieve a degree of success which may otherwise have been difficult to reach, independently of the size and scope of the movement itself. For instance, there are currently several independent sovereign states comprising populations of less than one million, and some less than half a million.

The period under study should in fact be viewed as a specific historical milieu which entailed an “objective possibility” for the Kurdish nationalist movement, particularly that in Iran, to achieve a certain degree of success. In the circumstances of the time, the Kurdish nationalist movement found itself before an unprecedented opportunity to express itself and to attain some important, albeit temporary, achievements. This dissertation will provide a general introduction on the Kurds and Kurdistan as well as a discussion on the Kurdish question in Iraq, although the main focus of the investigation will be on the Kurds in Iran.

Iran was the sole country in which the Allied military forces had met as early as 1941–1942, and this prompted the involvement of the Great Powers into Kurdish affairs. Iran became a *test case* both for relations

between the Big Three and for the United Nations (UN). In January 1946, the Kurds in Iran succeeded in establishing their own republic in the city of Mahabad, the People's Republic of Kurdistan (PRK)<sup>8</sup>, which was to survive for about one year. The UN sought an arrangement that would satisfy Iranian ambitions to retain integrity, and neglected the future of the Kurds and the fate of their republic. In addition, Iran had long attracted the attention of the Great Powers from the strategic and economic perspectives. The struggle arising from the conflict of interests among Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the US came to a head immediately after the Second World War, and the Kurds were a part of this context. In his dissertation, Manoucher Vahdat concludes that contemporary Iranian history in the 1940s, particularly 1941–1947, was characterised by extensive interaction between domestic Iranian problems and questions concerning Iran's relations to the Great Powers.<sup>9</sup> Throughout this period, particularly in 1945–1946, the Kurdish and Azeri nationalist movements were among the most acute problems confronting Iran, and this was correlated to the policies of the Big Three both *in* and *towards* the country. The dilemma is also known as the Azerbaijan (Iranian Azerbaijan) crisis, which entailed the struggle of both Kurdish and Azeri nationalist movements as well as the establishment and downfall of the two autonomous republics in Iranian Kurdistan and Iranian Azerbaijan.<sup>10</sup>

As to the Kurds in Turkey, they were subjected to such ruthless treatment during the 1920s and 1930s that they were in fact unable to revolt during the period under study. The Turkish government enveloped Kurdistan in an "iron curtain" in 1946 and militarised the area, thus denying the Kurds the possibility of rising against the government while simultaneously severing the region from other sections of Kurdistan.

There are a number of relevant questions to this study.

- How were the Kurdish question and the Kurdish nationalist movement affected by national and international developments during the period 1941–1947?
- How did the Kurds react to the political climate of this period? Where did the Kurds stand in relation to the Middle East policy conducted by the Big Three (Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the US), and in relation to Iran?
- What was the connection between the background to the emergence and the fall of the PRK on the one hand, and the origins of the Cold War in the Middle East context on the other?

## *Theory and Method*

The majority of states in the world today are ethnically heterogeneous, and ethnic variations in any given country have attracted much attention from students of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts. Although intergroup differences do not constitute sufficient cause for the development of an ethno-nationalist movement, they do represent a central condition to the rise of such a movement. One important question in this context is that of relations between the ethnic group and the central state. The subject has been studied by scholars who have employed the concept of centre-periphery “domination” relations. Although these explanatory theories are devoted to the analysis of political and ethnic conflicts, they may be applied to the study of ethno-nationalist movements as a whole.<sup>11</sup> An interesting interpretation of the concept of domination is provided in Michael Hechter’s centre-periphery theory which is based on the concept of internal colonialism.<sup>12</sup> Hechter’s study deals with the relationship between the English centre and the Celtic Fringe, with the former being more developed than the latter, thus resulting in economic and political inequality.

The weakness of the centre-periphery theory is that it may at times be difficult to determine the boundaries between what is the centre and what is the periphery. One significant complication is that the periphery is not always socially or politically homogeneous, and the same could be said of the centre. In fact, the periphery has its own “centre” with privileged sub-groups or groups collaborating with the centre. Likewise, the centre has its own periphery, namely the underprivileged, or peripheral groups within the centre, or the ethnic group which is considered to be the dominant one in the centre.<sup>13</sup>

Another factor which may fuel ethno-nationalist movements is *penetration* by the centre into the periphery. Penetration may be economic, political, cultural or physical, i.e. a military presence in and control of the periphery, and is often seen as an attempt by the centre to control and assimilate the peripheral ethnic group.<sup>14</sup> The centre thus expresses its ability to impose its will on the ethnic group in the periphery. In many cases, a programme of modernisation launched by the centre is viewed as a means of penetration and as a direct threat to traditional modes of social and political organisation in the periphery. In a discussion on the significance of penetration to ethno-nationalist separatist movements, Joane Nagel concludes that certain groups or individuals in the periphery are in fact uninterested in participating in ethnic peripheral actions against the centre.<sup>15</sup> The likelihood of a group becoming active in any peripheral

action/reaction would probably depend on the degree to which the political, economic and cultural life of an ethnic group has been threatened by the penetration.

The weakness of the central authorities may at times create an opportunity for a suppressed periphery to rise in separatist revolt.<sup>16</sup> Ethno-nationalist movements may in times of a power vacuum take action against the centre. In order to understand the development of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement in Iran, it is indeed important to appreciate the power vacuum in Iran that followed the Anglo-Soviet invasion of the country in August 1941, as well as the subsequent demise of the power of both the civil and military authorities.

In addition to ethnic differences and penetration by the centre into the periphery, the activation of a movement requires political mobilisation embodied in the form of ethno-nationalist organisations.<sup>17</sup> The establishment of such a body was in fact central to the achievements of the Kurdish movement in the period under study, as will be discussed later.



The discipline of international relations has long been plagued by a confusion regarding terminology. For instance, the term nationalism may at times deal with states and at other times with nations, nationalities and ethnic groups.<sup>18</sup> The international dimension of ethno-nationalist movements has been largely neglected in research.<sup>19</sup> Such a theme could be studied by placing a given ethno-national group within the framework of the interaction between domestic and foreign policies. By organising itself and by rising against the central power of the state, an ethnic group may affect political development in the country as well as influence its foreign relations, i.e. by gaining the support of or triggering the direct involvement of external actors, particularly states. Both the weakness of the central government and the international dimension of the Kurdish nationalist movement are important conditions for understanding the history of the movement during the period under study. This is, however, quite distinct from the history of the *official* diplomatic relations between the governments, to be discussed below.

International relations has generally been described as the process of state interaction at the governmental level. However, one premise in this study is that international relations are not limited to the study of official interstate diplomacy. Non-state relationships and actors must be taken into account in the study of international affairs. Domestic political issues and cross-cultural and social relationships, for instance, are important elements

in this context.<sup>20</sup> Non-state actors are entities other than states that interact on the international political arena.<sup>21</sup>

However, it is true that the primary actors in international relations are sovereign states.<sup>22</sup> Governments draft the main lines of domestic and foreign policy, formulate and enforce laws, declare war, make peace, outline the terms and scope of the country's international communications and diplomatic relations, and so on. Scholars referred to as traditionalists maintain that non-state actors are insignificant in the study of world politics, while others emphasise the importance of such elements.<sup>23</sup> The traditionalist view is expressed in the state-centric model which is based on several assumptions: states are equally sovereign, regardless of size and power; world politics are exclusively based on the interaction of states; the relationship between domestic and foreign policies is not relevant; there is no authority above that of the state; and the world is divided into states with governments exercising overall control.

The state-centric model ignores the existence and significance of regional and transnational organisations, despite the fact that most causes of international conflict since 1945 have involved non-state actors. One example of such actors are "stateless" groups, such as the Palestinians, the Basques or the Kurds. The model thus underestimates the role of other parties, such as transnational ethnic groups, of which the Kurds are one prominent example, as maintained by Philip Taylor.<sup>24</sup> The Kurds have long been a critical political factor in the region in which they are found by residing in a number of neighbouring countries; by being consistently involved in political upheavals against the central powers in those countries; through contacts of Kurds and especially Kurdish political movements with one another across official state boundaries; and by being involved in and affected by Great Power policies in the area.

Taylor has concluded that the following steps are important to creating a framework for analysis of non-state actors: to construct a typology of the units (size, geographical location, function, and importance) and to identify the purposes and functions of non-state actors. It is furthermore important to trace the reason for the existence of any given actors, as well as their objectives and the nature of their structures and processes. The manner in which the groups organise themselves, pursue their aims and reach certain decisions are all important to the understanding of the behaviour of any non-state actor.<sup>25</sup>

Taylor's definition and components for constructing a framework of analysis are largely functional, and may be applied as a theoretical framework for non-state actor behaviour. However, Taylor's effort suffers from certain weaknesses. In both the definition and the outlined compo-

nents of the framework, prominent *individuals* and *informal* groups have been excluded, although these may in fact be significant non-state actors. In our analysis of the Kurds during the period of 1941–1947, it is impossible to exclude Kurdish leaders, both the modern and traditional types, and informal groups such as tribes and tribal federations.

In our study, Kurdish political organisations, tribal chiefs and prominent leaders operate in the name of the Kurds. Yet it will be demonstrated that although the Kurdish population was an important element as a non-state actor, the state remained the dominant and decisive actor. Deprived of both statehood, adequate diplomatic channels and international platforms, the possibility for the Kurdish population to become an actor equal to a state was severely limited.

Thus, the notion of Great Power “Kurdish policy” does not fit into the realm of official diplomacy, and instead designates the policy of certain states towards an ethno-national group and its nationalist movement. As has previously been mentioned, the Kurds do not possess a state of their own and have therefore been deprived of official political relations with states. In addition, attempts made by any state to support the Kurds by whatever means or to bolster their claim to national rights, have often been regarded as interference in the *internal affairs* of those countries where the Kurds exist. This was precisely the case during the period under study. When supporting the Kurds and other groups in Iran, the Soviet Union was repeatedly accused by the Iranian government of *interference* into Iranian internal affairs.



The connection between nationalism and tribalism is significant to the question of loyalty, since loyalty might be either of a tribal or of a nationalistic nature. A certain loyalty exists within the tribe and remains confined to the borders of the tribe as a local community. This community may be defined either territorially or exclusively on the basis of kinship/descent<sup>26</sup>, with the latter being the principal factor in terms of solidarity within the tribe. The loyalty of the tribesman is to his tribe rather than to a certain nationality. These two types of loyalties, as Martin van Bruinessen has argued, exist in an ambivalent relation to one another.<sup>27</sup> However, the pioneer Kurdish nationalists emerged precisely among the tribal chieftains,<sup>28</sup> and particularly among the Shaikhs.<sup>29</sup> In certain cases, the interests of the tribal chiefs and the Shaikhs collided with those of the nationalist movement.<sup>30</sup> In the 1940s, the tribal way of life was still prevalent in Kurdish society. Therefore, in a study of the Kurdish

nationalist movement, of its relation to the Iranian central government in particular and to Great Power politics, the role played by the tribes must be appreciated. Tribal leaders were the key element in contacts between the Kurds and the Great Powers in Iran.

The theme of state-building is likewise important in this context. In the countries among which Kurdistan is partitioned, official authorities have attempted to erect strong central governments and integrated states, and have sought to foster a sense of belonging to the state rather than to a local community.<sup>31</sup> Such efforts have been countered mainly by two forces from the Kurdish side, which may be characterised as *the nationalistic* and *the tribal* respectively. The two have often had differing intentions in antagonising the central government and its attempts to build a strong centralised state. While the aims and strategies of the former have been formulated in terms of national rights or national self-determination, the tribal forces have been driven by the desire to live in a traditional manner free of state control. The most favourable situation for both categories has been that of a central government too weak to control all parts of the country. Nevertheless, both nationalistic and tribal forces have opposed the attempts of the central government to promote loyalty to the central power and its bureaucratic apparatus, as well as its effort at creating a state-nation. A *symbiosis* emerged between the élites of these two social forces, and this fusion has symbolised both the *development* of Kurdish nationalism on the one hand, and its *weakness* on the other. In other words, the two forces have periodically co-operated in order to strengthen the movement, yet have been at odds concerning main goals, thus creating a divergence within the movement itself.

In their attempts to gain power, the tribal chieftains are not only dependent on the actual potential of the tribe itself, but must also attempt to strengthen their position via alliances with other tribes and by espousing nationalistic ideas. This form of tribal conduct reflects traditional tribal efforts to *merge* with ideological and national feelings in order to promote their own causes.<sup>32</sup> The strength of the tribal chieftains may also be promoted by co-operation with “external”<sup>33</sup> powers, namely the central power of the state or of foreign powers, such as the Great Powers.

The tribal chieftains have thus consistently sought new contexts and new ideas in order to expand the opportunity to solidify their power. A tribe might find itself nationalistic, or conversely, in co-operation with the central government against the nationalist movement, thus in the first case strengthening the symbiosis and in the second case weakening the symbiosis and even in some cases leading to its collapse. To sum up this discussion, we can conclude as one scholar has that “the issue of tribalism

in the history of the Kurdish National Movement is absolutely central.”<sup>34</sup> In fact, there is an ambivalent relationship between Kurdish nationalism and the tribal and religious loyalties. On one hand, Shaikhs and Aghas were the pioneer nationalist leaders. It was because of the primordial loyalties to these authorities and to the values they embodied that the Kurdish nationalist movement gained its mass character. On the other hand, conflicts among these traditional leaders have served to prevent the Kurds from acting in unison.<sup>35</sup>

### *Concepts and Definitions*

The word ethnic has its origin in the Greek term “ethnikos” or “ethnos”, which basically means “people.” In the academic context, the terms ethnic group and ethnicity are relatively new conceptions.<sup>36</sup> Within Anglo-American anthropological, sociological and socio-psychological research, the term ethnic group has been employed to classify social groups with common characteristics such as language, culture and descent.<sup>37</sup> Ethnicity involves both the collective and the individual levels, and the term refers to a distinctive togetherness among individuals which invokes these individuals to consider themselves as a group differentiated from other groups.<sup>38</sup> The main element in this cohesion is that of joint culture, which entails a framework of beliefs and values.<sup>39</sup> Ethnicity serves to create a connection between individuals and to make of them a group. Ethnic affiliation grants individuals a fundamental sense of where they belong. The basis for this affiliation is a sense of shared modes, traditions and values which together determine the limits of “commonness”, which in its turn identifies the boundaries for group interaction. Although ethnic groups are maintained by sentiments, familiarity and rituals rather than by calculated measures, they are by no means irrational phenomena.<sup>40</sup>

It is important for our purposes to deal with the term “tribe”, which is often riddled with confusion and misunderstanding. Certain scholars have employed the term in order to depict relations within a group based on kinship, families, clans and lineage. The members of these groups have common traditions and myths of descent. Others apply the term to “people”, a group with a common culture and often a common language.<sup>41</sup> Despite these divergences, the term “tribe” may be used to designate small groups characterised by kinship relations and composed of clans who assert a common descent. The Kurdish tribe is a socio-political and often also a territorial unit. It is based on descent and kinship, with the following internal structure. The tribe is divided into a number of sub-tribes, which in

turn are divided into smaller units: clan, lineage, etc. Clan is that segment within the tribe which has its own name. Lineages are at a lower level and smaller than the clans and generally have stronger claims of common descent. In some cases, tribesmen share common economic interests, usually based on jointly held pasture land. This common interest, in addition to common locality, forms a solid base for group solidarity.<sup>42</sup>

The term nation must also be dealt with here. According to one definition, the term nation designates a group of individuals who see themselves as one community bound by ties of history, culture, and common ancestry.<sup>43</sup> Hugh Seton-Watson has stated that a feeling of *solidarity*, a common culture and a national consciousness must exist among the members of a nation. A nation exists if a significant number of individuals in a community consider themselves to form a nation or behave as if they did.<sup>44</sup> An important distinction between a kinship-based social organisation on the one hand, and a nation or an ethnic group with a collective identity on the other, is that in the latter cases, there must be solidarity among a great number of people.<sup>45</sup>

Nations have both “objective” and “subjective” characteristics. The former may include common territory, language, religion, and descent, although all of these components are not to be found in all cases. A people’s consciousness of its nationality and manifested feelings for it are considered to be “subjective” characteristics.<sup>46</sup>

As is the case for nationalism, there is no generally accepted definition of the concept of nation.<sup>47</sup> However, a nation may be defined as a politically mobilised people.<sup>48</sup> It has also been maintained that a people should possess its own state in order to be considered a nation, since the people would otherwise be labelled a nationality. The English-language literature has brought about quite a confusion regarding the term “nation.”<sup>49</sup> Certain scholars have suggested that the difference between nationality and nation is that the former refers to a people which has unsuccessfully sought to gain control over a territory, while nation applies to a people that has achieved its political goal in asserting control over a territory in the form of a state or some autonomous territory.<sup>50</sup> However, the definition of nation as based on statehood has failed to make room for the fact that there are peoples who are in fact considered nations, such as the Kurds. We may thus conclude that a nation may well exist without its own state and a state may likewise exist without a unified nation.<sup>51</sup> It is important to emphasise that the terms nation, nationality, and ethnic group are often used interchangeably.<sup>52</sup>

Two types of nation may thus be specified, namely the cultural and the political nation. The cultural nation is objective and is founded on criteria

such as common heritage and language, a specific area of settlement, and a particular religion, traditions and history. The political nation is subjective, since it involves individual and collective self-determination and derives from the individual's free will and commitment to the nation.<sup>53</sup> An important feature in this context is that of transformation, or the manner in which a cultural nation is transformed into a political nation by various political means. A nation is constituted by the consciousness of people and social groups of being a nation, or of the desire to be one, and by their demand for self-determination. As a rule, it is virtually impossible to determine when social groups or a people first perceive to be a nation.<sup>54</sup> Another fundamental element in such a process is the shift of loyalty of the individuals and communal groups, from primordial collectivities to other more "congenial" alternative collectivities, i.e. loyalty to the nation.<sup>55</sup>

There are three categories of nationalist élites, namely the political, cultural and economic, and the roles of these élites vary.<sup>56</sup> At one end of the spectrum, nationalists might comprise all individuals who express "national identity, ethnocentrism, and some kind of economic and social interest in the nation."<sup>57</sup> James Kellas prefers to use the term "nationalist" to "ethnocentrist" when focusing on the very idea of nation, and to use "nationalism" for actions relating to the nation.<sup>58</sup> A nationalist could also be an individual whose ultimate goal is the self-determination of the nation.<sup>59</sup> However, nationalists should not be viewed as homogeneous, since many differences may be noted among nationalist leaders, activists, sympathisers with nationalist ideas, etc. Nationalists vary in both social particularity and political consideration, although nationalists who demonstrate strong nationalist behaviour do in general constitute a certain proportion of any nation.<sup>60</sup> Intellectuals may be said to be the social force forming the backbone of nationalism. They are to a large extent the bearers of the movement, and are accordingly an indispensable pre-condition to the development of nationalism.<sup>61</sup>

As has been discussed, there is no generally accepted definition of nationalism in the academic context, although certain common features of nationalism are generally agreed upon, namely: consciousness of the uniqueness of a group of people, particularly with respect to their ethnic, linguistic or religious homogeneity; and shared historical memories and a sense of common mission.<sup>62</sup> Some fundamental elements in a nationalistic "thought system" may be outlined in order to achieve a generally acceptable definition of nationalism. First, there must exist a group, "the nation", that demonstrates a distinctive character; secondly, the nation's interests and values must be prioritised above other collective interests and values; and finally, there must be the greatest possible degree of

independence, in the form of political control over a territory, in order to materialise the interests and values of the nation.<sup>63</sup> Concerning the transition from ethnicity to nationalism, some theorists have viewed this phenomenon as a self-contained cultural process. According to James Kellas, these theorists are reductionists in the favour of culture, since they interpret the process as an articulation of the idea of “nation” and of the “ideology” of nationalism and the advancement of a “national culture,” via progression in the field of language, publications in national language, education and progression in literature.<sup>64</sup>

Nationalism may be viewed both as ideology and as a political movement.<sup>65</sup> In distinguishing various types of nationalism, two main categories may be pointed out: “ethno-nationalism” and “social nationalism.” The first type includes individuals who share common descent, and this definition is thus exclusive. Social nationalism includes individuals who do not necessarily share a common descent, and this type of nationalism is thus considered inclusive.<sup>66</sup> “Nationalist movement” is another term that demands clarification. According to Anthony Smith, a nationalist movement is the instrumental mean that helps “to turn a population into a nation.”<sup>67</sup> This definition is imperfect, since nationalist movements are in many cases the mean by which a nation or a national group seeks to attain its national and political goals. A more comprehensive definition of nationalist movement is thus that of Lewis Snider, who claims that “those minorities who aspire to political autonomy within a definable geographic area can be considered a nationalist movement.”<sup>68</sup>

### *Previous Research and Material*

Research concerning the Kurdish question has not been particularly extensive, although it is a currently growing field. There is to my knowledge no existing single study devoted to the Kurdish question during the period here under study. However, my attempt to examine the Kurds in international politics is not the first study to touch on the subject. A number of efforts have previously been made in this direction.

In his *The Soviet Union and the Kurdish Question: A Study of National Minority Problems in Soviet Policy* (University of Virginia, 1965), Wilson N. Howell, Jr. has sought to examine Soviet policy towards the Kurds. Howell has examined two rather different dimensions of Soviet policy. On the one hand, the author deals with Soviet policy towards those Kurds who lived within the borders of the Soviet Union, and who have been managed by the Soviet authorities since the October Revolution. This must be

regarded as a matter of Soviet domestic policy. On the other hand, Howell also deals with the Soviet stance towards those Kurds who reside outside of the USSR, and this entails a question of Soviet foreign policy. Howell concludes that the Kurdish problem in the Middle East has been exploited by the Soviet Union in pursuit of this power's own objectives in the region. However, a study of Soviet Kurdish policy for the period 1941–1947 appears incomplete if the international dimension is neglected. It is thus important to trace the policies of the US and Great Britain towards the Kurds. This will be accomplished in the present study via a discussion of the background and origins of the Cold War.

Few studies have been conducted on the PRK. In a study entitled *The Kurdish Republic of 1946*, (1963), William Eagleton Jr. has dealt with the Kurds in Iran during the first half of the 1940s, focusing on the PRK in particular. Eagleton has consulted neither British nor American diplomatic records. Consequently, the study is based primarily upon what the author was able to learn orally from the Kurds from Mahabad and the area around it. Eagleton's study is, as he himself admits, based on "imperfect memories."<sup>69</sup>

An article entitled "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad" was published by Archie Roosevelt Jr. in the *Middle East Journal* in July 1947.<sup>70</sup> Roosevelt was one of the few foreigners to visit the PRK, and the study is a general survey based upon the author's own observations. Roosevelt has discussed several aspects of the PRK, and concludes that the Kurdish nationalist dream of an independent Kurdistan was realised on a minor scale via the PRK. He adds that the strangely discordant themes of tribal warfare, rival imperialisms and social systems, medieval chivalry and idealistic nationalism, well illustrate the complexity of the Kurdish scenario.<sup>71</sup>

Few studies on the PRK have appeared in Kurdish. Mahmud Mulla Izzat has published a work entitled *Kom%r-% M%ll-% Mah%b%d [The People's Republic of Mahabad]*, (1986). Another study has been produced by Karim Hussami under the title *Kom%r-% Demokr%t-% Kurdistan y% Khud-mukht%r%? [Democratic Republic of Kurdistan or Autonomy?]*, (1986). Although both of these last-mentioned studies hold a certain degree of relevance, neither author has systematically taken into account the international environment in which the PRK appeared. Moreover, neither Mulla Izzat nor Hussami have consulted either the British or American diplomatic records. In addition, these authors have ignored the connection which must be drawn between the origins of the Cold War in the Middle East and the appearance and collapse of the short-lived Kurdish Republic.

An unpublished Master's thesis from the University of Oxford has been produced by Farideh Koochi-Kamali Dehkordi, and is entitled *The Republic of Kurdistan: Its Rise and Fall*, (1986.) Dehkordi's dissertation deals exclusively with the history of the Kurds in Iran in 1946, and centres on the birth and demise of the PRK. Dehkordi's main conclusion is that the PRK was a premature phenomenon.<sup>72</sup> The key factors which made the establishment of the PRK possible were the presence of foreign forces in Iran, the weakness of the central government, the establishment of the Azerbaijan Republic and Soviet assurances of support to the Kurds. She maintains that the emergence of the PRK was not the logical consequence of actual economic, social, political and cultural conditions in Kurdistan.<sup>73</sup> The role of the western powers and of the Soviet Union had varying degrees of relevance to the downfall of the republic. Dehkordi's study is valuable, yet fails to place developments concerning the Kurdish question in Iran in their wider historical context. One shortcoming of the study is the sparse use of primary sources. The main material limitedly used by Dehkordi is the British Foreign Office's Public Record Office (PRO).

A number of works and memoirs were produced by Iranians following the collapse of the PRK. The most important of these are Najafgholi Pisyani's two books, *Marg Bud B%zgasht Ham Bud [There Was Both Death and Retreat]*, (1948) and his *Az Mah%b%d-e Khun%shn t% Ker%neh%-e Aras [From Blood-stained Mahabad to the Shores of Aras]*, (1949). The accuracy of these accounts must be questioned, since the author was a correspondent to an official organ of the Iranian government (*Itila'at*) and since both books were published during the reign of the Shah. Abu al-Hassan Tafrishian, who was an officer in the army of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and who was involved in the dramatic events connected with the collapse of the PRK, has also written a book entitled *Q%sh%-e Afsar%on-e Khor%os%on [The Upheaval of Khorasan Officers]*, (1976.) The book does give some interesting information concerning the final days of the PRK.

A number of studies have been conducted on the Iranian crisis of 1945–1946 and Great Power policy vis-à-vis Iran. These works deal primarily with the period after the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran and the years immediately after the close of the Second World War. Focusing on the evolution of relations between the US and Iran, Keyvan Tabari has devoted his Doctoral thesis, *Iran's Policies Towards the United States During the Anglo-Russian Occupation, 1941–1946* (Columbia University, 1967) to tracing the origins of Iranian-American relations. Tabari concludes that the nature of Iranian-American relations took shape during the period of 1941–1946. The author also underlines the role of the UN in maintaining the

integrity and independence of Iran against a Soviet threat in 1945–1946.<sup>74</sup> Although Tabari points out that one important point of departure for his study is Iran's domestic politics, the author has devoted very limited space to the Kurdish problem in Iran during the period under study. The Kurds in Iran were a crucial part of Iranian domestic policy, and they were linked to the policies undertaken by the central Iranian government towards the Great Powers of the time.

In his Doctoral thesis, *The Soviet Union and the Movement to Establish Autonomy in Iranian Azerbaijan* (Indiana University, 1958) Manoucher Vahdat traces Soviet policy in Iran after the Anglo-Soviet occupation, with an emphasis on the Soviet aims of establishing an autonomous government in Iranian Azerbaijan. In his thesis, *Soviet Strategy in Iran 1941–1957* (American University, 1958), Paul Elwood Weaver devotes three out of seven chapters to the period 1941–1947, in which the main portion has been given to the Iranian Azerbaijan connection. Nevertheless, the Kurds in Iran are found only in the periphery of developments.

Another Doctoral thesis has been produced by Louise L'Estrange Fawcett. In *The Struggle for Persia: the Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946* (University of Oxford, 1988) Fawcett argues that the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946 was the major occurrence in modern Iranian history, one which had tremendous repercussions on Iran both in its internal political development and in the country's international relations. The Azerbaijan crisis of 1946 also held great significance for the development of international relations in the post-war epoch. As in the above-mentioned studies by Weaver, Vahdat and Tabari, Fawcett treats the Kurdish problem as a more or less peripheral component of the Azerbaijan (Iranian) crisis of 1946.<sup>75</sup>

The primary material used in our study falls into two categories:

1. diplomatic records i.e. Department of State's Decimal File (DSDF) in the National Archives (NA) of the United States, Washington DC, and American diplomatic material published in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS); and
2. the British Foreign Office (FO), Public Records Office (PRO), London. This primary material is indispensable to this study. It has, however, its own limitations.

In working with the above mentioned material, one must be cautious. There is no doubt that this material mainly reflects the views of the officials engaged at different levels in events and in policy making. Official Iranian records for the period under study are not accessible.

In the study of Soviet policy in Iran and its position towards the Kurds, an important fact must be taken into consideration. Primary Soviet sources are as of yet inaccessible, and this is a definite obstacle when studying Soviet policy. However, in reconstructing and critically using the American and the British archival material, Kurdish material, as well as secondary material, the study of Soviet policy has been made possible. It is unlikely that the conclusions drawn in this study, concerning Soviet policy, would profoundly be affected by investigating Soviet primary material in the future.

Given the absence of Kurdish statehood, there have been no Kurdish archives or diplomatic records. The lack of such records entails an obstacle in investigating the Kurds in the context of international relations. Indeed, in the states in which the Kurds reside, the authorities have strived to render Kurdish history invisible. In addition, the archives of those states remain inaccessible, particularly in cases pertaining to the Kurdish question.

Two Kurdish journals/newspapers published between in 1943 and 1946 are of special interest for our investigation: *Nishtiman*, the party organ of the Kurdish organisation *Komala*, published during the period April 1943–July 1944; and *Kurdistan*, the party organ of Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), published first as a journal on December 6, 1945 and later as a newspaper on January 11, 1946. In practice, *Kurdistan* also functioned as the official organ of the PRK since the Kurdish government had no official newspaper. A collection of documents and letters of the year 1946 has been published by Mahmud Mulla Izzat. The collection entitled *Dawlat-ê Jamhur-ê Kurdistan: Nîma-û Dîkumant*, [*The Government of the Kurdistan Republic: Correspondence and Documents*], 1992, has been of general use to this study.

## Chapter Two

# THE KURDS: A GENERAL BACKGROUND

### *The Kurds and Kurdistan*

The Kurds have existed in what is on ethnic grounds defined as Kurdistan for several thousands of years. The ancestry of the Kurds is often traced back to the Medes, a tribal group which moved into the Iranian plateau from Central Asia at the end of the second millennium. The Medes became a great power in 612 and expanded their empire over a larger area before collapsing in 550 BC.<sup>1</sup>

The existence of a people referred to as “Kardaka”, “Kurtie” or “Guti” has been indicated by Sumerian inscriptions dated 2000 BC, as well as by early Assyrian inscriptions from the 11th century BC.<sup>2</sup> In his book *Anabasis* of 401 BC, the Greek historian Xenophon mentions the Kardokhi people or Kardokai, who harassed the famous “Ten Thousand Greeks” as they marched from Mesopotamia to the Black Sea.<sup>3</sup> Many scholars believe that the Kurds are a blend of different ancient groups including all or some of the following: Kassites, Manneans, Guti, Medes and Kardokhoi (Kardokhi).<sup>4</sup> The word *Kurd* in its modern form first appears in Arabic sources in the 9th century AD, in the plural form *Akr%od*.<sup>5</sup> The Kurds appear to be descendants of diverse ancient groups, including Caucasian peoples in the north and peoples that had originally inhabited the mountainous territories west of the Caspian Sea from earliest times. The central part of these territories lies on both sides of the Zagros mountain range and stretches south and west through lower Anatolia into the mountainous area of northern Iraq and Syria.<sup>6</sup>



The Kurdish language belongs to the Indo-European family and is part of the Iranian group of languages. The Kurdish language is nevertheless in its roots and forms a separate language.<sup>7</sup> The Kurdish dialects fall into two main groups: the northern, called Kurmanji, and the southern, called Sorani.<sup>8</sup> However, there is a multitude of different dialects that may, according to Martin van Bruinessen, be classified into the following sub-groups:

1. the northern/north-western dialects, or Kurmanji;
2. the southern dialects which are called southern Kurmanji or Sorani; and
3. the south-eastern dialects of Sinei, Kermanshahi, and Leki.<sup>9</sup>

The Sorani dialect has developed the written Kurdish language using modified Arabic script, and most Kurdish literature is written in Sorani. Arabic letters are used by the Kurds in Iraq and Iran; Roman letters in Turkey; and Cyrillic in the former Soviet Union.<sup>10</sup>

The language issue has been an important concern to the majority of Kurdish nationalists, who have stressed the significance of creating a common, standardised language. Kurds recognise that Kurdish has had a powerful role in their struggle for national rights and recognition as a nation. The Kurdish language is both proof and symbol of the distinct Kurdish identity.<sup>11</sup> The governments of the countries which partitioned Kurdistan have also been aware of the significance of Kurdish for the Kurdish identity. They have therefore either forbidden or discouraged the use of Kurdish, with the exception of Iraq, whose governments have traditionally been more or less tolerant of the use of Kurdish in schools and public life. The variety of dialects within the Kurdish tongue and the policies aimed at assimilation of the Kurds have combined to hinder the development of a standard *lingua franca*.<sup>12</sup> The use of various alphabets in different parts of the Kurdish-speaking areas has had a negative impact on the identification process.<sup>13</sup> The division of the Kurdish language into many dialects has been affected by the imperfect communications in Kurdistan, which is a land of high mountains. Moreover, the Kurds have never enjoyed political unity which might have made a common literature possible.<sup>14</sup> The division of Kurdistan among a number of countries, the influences from the dominant languages of neighbouring peoples, and the limited opportunities for the Kurds to further their language, are other factors which have inhibited the development of a standard *lingua franca*. Several attempts to develop a single standard form of Kurdish have been made, although at no avail.<sup>15</sup>



It is difficult to give an exact estimate of the Kurds. Different researchers have given different figures. Mehrdad Izady summarises his general estimation of the Kurdish population for the year 1990 in the following table:<sup>16</sup>

**Table 1.** The Kurdish Population in 1990

State	Total population (in millions)	Total Kurds (in millions)	% Kurdish
Turkey	56.7	13.7	24.1
Iran	55.6	6.6	12.4
Iraq	18.8	4.4	23.5
Syria	12.6	1.3	9.2
CIS		0.3	
Total		26.3	

Source: Izady, 1992, p. 119.

However, one must also take into consideration the relatively large number of Kurds living in Lebanon and in exile in other countries, mainly in the west.<sup>17</sup> It is furthermore difficult to ascertain the exact number of Kurds due to infrequent and inadequate censuses as well as intentional underestimates made by central governments. The problem is even more complicated in Turkey where the use of the Kurdish language has been banned since 1924.<sup>18</sup> In Turkey, the Kurds were up to the beginning of the 1990s officially described as “mountain Turks.”

Certain Kurdish nationalists have tended to overestimate the number of Kurds in an attempt to underline the political importance of the Kurds, while régimes in the countries where Kurds reside have tended to underestimate the Kurdish population.<sup>19</sup> The number of Kurds living in Iran in the beginning of 1940s was c. 1,700,000, in Iraq c. 900,000, and in Turkey c. 3,400,000 and in Syria 260,000.<sup>20</sup>



The main religion among Kurds is Islam and the majority are Sunni Muslims.<sup>21</sup> Most Kurds in Kermanshah and in the region of Khanaqin, however, are Shi‘ite, and there are ‘Alawit Kurds in Turkey. The main non-Islamic communities among the Kurds are Yezidis.<sup>22</sup> The Kurds adopted Islam during 7th–9th centuries, prior to which the major portion of them had adhered to Zoroastrianism, a religion that reveres fire as the symbol of purity.<sup>23</sup>

From a cultural point of view, Islam has in a sense been an unfavourable factor in the development of a Kurdish national identity, since the central governments in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria recognise Islam as the official state religion. Thus, it has been more difficult for the Kurds to highlight the distinct Kurdish identity. One scholar has noted that after the establishment of the Islamic republic in Iran, Islamic unity was to serve as

a channel for acculturation. For the Ayatollah Khomeini, ethno-nationalism and conflicts rooted in ethnic distinctions were secondary issues which would dissipate after the greater goal of Muslim unity was achieved.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, given the fact that the absolute majority of Kurds are Muslims, the religion acts not as a dividing factor but rather as a uniting one.<sup>25</sup>



It is difficult to specify the nature of the social and political organisation of the Kurds.<sup>26</sup> Certain observers have characterised the mode of organisation as tribal.<sup>27</sup> However, this depiction provides an over-simplified view of the Kurds. Although the tribal structure has in fact been prevalent in the rural sections, particularly in remote and isolated areas<sup>28</sup>, there also exists a considerable Kurdish urban population. Over 35 per cent of the Kurds reside in cities and towns, although the number was only c.13 per cent in the 1940s.<sup>29</sup>

In contrast to the impression of many observers, only a minor fraction of the Kurds are nomads.<sup>30</sup> A process of detribalisation has long been developing in Kurdistan, and this phenomenon is rooted in a variety of social, economic and political factors. The tribal organisation among the Kurds has gradually been broken down as the semi-nomadic and pastoral way of life became less prevalent.<sup>31</sup>

Urbanisation among the Kurds has been significant to the development of Kurdish identification and nationalist consciousness. The process has also led to the development of new reformist or radical social doctrines, while the traditional tribe-dominated system has been characterised as archaic and backward.

Scholars still maintain that much of Kurdish life, even of later years, has been organised around the tribe. Nariman Yalda has claimed that the Kurdish peasants had neither the economic development nor the enhanced modes of communication needed to change traditional patterns of work or social allegiance.<sup>32</sup> The slow pace of economic development in Kurdistan has often been attributed to the fact that the central governments in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria have deliberately invested little capital in the Kurdish areas.<sup>33</sup> Relating this discussion to the issue of loyalty of Kurdish individuals to Kurdish nationalist élites, Mehrdad Izady has stressed that family-clan leaders still enjoy the strongest loyalty.<sup>34</sup>

Kurdistan is divided among four of the Middle Eastern states, namely, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, and the two former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia.<sup>35</sup> Kurdistan has been described as an arc stretching from Mount Ararat in the north-east leading southward to the southern part of Zagros and Pishtkuh in Iran; the line can then be drawn westward to Mosul in Iraq, continuing to the Turkish port of Iskandarun; from this point, the land extends in the north-eastern direction to Erzerum in Turkey, and from Erzerum eastward to Mount Ararat.<sup>36</sup> Kurdish territories also extend into Armenia and Azerbaijan.<sup>37</sup> Given this geographical sketch, it is clear that Kurdistan has no legal or internationally recognised boundaries of its own.

Developments throughout the centuries have generated an increase in social and cultural diversity through different parts of Kurdistan, and this has been significant to the fragmentation within the Kurdish population. For instance, since Kurds reside on the border zones of the mentioned states, they have often been absorbed into the political and military conflicts of these states and have been subjected to assimilation and forced integration. However, in the words of Mehrdad Izady, the Kurds “remain a vital nation steadfastly resisting assimilation and elimination.”<sup>38</sup>

The main portion of Kurdish territories lies within Turkey and comprises 17 provinces, all in the eastern or south-eastern parts of the country. In Syria, most Kurds live in the northern and north-eastern sections of the country and are concentrated mainly in the town of Qamishli, which serves as the focal point of Kurdish activities in Syria. Other Kurds reside in the Aleppo province and in the *Jabal al-Akr%da* (“the mountain of the Kurds”), with the town of Afrin as an important Kurdish centre.<sup>39</sup> In the former USSR, the Kurds are mainly found in Armenia and Azerbaijan. In Iraq, the Kurds reside primarily in the four Kurdish provinces of Sulaimaniya, Arbil, Kirkuk, and Dohuk. In the cities of Khanaqin, Mandali and Sinjar, the Kurds constitute the majority of the population. There are also considerable concentrations of Kurds in a few other Iraqi cities. In Iran, the Kurds are scattered throughout four provinces, namely west Azerbaijan, Sanandaj (officially called Kurdistan), Kermanshah, and ‘Ilam.<sup>40</sup>

From the geopolitical point of view, Kurdistan has lain on the frontier of empires such as the Byzantine, the Ottoman, and the Persian Empires. The British and the French conquests during the First World War severed Syria and Iraq from the Ottoman Empire, and the resulting interstate boundaries left a Kurdistan sectioned into five parts. Kurdistan’s proxim-



ity to the former USSR, combined with the fact that the Kurdish territories constitute a large and strategically vital area in four countries of the Middle East, has made Kurdistan an object of concern for several Great Powers in our time.

The existence of crude oil in Kurdistan has also attracted the interests of international petroleum companies. Major oil deposits have been exploited in Kirkuk and Khanaqin in Iraqi Kurdistan, in Kermanshah in Iranian Kurdistan, and in Siirt in Turkey's Kurdistan.<sup>41</sup>

### *Kurds within the Ottoman Empire*

It is generally agreed that modern Kurdish history began with the appearance of the Ottoman Empire. As of the dawn of this empire, Kurds were aware of their own political importance in the continuous warfare between the Safavi (Persian) Empire and the Ottomans.<sup>42</sup> The Safavi Dynasty emerged at the turn of the 16th century and rivalled the Ottoman Empire for influence in and dominance of the Kurdish areas. The Kurdish population was thus a central element in this conflict. In geopolitical terms, Kurdistan became a battlefield, yet at times also functioned as a buffer zone between the two powers. This reality made the Kurds aware of their important role in historical events. The Kurds had already erected "semi-independent" principalities<sup>43</sup> which were later recognised by the Ottoman Sultans in accordance with a *cordon sanitaire* established by the Kurdish Prince of Bitlis.<sup>44</sup> Many of these principalities flourished and survived into the 19th century. In securing the semi-independent status of the Kurdish principalities, the Ottomans most likely sought to strengthen these principalities as buffer zones between the Ottoman and the Safavi Empires. Moreover, the principalities could assume certain burdens, primarily the collection of taxes and the defence of their own territories.

The current boundary alignment (Turkey-Iran and Iraq-Iran) was delimited by a settlement between the empires in 1639. Kurdistan was thus for the first time divided into two parts.

During the first half of the 19th century, Ottoman Sultans strove to centralise policy-making to an ever higher degree. This measure was met with severe opposition from the Kurdish principalities.<sup>45</sup> The Kurdish prince of Soran, known as Muhammed Pasha of Rawanduz, attempted to unify a great part of Kurdistan in the 1830s yet was defeated by the army of the Ottoman Sultan.<sup>46</sup> The remaining principalities were likewise vanquished.

## *Kurdish Nationalism*

The development of ethno-nationalism is largely correlated to the existence of a common language, race, religion and historical experiences.<sup>47</sup> The Kurds constitute a mainly homogeneous ethnic group with its own language, ethnic affiliation, common feeling and values and shared historical experiences. The Kurds can be said to form one nation which has existed in its current habitat for some three thousand years, outliving the imperial entities of the Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, Mongols, and Turks.<sup>48</sup>

Scholars disagree sharply over the time and circumstances around which Kurdish nationalism appeared. Many have asserted that it first emerged in the 1840s.<sup>49</sup> Bedir Khan led an uprising against the Ottomans in 1843–1847. It has subsequently been claimed that this revolt was nationalist in a modern sense,<sup>50</sup> that it signalled the birth of a political movement whose aim was to establish a Kurdish national state encompassing the whole of Kurdistan.<sup>51</sup>

It is true that the Kurdish uprisings in the 19th century, particularly that led by Bedir Khan in 1843–1847 and by Shaikh ‘Ubaidullah Nahrî in 1880–1881, included components which paved the way for Kurdish nationalism. However, the scope of these revolts were largely confined to local affairs and involved only limited demands for administrative reforms, such as the exemption of Kurds from taxes and conscription, vague cultural demands, and the allowance of local self-rule by Kurdish officials. In addition these uprisings were led by religious and/or tribal leaders who deliberately exploited nationalist sentiments among Kurds in order to pursue their own self-interests, or to secure what they considered to be the interests of their tribes.<sup>52</sup> C. J. Edmonds asserts that nationalism has often been used to cloak the ambitions of certain leaders or the intolerance of tribesmen of any type of order and administration.<sup>53</sup> The Kurdish uprisings during the 19th century comprised elements from different social strata pursuing diverse and often contradictory interests. This may be due to the fact that ethnic conflict has a higher capacity to mobilise different people in the presence of at least one common denominator.<sup>54</sup>

According to another school of thought, Kurdish nationalism began to take shape in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.<sup>55</sup> Towards the close of the 19th century, the first Kurdish newspaper, which was entitled *Kurdistan*<sup>56</sup>, appeared. The newspaper was first published in Cairo and attacked the Ottoman Empire’s policy towards the Kurds. The paper also had a special interest in Kurdish literature and did much to consolidate the idea of Kurdish independence.<sup>57</sup> However, the Kurds established a

newspaper of their own quite late compared with other ethno-national groups living in the Ottoman Empire. The positive repercussions of the Turkish Constitutional Revolution (the Young Turks Revolution) led by the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress in 1908 must be noted. The impact of the revolution upon the national minorities within the Ottoman Empire was evident:<sup>58</sup> the Young Turks had proclaimed that interracial equality for all national minorities was to be guaranteed. Following their rise to power, a political movement emerged among the minorities aiming at their own national organisation, and the Kurds established their own organisations in this new political atmosphere.<sup>59</sup> Kurdish literary societies were founded and periodicals, anthologies, etc. were published.

This political atmosphere, which had notable effects on the development of modern Kurdish nationalism, did not last very long. In contrast to their promises, the Young Turks began pursuing a policy of Pan-Turkism.<sup>60</sup> The significance of these developments was that the Kurdish intellectuals and urban elements were for the first time able to influence the leadership of the Kurdish nationalist movement. The small nucleus of literate Kurds, who were affected by nationalism as a result of western influences in the urban areas of the Middle East, appeared to make their breakthrough.

During the First World War, US President Woodrow Wilson presented his Fourteen Points according to which nations could have the right to freely determine their own destiny.<sup>61</sup> The British Prime Minister Lloyd George proposed that the peace conference after the war should deal with the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of the colonies, and that the right to self-determination was applicable to these groups.<sup>62</sup> Wilson's Fourteen Points were welcomed by the national minorities of the Ottoman Empire, including the Kurds, and points 5 and 12 were particularly significant to them. Point 5 spoke of an equitable and sincere settlement for all conflicts regarding colonies, and according to Point 12, minorities within the Ottoman Empire should be assured the opportunity for autonomous development.<sup>63</sup> The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire momentarily created a power vacuum which fostered the aspirations of national minorities. The disintegration was followed by a peace settlement which included attempts to find solutions to the minority problems within the dismembered Empire.<sup>64</sup> However, the impact of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was uneven among the Arabs, the Armenians and the Kurds.<sup>65</sup> The dismantling of the Ottoman Empire was also an important factor in the evolution of ethno-national identities of ethnic minorities of the ex-Ottoman Empire, since there were now new national identities.<sup>66</sup> People were no longer *Ottomans* but *Turks, Arabs, Armenians, Kurds*, etc.

The aftermath of the First World War witnessed the development of many minority nationalist movements in the former Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. In the Middle East, minorities were negatively affected by the creation of a number of new states which entailed that boundaries were drawn across the territories of the disintegrated empires. Religious and ethnic minorities and tribes were partitioned and dispersed throughout various political entities. This development was one factor behind the rise of nationalist movements.<sup>67</sup> In this context, as Nader Entessar has concluded, the politicisation of Kurdish ethnicity coincided with the rise of the modern state system in the Middle East.<sup>68</sup>

Scholars emphasise the role played by a Kurdish élite, the educated urban dwellers, in the development of Kurdish nationalism.<sup>69</sup> This élite, as Omar Sheikmous points out, grew rapidly as of the Second World War in Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria, as a result of socio-economic changes in these countries.<sup>70</sup> However influential the role of the educated and intellectuals, the traditional élites have also played a significant role in the development of Kurdish nationalism. The Kurdish élite responsible for the spreading of nationalist ideas and the mobilising of people in nationalist movements was not solely the intellectual and educated sector: a traditional élite played a crucial role in the development of Kurdish nationalism.<sup>71</sup>



During the First World War, certain Kurdish leaders contacted the Russians and requested Russian support in creating an independent Kurdish state on the condition that such a state would exist under Russian protection. The endeavours of Abdurrazaq Bedir Khan, a Kurdish leader from Turkey's Kurdistan, were significant. This leader had travelled to Russia in order to offer Kurdish collaboration with the Russian armies in their advance to Bitlis and Erzerum in 1916. In return, the Khan requested Russian assistance in obtaining Kurdish autonomy. It seems that an independent state of Kurdistan was in fact promised by the Russians.<sup>72</sup> The Russians may have wished to deliver on this point but were unable to take such a step, since they were aware that the Ottomans, Persians, and Germans would oppose the measure.<sup>73</sup> In July 1918, a Kurdish tribal chief of Mahabad (in Iranian Kurdistan) discussed the idea of an independent Kurdistan under British protection with some British officials.<sup>74</sup> The British had posted political officials through a great part of Kurdistan. One of these was C. J. Edmonds, who later wrote that the British policy at that time was to avoid any commitments to the creation of a Kurdish autonomous or independent entity.<sup>75</sup> Another British official, Commis-

sioner Colonel Arnold Wilson, visited Sulaimaniya on December 1, 1918 and met about 60 leading Kurdish chiefs who had differing views about the future of the Kurds. Some of them hesitated to place southern Kurdistan (later Iraqi Kurdistan) under British administration, while others claimed that Kurdistan must be separated from mandate Iraq and governed directly from London. Shaikh Mahmud Barzinji, the most authoritative Kurdish leader at the time in what eventually became Iraqi Kurdistan, emphasised that the Kurds were demanding their own independent state in accordance with promises made by the Allied Powers during the war.<sup>76</sup>

Indeed, the Anglo-French declaration of November 7, 1918 defined the eastern war aim of the British and French Governments as “the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.”<sup>77</sup> Accordingly, immediately following the First World War, there was considerable talk of freeing the Kurds through the erection of an independent state.<sup>78</sup> In April 1919, the British High Commissioner in Constantinople informed the British representatives in Baghdad of demands for Kurdish independence stemming from a Kurdish Committee in Constantinople.<sup>79</sup> On another occasion, on May 3, 1919, the Foreign Office was informed by the High Commissioner in Constantinople that the Kurds “want to be quit for ever of the Turks, who had never done anything for them.”<sup>80</sup> In his *Diary on Special Duty in Kurdistan*, Major E. M. Noel, a British Officer involved in Kurdish affairs at this time, has written that suggestions had been made by Colonel Arnold Wilson for the founding of an independent Kurdistan under British auspice, to include the areas of Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, and Mamurat al-Aziz (Elzag).<sup>81</sup>

The British were divided on their views of how to handle the Kurdish question. Some of the British officials supported the idea of Kurdish independence, while others were against it.<sup>82</sup> However, after the armistice with the Ottomans in October 1918, the main British consideration was to obtain as much as possible of the disintegrated Ottoman Empire, and also to secure a new balance of power to assure that the Ottomans would never retrieve their former position. In order to reach these ends, the British needed the friendship, or at least a non-hostile position of peoples who had existed under Ottoman rule. The British found themselves in a bit of a dilemma.<sup>83</sup> They were to maintain their vital interests while simultaneously fulfilling Allied promises of self-determination for all peoples living under the control of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, according to Major Noel, the British sought to gain Kurdish support with the object of countering the

Pan-Islamic propaganda of the Turks and their efforts to turn the Kurds against the British.<sup>84</sup>

Upon the end of the First World War and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds, as well as other ethno-national groups within the Empire, found themselves before a historical opportunity to achieve independence. The disintegration was followed by peace settlements which resulted in, among other things, the Treaty of Sèvres, August 1920. According to Articles 62, 63 and 64 of this treaty, autonomy was provided for the Kurds living within the Ottoman Empire. This autonomy was to be transformed into independence after one year in accordance with a referendum to be conducted among the Kurds.<sup>85</sup> The Allied Powers, particularly Great Britain, supported Kurdish demands in the Treaty of Sèvres. By backing the idea of Kurdish autonomy or independency, Great Britain sought to create a buffer zone between the USSR and Turkey, Turkey and Iranian Azerbaijan, and Turkey and Central Asia, in order to prevent the creation of a state based on pan-Turkish assumptions. Another objective was to insure that the proposed Kurdish state be placed under British influence. Great Britain aimed not only at the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire but also at the fragmentation of the core land, later known as Turkey.<sup>86</sup> Great Britain moreover wished to contain any possible expansion of Soviet influence into the Middle East following the October Revolution. The possibility of Russian expansion might have increased after the *Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East* of September 1920, led by Lenin, which was a further reason for sharpened British concerns over its interests in Asia and in the Middle East.<sup>87</sup> It is most likely that the British wished for the proposed Kurdish independent state to act as a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the area of British interest.

However, the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres concerning the establishment of a Kurdish autonomy or independency did not materialise. Already at the London Conference in 1921, the Allies began to lax on their promises to the Kurds. A number of factors lay behind the shift in the Allied position. First, the advance of the Turkish nationalist movement, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in absorbing the Kurdish area of Anatolia into what became known as the Republic of Turkey. The absorbed area was part of what had been considered for the proposed Kurdish autonomy or independency agreed on at Sèvres. Secondly, according to the Research Department of the Foreign Office, there was the resistance of Turks under Atatürk who prevented ratification of the treaty of Sèvres. They also refused to allow any mention of Kurds or Armenians in the treaty of Lausanne which replaced it in 1923.<sup>88</sup> Thirdly, one factor was that of the conflicting claims to the Mosul province (the former Ottoman Mosul

*Wil%yah*) which comprised almost all of Iraqi Kurdistan, by Turkey on the one hand, and the mandate Iraq and the British on the other. British petroleum interests in Iraq and especially in the Mosul province led Great Britain to support Iraqi claims. The British thus chose to protect their own interests and the Kurds were the subsequent losers.<sup>89</sup> Finally, the intimate relations between the Turkish Kemalist régime and Soviet Russia worried the British considerably. Great Britain thus abandoned the idea of supporting the establishment of a Kurdish state, wishing to secure its own good relations with the new Kemalist régime.<sup>90</sup> The British had been faced with the option of friendship with the Turks or of “leaving” the Turks to the new régime in Russia. The latter option might have proven catastrophic to Great Britain. The British had thus prioritised their own strategic and economic interests.<sup>91</sup> The Kurds were made to accept the new states since an independent Kurdish state was not beneficial to British or French interests. The strategic and economically important oil-bearing Kurdish territories were the main British concerns when they decided to include today’s Iraqi Kurdistan in mandate Iraq, while the rest of the former Ottoman Kurdistan was to be included in Turkey.<sup>92</sup>

The Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 14, 1923. Article 5 of this document dealt with the question of minorities within Turkey and stated that the rights of minorities should be confirmed by Turkey.<sup>93</sup> The nature of these rights was not, however, specified, and the Kurds were not even mentioned. For all practical purposes, the Treaty of Lausanne placed the seal of futility on the provisions of the Sèvres Treaty.



For the following three years, 1923–1926, the Kurdish question was linked to the territorial dispute between the Iraq mandate and Great Britain on the one hand, and Turkey on the other.

The question of frontiers between Turkey and the Iraq mandate had been discussed already in the Treaty of Lausanne. Turkey demanded the entire province of Mosul, as did both Iraq and Great Britain. The Council of the League of Nations opened its deliberations on Mosul on September 20, 1924, and a special commission was appointed to investigate the dispute. Although the Kurds constituted the majority of the population in the Mosul province, Great Britain and Turkey continued to make claims to Mosul with no consideration for the interests and wishes of the Kurdish population concerned.<sup>94</sup> The commission reported that there were no national Iraqi feelings in the disputed territory and that the Kurds were demonstrating a growing national consciousness that was distinctly

Kurdish.<sup>95</sup> The final recommendation of the commission was that the interests of the Kurds in the Mosul province should be taken into consideration. The commission favoured some type of autonomous arrangement for the Kurds.<sup>96</sup> However, the Mosul province was ultimately relinquished to the Iraq mandate and Kurdistan was thereupon partitioned between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Soviet Union.<sup>97</sup> The idea of Kurdish independence appeared quite unrealistic from that time on, since none of the above-mentioned states wished to see any independent Kurdish state in existence.<sup>98</sup>

To sum up, a Kurdish nationalist movement existed at this time and drew the attention of various powers for two reasons: first, due to the existence of the Mosul oil fields; and secondly, since the Kurds were distributed among different states and could be used by certain states to embarrass the governments of adjoining states. In this context, the Kurds were thus an international element of some importance.<sup>99</sup>

## Chapter Three

# THE KURDS IN IRAN UNTIL 1941

### *The Kurds in Iran Prior to the Anglo-Soviet Occupation*

The political situation in Iran deteriorated as an immediate result of the outbreak of the First World War. The conflict between the Russians and the British on the one hand, and the Germans and the Ottomans on the other, extended into Iran although this country had clearly declared its neutrality. The Russians withdrew from the war and from Iran's political arena as a direct result of the Revolution of 1917, but this did not lead to any improvement of the situation in Iran.<sup>1</sup> The First World War left the Iranian government with inadequate control over the country, and this was particularly true in the peripheral provinces. The Kurdish tribal chiefs gained power and established tribal federations that threatened the central government. The enhanced tribal position also generated an increase in lawlessness. Kurdish demands began to be heard as a result of weakened central governmental controls. Certain Kurdish leaders held genuine nationalist aspirations, although these were linked to the traditional phenomenon of tribal revolt against the central authorities.<sup>2</sup>

The early 1920s ushered in a new phase in modern Iranian history. The year 1920 witnessed a successful coup d'état led by Reza Khan, the Minister of War, and the crown of Iran was conferred upon him as *Reza Shah Pahlavi* in 1925. Hence, the Qajar Dynasty that had governed Iran from 1796 to 1925 came to an end.

Among the most severe problems confronting Reza Shah were the strengthening of the provinces in relation to the central government and Great Power interference into domestic Iranian affairs. Developments in the modern history of Iran indicate a connection between the two issues. The background to this, as has been mentioned, was that the central government in Tehran dissolved into chaos during and immediately following the First World War. Decentralisation was simultaneously proceeding in certain areas of Iran. As in other parts of the greater Kurdistan, the Kurds in Iran had been affected by the First World War, and particularly by promises made by the Allies, and many Kurdish leaders sought to exploit the situation.

A major uprising broke out in Iranian Kurdistan in 1922 following a number of events in 1918. The revolt was led by a man known as Simko,

formally Isma‘il Agha, chief of the Shik%k tribe living to the south-west of Rezaieh (Urmiya).<sup>3</sup> Simko not only crystallised his position in Iranian Kurdistan by controlling large parts of the area, but also allied himself with Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan.<sup>4</sup> Simko entered Iraqi Kurdistan in 1923 and made contacts with Shaikh Mahmud Barzinji, the most influential Kurdish leader at the time. It has been claimed that both Simko and Shaikh Mahmud strove to mobilise the Kurdish movement in both parts of Kurdistan and to integrate the Kurdish national demands.<sup>5</sup> The uprising led by Simko was not, however, well-organised and the patterns that were adopted were almost exclusively traditional, or “tribal.”

The uprising was not confined to the local arena, but also involved an international dimension. Simko established contacts with Turkey and Great Britain. British diplomatic records indicate that it was Simko’s hostility to Persia that led him to join the British. However, after being defeated by the Iranian forces in August 1922, Simko travelled to Ankara where he hoped for the support of the Turks.<sup>6</sup> Simko gained no sympathy from the British, most likely due to British fears that their established interests in Persia and their good relations with the Persian government would be disturbed.<sup>7</sup> It was unreasonable to believe that the Turkish government would support Simko or involve itself in the Kurdish problem in Iran, given that the Turks denied the rights of their own Kurds, not to speak about Turkish support to the Kurds outside Turkey. Moreover, the Turkish government needed to improve its relations with other states at this critical time.

Although Simko’s uprising entailed the first extensive action taken by Kurds in Iran against the central government, Simko had neither the desire nor the ability to construct a modern Kurdish state. As has been asserted by Koochi-Kamali, recognition by the Iranian central government of Kurdish identity was not a central point in Simko’s uprising.<sup>8</sup>



Prior to the Second World War, the leadership of Iran had attempted to engender a national identity and the country confronted various difficulties in this context.<sup>9</sup> The creation of a national identity should be discussed within the framework of the modernisation<sup>10</sup> programme which was initiated and pursued by Reza Shah in the late 1920s and during the 1930s and was interrupted by the Second World War.

Scholars have discussed modernisation in relation to ethnicity and the role played by ethnic groups in the modernisation process, and hold conflicting views on the relationship between modernisation and ethnicity. Ethnic identity can act as a facilitating factor for modernisation, or as a

barrier to it.<sup>11</sup> Michael Hechter has argued that modernisation and the means of communication which it increases promote ethnic conflicts rather than closeness.<sup>12</sup> The process of modernisation is thus likely to aggravate ethnic conflicts. Modernisation could be seen as a process of state-nation<sup>13</sup> building, involving various means of control over ethnic peripheries in order to create integration, by means of assimilation or physical domination. Ethnic and local élites may seek to mobilise the ethnic group in order to counter modernisation, and this has often translated into attempts by the centre to minimise the role and influence of local élites in the periphery(ies).



The programme of modernisation launched by Reza Shah represents one interesting aspect in the history of the Kurds in Iran in the 1920s and 1930s. Reza Shah strove for an Iran which would be free of religious influence, foreign interference, tribal uprising and ethnic dissimilarities. European-styled educational institutions were to be established, and modern economic infra-structure such as factories and communication networks were created as well.<sup>14</sup> The modernisation programme in Iran generally aggravated communal conflicts while accelerating the rise of new social groups and economic groups.<sup>15</sup> Although the Kurdish territories were generally not included in any far-reaching economic and social modernisation programmes, the Kurds were affected to a certain degree.

The programme had social, legal, and economic repercussions, yet there are conflicting views on the actual effects and significance of modernisation in Iran. Richard Cottam, for instance, has argued that Iranian society was dramatically altered as a result of Reza Shah's policy. First, his policy of building an infrastructure of transportation resulted in easy access to Iranian people elsewhere. Secondly, the Iranian people became increasingly aware of the modern world as a result of education and conscription which affected various strata of Iranian society; and finally, his policy of suppressing tribes had definite repercussions.<sup>16</sup> Cottam paints a rather positive picture of the socio-political development generated by the modernisation programme. He maintains that the effects of the programme were equal throughout the country. However, this was not the case: the programme served to instigate problems in several dimensions and exacerbated hostile sentiments among certain social and ethnic groups. A great number of tribal chiefs were deported and placed in forced residence in Tehran or elsewhere. Their lands were confiscated and they themselves became hostages to be used against their tribes.<sup>17</sup> Such measures were

aimed primarily at weakening the power of the tribes both as a political/military force and as an economic institution.<sup>18</sup> Thus, despite apparent difficulties, Reza Shah largely succeeded in imposing the central government's authority on the tribes, which at that time constituted c. one-fourth of the Iranian population. On the other hand, the basic structure of the tribes remained and they were not completely deprived of arms.<sup>19</sup>

The rural population might have benefited from the programme as a result of Reza Shah's campaign against tribal chiefs and landlords. Yet this was not the case, since the primary focus of the programme lay outside of the rural areas.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, the programme involved a policy of assimilation of ethnic groups. A fundamental aim of the modernisation process was the transformation of Iran from a multi-ethnic empire into one unified state with a single people, nation, language, culture, and political authority.<sup>21</sup> The *Majlis*, the Iranian parliament, outlawed the traditional clothing of different ethnic groups in 1928. Literacy in non-Persian languages also decreased as a result of the programme.<sup>22</sup> The assimilation policy towards non-Persian ethnic groups was manifold. The policy aimed to impose a Persian consciousness in the quest to found a united and centrally controlled Iranian nation; to distort the ancient and modern histories of those ethnic groups; to staff the Kurdish areas with non-Kurdish, mainly Persian officials; and to alter the names of cities and places to the Persian language.<sup>23</sup> Reza Shah's Persianisation programme in fact served to heighten the Kurdish and the Azeri consciousness of their ethno-national distinctiveness.<sup>24</sup> This fostered hostility among the Kurds towards the central government. Nader Entessar emphasises the significance of uneven modernisation as a cause of ethnic inequality in Iran, which he claims has been the single most important source of the Kurdish predicament.<sup>25</sup> This was also reflected in other sectors such as those of education, public health, and public service.<sup>26</sup> Ethnic inequality can be understood as the result of a process of marginalisation of certain ethnic groups. It arises from the deliberate policy of the central government to further the social, economic, political and cultural marginalisation of ethnic groups.<sup>27</sup>

Reza Shah's modernisation programme can be placed in a wider context, involving the official policies of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria to establish state-nations out of disparate ethno-national groups. The common policy of these states has been to not only impede the growth of a distinct Kurdish identity, but in fact to destroy all such distinctions.<sup>28</sup>

The Kurds suffered notably from the centralisation policy of Reza Shah. No universities were built in the provinces outside of Tehran, and even primary and secondary schools were scarcely founded outside of this city.

The Iranian government made extensive efforts to eliminate their existence altogether. In addition, the quality of health care in Kurdistan and Baluchistan was the poorest in all of Iran.<sup>29</sup>

The 1930s witnessed a number of uprisings in Iranian Kurdistan. These upheavals were led by tribal chiefs who had directly been affected by the programme of modernisation and who refused to defer to the authority of the central government. The uprisings also reflected a Kurdish reaction to the Iranian assimilation policy. The revolts were led respectively by Ja‘far Sultan Jaf, Hama Rashid Khan, Mahmud Agha Kānī Senān-ī, and ‘Amer Khan. Each was quashed by force, and many of the leaders were forced into exile in Iraq until the collapse of Reza Shah’s régime which followed the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in August 1941.<sup>30</sup>

### *The Anglo-Soviet Occupation of Iran*

The essential components of Reza Shah’s modernisation policy were the development of industry and improvement of communications, and the termination of Great Power influence and interference in Iranian foreign and domestic affairs. These two dimensions of the programme were inter-related. In order to retain the independence of his country and to protect it from the influence of the Great Powers, especially that of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, Reza Shah strove to improve his country’s relations with Germany during the 1930s. Thus, Iran’s foreign trade with Germany became particularly significant.<sup>31</sup> During the latter half of the 1930s, Germany sought to extend its influence into the Middle East and especially into Iran and Turkey. In Iran, German industry secured unchallenged predominance in two strategic fields, namely communications and armament. The Soviets soon concluded that German influence in Iran by means of supremacy in these two spheres could seriously threaten Soviet interests throughout the region.<sup>32</sup> The German plan for the industrialisation of Iran seemed adapted to a German army’s ultimate push to the east.<sup>33</sup> The Iranians, on the other hand, considered Germany an auspicious market and source of supply, and were furthermore convinced of Germany’s respect for their “common Aryanism.”<sup>34</sup> Reza Shah’s closing of American and British schools in 1940 was an extension of the “nationalistic” policy he had pursued since the 1920s and the 1930s.<sup>35</sup> The Iranians, given their intimate relations with Germany, also tended to counter any eventual interference in or control of Iran by either the Soviet Union or Great Britain, or by the two powers combined. The Germans were more able and

willing than either the Soviets or the British to supply Iran with, for example, aircraft and railway material.<sup>36</sup>



At the end of June 1941, there were reports that the Germans had established a skeleton General Staff in the German Legation at Tehran which had contacts with branches of German business firms in Iran.<sup>37</sup> There were claims that a “German fifth column” existed and was strategically positioned throughout Iran. The activities of the “fifth column” increased in line with the German invasion of the Soviet Union, and the relevance of the column was also discussed in the context of a possible German invasion of Iran via the Caucasus.<sup>38</sup>

The Iranian authorities, however, made official assurances that no German organised fifth column activity existed in the country. Moreover, the Iranian government confirmed that the Iranian police were keeping the Germans under close surveillance.<sup>39</sup> In a telegram sent by the American legation to the Secretary of State, it was suggested that despite the potential danger of fifth column activities, the British were using the case as a pretext to invade Iran.<sup>40</sup> This argument was identical to the Iranian view on the British position.<sup>41</sup> Recognising the risks involved in the German presence in its country, the Iranian government sought to assure all parties involved, namely the Soviets, the British and especially the Americans, that they were actively working to expel the Germans.<sup>42</sup>

Reza Shah sought to keep Iran out of the war itself, and the Iranian government officially proclaimed its neutrality in the war on September 4, 1939. However, in spite of this announcement, Iranian officials reacted to the German claims to Danzig (Gdansk) and the Polish corridor with sympathy.<sup>43</sup> Reza Shah also maintained economic co-operation with Germany. Although few in number, the Germans in Iran could constitute a threat to e.g. the Anglo-Iranian oil company and transportation in Iran.<sup>44</sup> In addition, developments in the Middle East had always evoked fears of increased German influence in the area. One manifestation of this was the sympathy that Germany obtained from Arab nationalists (Rashid ‘Óli al-Gaiylani and prominent military leaders) who led the coup d’état of April 1941 against the British in Iraq.<sup>45</sup> Had the coup succeeded, its impact would not have been confined to the interests of Great Britain in Iraq: it was known that the leaders of the coup d’état intended to free Palestine and Syria from the mandate.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, the coup d’état provided a clear indication of the nature of Axis designs and influence in the Persian Gulf area.<sup>47</sup> The coup failed, however, and Iraq therewith remained attached to

the Allied cause. Yet Great Britain remained apprehensive of possible German advancements into the region. The coup d'état was a significant factor in fuelling British, and a short time later Soviet, concerns regarding the future of the Middle East in the war context. Thus, the British and the Soviet decision to invade Iran was in part related to fears triggered by the pro-German coup.<sup>48</sup>



German activities and influence in Iran became of particular significance upon the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. The German attack on the USSR brought common concern to Great Britain and the Soviet Union over Iran, since German armies would soon threaten the Caucasus region. A German breakthrough to Iran would have imperilled the Soviet left and the British rear flanks.<sup>49</sup> Fears of a German offensive through Transcaucasia and into Kurdish territories were well-founded. Evidence reveals that the scope of the offensive was restricted to seizing the oil resources of the Caucasus, and to reaching the Iranian and Iraqi border passes for an advance towards Baghdad.<sup>50</sup> The whole of Kurdistan was thus about to become a battlefield for the proposed German operation.

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union, both the British and the Soviets paid closer attention to Iran and its strategic significance to the war.<sup>51</sup> The British government was to align itself with and assist the Soviet Union.<sup>52</sup> The German invasion of the Soviet Union placed Iran between a rock and a hard place: the Germans had made breakthroughs in the Soviet Union and therewith threatened Iran, yet Reza Shah was warned by the German government that the expulsion of any Germans would be considered an unfriendly act. At the same time, both the British and the Soviets were interested in ridding Iran of the Germans.<sup>53</sup>

The Soviet war effort against the Germans required material and army supplies from overseas, and the most secure supply path to the Soviet Union ran via the Trans-Iranian railroad. The occupation of Iran was thus considered unavoidable in the quest to secure the arrival of needed supplies. The presence of a German fifth column in Iran might have constituted an obstacle to British and American attempts to make deliveries to the Soviet Union.

During June, July and August 1941, Great Britain and the Soviet Union intensified their diplomatic protests against the Iranian government over the presence of a German fifth column in Iran.<sup>54</sup> Reza Shah once again affirmed that no such German fifth column existed,<sup>55</sup> but the Iranian

government nevertheless agreed to reduce the number of Germans present in the country.<sup>56</sup>

In mid-July 1941, Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador to London, suggested to Anthony Eden that the British and Soviet governments make a joint appeal to the Iranian Government, urging it to rid Iran of the 5,000–10,000 German agents operating there.<sup>57</sup> The US refused to back the Anglo-Soviet representation in the requested expulsion of the Germans from Iran. However, the US Minister in Tehran was instructed to encourage the Iranian government to do all it could to prevent Axis activities from spreading.<sup>58</sup>



On July 19 and August 16, the Soviet and British diplomatic missions in Tehran presented the Iranians with a memorandum demanding the expulsion of a great number of Germans from Iran.<sup>59</sup> In a letter dated August 25 1941, Reza Shah wrote to President Roosevelt, claiming that the Soviets and the British had raised the question of the German presence in the country, despite Iranian assurances that they would exit Iran.<sup>60</sup> The Iranians were curious as to what position the US would assume in the event of a British and Soviet invasion of Iran. The official American view was expressed to Iran's Minister in Washington by the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who stated that the British planned their strategy without consultation with the US Government. The Secretary added that an invasion was possible as a necessary measure to prevent German activities in the area.<sup>61</sup> However, varying opinions existed within official American circles. Murray, Chief of the NE, argued that every effort should be made to induce the British to negotiate with the Iranians in order to obtain their friendly collaboration.<sup>62</sup> Although the immediate concern of the British and Soviets was that of the German presence in Iran, the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran also aimed at securing the supply route and to protect the oil fields in Transcaucasia.<sup>63</sup>



On August 25, 1941, Soviet and British troops simultaneously invaded Iran.<sup>64</sup> The British entered via the southern part and the Soviets invaded the northern part of the country. Although the Iranians had indicated that there might be some resistance to the invading troops,<sup>65</sup> this proved very limited.<sup>66</sup> British losses were few, with 22 killed and 42 wounded.<sup>67</sup> An immediate result of the invasion was that Iran was partitioned into three zones: the British (southern) zone, including the southern and central parts

of the country; the central (neutral) zone, including Tehran and Mashhad; and the Soviet (northern) zone, embracing, with some exceptions, the provinces of Azerbaijan, Mazandaran, Gilan, Astarabad, and Khorasan.<sup>68</sup> The northern part of Iranian Kurdistan fell under the occupation of the Soviet troops and the southern part under British troops. The central portion, however, with the politically important city of Mahabad, remained in the neutral zone.

Upon the Anglo-Soviet invasion, Reza Shah approached the US for assistance, asking the Americans to use their good office to restrain the invaders.<sup>69</sup> In a conversation between Cordell Hull and Ronald Campbell, an official at the British Embassy in Washington, Campbell was told that his country should issue a declaration on British intentions in Iran. Moreover, the US was concerned about the future of Iran under the occupation and its consequences. On September 2, President Roosevelt sent a letter to Reza Shah, assuring him of US support of Iranian independence and integrity.<sup>70</sup>

The occupation of Iran was now a fact and Iranian appeals for American intervention had proven fruitless. Great Britain and the Soviet Union acted to formalise the nature of their relations with Iran, and these efforts resulted in the Tri-Partite Treaty on January 29, 1942. There had, however been some difficulties in passing the draft treaty through the *Majlis*. This was partly due to the German advance deep into the Soviet Union, which triggered hesitation in some members of the *Majlis* in approving the draft treaty. Article 5 of the treaty implied that the *integrity, sovereignty and political independence* of Iran were guaranteed in return for the use of all internal communications.<sup>71</sup>

### *German Activities and the Kurds in Occupied Iran*

The German diplomatic representation in Iran was terminated as a result of the Anglo-Soviet occupation, yet the Germans increased their underground activities in Iran after the invasion. These activities, which involved Iranian “nationalists” together with Germans, were in part directed towards various ethnic groups and tribes. In January 1942, for instance, Franz Mayer, an official at the German Embassy in Tehran who had gone underground after the invasion, contacted prominent Iranian officials, and in January 1942, Mayer was able to establish contacts with the anti-Allied and pro-German *Milliyun-e-Iran*, (Nationalists of Iran) movement, (henceforth *Milliyun*).<sup>72</sup>

This author has found revealing documentary information in the “Mayer Documents” at the National Archives.<sup>73</sup> These papers were

originally retrieved by the British in Iran and a copy of the files was transferred to the Americans.

According to the American Minister at Tehran, the stories found in the documents concerning the activities of Franz Mayer were over-emphasised. While not entirely denying the significance of German activities, the American Minister is not convinced that the “Mayer Documents” provide concrete evidence of a dangerous conspiracy against security in Iran.<sup>74</sup> However, a presentation by the Assistant Military Attaché at the American Legation at Tehran (John G. Ondrick) contains arguments which lend credibility to the British presentation of the Franz Mayer documents.<sup>75</sup>

It has been argued that the main objective of the *Milliyun* was to cause agitation among the Kurds and other groups in Iran in order to stir them to revolt and to destroy communications.<sup>76</sup> However, primary sources indicate that the connection between the Kurds and *Milliyun* was in fact very limited, as was the Kurdish contribution to the activities of the movement. According to the plans of the *Milliyun*, the Kurds were not intended to play any major role. An enclosure to Document No. 49 of the Mayer Documents contains a very brief indication of the alleged presence of several Germans in Kurdistan.<sup>77</sup> No further details figure concerning the activities undertaken by these Germans, nor is there any precise information on the nature of their contacts with the Kurds. On the contrary, there are assertions that the *Milliyun* was successful in establishing close contacts with various peoples in different Iranian provinces except the Kurds.<sup>78</sup> One explanation for this was that the Kurds were supposedly rather on the Russian side.<sup>79</sup> According to the military plans of the *Milliyun*, the Kurdish territories were nevertheless vital, and Kurdish towns and supply lines for the Russians in Kurdistan were important targets for any action in connection with a German invasion of Iran.<sup>80</sup>

The main object of the *Milliyun* was to assist a German invasion by means of sabotage. The movement also considered exploiting the crisis which would arise by a German invasion in order to seize power in Tehran.<sup>81</sup> A potential German invasion of Iran would originate through the Caucasus or southern Iran.<sup>82</sup> It is, however, difficult to determine the extent to which the *Milliyun* movement was successful in meeting its objectives.<sup>83</sup>

### *The Kurds in Iran After the Occupation*<sup>84</sup>

A clearer understanding of the Kurds during the period under study requires a geopolitical overview. This will also serve to highlight the

connection of the Kurds to conflicts and political affairs around them. A relevant term in this context is the “Northern Tier.” Although historians disagree as to which particular countries the Northern Tier comprises, it is generally maintained that Turkey and Iran are the most important. The Kurdish territories constitute the heart of the Northern Tier, an area which had major significance during the Second World War and the subsequent struggle for power between the Great Powers.<sup>85</sup>

Soviet-German deliberations concerning territories had taken place on the eve of the Second World War and into 1940, and the Northern Tier was one of the areas in question. According to an early secret protocol signed between the Germans and the Soviets, the Soviet Union was assured the possibility of influence in the Middle East. The protocol, which was supplemented by a more exact formulation in November 1940, stated that the area south of Batum and Baku, in the direction of the Persian Gulf, was recognised as the centre of Soviet aspirations.<sup>86</sup> Thus, the Kurdish territories were of high relevance to the aspirations of the Soviet Union.



The joint advance of the Soviet and British troops towards Tehran precipitated the downfall of Reza Shah’s régime, and this ushered in political disorder and a power vacuum in Iran. The occupation invoked Reza Shah to abdicate in favour of his son, Muhammed Reza, on September 16, 1941.<sup>87</sup> A state of financial and economic disarray prevailed and conditions were aggravated by the war and the Anglo-Soviet occupation.<sup>88</sup> The invasion also had serious repercussions on both the central government in Tehran and on the Iranian political opposition, particularly the Communists, and had a specific effect on the situation of the Kurds, to be discussed below.<sup>89</sup>

One significant development in connection with the occupation was the initiation of modern Iran’s most liberal epoch, 1941–1946. Iran was during this period closer to being a constitutional monarchy than at any other time.<sup>90</sup> The new political climate entailed that various groups, both ethnic and political, maintained relationships with different foreign powers, which in turn tried to support the groups in order to serve their own interests.<sup>91</sup> After the occupation, the majority of the Majlis deputies were no longer being appointed personally by Reza Shah, and the claims of the middle and lower classes could now figure in the Majlis. Given the new freedom, the press could now write of popular discontent.<sup>92</sup> In short, the occupation fostered the activation of an exceptionally liberal climate which encompassed institutions, the press as well as nationalist movements.



The fall of Reza Shah's régime resulted in a state of political chaos and lawlessness in Iran. The defeat and consequent disintegration of the Iranian army provided the tribesmen with an opportunity to amass arms. The tribes thus reappeared as an important element of power to be reckoned with by both the Iranian government and the Great Powers.<sup>93</sup> Tribal chiefs assumed a distinct role during the period under study. Great Britain's official view of the situation, both before and after the collapse of Reza Shah's authority, was that the Kurdish power in Iran had been temporarily curtailed during Reza Shah's campaign against the Kurds. However, the pacification of Kurdish chiefs proved to be illusionary since the régime of Reza Shah collapsed and the chiefs therewith returned to their tribes and retrieved their local power.<sup>94</sup>

As the Soviet and the British troops entered Iran, the Iranian army was dissolved and the central government lost effective control of the country. This fostered a sense of hope among the Kurds, who began restoring their traditional position of semi-autonomous status.<sup>95</sup> The Kurdish resistance to the Iranian central government was at first politically unorganised. The movement was spontaneous and was led by tribal groups that had lost their power in connection with Reza Shah's modernisation programme.<sup>96</sup> The two initial centres for disturbance were Marivan and the Hawraman mountains, where Mahmud Agha Kānī Senān-ī established a precarious control; and Baneh, where Hama Rashid Khan, long in exile in Iraq, who founded a principality which included Saqiz and Sardesht. The weakened Iranian central government recognised the two tribal chiefs as semi-official governors of their areas. However, both were later driven into Iraq by the Iranian army.<sup>97</sup>



The nature of the prevailing socio-political force among the Kurds is a significant issue in discussing the Kurdish plight in post-occupation Iran. In the early days of the occupation, tribal elements dominated the Kurdish political arena. Other types of political forces emerged soon after the invasion, namely Kurdish political organisations. This development largely depended on the general state of affairs caused by the occupation.<sup>98</sup>

The Kurdish tribes constituted an important element in the political and security context of the Kurds and assumed a central role at the local, national and international levels. The tribes were a decisive factor affecting the Kurdish nationalist movement from within. In a new political climate, the Kurdish nationalist movement could be mobilised due to conditions

made possible by the occupation. No longer confined by the restraints of former authoritarian régimes, the tribes were able to rearm themselves and thus became a serious menace to the internal stability and security of the country. The tribes were also the socio-political force that the Great Powers dealt with, and the Soviets and the British were aware of the apparent power held by the tribes in Iran.

The dismantling of the Iranian army was crucial since it made it possible for tribes to seize rifles and ammunition.<sup>99</sup> The Kurdish tribes challenged the legitimacy and presence of the Iranian authorities in the Kurdish areas.<sup>100</sup> Another security issue in these parts was that of raids made on villages, especially on non-Kurdish ones, by certain tribes, especially in the vicinity of Lake of Urmiya. Such activities were intensified after the occupation, yet had occurred to varying degrees also in earlier times.<sup>101</sup>

Thus, tribal leaders represented the element that gained distinguished socio-political status within the Kurdish community. Furthermore, these leaders constituted the élite that could operate as a political actor and represent the Kurds in Iran before the occupying powers. A brief discussion of Kurdish tribes in Iranian Kurdistan is therefore relevant for our purposes.

Over sixty known Kurdish tribes<sup>102</sup> existed in Iranian Kurdistan, ranging from large tribes of c. 120,000 members, to small tribes comprising a few thousand individuals each.<sup>103</sup> The Jalālī tribe, consisting of c. 25,000 individuals, resides in the north-west of Iranian Kurdistan, close to the Turkish and Soviet borders. Despite their size, the Jalālīs played a relatively insignificant role in events of the period under study.<sup>104</sup> During the Second World War, the Jalālīs remained under the dominance of ‘Amer Khan, the powerful chief of the Shikāk tribe and the most influential of Kurdish tribal chiefs in Iranian Kurdistan. A neighbouring tribe south of the Jalālīs are the Mīlānīs, estimated to comprise 10,000 members. The Shikāk was one of the most important tribes in Iranian Kurdistan, both in the sense of power distribution among Kurdish tribes and in terms of the political role played by Shikāk chiefs. The Shikāk, consisting



of two main sections of the Kārdār and the ‘Abdovī, was the second largest Kurdish tribe in Iran, with c. 40,000 members. The Shikāks collided with non-Kurdish minorities in neighbouring areas, namely the Christians of the Salmas plain and the Azeri population of the town of Khoi.<sup>105</sup> Despite the presence of factions within the Shikāks, ‘Amer Khan played a unifying role, skilfully leading the Shikāks and playing an important part during the period dealt with in this study.

Continuing southward, the next notable Kurdish tribe was the Herkī tribe of about 20,000, with the majority based in Iraqi Kurdistan. For several generations the Iranian Herkī has dominated the area of Tergawar and Mergawar valleys located parallel to the west and south-west of Rezaieh. The most significant chief among the Herkī was Rashid Beg. Zero Beg was another notable leader, although less significant, who led a faction of the Herkī.<sup>106</sup>

The Begzāda tribe occupied an area west of Rezaieh near the Turkish frontier, in the midst of the Herkī. The interaction between the histories of the Begzāda and the Herkī has been so extensive that the tribes have at times been identified with one another. However, the Begzāda themselves have minimised the significance of their relationship with the Herkī.<sup>107</sup> In the Mergawar Valley of Rezaieh, the Naqishbandi Sayyids of Shemdinan can be found, descendants of Shaikh ‘Ubaidullah Nahrī of the 1880–1881 Kurdish revolt against the Ottoman Empire, had some influence.<sup>108</sup>

The relatively small Zerzā tribe resides over the Zard-Kuh Mountains into the Ushnavieh Plain, south of the Mergawar valley. A non-Kurdish tribe, the Qarapapāgh, existed south of the Zerzā, with its centre in the town of Naghadeh.<sup>109</sup>

To the south of Qarapapāgh and near the Iraqi frontier, there was the Māmash tribe. This tribe was formed by the division of the Bilbās confederation in the 1800s into two parts. The Mangur, also a tribe of the Bilbās, are situated in mountains south of Mahabad, near the Iraqi frontier.<sup>110</sup> There are a number of other Kurdish tribes with varying degrees of significance, depending on their actual size or on the role they have played in Iranian Kurdistan in the period here in question.

## Chapter Four

# THE GREAT POWERS AND THE KURDS: THE FIRST PHASE 1941–1943

### *Great Britain's Kurdish Policy*

Once the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran was a fact, the British and the Soviets needed to deal with various features of domestic Iranian politics. The most important of these elements was the existence of a number of Iranian political movements, Iran's ethno-national minorities and other socio-political forces. The Kurds in Iran were a powerful factor which no foreign power with interests in Iran could afford to ignore. Depending on the situation, the Kurds could serve as either a stabilising or a destabilising force.<sup>1</sup>

Great Britain and the Soviet Union were well aware of the Kurdish problem in Iran and Iraq. They were also familiar with Turkey's distinctly negative attitude towards the Kurds. Taking this fact into consideration and since Germany had already invaded the Soviet Union and reached the northern Caucasus, Great Britain and the USSR avoided any action which might provoke Turkey into entering the war on the German side. Both powers therefore initially assumed an aloof position towards the Kurds, yet shortly thereafter altered their attitude and adopted different stances vis-à-vis the Kurds.<sup>2</sup>

It was difficult for the Kurds to deal with the two occupying powers simultaneously. This was mainly due to the fact that in addition to the areas occupied by British and Soviet forces, there were also Kurdish areas situated in the so-called free zone. George Lenczowski has argued that Kurdish deputies to the *Majlis* had differing sympathies towards the respective powers depending on which zone they came from. This was partly a result of the distinct policies pursued by the British and the Soviets in their given zones.<sup>3</sup> The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Kurds had difficulties in unifying into a single political actor.



Once they had invaded the USSR in June 1941, the Germans posed a threat to British interests in the Persian Gulf since it appeared that German forces might break through the Caucasus. The Kurdish areas, especially those in

Iraq and Iran, would have to be crossed and Kurdistan would thus become a battlefield. It was therefore in the interest of the British to uphold friendly relations with the Kurds and with the Kurdish tribes in particular. In addition, significant British-controlled oil-installations were located in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the security and labour-management of the oil depended on the success of British tribal policy.<sup>4</sup>

Yet the British refrained from direct support of Kurds since such action would have been perceived by the Iranians as interference with Iran's domestic affairs. Support of the Kurds might also be considered an instigation to pan-Kurdism or an indication of encouragement to the Kurds in Turkey.<sup>5</sup> The British recognised the fact that the tribes<sup>6</sup> traditionally represented an important element in Iranian domestic as well as foreign affairs. Although they therefore paid close attention to this aspect of policy-making, the British approach was mainly based on support of the central government.

As has been mentioned, the British knew from earlier experience that the tribes were a powerful element, one which had now been strengthened in connection with the occupation, the abdication of Reza Shah, and the dismantling of the Iranian army. This combination of developments had resulted in a weak Iranian government and the Kurds had seized the opportunity to amass weapons.<sup>7</sup> The British nevertheless had to make clear whether they would back the central government or assist the "tribes." The question was discussed in a meeting at the British Legation in Tehran in the autumn of 1942. In addition to the Embassy staff, the Commander of the British Forces in Iraq and Persia and the Commander-in-Chief in India were also present.<sup>8</sup> A number of arguments were made in favour of supporting the central government in Tehran. It was concluded that: 1) a strong central government could deal directly with the tribes; 2) while the Iranian government was weakened by the occupation and the abdication of Reza Shah, it would be in Great Britain's interests and for the sake of the Iranians that the central authorities be strengthened; 3) the British should avoid becoming involved in tribal quarrels; and 4) the support of the tribes to the British war efforts against the Axis was insignificant.<sup>9</sup> The conclusions reached at the meeting were presented to the Foreign Office which in its turn approved the recommendations.<sup>10</sup> This feature of British policy was primarily based on the conviction that a strong Iran was essential to British interests.<sup>11</sup> A stable Iran was also necessary to the success of the Allied cause, and any disturbances might jeopardise these efforts.<sup>12</sup> The attitude of the British towards the tribes in Iran can also be viewed in light of the Soviet position. The British feared possible Soviet

sympathy with the tribes, since this might promote the position of the USSR in Iran.

The British nevertheless cultivated friendships with Kurdish tribes inhabiting their zone. This by no means translated into actual British support, but rather a desire to *neutralise* the tribes in order to render them innocuous. However, when upheavals broke out under the leadership of tribal chiefs in Iranian Kurdistan immediately after the occupation, rumours maintained that the uprisings were supported by the British. In an effort to counter these claims, the British Legation in Tehran issued a printed statement in Persian, copies of which were dispatched to the Kurdish areas. The declaration stated clearly that the British government was to support the Iranian government in restoring its authority in Kurdistan. The British furthermore categorically denied any support of the rebel leaders.<sup>13</sup> The Turkish government was in its turn highly concerned over the uprising. Although the events never assumed any nationalist or politically organised character, the Turkish government feared that the upheavals were a prelude to a general Kurdish movement aimed at the establishment of a Kurdish independent state. Accordingly, the Turkish authorities expressed their anxiety to the British, who in turn conveyed the concerns of the Turkish government to the Soviets. The Soviets claimed that they had received information of Kurdish ambitions to create an independent state and on raids made by Kurds on Turkish territories via a memorandum sent from Eden to Molotov, and that the memorandum was based on particulars given by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>14</sup> Maisky's memorandum also stated that the Soviet authorities had no connection to such acts or aspirations of the Kurds.<sup>15</sup> Contrary to what had been claimed, the Soviet troops did in fact take all necessary measures to disarm the Kurds. According to the Soviets, the weapons were not given to the Kurds by the USSR but had been dropped in from either the British or the neutral zones.<sup>16</sup>

In early 1942, the British Legation in Tehran received information from the Turkish Consul in Rezaieh who noted that the Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians had formed a party named 'Liberation', and had posted notices appealing to Government officials to withdraw from Rezaieh.<sup>17</sup> It was also claimed that Soviet authorities had instructed Rezaieh's Governor to reduce the number of police in Rezaieh from 100 to 45.<sup>18</sup> The British expressed their apprehension to the Soviets by noting that any divergence in policy between the British and Soviets might be detrimental, particularly if exploited by a third part.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, the significance of incidents in Rezaieh might have been exaggerated by the Turkish

representatives in Rezaieh and by the Turkish government, reflecting their hyper-sensitivity to the Kurdish question.



The absence of British support was one key factor which led the Kurds to seek another compatriot. The British realised that the Kurds viewed the Soviets as a Great Power which could support the Kurds at a time when the British would not. A dispatch sent to the Foreign Office from the British Legation in Tehran in January 1942, included the words: “British loyalty to Persian Government which has prevented our encouraging the Kurds and has thus left opening for the Russians to pose as their friend... Kurds will now realise that Russia is their only friend.”<sup>20</sup> In order to justify support of the central government in Tehran, Anthony Eden employed arguments which more or less reflected the official British position on Kurdish nationalist ambitions. Eden argued that the Kurds were speaking only a dialect of the Persian language and stated that the Kurds were Iranians by race and language. Eden concluded that there was no true basis for the rise of an “artificial” movement of independence or irredentism among the Kurds.<sup>21</sup> In his argument, Eden adhered intentionally or not, to the official conclusion of the Iranian government concerning the Kurds and their nationalist aspirations. The Foreign Minister furthermore underlined that all elements hostile to the integrity, independence and unity of Iran were surely finding protection from the Soviet agents in their zone.<sup>22</sup> Eden thus placed the question of Kurdish nationalist aims into a Great Power context, particularly involving the Soviet occupying authorities. The British concerns were in fact rooted in the alleged refusal of the Soviet authorities to permit the entrance of Iranian forces into Kurdish areas.<sup>23</sup>

British officials suggested on several occasions that the state of disorder in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan might have repercussions on the amount of military material reaching the Soviet Union through north-western Persia.<sup>24</sup> The significance of the Rawanduz Road was also discussed. This road was needed for the transfer of British reinforcements from or via Iraq to the Caucasus<sup>25</sup>, and might be negatively affected by events in Iranian Kurdistan. In addition, the British were concerned about the situation in Iranian Kurdistan also in the context of Turkish-Soviet relations and of the animation of Turkey to the Allied war effort. A general state of instability in Iranian Kurdistan was perceived as the major barrier to the improvement of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Turkey shared borders crossing Kurdish areas with Iran, and also comprised the greatest Kurdish population. The country was thus vitally interested in the preservation of

the political *status quo* in Iranian Kurdistan. From the British point of view, it was therefore most urgent that Turkey's fears on this score be alleviated. Otherwise, Turkey "should react on her whole policy as regards the war and even undermine her determination to resist a German attack."<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, the British were aware of the critical stage of the war and of their crucial alliance with the Soviet Union. Thus, it was equally urgent to grant the Soviet Union full support regardless of Soviet activities in their occupation zone in relation to the Kurds.<sup>27</sup>

The British nevertheless hoped that the Iranian government in Tehran would adopt a conciliatory policy towards the tribes. For instance, in his first conversation with the Iranian Prime Minister 'Ali Suheiliy in March 1942, the British Minister to Tehran, Reader Bullard, expressed concerns over the security problem which directly involved the reassertion of the Iranian authorities' control over the tribes. Bullard asked Suheiliy to issue a statement promising an investigation of the grievances of the tribes.<sup>28</sup> However, the resulting statement was vague and void of any concrete suggestions to improve the situation of the tribes.<sup>29</sup> Refusing to solve the tribal problem by peaceful means, the Iranian government wished to employ military methods and to promote and exploit inter- and intra-tribal conflicts. The government's policy thus remained mainly persuasive and manipulatory, and involved no attempt to understand the plight of the tribes.<sup>30</sup>

On several occasions, the British Legation in Tehran advised Muhammed Reza Shah (henceforth the Shah) and the Prime Minister to adopt a conciliatory policy towards ethnic minorities in various provinces, above all in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. Bullard went as far as to propose a "decentralisation" of the political power, thus allowing more room for action by the provinces. Both the Shah and the Prime Minister were positive to the idea, and seemed to realise that granting local councils to all the provinces could serve to forestall demands for greater concessions.<sup>31</sup> However, they took no concrete steps towards a settlement of the minority problem. British sources suggest that various reforms mentioned by both the Shah, Iranian cabinet officials and British officials in Tehran were mainly tactical measures designed not only to deal with the complaints of the provincial ethno-national minorities, but above all to meet the Soviet menace<sup>32</sup> and to impede the rise of communism in Iran.<sup>33</sup>

Evidence reveals that the British feared co-operation among Kurds throughout greater Kurdistan. A telegram sent from the British Embassy in Baghdad to the British Legation in Tehran, dated October 24, 1941 reflected concerns over developments in Iranian Kurdistan. This was due to the fact that there was an intimate connection between the Kurds in Iran

and those in Iraq. It was maintained that the Kurds in Iraq were closely following the political situation in Iran and were showing signs of impatience. It was also stressed that if the Kurds in Iran were successful in establishing a partly independent Kurdish enclave, such a development would inevitably trigger reactions in Iraqi Kurdistan.<sup>34</sup>



An attempt to gain British support for the Kurds was made by the tribal chief Hama Rashid Khan, mentioned above, although this effort was smaller in scope than that of Sherif Pasha.<sup>35</sup> An emissary to Rashid Khan visited the British Embassy in Baghdad in October 1941, and appealed to the British to build a protectorate over Iranian Kurdistan and to extract the Kurds from Iranian oppression. The British countered that a better strategy was for the Kurds to reach some sort of agreement or understanding with the central government in Tehran. The emissary adamantly repeated that it was unthinkable for the Kurds to accept the rule of Iranian authorities in the Kurdish areas. Furthermore, he was concerned as to whether the British government intended to support the Iranian government in the forceful reimposition of control over the Kurdish areas. The emissary was told that if the Iranian Kurds assisted the British forces when needed, it was unlikely that British forces would assume any military actions against them. However, it was also stated that any disruptions which impeded the British war effort would be firmly suppressed.<sup>36</sup> Great Britain continued to maintain a cautious stance towards the Kurds and instead appeared supportive of the governments of Iraq, Iran and Turkey. Hama Rashid Khan, nevertheless, did not in fact represent the nationalist aspirations of the Kurds, nor any substantial part of the Kurdish population. The British had no confidence in Hama Rashid Khan and did not consider him to be a legitimate representative of the Kurds in Iran.

### *The Soviet Union's Kurdish Policy*

The Soviet attitude towards the Kurds in Iran was strongly correlated to policy in its own zone of occupation, to policy towards Iranian Azerbaijan and towards Iran, and to Soviet relations with the British and the Americans. The Kurdish element was significant to the Soviets. Besides the fact that Kurdish areas were under Soviet occupation, a number of Kurds resided in Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan; there existed a traditional Kurdish aspiration for independence or self-rule and any Kurdish movement in Iranian Kurdistan would undoubtedly have repercussions in

the Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iraq, thus affecting international affairs;<sup>37</sup> the Kurds in Iran could be used as a bargaining chip in Soviet-Iranian relations.

Shortly after the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, the Soviets adopted a considerably different attitude towards the Kurds than did the British. In the early phase of the occupation, the attitude of the Soviet authorities aimed primarily at securing Kurdish good-will.<sup>38</sup> The Soviets offered some type of *indirect* protection of the Kurds against Iranian forces in the Soviet zone, whose freedom of movement was at times hindered by local Soviet authorities.<sup>39</sup>

A Kurdish delegation of 30 notables, mainly tribal chiefs and landlords from the city of Mahabad, was invited to Baku by the Soviet Azerbaijan authorities in late 1941. This measure reflected the importance attributed by the Soviets to the Kurdish element in Iran. The British believed that the visit was devoted to discussing plans for a Kurdish independent state.<sup>40</sup> It was also reported that a decision had been taken at Baku “to set up a central ‘deliverance’ committee as the nucleus of a Kurdish independent state.”<sup>41</sup> The Iranian Minister in London stated that the trip was organised “for some of the turbulent elements to travel to Baku, where they are trained for the purpose of actively engaging in dangerous propaganda and are sent back to Kurdish provinces, where they make open demonstrations in favour of the Soviet system mixed with separatist tendencies.”<sup>42</sup> However, in a memorandum sent to Eden from Maisky, the latter underlined that the trip had no political significance and was of a purely cultural nature.<sup>43</sup> Molotov also ensured Bullard that the Kurdish visit was of a strictly cultural nature.<sup>44</sup> There is in fact no evidence confirming that the Soviet aim in inviting the Kurdish delegation to Baku was to support the Kurds in establishing an independent Kurdistan. The trip could rather be seen as an attempt made by the Soviet Azerbaijani authorities to secure amicable relations with Kurdish tribal chiefs. As Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou has concluded, the Kurdish delegation did not represent a Kurdish nationalist movement. The visit mainly reflected the desire of Soviet authorities in northern Iran and Azerbaijan to become informed of the situation of the Kurds. In return, the Kurdish delegation would learn of material achievements and living conditions in the USSR. The delegates were accordingly taken in tours to factories, theatres, farms, etc.<sup>45</sup> In fact, the delegation does not seem to have had a clear outline of goals to present to the Soviets. A lack of harmony prevailed among the delegates, who might, however, have perceived the invitation as a sign of possible Soviet support.<sup>46</sup>

It was claimed in various official circles that the Soviets had dismissed all of the police and gendarmerie, the Iranian army police, in their occupation zone. In times of Kurdish uprisings, the Soviet authorities refused to support the Iranian government in its efforts to restore order. Reader Bullard has asserted that this was a typical instance of the general Soviet attitude.<sup>47</sup> The Soviets in their turn argued that they adopted a policy based on non-interference into internal Iranian affairs.<sup>48</sup>

One question which deserves particular attention is whether Soviet policy towards the Kurds was based on pragmatic or ideological considerations. In the early stages of the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, contacts were made between the Kurds and the local Soviet diplomatic representatives as well as occupying troops. However, there was yet no Kurdish political organisation or nationalist institution which could represent the Kurds in these contacts. In other words, there was no unified Kurdish leadership which would act as a representative for the Kurds as an ethno-national minority. The Iranian authorities were furthermore disintegrated, particularly in the provinces. Kurdish tribal chiefs were almost until the end of the war the only élite which could function as representatives in relations with the Soviets, and which could act as proponents of Kurdish nationalist aspirations.

As George Lenczowski has concluded, the occupying powers needed to co-operate with the tribes. This fact required the adoption of a second diplomacy, that of relations with tribes, besides normal diplomacy, or formal intergovernmental relations between Moscow and Tehran. By maintaining communication with the representatives of the occupying powers, the tribes constituted a major complication for the Iranian government. This was true not only in respect to Iran's domestic affairs, but also for the country's foreign policy, particularly those linked to Iran's relations with the occupying powers.<sup>49</sup>

The Soviets in Iran had no choice but to consider the fact that tribal chiefs and landlords enjoyed substantial social and political influence within the Kurdish community. There were at least two alternatives available to the Soviets in dealing with both the tribes and the central government in Tehran. On the one hand, the Soviets could allow Iranian forces to enter the zone occupied by the Red Army, which might entail clashes between the tribes and the government forces. On the other hand, the Soviets could co-operate with the tribes, thereby crystallising Soviet influence in their zone. Generally speaking, the Soviets viewed the second alternative as the better option. One consideration behind this choice was that the tribes could function as a stabilising factor at the local level.<sup>50</sup> The Soviet authorities had to deal with tribal chiefs as partners if they wished to

stabilise conditions in their zone. William Eagleton has argued that in dealing with the Kurdish tribes, the Soviets were both “encouraging Kurdish aspiration” and promoting the tribes’ freedom of action in local affairs.<sup>51</sup>

It has frequently been stated that the Soviets were already after the invasion of Iran supporting subversive acts by tribes and separatist movements in their zone of occupation.<sup>52</sup> It must be noted that the Soviets were initially eager to be on good terms with various groups, and particularly with the tribes. This type of relationship prevailed in 1941–1942, but subsequently shifted in light of altered circumstances during the war. Soviet actions immediately after the occupation of northern Iran were mainly adapted to the war effort. The Soviet leadership considered Iran a vital lifeline in its struggle against Germany, and accordingly pursued a pragmatic policy. This required co-operation with those elements which could contribute to the preservation of their security, and the tribes occupied a key position in this context. Soviet policy concerning the occupied Kurdish areas was rooted in this reality.<sup>53</sup> Policy towards the tribal chieftains was thus not formulated according to ideological Communist considerations, but rather on pragmatic premises.

The Soviets might have preferred to deal with a Kurdish nationalist party rather than with tribal chiefs. However, in this stage, there appeared to be no party strong enough to conduct such relations, and the Soviets thus employed a positive approach to tribal leaders. These good relations initially proceeded on a day-to-day basis. Events both at the Kurdish, Iranian and international levels in the latter part of the war necessitated a more articulated Soviet policy towards the Kurds. The tribal chieftains, nevertheless, remained a significant power element also in the later phase of the war.

### *Kurds, Iranians, and the Great Powers*

In the Winter and especially in the Spring of 1942, the Soviet occupation zone was the scene of a number of anti-Iranian uprisings in the Kurdish areas. Kurds were allegedly attacking gendarmerie posts outside of Rezaieh. These events involved mainly Kurds but also Assyrians and Armenians, and were, according to the Iranian government, linked to the conduct of local Soviet authorities in the area. The Iranian Foreign Minister claimed that his government was disturbed by what he called a “Kurd-Armenian-Assyrian separatist movement” supposedly inspired by the Soviets. Furthermore, the Iranians alleged that the central government was

powerless in relation to this movement, since the Soviet military authorities denied the Iranian forces entry into the areas concerned.<sup>54</sup> Meanwhile, the Turkish Embassy in Tehran, acting in accordance with information received from the Turkish Consul in Tabriz, stated that Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians had formed a party called Liberation. According to this information, the activities of the party intensified in December 1941 and January 1942. It was furthermore claimed that the anti-government activities of the Kurds, Assyrians and Armenians were supported by the Soviet authorities in the Soviet occupation zone. The British Minister in Tehran had, however, expressed reservations as to the accuracy of the information given by the Iranian minister.<sup>55</sup> The Kurdish, Assyrian and Armenian activities and alleged Soviet support did, however, disturb the British representatives in Tehran, who thereupon met with the Soviets. The Turkish government and the British representatives in Ankara were likewise concerned over the activities in the Soviet zone in light of developments in Iraqi Kurdistan. They were interested in a possible correlation between Kurdish activities in the two parts of greater Kurdistan. However, the British Ambassador in Ankara reassured Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Kurds in Iraq were well in hand and should not be a source of anxiety.<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, the Turks were assured that the Kurdish leader Jeladet Bedir Khan, then living in exile in Syria and himself from Turkey's Kurdistan, had often instructed the Kurds in Turkey not to cause the Turkish government any trouble.<sup>57</sup>

Louis Dreyfus, the American Minister in Tehran, argued that military action might be necessary to terminate the Kurdish disturbances.<sup>58</sup> Meanwhile, Soviet authorities sought some type of peaceful resolution between the Kurds and the Iranian authorities. The Soviet Consul General in Tabriz, the Commanding Officer of the Red Army, and a number of Iranian officials and Kurdish notables met at Askerabad, a village near Rezaieh, on May 2, 1942. The Kurds outlined a series of demands, while the Soviet Consul General appealed to the Kurds to disband and return home.<sup>59</sup> The Kurdish activities nevertheless continued and the anxiety of the Iranian government escalated accordingly. The Iranian Ambassador to Ankara informed his American colleague of his government's concerns over the situation in the Kurdish areas, and stated that the Soviets were inciting the activities of approximately 3,000 armed Kurds. The Iranian Ambassador reaffirmed that his government wished to send Iranian forces into the Kurdish areas in order to cope with the situation.<sup>60</sup> The Americans were also concerned and subsequently discussed the matter with the Soviets. The American Minister in Tehran was instructed by the Department of State to express the view of the US administration to the Soviet

representatives, and to list the reasons for US concerns. The Axis Powers were drawing great capital of the events in Kurdistan, since they could exploit the issue of the Soviet involvement in Kurdish affairs in their own propaganda. This propaganda which was mainly directed at Turkey, Iraq and Iran might have some unfavourable effects on Allied war efforts throughout the area. Furthermore, the Kurdish activities were likely to create difficulties for the supply line to the Soviet Union via Iran. Moreover, American property and lives were in danger, and the wife of an American correspondent had been killed in the Kurdish area in question.<sup>61</sup>

‘Ali Suheiliy, the Iranian Prime Minister, adopted a dual strategy aimed at guaranteeing Soviet non-involvement in Kurdish affairs. On the one hand, Suheiliy sought American help in persuading the Soviets to allow the Iranian government to send troops into the Kurdish areas.<sup>62</sup> On the other hand, Suheiliy asked Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to instruct the Soviet military authorities in Iran not to resist local Iranian forces in their efforts to preserve order.<sup>63</sup> In a reply which the Iranian Prime Minister described as satisfactory, Molotov stated that the Soviet authorities were to co-operate with Iranian efforts to bring about an end to the uprising and to reinstate control in the area.<sup>64</sup> The Soviets agreed that twenty-one police posts were immediately to be established. Each post would be staffed by c. 20 Soviet soldiers and officers and 3–4 Iranian gendarmes between the cities of Rezaieh and Khoi. However, the understanding between the Iranians and the Soviets in no way entailed any concessions to the Kurds, and this was made clear by the Soviets.<sup>65</sup>

The Iranian Minister of War revealed that the Soviets had agreed to permit the entry of 500 Iranian troops into the Rezaieh area. The Minister later asserted that a total of 1,500 Iranian troops had Soviet permission to enter the area,<sup>66</sup> although the Iranians insisted that 5,000 troops would be required to restore order.<sup>67</sup>

On closer analysis, it appears that the Iranian request for Soviet co-operation in this matter was largely a tactical move designed to further draw the Americans into confrontation with the Soviets. The Iranian government did not in fact possess a sufficient number of troops to dispatch to the Kurdish areas. The Soviet military authorities had on their own initiative asked that the Iranian government send a brigade to Tabriz, to which the Iranians had replied that no brigade was available for that purpose.<sup>68</sup> The Soviet request must be viewed in light of the war effort against Germany, which necessitated the transfer of Soviet troops back to the home arena.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, it was also reported that the Soviets were in fact

adopting sterner attitude towards the Kurds and would most likely not object to their being disarmed.<sup>70</sup>



Local Soviet authorities in Iranian Azerbaijan attended a meeting held in late April 1942. A delegation consisting of Iranian and Soviet officials were to meet with twelve Kurdish notables near Rezaieh. The most influential among the Kurdish representatives were the chiefs of the Herk§ tribe Nuri Beg and Kamil Beg. The Soviet Consul General had asked the American representatives in Tabriz to participate in the negotiations, but there is no evidence of any American presence at the meeting. The Kurdish delegates expressed their demands as following:

- 1- No gendarmerie posts to exist in the Kurdish region between Khoi and Mahabad.
- 2- Kurds to be allowed to carry arms.
- 3- 1.200 rifles alleged to have been given to Persian villagers in Rezaieh district to be withdrawn.
- 4- Kurds to have one representative in each of the Government departments at Rezaieh.
- 5- Kurds to enjoy freedom in their own national affairs.
- 6- The Persian Government to provide for schools in Kurdistan where the Kurdish language would be used.
- 7- Certain specified lands to be restored to their original Kurdistan [Kurdish] owners.
- 8- Twenty Kurds now in prison to be released.<sup>71</sup>

There is no evidence indicating Soviet support of these requests. The Kurdish demands were clearly formulated, which suggests that those responsible for them must have had some political knowledge. Paragraphs 1, 4, 5, and 6 are politically well articulated and are nationalist demands in character, and this can be identified with basic prerequisites for autonomy. It is unclear whether the Kurdish representation at the meeting was exclusively tribal, or comprised a combination of tribal chiefs and urban nationalist elements. However, the Iranian Chief of Police asserted that he had come to the negotiations exclusively to discuss the matter of disarming the Kurds. He pointed out that any other demands were the concern of the central government. The Soviet Consul General was likewise at a loss in the face of the Kurdish requests. His primary concern was that of security, and particularly the question of how and where the Kurds should be permitted to bear arms.<sup>72</sup>

The British representatives in Tabriz were interested in further details of the Kurdish requests and in the degree of Soviet involvement in Kurdish affairs. Upon his return to Tabriz, the Soviet Consul General was thus questioned by the British Consul. The Soviet Consul General mentioned only points 2, 3, and 8 and maintained that the Kurdish claims had been modest. He furthermore assured his British colleague that the Kurds were willing to be disarmed and that disarmament was a precondition to the realisation of their demands. The British Consul suggested that the Soviets had both the opportunity and the ability to disarm the Kurds, to which his Soviet colleague retorted that the Iranians would be happy to see the Russians fighting the Kurds.<sup>73</sup> British concerns over developments in the Kurdish areas were due partly to the Iranian government's apparent inability to cope with the issue, and partly to the role which the Soviets might be playing in the context. According to conclusions drawn by British officials, the situation in the Kurdish areas indicated that the Soviets did not play a very clean game: by supporting the Kurds, the Soviets were allegedly "attempting to fish in muddy waters in North Persia and are looking after their future interests in the area."<sup>74</sup>

Despite hopes that developments in northern part of Iranian Kurdistan might take a positive turn after the meeting, the situation continued to deteriorate. At this time, the Iranians decided to play their British card. Iran's Minister in London, Sayyid Hassan Taqizadeh, appealed to the British on behalf of his government for their intervention to persuade the Russians to allow the Iranian government to reimpose order.<sup>75</sup> The Iranian Ambassador in Ankara informed his American colleague of the Iranian government's concern over developments in Iranian Kurdistan. He claimed that although a great number of Soviet troops were stationed in Azerbaijan, they had done nothing to discourage the Kurds. In fact, the Soviets were allegedly promoting the rebellion by denying Iranian troops permission to enter the Kurdish areas. Furthermore, the Iranian representatives had supposedly already established direct communication with Joseph Stalin regarding this matter.<sup>76</sup>



The Turkish authorities announced their official position in light of different considerations: the eventual effects which the events could have on Turkey's Kurdistan; the role played by the Soviets in Iran; possible collaboration between the Iranian Kurds and the Kurds in Turkey; and finally, a potential increase of Soviet influence in the region.<sup>77</sup> The Turkish authorities informed the British Embassy in Ankara that armed Kurds had

triggered an outbreak of violence in northern Kurdistan near the Turkish border. It was also contended that the gendarmerie was unable to restrain the Kurds, and that the Soviets were actively involved in the uprising by arming, supplying and leading the Kurds.<sup>78</sup> The British maintained that Turkish concerns and allegations were affected by the active efforts of Axis circles in propagating rumours of a Soviet-inspired rebellion in Azerbaijan, where Kurds and other rebels had proclaimed a Soviet republic.<sup>79</sup> On the other hand, it was also asserted that the rumours were not entirely without effects and should be countered.<sup>80</sup> The Turkish concerns seemed to reflect the persistent anxiety of the Turks regarding all developments in Iranian Kurdistan. Thus, they exaggerated the scope of the events by depicting them as a comprehensive Kurdish revolt.<sup>81</sup>

In conclusion, the Turkish government overstated the threat to Turkey's security posed by the Kurdish activities in Iran. Indeed, in this phase of the war, there was no evidence of significant politically organised communications between the Kurds in Turkey and those in Iran. The contacts that did occur between Kurdish tribes over the official borders of Iran and Turkey were traditional ones that had long existed. In addition, there is no concrete indication of any Soviet involvement in supporting the Kurds in this context. The Soviets appear to have been indifferent, although their position in the events was ambiguous.

The Iranians continued to maintain that the Soviets should either disperse the Kurds themselves or allow the Iranian authorities to resolve the matter either by negotiation or by bringing in troops from the south.<sup>82</sup> In reality, it appears that the Iranian government was neither willing to enter negotiations with the Kurds nor capable of handling the situation by military means. The Soviets were convinced that both the Iranians and the Turks exaggerated the significance of the upheaval and particularly the role played by the Soviet authorities in relation to the upheaval.<sup>83</sup>

While the Iranians spoke persistently of Soviet involvement in the uprising, they refused to admit that unemployment, economic stagnation and a lack of confidence in the government were the key factors behind the aggravated situation in the northern part of Iranian Kurdistan (henceforth northern Kurdistan).<sup>84</sup> The Iranian government was in reality too weak to either remedy injustices or to keep the tribes in order.<sup>85</sup>

A number of Kurdish tribesmen sought to exploit the prevalent state of chaos and the weakness of the central government. The tribes had long been characterised by an inclination towards lawlessness, upheaval against the weak central governments, refusal to pay taxes, and towards challenging the prevailing order.<sup>86</sup> This does not imply that the tribes did not have legitimate complaints, but rather reflected actual grievances and

dissatisfaction. The uprising signalled a decline in the government's ability to cope with the problems of the people, whether as individuals or as groups. Furthermore, the central government limited its attempts of dealing with the Kurds and other minority problems to methods of suppression and police action.<sup>87</sup> During the uprising in northern Kurdistan, tribal chiefs made nationalist demands upon the central government besides the traditional goals of tribes.

The British government viewed the tribal grievances as a matter to be investigated and resolved by the Iranian government, which had been urged by the British to arrive at an amicable and fair settlement.<sup>88</sup> A committee which consisted of the Minister of Justice and other high ranking personalities<sup>89</sup> was appointed in the *Majlis* on March 31, 1942, with the express purpose of dealing with tribal grievances. Meanwhile, the British Embassy in Tehran had been pressing the Iranian Government to issue a declaration of policy which should include specific reforms regarding the tribes.<sup>90</sup> In an apparent response to the British request, the Iranian Prime Minister made a declaration before the *Majlis* on March 31. The Minister made it clear that at least some of the grievances of the tribes were justified and the Iranian government was obliged to deal with this discontent. The proposed measures would involve reforms in the fields of justice, health and education. However, the Iranian government took no steps to implement these provisions, thus leaving the British dissatisfied.<sup>91</sup> In an effort to promote reform and a conciliatory policy towards the Kurds, the British Consul in Kermanshah appealed to both the Iranian authorities and the Kurds to avoid prolongation of the struggle and to find a reasonable settlement.<sup>92</sup> British representatives in Kermanshah attempted to establish communication between Iranian authorities and Kurds, and sought to persuade the Iranian authorities to deal non-violently with the Kurds. However, they simultaneously confirmed the British policy of non-intervention, although it was clear that without British interference in the matter there were no hopes that Kurdistan would be satisfied in its demands.<sup>93</sup>



The Americans had not assumed a distinct position on the uprising in Kurdistan, and instead emitted different and even conflicting signals. The American Legation in Tehran maintained that the Kurdish tribes involved in the uprising had no just complaints.<sup>94</sup> Yet the Legation also described the attitude of the Iranian government against the Kurds as being far from conciliatory and noted that the government was doing nothing to appease

the Kurds. While the Legation could not assert that the stance of the Iranian Government was wrong, it argued that the Kurdish problem was “strictly *sui generis* and must be approached with proper regards for its background.”<sup>95</sup> Official US circles seemed inclined to accept a military solution. It was thus emphasised that there would be no improvement in the situation unless strong forces were sent to the Kurdish areas and the Soviet assumed responsibility for policing the areas.<sup>96</sup> The American Legation in Tehran noted two obstacles impeding comprehensive military action in Kurdistan: first, the Soviet refusal to permit Iranian forces to enter the Kurdish area in the Soviet occupation zone, and second, the low morale of the Iranian forces in fighting the Kurds, not only within the Soviet but also in the British and the neutral zones.<sup>97</sup> The Soviet role in preventing Iranian forces from entering Kurdistan does not appear to have been decisive in the Iranian inability to assert full control over Kurdistan. It seems that the Iranian government emphasised the Soviet connection in an attempt to draw the Americans into Iranian affairs. The central government hoped that the Americans and the British would exert diplomatic pressure on the Soviets and thus spare the Iranian authorities from this task. The Soviet Ambassador in Tehran suggested to his American colleague that the Iranians had fabricated some of the details of the crisis in order to force the Soviet authorities to allow Iranian troops into the areas concerned and argued that the Iranian claims reflected Iranian aims to bring the issue to the fore.<sup>98</sup> The Iranian approach did, however, succeed in engaging the Americans into what had originally been labelled a domestic Iranian affair. The American Minister noted that the Soviet refusal to accept Iranian forces reflected a traditional tactic of keeping the Iranian troops out of the area. He maintained that the American government should:

support the Iranians in their stand unless the Soviets can show, which they have not yet done, that there is some impelling military reason why such action would be detrimental to the allied cause.<sup>99</sup>

Iranian allegations that the Soviets were responsible for Iranian impotence in dealing with the situation in Kurdistan were not well-founded. As has been mentioned, the Iranian army was still in a state of disintegration and corruption, and would have been unable to maintain control over the area concerned. Analyses by the American Legation in Tehran regarding conditions in northern Kurdistan concluded that responsibility lay with the Iranians themselves: “their inertia, their spirit of defeatism,... and their tendency of play politics to the detriment of efficient action have prevented the carrying out of an intelligent and forceful policy.”<sup>100</sup> Indeed, the inability of the Iranian government to secure its authority in the Kurdish

and other areas was rooted in various factors, namely, the breakdown in the morale of the Iranian army as an immediate result of the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran; the absence of competent and effective leadership; the lack of mobility due to inadequacies in communication and transport; the weakness of the central authorities; and finally, the severe food shortage which made it difficult to rule over the masses.<sup>101</sup> The same point was also emphasised by the Shah in a conversation with officials of the American Legation in Tehran.<sup>102</sup>

The Iranian government persisted in highlighting each and every event in the zone controlled by the Soviet army, while marginalising the significance of events in other sections of Kurdistan. As has already been stated, it is clear that the Iranians sought to underline the Soviet danger in an effort to draw the Americans into Iranian affairs. This Iranian policy entailed the so-called *Siyāsat-e movāzaneh-ye manfī*, or policy of negative equilibrium<sup>103</sup>, which has characterised much of Iranian foreign policy in the 20th century. The strategy aims at employing one power in order to offset the activities of other powers or to serve as a balancing factor between other powers. Accordingly, the Iranians hoped that an increasingly involved US could act as a buffer or counter-balance to the Soviet and the British pressures, although the primary Iranian goal in this context was to strike a balance between the Americans and the Soviets. Otherwise, one might wonder why the Iranian government did not emphasise the upheavals which erupted in Kurdish parts outside of the Soviet zone.

It has been asserted that uprisings and disorder were sweeping through all of Iranian Kurdistan.<sup>104</sup> One example of this development was the revolt of Hama Rashid Khan already in September 1941, which had resulted in control by the rebel forces over Baneh, Saqiz and Sardesht. The Khan had full control of Baneh until the end of September 1944. The low morale of the Iranian army was the main reason for the success of Hama Rashid Khan's men.<sup>105</sup> The rebel leader was in charge of the entire administration of the city of Baneh and its surrounding areas. However, Hama Rashid Khan's movement was no more than a traditional tribal rebellion against the Iranian authorities. The Khan was expelled to Iraq by the Iranian army, but returned in 1945 to later play a role in Kurdish affairs in Iran.<sup>106</sup>



While the uprising in the Soviet occupation zone of northern Kurdistan persisted, there were also clashes between Kurds and the Iranian army in

the British zone. However, Field Marshal Shabakhti, the officer in command and one of the two highest-ranking officers in the Iranian army, reported that he had engaged in conversations with Karim Beg, a Kurdish chief, who presented Kurdish demands as following:

- (1) no Iranian officials should be allowed in Kurdistan, (2) official and gendarmerie posts to be held by Kurds, (3) opening of schools in all areas where Kurdish as well as Persian [Farsi] would be taught, (4) Kurds to have all legal rights of Persians including representation in the Majlis, and (5) a road building programme so that produce maybe [could be] marketed.<sup>107</sup>

Shabakhti negotiated with the Kurds, although he himself advocated a stern policy towards them. He claimed to have been more or less forced into deliberations since his present position was too weak to risk further hostilities.<sup>108</sup> These negotiations thus did not indicate the willingness of the central government to truly resolve the Kurdish question. They furthermore confirmed that the central government was unable to implement an effective military solution to the uprising in Kurdistan. The exact position of the government and its reactions to Kurdish demands is not evident. Yet it is probable that Shabakhti and the central government had no alternative but to assume negotiations, since the weakness and inefficiency of the Iranian army was a fact. Thus, the deliberations most likely represented a tactical Iranian action measure designed to gain time.



In light of its difficulties in maintaining order, especially in Kurdistan, the Iranian government sought financial and military support from the US. The British Foreign Office was positive to this measure.<sup>109</sup> The issue was discussed in light of the British-American concern that any disorder in Iran might threaten the safety of the Allied supply route to the USSR.<sup>110</sup> Thus, the US now had an additional reason to change its policy in Iran. Events in Iranian Kurdistan had previously led the Tehran government to request US assistance in improving the gendarmerie. Meanwhile, Soviet-Iranian tensions intensified since the uprising in northern Kurdistan led to perpetual Iranian protests against the Soviet government.<sup>111</sup>

### *The Kurds and the Relations among the Great Powers*

During the Second World War, the case of Iran provided a unique occasion to implement the principles of co-operation between the Allies.<sup>112</sup> Not long after the Anglo-Soviet occupation, it seemed that the British and the

Soviets were each pursuing their own direction regarding policy to Iran and related affairs. Already in the days immediately after the occupation, the British were closely observing Soviet activities in the Soviet occupation zone. During the war years, neither side concealed its suspicions of the other. The British, for instance, were uneasy over alleged Soviet support of Kurdish and Azeri separatist movements, and Eden thus informed Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in Great Britain, that any unwarranted interference into Iranian affairs or sympathy for separatist movements would be most detrimental.<sup>113</sup>

The Americans in their turn asserted that there was no active Soviet involvement in separatist movements, and that the Soviet military authorities had in fact discouraged such trends in the early phase of the occupation.<sup>114</sup> On the other hand, the Americans also maintained that there were disturbing Soviet activities in northern Iran. Suggestions were made to reactivate the American missionary schools in northern Iran in order to counter-act Soviet activities, and this was discussed within the Department of State already in autumn of 1941. The aim of the proposal was to counter-balance the Soviet measures, due to fears that the Soviets were strengthening their position in their zone of occupation. American missionary activities were thus to act as a restraining influence on Soviet moves to “Sovietise” that area.<sup>115</sup> However, Andrey Vyshinsky, the Soviet Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, assured the American Ambassador in Moscow that the Soviet authorities in northern Iran were not sympathising with any separatist movement. He also stated that any propaganda to the contrary was of German origin. Vyshinsky emphasised that the Soviet authorities in northern Iran were primarily interested in the preservation of law and order.<sup>116</sup>

The Iranian government played an important role in this context. In dealing with the Big Three, the Iranians were especially discriminating against the Soviets who were considered to be the most problematic of the powers. In early October 1941 the Shah told the American Minister in Tehran that while he did not object to the British occupation, he strongly opposed the Soviet one since it was having disastrous effects on Iran.<sup>117</sup> There is in fact no evidence of any direct Soviet support of separatist movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan during the first years of the occupation, namely 1941 to 1943. The Soviets were at that time mainly seeking to secure amicable relations with various groups in their zone.

Reports from various sources suggested that this zone was experiencing a period of disorder. The tribes had armed themselves upon the dismantling of the Iranian army and were now in conflict with the Iranian authorities.<sup>118</sup> In order to restore some degree of order, the Soviets pre-

ferred to be on good terms with the tribes and to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the Kurds and the population of northern Iran in general. It is likely that this policy of appeasement was interpreted by the Iranian government as Soviet support of the tribes.

## Chapter Five

# THE GREAT POWERS AND THE KURDS: THE SECOND PHASE 1944–1945

### *The Origins of the Cold War*

The majority of scholars who have dealt with the Cold War have adopted a Eurocentric view, maintaining that the phenomenon originated in Germany and Eastern Europe. In *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East* (1980), Bruce Kuniholm has instead argued that the Cold War developed in the Middle East, or according to the subtitle of his work, in Iran, Turkey, and Greece.<sup>1</sup> It is undeniable that conflicts over the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean played an important part in the inception of the Cold War.<sup>2</sup> Diplomatic historians and scholars of various persuasions agree that the Iranian crisis of 1945–1946 was critical to the initial phase of the Cold War.<sup>3</sup>

The onslaught of the Cold War has been analysed by a number of diplomats. The subject has also been tackled by numerous scholars, mainly historians and political scientists. Several American officials of the time have argued that a major component in the birth of the Cold War was the US response to Soviet attempts to dominate Iran.<sup>4</sup> Robert Messer has examined the political decision-making process within the Department of State in the early Cold War context. Messer claims that an understanding of the US decision to “contain” the USSR after the Second World War requires a closer look at policy-making developments within the Department of State in the winter of 1945–1946. The process culminated in George Kennan’s well-known long telegram from Moscow to Washington of February 22, 1946. According to Messer, *containment*, as based on Kennan’s proposals, was deliberately adopted in early 1946.<sup>5</sup> Gary Hess maintains that the American response to the Iranian crisis resulted in the reorientation of US policy towards the Soviet Union, entailing a shift from “appeasement” to “getting tough.” Hess concludes that the key factors behind the crisis were Soviet reluctance to withdraw its troops from northern Iran, and Soviet encouragement of nationalist movements in Iranian Kurdistan and Azerbaijan.<sup>6</sup>

From the revisionist standpoint, Soviet security concerns were rejected by the Americans, who applied the “open door” policy to Iran. According

to this school of thought, the US would not tolerate any Soviet influence in the area and thus exerted severe pressure to force the Soviets to withdraw their forces from northern Iran.<sup>7</sup>

According to Stephen McFarland, both the Soviet and US positions on Iranian affairs were partly rooted in the actions of the Iranian central authorities and various Iranian groups, namely the *Tudeh* Party, the Azeris and the Kurds. Both the Iranian central government and the *Tudeh*, Azeris and Kurds sought to use the internal conflicts among the Allies to their own advantage. McFarland asserts that domestic unrest within Iran attracted Great Power intervention and this was an element in the ensuing Cold War.<sup>8</sup> This intervention did not, however, take place in a vacuum, and both the US and the Soviet Union had economic and strategic interests in the region.

Richard Cottam maintains that independently of the nature of Soviet goals in supporting the Azeris and the Kurds in Iran, this policy did indeed lead to international crisis in 1946.<sup>9</sup> One scholar has argued that the crisis of 1945–1946 was fostered by Soviet support of Azeri and Kurdish nationalist movements and in Soviet assistance to these two groups in establishing republics (in late 1945 and early 1946 respectively). The Soviets sought to thus promote their own interests in Iran.<sup>10</sup> Mark Gasiorowski, for instance, has argued that the presence of Soviet troops in northern Iran was a central factor in the emergence of the Cold War.<sup>11</sup>

The Kurds in Iran were already in late 1941 and early 1942 an important element in the relations between the Allies in Iran as well as between them and Iran. The role of the Kurds in this context must be appreciated, since it is otherwise impossible to understand the background to the Iranian crisis of 1945–46 and the development of the Cold War in Iran.

Despite the prevalence of close co-operation among the Big Three in Iran during the Second World War, the dimensions of rivalry and mutual suspicion also existed, and this contributed to the political climate which fostered the Cold War. In fact, as has been argued by Campbell, the Cold War had begun long before the Second World War was over.<sup>12</sup> The Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States each developed distinct perceptions concerning policies, interests and future roles in Iran.<sup>13</sup> The Soviet military force in Iran was employed as an instrument of interference in Iranian affairs, mainly by offering protection to the Kurdish and the Azeri autonomist movements and later to the two autonomous republics. Simultaneously, several parties, mainly Iran, the US, Great Britain and the UN insisted on the complete withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Iran. Thus, the struggles between diverse groups and the central government on the one hand, and among the Great Powers themselves on the other, should

be placed within the same context. The Kurdish question in Iran in the period under study must be analysed within this framework.

### *US Policy in Iran and the Kurds*

The US began showing political interest in Iran in the early 20th century.<sup>14</sup> The Iranians were positive to this presence, and the advisers were viewed as representatives of a “*Third Power*.” The Iranians hoped that as a third power, the US might function as a neutral buffer between Great Britain and Russia, or as a counter-weight that would strengthen Iran’s position in the face of British and Russian attempts at hegemony.<sup>15</sup>

Already a short time after the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, there were discussions in official American circles regarding the formulation of US policy towards Iran. Primary consideration was given to American economic interests in the country. In November 1941, the NE recommended that severed trade negotiations between Iran and the US should be resumed “for reasons of political expediency and in order to safeguard American trade interests in Iran during the post-war period.” The Secretary of State supported this view, as did the Assistant Secretary of State and other officials.<sup>16</sup> American efforts to resume trade negotiations were also related to Soviet policies in Iran, since the Americans wished to enhance the position of the Iranians vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup>



After the Anglo-Soviet troops entered Iran, Winston Churchill contacted President Roosevelt in order to request US aid in equipping the Trans-Persian Railway, by which Lend-Lease aid was sent to the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the United States Military Iranian Mission for Lend-Lease reached the Persian Gulf in November 1941, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.<sup>18</sup> This step was taken in order to ensure the arrival of US supplies to the USSR.<sup>19</sup>

One important element in US policy in Iran was the American military presence in the country, which comprised some 30,000 men and was thus far smaller in scope than that of the USSR and Great Britain. The Persian Command was active in facilitating Iranian transport, distributing Lend-Lease to Iran, and managing the dispatch of Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviet Union. The US enjoyed a favourable position in Iran compared to that of the Soviet Union and Great Britain. This was primarily due to the invited presence and active role of American missions in the fields of finance, administration and the armed forces.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, the Iranian

authorities preferred the American presence over the British and particularly over the Soviet, and this fact worked to the advantage of the Americans.

The US military presence in Iran indicated a departure from the traditional US policy towards the Middle East.<sup>21</sup> The deployment of American troops in Iran reflected growing American interests in the Middle East, with a focus on Iran.<sup>22</sup> As stated by Cordell Hull, Iran received more American attention than any other country in the Middle East.<sup>23</sup> However, certain American officials were still in doubt as to whether the US had any justifiable interest in Iran. It was also alleged that the sole American interest in the Middle East lay in oil concessions, which were in fact not concentrated in Iran but in the Bahrein Island.<sup>24</sup>

George Lenczowski claims that ideological considerations formed the core of the unselfish American policy at the time. Lenczowski argues that US policy towards Iran was formulated on the basis of “noble principles such as respect for integrity, nonintervention in internal affairs, readiness to extend economic assistance and advice, and the Open Door doctrine.”<sup>25</sup> Lenczowski has failed to note the existence of concrete American political and economic interests in Iran. It is true that both the Shah and the Iranian Prime Minister appealed to the US for support in preserving Iranian sovereignty and integrity, maintaining that the Americans had no selfish ends to serve in Iran.<sup>26</sup> However, the preservation of Iranian integrity and sovereignty must be seen in light of American interests in the country. The nature of American considerations in relation to Iran, both ideological and practical, were discussed in a memorandum from Cordell Hull to President Roosevelt on August 16, 1943. Hull highlighted the advantages of securing the integrity, independence and stability of Iran. He furthermore claimed that it was in the interest of the US “that no great power be established on the Persian Gulf opposite the important American petroleum development in Saudi Arabia.”<sup>27</sup> The Department of State noted Iran’s strategic importance in terms of American objectives in the Arabian peninsula.<sup>28</sup> President Roosevelt and the Department of State recognised in as early as 1943 that Iran was vital in this context. Iran constituted a buffer between American interests in the Middle East and the Soviet Union.<sup>29</sup> Already on March 11, 1942 Roosevelt found the defence of Iran vital to the US,<sup>30</sup> and it was thus argued that Iran be made to qualify for Lend-Lease assistance. The Department of State contended that an American military mission would contribute to promoting the American position in Iran, and to the foundation of a solid base for future relations. Accordingly, a number of American missions arrived in Iran during 1942.<sup>31</sup> The Americans assumed a more active role in Iranian affairs throughout the year, and this

development was rooted in several factors: Iran was particularly valuable as a supply route to the Soviet Union, occupied a highly strategic location and produced vast amounts of petroleum. Accordingly, Jernegan suggested in January 1943, that the US pursue a more active policy vis-à-vis Iran.<sup>32</sup> On April 24, 1943 Wallace Murray confirmed that Jernegan's memorandum symbolised the direction of US foreign policy at the time.<sup>33</sup>



According to American officials differences existed between the policies and objectives of Great Britain and the Soviet Union in Iran. While the Soviet aims in that country were characterised as aggressive, the British intentions were described as purely defensive and geared towards preventing further Soviet penetration to the south. It was claimed that the British sincerely wished for the independence and stability of Iran.<sup>34</sup> However, both the Soviets and the British were acting to preserve their own interests and to meet their objectives in Iran since this country had traditionally been of vital importance to both powers. Yet the British and Soviets differed markedly in their methods. While the British supported conservative forces in general, and particularly pro-British groups within the Iranian political establishment and central government, the Soviets chose to promote left-wing forces and the Azeri and the Kurdish nationalist movements.

In 1943, Hull warned that if events continued in the current direction, both the USSR and Great Britain might take certain actions that would severely impede or destroy Iranian independence.<sup>35</sup> In autumn of 1943, the Department of State presented a declaration of American objectives and interests in Iran, supported by President Roosevelt. The Department of State favoured the proposals made by the NE, asserting that American influence in Iran should be directed towards terminating the half-century old competition between the British and the Soviets.<sup>36</sup>

American policy aimed at the strengthening of the central government in Tehran. The US supported the Iranians by i.e. providing the army with American advisory missions, who worked to enhance Iran's ability to combat its domestic opponents.<sup>37</sup> The Iranian government appointed Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who was under the supervision of the American Minister of War, to implement reforms within the Iranian army and gendarmerie in order to increase its efficiency.<sup>38</sup>

US policy towards Iran was in a sense similar to that of Great Britain. Both countries were willing to support the central government in Tehran, hoping that Iran could thus counter any Soviet attempt to establish control

over the country. The differences that did exist between the US and Great Britain in relation to Iran were minor compared to those that developed between the Americans and the Soviets. As has been argued by Louise Fawcett, there was nevertheless a degree of American suspicion of and disagreement with British policy in Iran. This was the key factor which led to the articulation of an independent American policy.<sup>39</sup> As has been discussed, another important aspect in this context was that of the foreign policy of Iranian central government itself, which aimed at attracting the Americans closer to Iran. It was hoped, as mentioned above, that the US would thus act as a counter-weight to the traditional pressures put on Iran by Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The Iranian government thus played a crucial role in absorbing the US into Iranian issues in the realms of both foreign policy and internal affairs.

President Roosevelt received a report on US policy towards Iran sent by Patrick J. Hurley, the Brigadier General. Hurley suggested that Iran might be used as a pattern for US relations with all less-favoured associate nations. Supporting Iran would entail the implementation of various reforms in the country, constituting a so-called plan of nation-building.<sup>40</sup> In his reply, Roosevelt wrote to the Department of State that the views presented in Hurley's report were highly interesting and that the President approved of the idea of using Iran as an example of what "an unselfish American policy" could entail.<sup>41</sup> In a note the Department of State replied that President Roosevelt's memorandum of January 12, 1944, had proven helpful to the Department in its attempt to instigate an American advisory program in Iran that could serve as a model.<sup>42</sup>

The US view towards the peoples of the Middle East and their future was highlighted in connection with the Atlantic Charter. The American government spoke against territorial changes that did not occur in accordance with the wishes of the peoples concerned. All people had the right to choose the form of government under which they will live.<sup>43</sup> Hull elaborated on the point in the basic statement of policy drafted on July 23, 1942. He maintained that the American government had always and would continue to employ its influence to support the achievement of freedom by all peoples who had shown themselves worthy.<sup>44</sup>

Policy-planners within the Department of State anticipated the development of several problems in the post-war period, many of which would be of relevance to the Middle East. The question of boundary changes connected to ethnic claims was particularly important. The policy-planners feared that if disunity prevailed in Eastern and Central Europe and especially in the Middle East, the result would be "revanchism and balkanisation." The main concerns in this context were the principles of

territorial integrity and national (state) sovereignty, primarily based on the pre-Second World War status quo. Thus, demands for boundary changes based on historical/ethnic grounds, related to the settlements of 1919, would not be favoured.<sup>45</sup> This policy reflected the position generally adopted by the US, as based on the principles of the Atlantic Charter and against any territorial changes. The *status quo* should be preserved and remain unaltered.<sup>46</sup>

### *The Irano-Soviet Oil Crisis*

The Iranian crisis in the winter of 1945–1946 was rooted in Allied operations and policies in the country during the war. However, one serious development in late 1944 aggravated both Soviet-Iranian and Soviet-American tensions, namely the oil crisis.<sup>47</sup> The Irano-Soviet oil crisis has been labelled a land-mark in terms of the reorientation of Soviet policy both in and towards Iran.<sup>48</sup>

The Iranian government had invited American oil companies to seek an agreement regarding oil concessions in Iran. Iran's Commercial Attaché in Washington asked the Standard Vacuum Oil Company whether the company had any such interests.<sup>49</sup> Gerald Nash has asserted that both Roosevelt and his policy-planners had in fact been highly interested in Middle Eastern oil since 1943. Some years earlier, the Texas Company and the Standard Oil Company of California, had jointly exploited the oil fields of Saudi Arabia. Already in 1942 there were fears both within the US administration and the oil companies that the British were seeking to have the Americans expelled.<sup>50</sup> By early 1944, the American-owned Sinclair Oil Company and Standard-Vacuum Company were negotiating with the Iranians on the question of oil concessions.<sup>51</sup> The American bid led the British to follow suit, which in turn resulted in strong US governmental support of the American companies' efforts. One development which symbolised American penetration into Iran was that the Department of State backed the bids of US companies for oil concessions.<sup>52</sup>

The Soviets were entirely excluded from the deliberations which took place during 1944<sup>53</sup> between the US and British governments on Middle Eastern oil.<sup>54</sup> While the Americans and the British were close to each other in their efforts to gain concessions and were welcomed by the Iranians, similar Soviet demands<sup>55</sup> were refused as Iran's Prime Minister announced that no country would be granted concession until after the war.<sup>56</sup> This Iranian decision was taken in accordance with a bill passed through the *Majlis*, which forbade the government to negotiate with any foreign power

without the approval of the *Majlis*.<sup>57</sup> The Soviets were most disturbed by this development and Irano-Soviet relations consequently suffered. In late 1944, after their demands for oil concessions subsided, the Soviets began interfering more extensively in the most critical elements of Iranian domestic affairs.<sup>58</sup> The oil crisis, as Stephen McFarland has concluded, acted as a catalyst to the Soviet-American confrontation over Iran.<sup>59</sup> The Soviets adopted means outside of ordinary diplomatic channels designed to exert pressure on the Iranian government to accept Soviet requests for oil concessions. Soviet activities in supporting the Azeris and the Kurds was the primary element in this direction.

The oil crisis revealed many aspects of inter-Allied relations, as well as the nature of Soviet policy and the actual aims of the Americans in Iran. It has frequently been concluded that the Soviets did in fact openly support the Kurds by late 1944.<sup>60</sup> However, the American Consul in Tabriz remarked that Kurdish activities had increased notably even before the eruption of the oil crisis.<sup>61</sup> The oil crisis of 1944 must nevertheless be viewed as one of the most important factors that influenced the political climate in Iran both in internal and international terms. Iran's relation with the US, with Great Britain and particularly with the Soviet Union were affected. The crisis combined with developments in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, including alleged Soviet involvement in the events in these areas, resulted in further Iranian demands for US support against the Soviets.<sup>62</sup> Iranian domestic politics were also involved since Soviet support of left-wing elements and the nationalist movements in Azerbaijan and in Kurdistan now crystallised.<sup>63</sup> After the departure of Kavtaradze's mission from Tehran in December 1944, the Soviets began to solidify their control over their zone of occupation. Moreover, at the Yalta Conference of February 4–9, 1945, the Soviets appeared less flexible than ever before. They rejected the British proposals of *pari passu* withdrawal of the Allied forces from Iran.<sup>64</sup> The dilemma persisted through 1945 and a part of 1946, until an agreement was reached between Iran and the Soviet Union.

Analysing Soviet objectives and interests in Iran, George Kennan, the American Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow, concluded that the Soviet bid for oil concessions indicated attempts at Soviet penetration of Iran as well as Soviet concerns over prestige. The Soviets wished to prevent any other power from exploiting oil in northern Iran, and might have been aware of US resistance to Soviet aims in northern Iran.<sup>65</sup> It should be emphasised that the Soviet interference and refusal to withdraw its forces from northern Iran was strongly interwoven with the oil crisis.<sup>66</sup> To conclude this discussion, while the oil crisis resulted in changes in US relations with Great Britain on the Iranian scene, it also intensified rivalry between the

two Western powers on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. Furthermore, the development also proved significant to Iranian affairs since it fuelled Soviet interest in the nationalist movements of the Kurds and the Azeris.<sup>67</sup>

### *The Soviet Union's Kurdish Policy*

According to Wallace Murray, the American Ambassador in Iran, the main Soviet objective in its occupation zone was the promotion of “regional consciousness and dissatisfaction with central Government.” This could result in separation and the probable incorporation of those areas into the Soviet Union. Murray emphasised that the primary Soviet aim was the creation of a so-called “popular” government in Tehran, similar to the Groza régime in Rumania, which would consist of men under Soviet influence who would be hostile to other foreign nations.<sup>68</sup> A short time later Murray also contended that Soviet intentions included access to the Persian Gulf and penetration of the entire Near East. In Iran, the Soviets wished at least to maintain predominant influence in the northern provinces.<sup>69</sup> Others, such as Charles Baxter, Head of Eastern Department of Foreign Office, argued that the Soviets were supporting the Kurds and the Azeris in order to bring pressure on both Turkey and Iran.<sup>70</sup> Robert Rossow has asserted that Soviet policy in Iran was one component in a grand strategy aimed at enhancing Soviet influence throughout Eastern Mediterranean, Suez, and the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. According to Rossow, the Soviet Union thus paid close attention to Iran and to Iranian Azerbaijan in particular,<sup>71</sup> where Soviet political undertakings coincided with the rise of the Azeri and the Kurdish nationalist movements.

In March 1946, George Kennan cabled Washington, expressing his view on Soviet aims in Iran. Kennan stated that the main Soviet goal was to bring to power in Tehran a régime that would accept all Soviet demands, particularly those concerning oil concessions and the maintenance of Soviet armed forces in Iran. The USSR would exploit Iranian elements in order to secure its aims in the country.<sup>72</sup> The Iranian government had in reality already informed the Americans that the Soviets were actively utilising the Kurds and the Azeris for their own purposes.<sup>73</sup> The Soviet Union did wish to use the Azerbaijan issue in exerting pressure on the central government in Tehran, but the objective was not to separate Azerbaijan from Iran.<sup>74</sup> Bruce Kuniholm has contended that Soviet diplomacy in northern Iran, particularly concerning support of the Azeris and the Kurds, was intended to prevent any foreign power from

establishing a foothold in northern Iran. The Soviets also wished to construct an outer defence zone for Russia's southern boundary and simultaneously counter-balance other foreign penetrations.<sup>75</sup> Independently of other factors, it is evident that it was in the interest of the Soviets to back the Kurds and the Azeris. This policy must be seen in light of Soviet interests in Iran and in the Middle East, and in light of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the two Western powers.

It has been claimed that the Soviets sought to enhance their influence in Iran during 1944, especially as of the autumn,<sup>76</sup> but there is disagreement over this claim. There are also different views on when the shift in Soviet policy towards the Kurds occurred. The change in the Soviet attitude towards Iran and the issues related thereto was not correlated only to the oil crisis. The redirection appears to have been equally linked to the progression of the war in favour of the Allies, which included the Soviet Union. The USSR's active role and its strategic and political aims vis-à-vis Iran developed already in 1942–1943 due to a number of factors: 1) the war efforts and the changing course of the war, as the tide of the war turned in the favour of the Allies; 2) relations to the British and the Americans and their policies in Iran, especially their reaction to various Soviet activities in northern Iran; and 3) the growth of American and Soviet interests in Iran.

Soviet pressure on Iran and efforts to increase its influence in the country escalated at the same time as the USSR expelled Germany from Soviet soil. Some time in 1943, the Soviets had determined to eliminate or at least to curtail British influence in Iran.<sup>77</sup> The Soviets also adopted a more active role in events in Kurdistan as the USSR achieved decisive military victories in the war against Germany.<sup>78</sup> The successful battle of Stalingrad of winter 1942–1943 led to a relaxation of German pressure on the USSR, and this entailed that the Soviets had more time to devote to the promotion of their interests in Iran for the coming post-war era. The Soviet Union was to pursue a more active foreign policy towards Iran and to become ever more involved in Iranian political affairs, both domestic and international.<sup>79</sup> Parallel to its counter-offensive on German troops in 1943, the Soviet Union undertook a diplomatic offensive in the Middle East. For example, the Soviets resumed their diplomatic relations with Cairo in August 1943, and Vice People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Ivan Maisky visited Arab countries and held "friendly talks" with Arab leaders.<sup>80</sup> Changes in Soviet policy in the Middle East, notably in Iran, can be viewed in the framework of a more offensive policy launched by the Soviet Union worldwide. In conclusion, it remains clear that Soviet

attempts to secure oil concessions in northern Iran entailed certain crucial developments.

### *Kurds, Iranians, and the Great Powers*

Given the ongoing unrest in the Soviet zone of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, the Iranian authorities attempted to restore order in and control over these provinces in early 1945. As had previously been the case, the central government preferred to employ military means. Graeffe, the Belgian Minister in Tehran, acted in behalf of the Shah and informed the American Ambassador in Tehran that Kurds had attacked towns and slain Iranian policemen. The government thus sought British and American approval in sending Iranian troops to take punitive action against the Kurds. The Soviets denied the Iranian troops access to the area. On behalf of the Shah, Graeffe was to forward an Iranian request to Reader Bullard, the British Ambassador, and to Leland Morris, the American Ambassador, to appeal to their respective governments on this matter.<sup>81</sup> Despite continued requests, the Iranians failed to secure American support in this matter. The American envoy in Tehran feared that the entry of Iranian troops into the Soviet zone would provoke additional trouble in the areas in question.<sup>82</sup> However, as Kurdistan continued to be plagued by instability, US officials followed the situation closely. Morris informed the Department of State of Kurdish raids on the town of Mahabad south of Lake Rezaieh, and of the possibility of bringing in Iranian forces from Saqiz, which lay outside of the Soviet zone.

It was presumed that the Soviet authorities were involved in the disturbances, or were at the very least hindering Iranian troops from quelling the Kurdish attack on Iranian forces.<sup>83</sup> However, Baxter asserted that there was no confirmation of the reported barring of Iranian troops by the Soviets.<sup>84</sup> Adding that the Soviets did lie behind the agitation of the Kurds and the Azeris, Baxter noted that there was no concrete evidence to that effect.<sup>85</sup> Discussions were initiated between the Iranian Minister of War, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Iranian Chief of Staff and the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran. The Iranians sought to persuade the Soviets to allow Iranian forces into the Kurdish areas concerned. However, both the Kurds and the Soviets expressed opposition to the entrance of troops to Mahabad,<sup>86</sup> with the Soviets arguing that “the troops would simply provoke trouble from the Kurds.”<sup>87</sup>

By perpetually reminding the Americans of the dire circumstances in the Soviet-controlled areas of Kurdistan, the Iranians were acting to secure

American involvement in matters that were in fact of domestic character and that also involved Soviet-Iranian relations. Thus, the question was not so much whether Iranian forces would be allowed to move into the Kurdish areas: in reality, the Iranian forces designated for action in Mahabad were too weak to successfully combat the armed Kurds in the town. General Derakhshani, Commander of Iranian Forces in Tabriz, noted that the armed Kurds in Mahabad and near the town, estimated at some 6,000 men, were strong enough to expel any armed Iranian force which would be sent to Mahabad.<sup>88</sup>

The risk of heightened Soviet-American tension was evident in early 1945, when the Iranian government appealed to the Americans to exert pressure on the Soviets regarding the dispatch of Iranian troops to troubled areas.<sup>89</sup> In the Spring of 1945, the US Ambassador to Tehran was instructed by the Department of State to advise the Iranian government that it could send troops to Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in accordance with the provisions of the Tri-Partite Treaty and the Tehran Declaration (December 1943). If the Soviets objected to this action, the Iranians could approach the US and the British governments. This same message was forwarded to the Iranian government via the Iranian Minister in Washington.<sup>90</sup> On September 25, 1945 Murray warned the Department of State of the harmful consequences that Soviet domination of northern Iran could have on American interests in Iran and the Middle East. He emphasised that the areas which might negatively be affected were those in which US airline, commercial and oil interests were involved. Moreover, Soviet control would entail the extension of Soviet influence to the shores of the Persian Gulf, and this would pose a potential threat to substantial American oil holdings in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait.<sup>91</sup>

The Soviet view and actions vis-à-vis the Kurds in Iran were part of the general background to the situation. The Iranian Foreign Minister presented complaints to the Soviet government regarding this matter. In a letter to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, the Iranian Foreign Minister stated that Kurds in northern Kurdistan had obtained arms, and this was especially true in Rezaieh and Mahabad; that a number of Kurdish chieftains had paid a visit to Baku; and that Mulla Mustafa Barzani (henceforth Mulla Mustafa) had entered Iran with a number of followers in autumn of 1945.<sup>92</sup> In late November, the American Embassy in Tehran dispatched several observers to Tabriz to investigate events in the area and to assess whether these could be linked to Soviet support of the Kurdish and Azeri nationalist movements.

Meanwhile, in a note of protest to the Soviet leadership, the Iranian government expressed its concerns about the Soviet role in the distur-

bances. One issue was the support by Soviet authorities of rebelling Kurdish chiefs. However, the Soviet reply to this contention was in the words of the Iranian Ambassador in Washington “extremely flimsy” and placed the blame on the Iranians themselves.<sup>93</sup> In a report on the situation in Azerbaijan, Loy W. Henderson, Director of the NEA, spoke of developments in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan in late 1945. He claimed that the state of affairs in the area would have repercussions both on internal Iranian affairs, inter-Allied relations and US interests in Iran. Henderson argued that US policy had been based not only on the will to support a friendly nation, but also on the need to prevent the Iranian question from becoming a threat to international security and Allied solidarity. These objectives were correlated to American interests with regards to Iran. Henderson emphasised that the US had a direct interest in the question due to its oil, economic, and strategic considerations in this area.<sup>94</sup>

## Chapter Six

# THE KURDISH QUESTION IN IRAQ DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

This chapter deals with the Kurds in Iraq during the Second World War. Although the present study focuses mainly on the Kurds in Iran, there are several reasons for devoting a chapter to the Kurds in Iraq and to the uprisings in the Barzan area in particular. There was a close interaction between events in Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan during the period under study. The Barzani Kurds of Iraq and Mulla Mustafa in particular played a distinct role in political developments in Iranian Kurdistan, after Mulla Mustafa's expulsion from Iraq in the autumn of 1945. The Barzanis, under the leadership of Mulla Mustafa, were the focal point of political developments in Iraqi Kurdistan during the war years. For instance, studying British policy in both Iran and Iraq provides an interesting opportunity for a comparison of the policy adopted toward the Kurdish question in the two states.

### *The Kurds in Iraq Prior to the Second World War*

The area which later became the state of Iraq was occupied by Great Britain during the First World War. In accordance with the San Remo Conference, Iraq became a state in the form of a British mandate in 1920. Assurances of autonomy for the Kurds within Iraq's border were also given at this time, but these promises were not materialised. No Kurdish concessions were stipulated in the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930, according to which Iraq was to become independent.<sup>1</sup> The majority of the Kurds in Iraq were unsatisfied with this treaty and therefore boycotted the elections which preceded its ratification. A large number of Kurds demonstrated against the treaty in the city of Sulaimaniya on September 6, 1930. The Iraqi government, supported by the British, retaliated with violence, killing 30 of the demonstrators and wounding many more. September 6, 1930, has thereafter being called "Rozh% Rash", meaning "the Black Day."<sup>2</sup> Seeking to exploit the situation, Shaikh Mahmud Barzinji of Sulaimaniya, who had led several uprisings in 1919–1927, once again led a Kurdish rebellion demanding "autonomy" for Kurdistan. Shaikh Mahmud attempted to flee to Persia in March 1931 following a struggle against the

Iraqi forces, but was prevented and was ultimately forced to surrender to the Iraqi authorities. He was consequently deported to southern Iraq where he was forced to live under surveillance in Nasriyah, in southern Iraq.<sup>3</sup>

During this same period, 1930–1931, Iraqi Kurdish leaders appealed to the League of Nations to erect an independent Kurdish state or to at least grant the Kurds political and national rights within Iraq, but in vain.<sup>4</sup> The 1930s also witnessed a rise in political activity embodied in political parties and associations. In 1935, a Kurdish association known as *Komala-y Azād-ī Kurd*, the Kurdish Freedom Association, was founded in Sulaimaniya. One of the main objectives of this body was to unite all parts of Kurdistan and to establish a Kurdish state. In 1938, the Kurdish association *Komala-y Birāyat- ī Kurd*, the Kurdish Fraternity Association, was formed. The most influential political party which appeared at the end of 1930s was the *Hīwā* Party.<sup>5</sup> These various political activities were marked by the fact that they were conducted by civil servants, students, wage-earners and other urban strata. A significant change was now taking place within the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq. The most important development was that the Kurdish leadership considerably shifted to urban centres.

### *During the Second World War*

In the Kurdish-Iraqi conflict during the war years, no homogeneous position existed in either the Kurdish or the Iraqi camp. Iraqi governments were themselves divided on how to deal with the Kurdish question. It has been maintained that the conflict between Kurds and the Iraqi government came to split the ruling establishment into “hawks” who favoured a military solution, and “doves”, supported by Kurdish intellectuals, advocating reforms throughout the field of Kurdish relations.<sup>6</sup> The lack of unison was more acute in the case of the Kurds. The “traditional” leadership, which was tribal, preferred military means to achieve Kurdish aspirations. Kurdish intellectuals and educated elements representing the urban part of the Kurdish society, organised in political parties and associations or non-organised, advocated a political solution. In addition, certain prominent Kurdish personalities espoused collaboration with the Iraqi government. These individuals sought to appease the Kurdish areas and to redress the grievances of the Kurds by working through the Iraqi government.<sup>7</sup> However the hawks prevailed both within the Iraqi government and among the Kurds.<sup>8</sup>

At the time, Iraqi Kurdistan comprised two centres of resistance against the government, one at Sulaimaniya and the other in the Barzan area. The latter had been a centre of uprisings against the Ottoman authorities already prior to the formation of the state of Iraq. The existence of more than one main point of resistance led the American Minister in Baghdad, for instance, to state that the Kurds had “no leaders who seem ready and able to lead their people in a successful struggle for autonomy within the Iraqi state or for independence.”<sup>9</sup> In fact, a few leaders did attain a certain degree of popularity among the Kurds, namely Mulla Mustafa of Barzan and Shaikh Mahmud Barzinji of Sulaimaniya. Yet neither had the ability to mobilise and unite the Kurds or to lead a united Kurdish nationalist movement. Furthermore, a rivalry existed between the Barzani leaders and Shaikh Mahmud over power and socio-political status.



Because of the relatively weakened position of the British in Iraq in the early 1940s combined with the increased political activity of diverse organisations and the uprisings of the 1920s and 1930s, the way was once more paved for upheavals in Iraqi Kurdistan. Moreover, the deterioration of the conditions of the Kurds in Iraq was drastic, and even the British authorities were aware of the failure of the Iraqi government to improve or to reasonably deal with the situation. The decline in conditions was reflected in general dissatisfaction among the Kurds. The British Ambassador in Baghdad described the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan as unsatisfactory.<sup>10</sup> On another occasion, the Ambassador also noted that while there was no direct evidence of positive discrimination against the Kurds, it was clear that Iraqi governments had consistently adopted a negative attitude towards the Kurds and their grievances.<sup>11</sup> In a memorandum sent to London from the British Embassy in Baghdad, it was stated that the Kurds in Iraq were “victims of incompetent and dishonest administration and of the economic policy (or, rather, the lack of one) of the Iraqi Government... they [the Kurds] have certainly very real grievances against the Government, which no serious attempt has yet been made to remove.”<sup>12</sup>

In light of such conditions, a revolt led by Mulla Mustafa erupted in Iraqi Kurdistan in the Barzan area in 1943.<sup>13</sup> The British Embassy in Baghdad reported that Mulla Mustafa was leading the revolt and was protesting that neither his own grievances nor those of his fellow Kurds had been handled by the Iraqi government in a satisfactory manner.<sup>14</sup> The British Embassy in Baghdad received two letters, one from Mulla Mustafa and the other from a certain “Kurdish Leadership Headquarter” which was

not involved in Mulla Mustafa's/Barzan uprising. In both letters, the Iraqi government was accused of failing to find a reasonable solution to the Kurdish problem.<sup>15</sup> The British did not adopt a clear policy in criticising the Iraqi government on this point. The British wished to make it perfectly clear that they themselves were in no way responsible for the Kurdish predicament in Iraq. Yet they simultaneously sought to exploit the conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi government to their own advantage, in further strengthening their position in Iraq. It seems reasonable to conclude that the British could have resolved the Kurdish problem in the period 1920–1932 during which Iraq was a British mandate. Even after Iraq became independent in 1932, the British maintained considerable influence on Iraqi governmental policies.

### *The Mulla Mustafa Uprising 1943–1945*

The Barzan area was home to an upheaval in late 1943 and early 1944. This uprising entailed armed attacks on Iraqi police posts and worried both the British and Iraqi authorities. In Iraq, the persistence of such troubles weakened the position of the Iraqi government and caused general instability on the political arena in the country, especially in Kurdistan.<sup>16</sup> From the British point of view, the situation in the Barzan area was described as an embarrassment to the war effort of His Majesty's government.<sup>17</sup> The British were eager to see an end to these disturbances and therefore contacted Mulla Mustafa in order to familiarise themselves with his demands. Mulla Mustafa appealed to the British Ambassador to Baghdad to instruct the Iraqi government to pardon him and to release the other Barzan chieftains who were detained at Hilla (in southern Iraq). In return, Mulla Mustafa pledged to keep the peace and to preserve order, although it was clear that he wished to maintain undisturbed control of the Barzan area.<sup>18</sup>

The correspondence between the British Embassy in Baghdad and Mulla Mustafa suggests that the rebel wished to give the impression that he had grievances against the Iraqi government, but not against the British. Mulla Mustafa made it clear to the British representatives in Baghdad that he was ready and willing to obey the British government, for which "he expressed his deep affection in eloquent terms."<sup>19</sup> This might be interpreted as a calculated measure aiming to create a conflict between the British and the Iraqi authorities concerning the attitude of the two towards the upheaval in Barzan. Mulla Mustafa was not, however, successful in his attempts. Although they often criticised the Iraqi authorities for failing to

deal with the situation, the British were determined to put an end to the uprising. Evaluating British policy towards the Barzan uprising, the American Legation in Baghdad concluded that British sympathy for Mulla Mustafa was clear to both the rebel himself and to the government in Baghdad. However, the British admitted their long-term interests in Iraq, and these necessitated support of the government in Baghdad. Thus, while the British agreed that the Iraqi government should grant certain concessions to Mulla Mustafa, they simultaneously backed the Iraqi army against his uprising.<sup>20</sup> In fact, the British Embassy in Baghdad issued a warning to Mulla Mustafa on December 21, 1943 in the name of the British government, which clearly stated that the British government was obliged to view Mulla Mustafa's intentions as unfriendly.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, while there is evidence suggesting that the British had some limited appreciation of Kurdish grievances, this was overwhelmed by British support for and alliance with the Iraqi government. The British diplomatic records of the time do not indicate any British sympathy with Mulla Mustafa's cause. In fact, it appears that in their relations with the Iraqi government, and in light of the government's weakening position in the face of the uprising, the British exploited the situation in Kurdistan to score political points.

It is equally important to point out that Mulla Mustafa's correspondence with the British Embassy in Baghdad reveals the fact that the rebel's demands were *local* in character, and thus failed to mention the general grievances of the Kurds as an ethno-national group in Iraq. The Iraqi and British governments both sought options that might bring an end to the Barzan rebellion.<sup>22</sup> The British government and its representatives in Baghdad hoped that the Iraqi government would adopt a conciliatory position and thus facilitate a peaceful resolution. While the British were more flexible and open to Mulla Mustafa's complaints and to the plight of the Kurds in general, the Iraqi government would accept only the complete surrender of Mulla Mustafa.<sup>23</sup>



The Iraqi government did, however, attempt to deliberate with Mulla Mustafa through various negotiators. In the autumn of 1943, General Muhammed Sa'id al-Takriti, the commander of the Iraqi forces in northern Iraq, was authorised by his government to undertake negotiations with Mulla Mustafa. The subsequent meetings were marked by the unwillingness of either part to compromise. Mulla Mustafa's demands included full pardon for himself and his men, including police and army

deserters; consideration of his claims on the return of sequestered lands in the Barzan district belonging to his family; and permission for the other Barzani Shaikhs, now in *résidence forcée* at Hilla, to return to Kurdistan.<sup>24</sup> The negotiating terms of the Iraqi government were that Mulla Mustafa should accept unconditional surrender and throw himself upon the mercy of the Government.<sup>25</sup> The British Embassy in Baghdad and British advisers in Iraq attempted to persuade each side to compromise. Major C. J. Edmonds, a long-time British Adviser to the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior and an authority on Kurds, drafted a formal proposal to this end. The provisions stipulated by Edmonds and under which Mulla Mustafa was to submit to the Iraqi authorities assumed the integrity of the Iraqi government. The terms presented to Mulla Mustafa were: 1) after their submission, Mulla Mustafa and his men would be pardoned while other elements such as deserters from army and police would not be granted a pardon; 2) the return of detained Barzani Shaikhs in the southern city of Hilla would be reconsidered by the Iraqi authorities; 3) the return of the Barzani Shaikhs' land was also to be reconsidered; 4) Mulla Mustafa and his men were to surrender all captured arms and ammunition.<sup>26</sup>

Given the nature of these terms, Mulla Mustafa would have virtually thrown himself at the mercy of the Iraqi government had he accepted them. Furthermore, the terms did not oblige the government to give any favourable considerations to Mulla Mustafa's claims. Acceptance of the terms would also imply that Mulla Mustafa would find himself in the same situation as prior to his flight, namely in a state of *résidence forcée*.

Mulla Mustafa expressed disapproval of Edmonds' proposal, stating that he would prefer an honourable death to submission to the Iraqi government. Yet he suggested that he was willing to submit to the British, or to come to an agreement with the Iraqi government on the basis of a British guarantee that the terms would be carried out.<sup>27</sup> According to the American Legation in Baghdad, by late December 1943, the British government did exert pressure on the Iraqi government via the Ambassador, the British Military Mission to the Iraqi army, and the British advisers in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, to arrange a peaceful settlement.<sup>28</sup>

### *Further Negotiations with Mulla Mustafa*

The Iraqi government also sought negotiations with Mulla Mustafa through Majid Mustafa, Minister without portfolio for Kurdish Affairs, and himself a moderate Kurdish nationalist.<sup>29</sup> At a meeting in Mergasur, the administrative centre of the Barzan area, Mulla Mustafa and Majid Mustafa

discussed prospects of a peaceful end to the revolt. Accordingly proposals were presented: a) that Mulla Mustafa would be allowed to reside in a village outside the Barzan area; b) that Mulla Mustafa's brother Shaikh Ahmed Barzani, the head of the Barzani tribe, and his followers would be allowed to return to their homes; c) that Kurdish officers would be appointed to work with the pacification in Barzan area under Majid Mustafa's direction; d) that grain would be sent to the areas that had suffered from fighting; e) that Iraqi troops would be withdrawn from Mergasur, but some police posts would be re-established in that area.<sup>30</sup>

Majid Mustafa drafted a report evaluating events in Barzan, in which he distinguished between the legitimate complaints of the Kurds on the one hand and the self-interest of certain Kurdish elements on the other. He furthermore pointed out that the entire situation was mainly the result of the failure of the Iraqi administration to deal with the plight of the Kurdish population. Majid Mustafa also maintained that certain elements, and Mulla Mustafa in particular, were exploiting the political instability and grievances of the population in Kurdistan for their own benefit. As far as Mulla Mustafa and his followers were concerned, they had been treated poorly by the Iraqi authorities in Sulaimaniya, their place of "exile."<sup>31</sup> Majid Mustafa's attempts to reach a peaceful solution to the Barzan problem proved futile.

On June 16, 1944, Kunahan Cornwallis, the British Ambassador to Baghdad, met with the Iraqi Minister of the Interior to further discuss the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan and the Barzan uprising in particular. The Minister argued that force should be employed only as a last resort and that every effort should first be made to gain the confidence of Mulla Mustafa and persuade him to relinquish his arms and disperse his following.<sup>32</sup> There is no evidence as to whether the Ambassador wholly agreed with this position. However, he was convinced that the best option to solve the Barzan problem was to isolate Mulla Mustafa from the entire Kurdish question. This could be accomplished by satisfying Kurdish demands via the adoption of a generous policy. Cornwallis also suggested that the Iraqi government immediately announce a programme to improve the state of affairs in Kurdistan.<sup>33</sup> The Ambassador was convinced that once his suggestion was followed, Mulla Mustafa, instead of being considered a champion of Kurdish rights, would most likely "relapse into his proper place."<sup>34</sup> The meeting resulted in an agreement on three main points aimed at solving the Barzan problem, according to which the government should:

- (a) immediately make it known that it intended to adopt a generous policy towards the Kurds;

(b) urgently consider what projects – schools, hospitals, roads, etc., – should be undertaken this year. Publicity should be given to the programme amongst the Kurds and actual work started as soon as possible.

(c) remove the garrison from Bille [administrative district in Barzan area].<sup>35</sup>

The Minister of the Interior, who was known to have an anti-Kurdish attitude, was unwilling to take the necessary steps to realise what had been agreed upon between him and Cornwallis. The Minister sought to at least temporarily hinder point b by noting that there was no “budgetary provision,” and point c by stating that the withdrawal of the garrison from Bille required time.<sup>36</sup> Shortly after the meeting, Iraq's Prime Minister made a statement on June 24, in which he made it clear that the government had no intentions of undertaking any specific programme for the Kurdish areas. Two days later, Mulla Mustafa sent a letter to Iraq's Prime Minister and in the name of the Barzani and Zēbārī tribes, he appealed to the government to meet the request for reforms.<sup>37</sup> The British Ambassador reacted to this letter by sending a message to Mulla Mustafa, urging him to leave politics.<sup>38</sup>



Further attempts were also made to persuade Mulla Mustafa to disperse his armed following and to surrender the rifles which he had captured from Iraqi armed forces last autumn. In return for Mulla Mustafa's co-operation in this matter, it was understood that Iraqi troops at Bille would be withdrawn.<sup>39</sup> Major Kinch, Acting Political Adviser, Northern Area, was to impel Mulla Mustafa to cease hostilities against the government, while also warning him that in the long term, his subversive policy would ultimately result in disaster for him and misery for his people.<sup>40</sup> The British were aware of the fact that Mulla Mustafa had by this time extended his influence over the area between ‘Amadiyah, ‘Aqrah and Rawanduz and the Turkish and Persian frontiers. Mulla Mustafa was also working on an alliance with the chiefs of the Zēbārī tribe. Kinch's impression was that any settlement between Mulla Mustafa and the Iraqi government would be difficult to reach. He furthermore maintained that the policy of appeasing Mulla Mustafa has failed, and that the only alternative left for the Iraqi government was to prepare the army for a campaign against the rebel leader. However, the British Ambassador advised the government in London that it was in the interest of the British that trouble in Kurdistan be avoided at this time.<sup>41</sup>

The uprising of Mulla Mustafa persisted and efforts to solve the problem via negotiations repeatedly failed.<sup>42</sup> The desire of the Iraqi government to implement a military solution increased accordingly. British anxiety over the upheaval and the general situation in Kurdistan became ever more evident. First, the British feared that the revolt would lead to co-operation among Kurds throughout greater Kurdistan. The idea might spread to other parts of Iraq.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, the Kurds in Iraq might seek contact with the Soviet Union and thus become instrumental in the advancement of Soviet aims. The British view must be understood in light of Great Britain's strategic and economic interests in the area. The revolt could, for instance, result in a situation where Iraqi officers would be instigated to take action against the British in Iraq. In a telegram sent from Arshad al-'Umari, Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the British Embassy in Baghdad, the situation in Kurdistan was described as grave. The Minister feared that serious trouble might erupt not later than the autumn, and that comprehensive action was being planned, embracing not only Kurdish tribesmen in Iraq but also those in Persia and Turkey. According to the Minister, recent reports from Tabriz clearly indicated that Russia had a part in all of this.<sup>44</sup> The British were, however, informed by Iraq's Minister of Foreign Affairs that there was no evidence of Soviet activity in the Barzan area. On the other hand, the Minister felt that there was reason to suspect that emissaries from Mulla Mustafa had been sent to Iranian Kurdistan, where they might have been in contact with subversive elements.<sup>45</sup> The Minister was particularly interested in the regional dimension of developments in Kurdistan. An extensive Kurdish uprising might encourage the Kurds in Iran into similar action, where the government would be nearly powerless in the face of such a development, and the Kurds in Turkey, where the government had the strength to deal quite severely with the Kurds. The Minister felt that any major Kurdish rebellion in Iraq could trigger Turkish incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan for the purpose of "restoring order." It was therefore urgent that the Iraqi government take action to remedy the situation before it worsened.<sup>46</sup>

The Iraqi government wished to keep the Americans informed of Iraqi intentions and of which measures the Iraqi government would adopt against the Barzan uprising. Accordingly, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was also the Acting Minister of Defence, told the American Minister in Baghdad that the Iraqi government planned to launch a far-reaching campaign against the Barzan uprising.<sup>47</sup> The British Ambassador himself was convinced that Mulla Mustafa's position was crystallising and

that peaceful measures would not be fruitful. Yet the Ambassador stated that the head of the British Military Mission in Iraq and others estimated that the Iraqi army was in no condition to assume military action against Mulla Mustafa.<sup>48</sup> The best option, the Ambassador argued, was to evacuate areas which could not be protected and to isolate the area economically. Furthermore and in accordance with the suggestions of certain British officers, the Iraqi government should at once begin intensive work to reorganise and train the army, to include the formation of a mountain division. The question of British aircraft assistance to the Iraqi army figured in every action that was to be undertaken against the men of Mulla Mustafa. The Ambassador made it clear to the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs that no such assistance could be expected, since the British had quite enough on their hands and had neither the men nor the equipment to spare for undertakings in Kurdistan.<sup>49</sup> From the autumn of 1944 and up to the collapse of the uprising in late 1945, the international dimension of the Barzan uprising became ever more significant. Potential Soviet involvement in the uprising did increase, and this in turn fuelled American concerns.

### *American Concerns*

The deterioration of affairs in Iraqi Kurdistan, mainly in the Barzan area, represented a source of concern to the Americans.<sup>50</sup> The Department of State ordered Loy W. Henderson, the American Minister in Baghdad, to gather precise information on the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan and the attitude of the British and the Iraqi governments towards the issue. On August 14, 1944 Henderson met with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Arshad al-'Umari, who made a number of points relating to the Kurdish question. Al-'Umari emphasised that the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan should be viewed as an international rather than an exclusively internal Iraqi issue. He furthermore claimed that the establishment of an independent Kurdistan would affect the territorial integrity of Iran, Iraq and Turkey. Such a development might, as al-'Umari concluded, also be of varying degrees of interest to the Great Powers, namely Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the US.<sup>51</sup>

However, the state of affairs in Iraqi Kurdistan continued to worsen during 1945. Members of the Iraqi government felt that their patience was wearing thin, and the British in Baghdad could appreciate the Iraqi government's point of view.<sup>52</sup> Yet both the British representatives and the Iraqi government believed that they might still persuade Mulla Mustafa to

dissolve his commando and lay down his arms. The attitude prevailing among both Iraqi ministers and the British representatives in Iraq was that if Mulla Mustafa were not put down, no peace could be expected in the north.<sup>53</sup> The British were now prepared to co-operate with the Iraqi government in terminating the Barzan uprising. The British sent a warning via the British Ambassador in Baghdad to Mulla Mustafa, asserting “that this is the last warning he [Mulla Mustafa] may expect from his Majesty’s Embassy and that if he persists in ignoring it, the consequences will be upon his own head.”<sup>54</sup> Although the British and Iraqi governments at last agreed upon the necessity of military operation in the Barzan area, there were signs of discord between the two sides. For instance, the British military advisers wished to refrain from any rash or hasty action. These differences were resolved in connection with a meeting between Iraq’s Prime Minister and the British Ambassador in Baghdad,<sup>55</sup> and in August 1945, the Iraqi Army was prepared for a major operation against the uprising.

When the operation against Mulla Mustafa was launched,<sup>56</sup> the First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, A. H. Tandy, was summoned to the NE at the Department of State on September 7, 1945. In the conversation between Tandy and Gordon Merriam, the Chief of the NE, the latter expressed “some concerns” regarding the campaign against the Kurds in Iraq. Merriam stated that although the campaign was conducted by the Iraqi government, it seemed that its principal features had been drafted by the British and had in fact been realised at the suggestion.<sup>57</sup> While he did not deny the role played by the British in the campaign, Tandy was more interested in discussing the complications which would result from possible Soviet support of the Kurds in Iraq, and whether the active participation of the British in the campaign might result in a struggle between the Soviets and the British. Merriam pointed out that the campaign might result in Soviet reluctance to withdraw its troops from Iran after the end of the war.<sup>58</sup>

The course of this conversation created unrest among the British who wished to know the exact reason for the Chief of NE’s concerns. Upon receipt of the report of the conversation G. H. Thompson, British Chargé d’Affaires in Baghdad, reacted to the formulation “some concern” with alarm, and therefore asked the Second Secretary at the American Legation in Baghdad, Robert G. Memminger, whether there was true American anxiety over the role of the British in the campaign in Kurdistan. Memminger pointed out that the campaign in Kurdistan was largely a British-inspired measure and was in itself a cause of concern not only to the Kurds, Iraqis and British, but indeed to every country interested in inter-

national stability. He furthermore stated that even if one accepted the British claim that the campaign was originally suggested by the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, the British could probably have stifled the campaign in its inception.<sup>59</sup>

Regarding potential Soviet involvement in the uprising, Thompson the British Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad, maintained that he had seen no evidence confirming a Soviet connection to the situation.<sup>60</sup> However, this question brought conflicting reports from different sources. There were certain claims that the Soviets were encouraging Kurdish ex-officers of the Iraqi army, a number of whom were in Iranian Kurdistan at the time.<sup>61</sup> There is nevertheless no direct evidence confirming any type of Soviet support for Mulla Mustafa's uprising. In fact, in a conversation which took place in Spring 1947, Mulla Mustafa asserted that he had made various attempts to gain Soviet support for his activities, and that the Soviets have proved reluctant to become involved in the Barzan uprising.<sup>62</sup>

The American Legation in Baghdad followed the news of the campaign and was particularly interested in the British role in the context. Thompson stated that the campaign had gotten off to a poor start yet would ultimately prove successful; that Great Britain did not encourage nor protect any minorities in Iraq since it wished them to become good Iraqis; and that the internal objective was to assist Iraq in securing peace. However, Thompson also stated that he had advised the Iraqi government that the grievances of the Kurds were justified and that the Iraqi authorities should immediately take constructive steps in this matter.<sup>63</sup> The British were concerned over American attention to Kurdish affairs. Accordingly, in late September Tandy gave the Americans the most recent information concerning the campaign. Tandy informed Adrian Colquitt, an official of the Department of State, that the British had provided a number of containers for the air-dropping of supplies, and emphasised that the Iraqi government's adoption of the campaign was necessary for preserving domestic security. Tandy also pointed out that there was no evidence of any Soviet involvement in or support of the Barzan uprising, and that the campaign against the revolt would not affect on-going discussions with the Soviets regarding Middle Eastern problems.<sup>64</sup>

Captain Archibald B. Roosevelt, the American Legation's Assistant Military Attaché, paid a week-long visit to Sulaimaniya in early October 1945 in order to observe the situation. Roosevelt noted that there was growing resentment against the actions of the Iraqi government in Kurdistan. He further reported that the Iraqi authorities in Kurdistan were reliably reported to be arbitrarily arresting Kurds, confining them in concentration camps, and to be performing summary executions of civilians.<sup>65</sup> Both the

American Legation and the British Embassy in Baghdad were aware of the plight of the Kurds, and their common concern led to contact between the two regarding developments in Kurdistan. The British manifested their discontent over the state of affairs while making it clear that the British Ambassador in Baghdad could do as he pleased with Mulla Mustafa or any of his close associates, but was to stress that the Kurdish people must be treated with far greater leniency.<sup>66</sup>

The British Royal Air Forces (RAF) assisted the Iraqi Army in the campaign and Mulla Mustafa and his forces were subsequently forced to retreat and to cross the Iraq-Iranian boundary into Iranian Kurdistan.

There is no evidence of concrete support from the Iranian Kurds for Mulla Mustafa, besides some glorification of the rebel as a nationalist leader. Furthermore, the Barzan uprising had no profound effects upon Iranian Kurdistan, and Mulla Mustafa's flight to Iranian Kurdistan upon the end of the revolt caused no major stir in this area.<sup>67</sup>

When Mulla Mustafa crossed the border into Iran, the Kurds there appeared close to proclaiming an autonomous republic. The British representatives in Iraq and the Iraqi government paid close attention to this combination of developments. Both the British and the Iraqis were concerned over the likelihood that the Kurds in Iraq would somehow be affected by or directly involved in events in Iranian Kurdistan. The British Ambassador sought appropriate measures designed to limit the impact of developments in Iranian Kurdistan on Iraqi Kurdistan. The Ambassador made it clear to the Prime Minister that the Iraqi government should assure the Kurds in Iraq that Kurdish interests would not be neglected. It seemed particularly important that the Kurds in Iraq be prevented from seeking friends elsewhere outside of Iraq.<sup>68</sup>

### *Political Options*

Parallel to the uprising in Barzan, a number of politically nationalist-oriented Kurds wished to draw the attention of the Great Powers to the plight of the Kurdish people. These individuals demanded that the Kurdish question be placed on the agenda of a Peace Conference to be held in connection with the end of the war. They wished to convince the Great Powers that the Kurds both in Turkey, Iran and Iraq were oppressed and discriminated against, and that they should be granted the status of an independent nation. Meanwhile, many of these Kurds claimed that if independent statehood proved unattainable, they would accept a solution within the framework of Iraq, namely that the Kurds in Iraq would be

granted local autonomy.<sup>69</sup> A petition signed by 28 prominent Kurds of Sulaimaniya, most of whom were tribal and religious leaders, was addressed “in the name of the Kurdish people” to the representatives of the US, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China and France. The appeal cited atrocities committed by the governments of Turkey, Iran and Iraq, who were accused of “massacring” the Kurds in their countries. It was also suggested that an international commission be established to investigate the situation of the Kurds.<sup>70</sup>



Kurdish political parties and Kurdish nationalists were aware of the importance of Great Power support in attaining Kurdish independence or self-rule. In fact, various contacts were made by Kurdish nationalists with Great Powers as well as with the United Nations. The Kurdish *Rîzgārî* Party was one such group. In a memorandum to the UN sent through a number of diplomatic legations and embassies in Baghdad, the *Rîzgārî* presented the grievance of the Kurds and appealed to the international community to support Kurdish demands, which were described as self-determination and sovereignty. In a memorandum, the *Rîzgārî* party complained that the British and the Iraqi governments had together caused the suffering and discontent of the Kurds in Iraq. The party operated underground in Iraqi Kurdistan, yet its complaints were also directed against the governments of Turkey and Iran for oppressing the Kurds. In its memorandum the *Rîzgārî* party, which was characterised as a left-wing organisation, stated that:

The Kurds and their compatriots [the Azeris] owe their freedom to the non-intervention of USSR in their affairs and its refusal to support and help the central government [in Tehran]. But it is quite regrettable that the British authorities in their zone of occupation are supporting morally and even materially the central government of Tehran to frustrate and suppress the national liberation movements, contrary to the provisions of the Atlantic Charter.<sup>71</sup>

The *Rîzgārî* party claimed that the Kurds in the Soviet zone in Iran enjoyed full rights and had been granted full freedom to express their opinions and to revive their own culture.<sup>72</sup>

In a memorandum sent to the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, the *Rîzgārî* Party presented the plight of the Kurds and their quest for national rights. The *Rîzgārî* demanded that the national rights of the Kurds in Iraq be realised and also proclaimed its support for the struggle of the Kurds in Iran. Furthermore, the party requested that the

grievances of the Kurds in Turkey be taken into consideration.<sup>73</sup> The primary aim of the *Rīzgārī* Party in appealing to the Conference of the Foreign Ministers in Moscow was to place the Kurdish question on the agenda. However, there is no evidence that the Kurdish question was in fact discussed, nor is there any evidence in official British, American or UN records that the appeals of the *Rīzgārī* Party were dealt with.

### *Great Britain's Cautious Kurdish Policy*

British policy towards the Kurds in Iraq was generally characterised by caution. This is reflected, for instance, in Great Britain's reaction to the possibility of recruiting Kurds in Iraq to serve in British forces. In 1942, the British discussed the possibility of recruiting Kurds, Armenians, and Assyrians. The question had been raised with the War Office by the Commander-in-Chief-Middle East.<sup>74</sup> The position of the Foreign Office was that such a measure might antagonise majority elements, and would place the British government under obligations to the minorities which might prove impossible to fulfill after the war.<sup>75</sup> Winston Churchill himself discussed the recruitment proposal, and maintained that it would expose him to "much adverse criticism if he were to agree to open recruitment in Iraq for British forces."<sup>76</sup> It appears that the British abstained from making any promises to the Kurds in order to avert the uneasiness of the central government in Baghdad and perhaps of that in Turkey.



British governmental policy towards Iraq was discussed in a staff meeting of the British Embassy in Baghdad, with particular focus on Great Britain's stance towards the Kurds. It was asserted that, in addition to the realisation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, British policy vis-à-vis Iraq entailed three main elements:

- (a) to ensure, by adopting a policy of friendship, that the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people should afford every assistance to our armed forces in a spirit of willing co-operation;
- (b) to encourage the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people to contribute to the war effort, especially by increasing the production of the country;
- (c) in general, to maintain British interests.<sup>77</sup>

The British Ambassador was particularly concerned with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, which had assured non-involvement of the British in Iraq's internal administration. On the other hand, the Ambassa-

dor stated that the sole exception to this had been the case of the Kurds, more precisely the involvement of the Embassy in sending a warning to Mulla Mustafa. At the meeting, the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan was described as unsatisfactory and as requiring most careful monitoring. It was also stated that the conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi government was long-standing and that a solution of the Kurdish question would also be to the advantage of the Iraqi government. On the other hand the Ambassador argued that if the Iraqi Government were forced to implement reforms in Kurdistan against its own will, any subsequent improvements would be only temporary. It was furthermore concluded that the British could do nothing if the Iraqi government turned against the Kurds after the close of the war.<sup>78</sup> However, the Ambassador remarked that he had been involved in efforts to exercise pressure designed to persuade the Iraqi government to adopt a more sympathetic position on the Kurdish problem.<sup>79</sup> The British understood that the fundamental grievance of the Kurds in Iraq was rooted in a Kurdish mistrust of the Arab government in Baghdad.<sup>80</sup> In conclusion, it appears that the British sought some type of balance between the Kurds and the Iraqi government, yet could not abandon their own strategic alliance with the Iraqi government. In other words, they prioritised their own interests which were here best secured by means of co-operation with the central government in Baghdad.

The term “British policy” in this context designates the official policy of the British government as well as the conduct of the British Embassy in Baghdad towards the Kurds. The Embassy was in direct communication with the Iraqi government and was at times involved in contacts with Kurds, and the Embassy interpreted the principal features of the British government’s policy. Another level of policy involved British officers who worked locally in Kurdish districts, and who were in contact with the Kurds and their every-day life. These officers could observe the unsatisfactory situation in Kurdistan first-hand, and could directly be affected by Kurdish critique against the Iraqi government. Thus, the British Ambassador in Baghdad informed these officers that they could be viewed as disloyal if they expressed disagreement with their own Government’s policy. It was therefore required that the British officers be most cautious in what they said to the local Kurdish population.<sup>81</sup> It was later reasserted that members of the Political Advisory Staff in the Kurdish areas were “not to concern themselves with sectional politics or personal disputes, and are to do everything to *oppose the continued development of a minority complex.*”<sup>82</sup>

The Iraqi government was nevertheless convinced that British officers were, intentionally or not, giving the impression that they sympathised

with the ambitions of the Kurds. In 1944, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arshad al-'Umari, reprimanded the British in Iraq for the behaviour of many British officers in encouraging Kurdish nationalism.<sup>83</sup> The British in fact avoided dealing with Kurds and other ethno-national minorities as specific national groups. Instead, the individuals belonging to such groups were to be viewed strictly in their capacity as Iraqi subjects, and not as a distinct minority. It was also emphasised that all grievances would be directed to the Iraqi government via constitutional channels. The British were inclined to pursue a policy aiming not only at the integration of the Kurds into the Iraqi state, but also at their assimilation. The British Ambassador in Baghdad noted that in the long run it would prove better to pursue a policy aimed at fostering assimilation.<sup>84</sup> On the other hand, the Ambassador asserted that he and members of the Embassy staff should encourage the Iraqi government to launch a programme of development in education and social services in the Kurdish areas. The Kurds should also be given the opportunity to hold a proper share in Government posts.<sup>85</sup> The Ambassador stated that these aspects of the British position should be made clear to the Iraqi government. The Iraqis were also to be informed that the British policy towards the Kurds, as was asserted in an Aide Memoire addressed to Iraq's Prime Minister, was in absolute harmony with the interests of the Iraqi Kingdom.<sup>86</sup>

### *Negotiations with Sherif Pasha*

In late 1945 and early 1946, Sherif Pasha, the well-known Kurdish leader from the negotiations of the Sèvres Conference and an ex-Ottoman officer, sought British support in resolving the Kurdish dilemma. He contacted the Orient Minister with the help of Walter Smart, the British Ambassador to Cairo. However, commenting Sherif Pasha's approach to the Foreign Office, Smart argued that it was crucial at that moment not to give the Iraqi government reason to suspect that the British were supporting Kurdish nationalists. He added that if the British Embassy at Cairo received Sherif Pasha again, this would create a negative impression within the Iraqi government. Moreover, the Ambassador feared that further contact would be misinterpreted by Sherif Pasha as a reflection of official sympathy.<sup>87</sup> The Ambassador claimed that Sherif Pasha should not be received again at the Embassy and that communication should be made with him via other channels. The British would thus at least be kept informed of his activities.<sup>88</sup>

The Foreign Office expressed definite misgivings about the conversation between Sherif Pasha and the Orient Minister, and about the occasion given Sherif Pasha to meet the British Ambassador in Cairo: the initiative taken by Smart might have been “at variance with the attitude which British officials have been instructed to adopt in Iraq, and might even lead to an accusation by the Iraqis of bad faith on our part... no further communications will be held with Sharif Pasha.”<sup>89</sup> The British Embassy at Baghdad also remarked that it was best to avoid Iraqi suspicions of British involvement in supporting any type of Kurdish independence. It was also maintained that Sherif Pasha had no influence in Kurdistan since he had been in Europe since the beginning of the century.<sup>90</sup> Nevertheless, it is evident that Sherif Pasha had established contacts with a number of notable Kurds from the provinces of Kirkuk, Sulimaniya and Mosul. The demands which were made all centred on the question of autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan within the framework of the state of Iraq, but not for Kurdish independence per se. Sherif Pasha was convinced that an independent Kurdistan comprising all parts of Kurdistan was not feasible.<sup>91</sup>

Sherif Pasha had expressed his view on the Kurdish question by placing the issue in a broad Great Power-policy context. He concluded that in “Persia, the Russians with money and by other means were getting hold of the Persian Kurds. Unless Great Britain did something soon, the Russians would, indirectly, be in Kirkuk.”<sup>92</sup> Sherif Pasha wanted to show that he understood Soviet and British interests in and rivalry over Kurdistan. It also seems that he was interested in striking a deal with the British, by promising Kurdish support to Great Britain in the face of the Soviets and their real or alleged extension of their influence in the area. In return, the British would back the Kurds in their demands. British officials maintained that the most important thing was that Iraqi Kurdistan remain on the British side and form a bulwark against Russian advances.<sup>93</sup>

However, British policy was drafted immediately after the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, and an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan might have fuelled Kurdish separatist movements in Iran and Turkey’s Kurdistan. This would undermine Great Britain’s interests throughout the region since the British were allies of Turkey, Iraq and Persia and felt that they could thus not encourage any movement that would weaken those allies.<sup>94</sup>

## Chapter Seven

# THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KURDISTAN 1946

### *The Path to the Establishment of the People's Republic of Kurdistan*

It is generally acknowledged that the PRK embodied the most serious challenge posed by the Kurds against the state of Iran. The birth and demise of the republic have been interpreted in various ways. The phenomenon has, for instance, been analysed in light of the Soviet role in Iran following the Russian invasion of the country, particularly after the end of the Second World War. Nader Entessar, for example, has pointed out that the rise and fall of the republic must be placed within the framework of Soviet expansionism in Iranian Azerbaijan.<sup>1</sup> However, this would result in a rather narrow view of the course of events. It will here be maintained that the creation and downfall of the PRK must be seen as a historical occurrence rooted in several closely interwoven developments. These entailed developments within Kurdish nationalism, the dramatic alteration of the political situation in Iran, and the relations of the Big Three with one another, with Iran, and to the Kurds.

### The Formation of Political Organisations

The *Komala*,<sup>2</sup> or *Komala-y Zhīānawa-y Kurd*, (Association for the Resurrection of the Kurds), founded in 1942, is often claimed as the first political organisation in Iranian Kurdistan.<sup>3</sup> This is, however, not completely true. The *Komala-y 'Āzādī-khwāzān-ī Kurdistān*, (Association of the Liberators of Kurdistan), had been founded in 1939, yet had failed to develop either a political programme or an established newspaper to convey its platform. This organisation was of a nationalist character and aimed at the liberation of Kurdistan, and also demonstrated left-wing tendencies.<sup>4</sup> Since it played a minor role in the attempts of the Kurds in Iran to gain national rights, however, the organisation has been of a lesser interest to scholars.

On August 16, 1942 the organisation *Komala* was established in the town of Mahabad in Iranian Kurdistan<sup>5</sup> by a dozen young Kurds, mainly merchants and petty officials. The *Komala* was nationalistic in its programme and principles, and membership was restricted to persons of full Kurdish parentage. An exception was made for those with an Assyrian mother. This reflected the close relationship between Kurds and Assyrians.<sup>6</sup> Although the *Komala* has been described as nationalistic, the organisation also comprised a social programme. The main political objective of the organisation was autonomy for Iranian Kurdistan.<sup>7</sup> As was stated in the first issue of the *Komala's* paper, *Nishtiman*, another aim of the organisation was to unite the partitioned Kurdistan into one entity in which all Kurds would live freely.<sup>8</sup> Another vaguely expressed objective was the development of the Kurdish people.<sup>9</sup> The goals of the organisation can best be characterised as autonomy for the Kurds in Iranian Kurdistan and the ultimate liberation and union of all Kurdish lands into one independent state.<sup>10</sup> The demands of the *Komala* were formulated as follows in a memorandum directed to the Iranian government through the minister Khalil-i Fahm-i:

1. The Iranian government should acknowledge the Kurdish language as the official tongue in all Kurdish territories with a population of over 3 million.
2. Kurdish should be the official language in education, administration, and justice.
3. The state officials in Kurdistan should be Kurds.
4. All financial resources gathered in Kurdistan should be expended in Kurdistan in the construction of schools and hospitals.
5. These demands should be brought up in parliament and given legal status.
6. These are our demands in the present circumstances. Yet the future goal shall be self-determination, based on the legitimate right of all peoples to self-determination. Negotiations to this end should be conducted after the war, and there may be no doubt that the Kurds will determine their own future.
7. If the Kurdish people is enabled to determining their future, then Iran should be dealt with as a neighbour.<sup>11</sup>

Several factors paved the way for the escalation of political activity in Iranian Kurdistan and for the consequent appearance of the *Komala*. The central developments in this context were the collapse of effective Iranian authority in Iranian Kurdistan, which was the result of the Anglo-Soviet occupation; the possibility for the Kurds to move freely and openly in their areas within Iran as well as over Iraq-Iran boundaries into Iraqi Kurdistan; and finally, the occupation of a part of Iranian Kurdistan by the Red Army which was viewed as a protector of Kurds against the central government.

The fact that a genuine Kurdish nationalist movement existed was fundamental to political mobilisation among the Kurds.<sup>12</sup>

After the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, the Kurds were engaged in joint political activities in Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan across the borders. Before the *Komala* was founded, Iraqi Kurds had made unsuccessful attempts to create a branch of the *Hîwā* party (active in Iraqi Kurdistan 1939–1945) in Iranian Kurdistan. Mir Hāj, a representative from *Hîwā* participated actively in the establishment of the *Komala*: this organisation needed the support of the more politically experienced Iraqi Kurds.<sup>13</sup> Another Kurd, Mustafa Khoshnaw, also from Iraqi Kurdistan, likewise partook in the founding meeting of the *Komala*. The question of whether the activities of *Komala* would be limited to Iranian Kurdistan is particularly significant. Although Arfa claims that the *Komala* “was purely local, and had no ties with the *Hîwā* party, of the Iraqi Kurds,”<sup>14</sup> the reality was quite the opposite. The scope of the *Komala*’s activities was not limited to Iranian Kurdistan, but extended to Iraqi Kurdistan. An intimate relationship existed between the *Komala* and the *Hîwā*, and representatives from the two organisations would meet to discuss common matters.

There was also some co-operation between the *Komala* and the Kurds in Turkey. As soon as the *Komala* came into being, derivative branches were founded in both Iraqi and Turkey’s Kurdistan, and the organisation dispatched its emissary, Muhammed Amin Sharifi, to both Iraqi and Turkey’s Kurdistan.<sup>15</sup> The *Komala* furthermore received representatives from all parts of Kurdistan, namely Isma‘il Haqi Shaways and Osman Danish from Iraq, Qadir Beg from Syria, and Qazi Wahab from Turkey.<sup>16</sup> Branches of *Komala* emerged in the towns of Kirkuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Rawanduz and Shaqlawa in Iraqi Kurdistan.<sup>17</sup> The co-operation between the *Komala* and Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan grew and a meeting was organised between representatives of the *Komala* and Kurds from Turkey and Iraq at the location where the boundaries of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey meet (the Dalan Par Mountain). This meeting was called the Three-Boundary Conference. The participants reached a decision known as *Paymān-ī Sē Sinūr* (Treaty of Three Boundaries), according to which a united command should be established for all of Kurdistan. Meanwhile, the command of the *Komala* branches in each part of Kurdistan should also continue to exist.<sup>18</sup>

The existence of the *Komala* and its co-operation with Kurds throughout Kurdistan concerned the governments of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq. Archie Roosevelt states that it was inevitable that the Soviet Union and Great Britain should eventually hear of the *Komala*. The British kept a watchful

eye on developments in the Kurdish areas<sup>19</sup>, and showed particular concern over Kurdish activities across the Iraqi-Iranian boundaries.

The *Komala* attempted to gain Soviet support, and in a meeting in April 1943, the leadership of the organisation decided that communication should be made with Soviet authorities in Iran.<sup>20</sup> However, there is no evidence as to whether these contacts were made. In the initial phase of its existence, the *Komala* does not appear to have been known to the Soviets. Wilson Howell has argued that the Soviets had to overcome certain disadvantages in seeking the sympathy and co-operation of Kurdish nationalists. Howell maintains that the Kurds were not likely to suddenly shed their traditional distrust of the Russians and of Marxism. The memory of Russian excesses during the First World War had not yet faded either.<sup>21</sup> Howell has exaggerated the significance of such obstacles, whether related to historical memories or ideological perceptions. Kurdish nationalists recognised that the Soviets had control over the northern provinces of Iran, including a part of Iranian Kurdistan, and that the Red Army kept the Iranian forces at a safe distance. Kurdish nationalists, including conservative tribal and religious leaders, were politically pragmatic and dealt with the situation on a purely *realistic basis*. Given this critical stage in their history, the Kurds felt that collaboration with the Soviets did not require justification.<sup>22</sup>

British officials were concerned over reports that the Soviets were encouraging the Kurds to join and support the pro-Soviet *Tudeh* Party.<sup>23</sup> In reality, the *Tudeh* Party was not able to gain a standing among the Kurds. The Soviets therewith adopted another option, namely support of the movement of Kurdish nationalism known as *Komala* which was rapidly gaining ground.<sup>24</sup> However, despite the assertion that the *Tudeh* was not successful in obtaining any foothold in Kurdish areas, there is no evidence confirming the claim that the Soviets were supporting *Komala* or encouraging the Kurds to join *Komala*. There are also affirmations that the *Komala* had no direct relations with the Soviet authorities in Iran. According to the testimonies of Mulla Qadir Mudarrisi, one of the founders of the *Komala*, the Soviets showed major interest in the *Komala*, its organisational structure and its activities, albeit without success.<sup>25</sup> There is thus no evidence of any co-operation between the *Komala* and the Soviet authorities in Iran, at least in the early period of the *Komala*'s existence. First, the principal Soviet concern in the early phase of the war (1941–1943) was the western front with Germany; secondly, Soviet policy towards the Kurds was not yet crystallised; and finally, the *Komala* was characterised by secrecy and obscurity.<sup>26</sup>

It gradually became clear that the Soviets had an interest in consolidating their influence in the Kurdish nationalist movement, and particularly within the *Komala*. This was reflected in the fact that Soviet authorities in Iran preferred that a single individual assume the leadership of the *Komala*. Soviet authorities even approached several tribal leaders to this end, yet were refused.<sup>27</sup> According to Mulla Qadir Mudarrisi, the Soviets in Iran made notable efforts to understand the structure of the *Komala* and to instigate profound changes in the foundation of the organisation. Mudarrisi also states that the Soviets were unsuccessful in these attempts and thus turned to another alternative. Through Mir Ja‘far Baghirov, the First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party and the Chairman of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers, the Soviets sought to promote the establishment of another Kurdish organisation.<sup>28</sup> Meanwhile, it has also been claimed that the Soviets found in Qazi Muhammed a leader for *Komala* which would be acceptable to them.<sup>29</sup> While it is difficult to confirm any Soviet connection in the case of Qazi Muhammed becoming a member of the *Komala*, it is evident that Qazi Muhammed’s membership in the *Komala* led to the flourishing of the organisation.

During the years of its existence, the *Komala* played a role in the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran and reflected an important development in the contemporary history of the Kurds in Iran. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou has observed that the majority of the founders of the *Komala* were from the middle class and that the creation of the *Komala* signalled a new trend in leadership among the Kurds.<sup>30</sup> Ghassemlou has concluded that the *Komala* failed to mobilise the Kurdish masses because the organisation was nationalistic and operated in obscurity.<sup>31</sup> This claim implies that the nationalistic character of the *Komala* might have been the main weakness of the organisation, and is scarcely a convincing argument. On the other hand, one could agree with Ghassemlou that the obscurity of the *Komala* was an obstacle to the mobilisation of Kurdish masses. A more relevant factor behind the weakness of the *Komala* was the exclusion of Kurdish chiefs from its ranks. The leadership of the organisation was convinced that the tribal chiefs and landlords were responsible for “Kurdish backwardness.”<sup>32</sup> Thus, the socio-political dominance of the tribal chiefs and landlords in the traditional Kurdish society, coupled with the position of these elements in the life of the Kurdish masses, was decisive to the lack of mass support for the *Komala*. It is true that the *Komala* failed to create a functional symbiosis of Kurdish intellectuals and urban élites on the one hand and traditionalist élite on the other. The organisation was apprehensive in allowing the traditional élite much power within the leadership, although this might have served to mobilise the

population.<sup>33</sup> Another political shortcoming was the refusal of the *Komala* to secure Soviet support since it felt that the *Komala* did not owe anything to Russian inspiration.<sup>34</sup>



It has been stated that since the *Komala* was unable to effectively lead the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iranian Kurdistan, there was an urgent need for an all-encompassing organisation.<sup>35</sup> However, Farideh Dehkordi's claim that a completely new organisation was needed<sup>36</sup> is exaggerated, since it over-emphasises the role of masses in this stage of political activities in Kurdistan. In the 1940s, the masses still lay outside the framework of active participation in party politics. The masses primarily followed the behaviour of tribal chiefs and prominent traditional leaders in party politics. There was no significant distinction between the principles of the *Komala* and those of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).<sup>37</sup> The difference thus lay in the fact that the *Komala* failed to gain the support of tribal chiefs and landlords, primarily since this organisation was critical of both of these categories, stating that they exploited the masses. The *Komala's* attitude in this matter thus resulted in the negative stance of tribal chiefs and landlords towards the organisation.<sup>38</sup>

The accessible sources do not offer any evidence as to whether an internal conflict existed in the *Komala* during its final days. On August 16, 1945 the *Komala* was replaced by the KDP, with the former as its basis.<sup>39</sup> The party soon as Abdul Rahman Ghasemlou writes, "attained considerable popularity and gained the support of large sections of the peasantry, town working people, petty bourgeoisie, middle landowners and the patriotic tribes."<sup>40</sup> The KDP reflected an affiliation between traditionalist élites and those of the urban sectors, especially intellectuals and educated elements. The role and significance of rural peasants and town workers should not be over-emphasised. It is likely that a considerable portion of these groups simply followed the example of their landlords and chiefs. The peasants in Kurdish society had little contact with politics beyond the boundaries of their local communities. Two factors account for the success of the KDP. Firstly, compared to the structure of leadership in the *Komala*, the KDP was modified to encompass tribal chiefs and landlords; and secondly, the support of the Soviets was obtained.<sup>41</sup>

However, the question of whether the Soviet authorities were directly involved in the establishment of the KDP is a matter of controversy. Some observers maintain that the KDP was founded at the incitement or direct instruction of the Soviets to Kurdish leaders in Baku in September 1945.<sup>42</sup>

There is, however, no evidence to confirm such an assumption. The single source of support for this claim is a simple slogan which concludes the KDP's first manifesto: the words "long live Kurdish democratic autonomy" have been seen as a word for word translation of a slogan constantly used by the Soviets.<sup>43</sup> One cannot deny the existence of contact between the Kurds and the Soviet authorities, nor the fact that the Kurds may have perceived the Soviet Union as a "partner." However, the Kurdish strive for a nationalist and democratic party was the primary impetus to the establishment of the KDP. It is nevertheless likely that through their contacts with the Kurdish leaders, the Soviets encouraged these individuals to found a party which would be friendly to the Soviets. As Bruce Kuniholm concludes, the appearance of the party can be correlated to the reaction of tribal elements who were opposing the detribalisation policy of the central government, and concern for Kurdish identity.<sup>44</sup> However, these two factors alone cannot account for the entire development. From the start, the leadership of the party made clear that it would pursue goals defined as national rights in the eight-point declaration below. Furthermore, there existed a genuine nationalist movement among the Kurds who expressed their grievances against the minority policy of the Iranian central government.

Following its founding meeting, the KDP issued its first manifesto, the eight-point declaration, in which the objectives of the party were outlined. It was asserted that the Kurdish people intended to take advantage of the Allied victory and to reap the benefits of the Atlantic Charter.<sup>45</sup> The manifesto also contained eight points as the main objectives of the KDP:

- 1- The Kurdish people in Iran should have freedom and self-government in the administration of their local affairs, and obtain autonomy within the limits of the Iranian state.
- 2- The Kurdish language should be used in education and be the official language in administrative affairs.
- 3- The of Kurdistan should immediately be elected according to constitutional law and should supervise and inspect all state and social matters.
- 4- All state officials must be of local origin.
- 5- A single law for both peasants and notables should be adopted and the future of both secured.
- 6- The Kurdish [Kurdistan] Democratic Party will make a special effort to establish unity and complete fraternity with the Azerbaijani people and the other peoples that live in Azerbaijan (Assyrians, Armenians, etc.) in their struggle.
- 7- The Kurdish [Kurdistan] Democratic Party will strive for the improvement of the moral and economic state of the Kurdish people through the exploration

of Kurdistan's many natural resources, the progress of agriculture and commerce, and development of hygiene and education.

- 8- We desire that the people living in Iran be able to strive freely for the happiness and progress of their country.<sup>46</sup>

The Iranian government saw this manifesto as a challenge to the legitimacy and the physical presence of the Iranian authorities in Kurdistan.<sup>47</sup> One important point in the manifesto was the question of whether the KDP wished for an independent Kurdistan or for local autonomy only. In examining the manifesto, Hassan Arfa has maintained that its provisions were in contrast to the Iranian Constitution and that they leaned towards the creation of a completely separate state.<sup>48</sup> In claiming that paragraphs 3 and 5 revealed the secessionist character of the KDP's objectives, Arfa was expressing the official position of the Iranian central government who wished to discredit the fundamental Kurdish demands. The principle of Kurdish autonomy was in reality a legal step taken in accordance with the Constitution of Iran. In provisions 1 and 2 of the manifesto, the KDP unconditionally recognised Iran's Constitution and asserted that Kurdish demands were presented with respect to the integrity and the unity of Iran, and were compatible with the Iranian Constitution.<sup>49</sup> However, the official interpretation resulted in many serious disadvantages for the Kurds in Iran. First, in presenting Kurdish demands as measures towards Kurdish independency, the Iranian government was able to mobilise Great Britain and the US on its side. This was due to the fact that both the British and the Americans had on various occasions stressed that the integrity of Iran was to be preserved. Consequently, secessionist movements in Iran were unable to gain the sympathy of these two Great Powers, and instead generated their opposition. This was particularly true when these movements were considered to have a Soviet connection. Secondly, the central government in Tehran was able to mobilise itself and direct its army against the Kurds. Finally, Iraq and particularly Turkey were unequivocally against the idea of a Kurdish independent state in any part of Kurdistan.

A close analysis of the principal manifesto of the KDP reveals that the party was in no means a Communist-oriented organisation. There is no evidence suggesting a tendency towards Communism or the influence of Communist ideology. The KDP's political programme included, as did the programmes of many other Iranian political parties of the time, essential features of liberalism. The party did not demand either the collectivisation of land nor the nationalisation of private property. The party programme emphasised that a democratic political system should be established in Iranian Kurdistan and in Iran in general.<sup>50</sup>

## The Soviet Connection

The nature of Soviet policy towards the Kurds became ever more clear during the period 1944-1945, and was partly related to revisions in the direction of overall Soviet policy. The Soviet Union had sealed decisive victories over the German army and had raised the German siege of Stalingrad in 1943. Given this newly acquired power, the Soviet government felt entitled to a higher status in the international arena. Preparing to pursue its traditional goal of extending beyond its southern frontiers, the USSR initiated a more active policy in Iran.<sup>51</sup>

A Kurdish delegation from Iranian Kurdistan was invited to Soviet Azerbaijan, in the autumn of 1945, to meet with Baghirov.<sup>52</sup> The Kurdish delegation assembled at the request of Soviet army General Atakchiov at Tabriz, and was greeted by Baghirov, who acted as an intermediary between the Kurdish leaders and the Soviet government.<sup>53</sup> The visit was of a political nature and each side had clearly formulated political objectives.<sup>54</sup> It appears, however, that the Kurdish delegation and their hosts had different ideas concerning the future of Kurdish activities in Iran. The delegation expressed its need for Soviet military and financial support and its hope that the Kurds might determine their own destiny by creating an independent state.<sup>55</sup> In response, Baghirov simply advised the delegation to join the new Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP).<sup>56</sup> Baghirov was initially vague concerning the possibility of Soviet support to the Kurds, and his immediate reaction was to discourage the Kurdish demands. He pointed out that:

There was no need for the Kurds to hurry the formation of their own state. Kurdish freedom must be based on the triumph of popular forces not in Iran alone but also in Iraq and Turkey. A separate Kurdish state was a desirable thing to be considered in the future when the entire 'nation' could be united. In the meantime Kurdish aspirations should be achieved within autonomous Azerbaijan.<sup>57</sup>

The Kurdish delegation rejected this suggestion and Baghirov ultimately deferred to the view of the Kurdish delegation, stating that as long as the Soviet Union existed, the Kurds would have their independence.<sup>58</sup> However, Baghirov also indicated that his nationals (Iranian Azeris) had priority for Soviet support.<sup>59</sup>

A number of reasons and circumstances account for the fact that the Soviets were more interested in supporting the Azeris than the Kurds. Firstly, Azerbaijan was as one of Iran's most important provinces in terms of economic potential. The region spreads over some 35,000 square miles

in area and is rich in minerals, is well-irrigated and yields a surplus of wheat, fruit, and wool.<sup>60</sup> Secondly, a cultural and historical link exists between Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan. The language spoken by Azeris in Iran is *Azeri-Turkic*, which is identical to the language spoken in Soviet Azerbaijan. Thirdly, some important differences existed between the autonomist movement of Azerbaijan and that of Kurdistan in terms of the Soviet connection. In Azerbaijan, the Soviets could rely on the vast source of Azeri Marxists. Many of the founders of the ADP had in fact spent years in the Soviet Union and had been involved with their Soviet counterparts in Soviet Azerbaijan. Fourthly, although there is no convincing evidence that the Soviet Kurdish policy reflected its policy towards Azerbaijan, it is possible that Stalin envisaged the eventual secession of Iranian Azerbaijan and its integration with Soviet Azerbaijan under the authority of Moscow.<sup>61</sup> Finally, the common boundaries between Iranian and Soviet Azerbaijan facilitated Soviet infiltration of Azerbaijan. Cultural ties between the Kurds in Iran and those in the Soviet Union were historically weak.

The Kurdish delegation was ultimately assured Soviet support in the form of financial help and military equipment including tanks and cannons.<sup>62</sup> Accordingly, Kurds were granted some ten thousand rifles before and after the declaration of the PRK, although a crucial part of the promised assistance, namely tanks, cannons, and financial aid was never received.<sup>63</sup> The Soviet support of the Kurds did not necessarily reflect the official position of the USSR, and may instead be considered as a step taken by the local leadership in Soviet Azerbaijan in collaboration with Soviet authorities in Iran. However, it is possible that the central Soviet government did not oppose such measures.

It appeared that the Kurds in Iran would eventually establish an autonomous entity even in the absence of assured Soviet support. Given this reality, the Soviets understood that the wiser alternative was for them to support the Kurds. In this manner, the Soviets hoped to avoid any hostility on the part of the Kurds against the Soviet supported Azeris, and that the Kurdish territories might function as a buffer zone for Azerbaijan's southern flank against the Iranian army. In other words, the primary Soviet concern was the Azeri, not the Kurds.

The Kurdish delegation abbreviated its trip and returned to Iran in order to deal with an alarming incident. While in Baku, the delegation had received word that Mulla Mustafa and a following of 2,000 including 500 armed men were at the Iraq-Iranian frontier and were preparing to cross the border into Iranian Kurdistan.<sup>64</sup> There were two main reasons behind this development. Firstly, the uprising led by Mulla Mustafa had been

suppressed by the Iraqi army supported by the British, and the rebel refused to submit to the Iraqi authorities; secondly, given the unstable political situation in Iranian Kurdistan, Mulla Mustafa decided to seize the opportunity and co-ordinate his forces with those of the Kurds in Iran. Before crossing the border into Iranian Kurdistan, Mulla Mustafa had established communication with the *Komala* and expressed his desire to enter Iranian Kurdistan with his followers. The reaction of the *Komala* had been positive and the organisation had expressed its willingness to assist Mulla Mustafa and his followers.<sup>65</sup>



The Kurdish trip to Soviet Azerbaijan aggravated the Iranian government which voiced official protests against the Soviet Union through the Soviet representatives in Tehran. According to a report written by the British military attaché in Tehran:

The Persian government, incensed at this visit without their permission and even without obtaining exist visas... protested to the Soviet Embassy and even demanded the extradition of the seven Kurds [the Kurdish delegates].<sup>66</sup>

The visit had thus triggered concerns among Iranian authorities, who now paid particular attention to events in Iranian Kurdistan. The government placed the entire issue in the context of the Soviet military presence in Iran and allegations of Soviet support of the Kurds. In a statement on the situation in Kurdistan both Ibrahim Hakimi, Iran's Prime Minister, Amanollah Ardalan the Minister of Justice, and Ibrahim Zand, the Minister of War, charged that Kurdish leaders had obtained illegal passports which they had used in their trip to Soviet Azerbaijan; that the Kurds were preparing themselves by collecting arms and forming groups for a major revolt against the Iranian authorities; and that Kurds were printing newspapers in Kurdish with printing material received from the Soviet Union.<sup>67</sup>

In February 1945, the American Consul in Tabriz noted that although Soviet policy towards the Kurds was as of yet obscure, the Soviets were certain to exploit the threat posed by the Kurds to the Iranian authorities. The Consul contended that there was no evidence that the Soviets considered support of any unified action for Kurdish independence.<sup>68</sup> However, the presence of Soviet troops in Iran was seen as a mean of protection for the Kurds and Azeris and also as a deterrent to the Iranian forces, and this made it possible for the Kurds to mobilise and to pave the way for the declaration of the PRK in January 1946. The Soviet troops now manifestly barred the Iranian army from entering Kurdish areas.<sup>69</sup> Iran's Foreign

Minister met the Soviet Ambassador to discuss possibilities of sending Iranian forces to Kurdish areas, particularly to Mahabad. An understanding had been reached between these two parties, and the Iranian Minister of War was informed that troops were to proceed to certain Kurdish areas. However, the local Soviet military authorities in Azerbaijan, and the Soviet Commander at Miandoab in particular, denied having knowledge of such an understanding and continued to prevent the Iranian troops from entering Mahabad. The Soviet authorities in northern Iran argued that the entrance of Iranian troops into Kurdish areas would only serve to provoke the Kurds and result in further instability. However, the fact that the Soviets blocked the entrance of Iranian forces should be seen in light of the Iranian inability to deal with the Kurds. The American Embassy in Tehran concluded that the "Iranian authorities, on more mature consideration, are not very anxious to risk a clash with the Kurds and are using the Soviet attitude as an excuse for remaining inactive."<sup>70</sup> However, although the presence of the Red Army offered Azeris and Kurds the opportunity to establish their own governments, it did not directly participate in the undertaking.<sup>71</sup>

### The Proclamation of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan

An almost bloodless revolt erupted in Iranian Azerbaijan in mid-October 1945 and was led by the ADP (the *Firqah-e Demokrat-e Azerbaijan*, also known as *Firqah*), established in September 1945. The Iranian authorities offered little resistance to the Azeri revolt, and this was linked to the political vacuum in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan which facilitated the rebel take-over. In early November 1945, the armed *Firqah* volunteers (*Fidayis*) occupied Tabriz, the most important town of the province. Meanwhile, the Soviet army persisted in denying Iranian troops access to the north-western provinces.<sup>72</sup> On November 23, 1945, the ADP worked to organise elections for a national assembly for Azerbaijan, although the *Majlis* had in October of the same year forbidden all elections as long as foreign troops were on Iranian soil.<sup>73</sup> On November 20, 744 delegates of the Azerbaijan Congress (National Assembly) met in Tabriz. The members were elected from those communities in northern Iran which were taking part in the Azerbaijan rebellion. From the point of view of Azeri activists, these measures were legitimate actions taken in accordance with the Iranian Constitution of 1906.<sup>74</sup> The Azerbaijan National Assembly (ANA) proclaimed the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan (ARA) on December 12, and a local government headed by Ja'far Pishevari was formed.<sup>75</sup> The

important city of Rezaieh fell upon the cessation of all Iranian resistance in early January 1946.<sup>76</sup>

### *The Establishment of the People's Republic of Kurdistan*

As has been mentioned, the Kurdish town of Mahabad was the primary centre of Kurdish political activities in Iranian Kurdistan. The *Komala* had been founded here and had in fact dominated and administered Mahabad and its surrounding areas since 1943. The authority of the central government was severely restricted already by the time the Anglo-Soviet troops invaded Iran in 1941, and was further weakened at the end of 1943. Already in early 1943 there were only 10-15 Iranian soldiers in Mahabad.<sup>77</sup> By the end of the Summer of 1945, Qazi Muhammed had crystallised his authority in Mahabad and the central régime had scarcely any control over the city.<sup>78</sup> The American Ambassador to Tehran remarked on the inability of the Iranian forces to effectively deal with the deteriorating circumstances.<sup>79</sup> Reports of the aggravation of affairs in Kurdistan were interpreted as the manifestation of Kurdish discontent with the political organisation and the conduct of the Iranian authorities. The entire development was thus the expression of a Kurdish movement which was understood as a prelude to an ultimate Kurdish demand for "independence."<sup>80</sup> The term independence as used in diplomatic dispatches was not well-adapted to actual political developments in Kurdistan. However, these events did lay the foundations for the proclamation of the autonomous Kurdish Republic in Mahabad, namely the PRK. Already in mid-November the Iranian Foreign Minister spoke of the "threat of Kurdish revolt," linking this phenomenon to the role of the Soviet forces in preventing the free movement of Iranian troops in Kurdistan.<sup>81</sup>

The proclamation of an autonomous Azerbaijan was an inspiring example to the Kurds and encouraged them to escalate their efforts and further mobilise their forces. Parallel to the events in Tabriz, a Kurdish uprising took place in northern Kurdistan. On December 17, 1945 a KDP meeting was modified into a popular march against the last symbol of Iranian authority in Mahabad, the Department of Justice. The Kurds occupied the building and this symbolic action terminated the authority of the Iranian government in the city.<sup>82</sup>

There was communication between the Kurdish leader Qazi Muhammed and the Prime Minister of the autonomous government of Azerbaijan, Ja'far Pishevari, already prior to the proclamation of the PRK. At the end of December 1945, Qazi Muhammed had met Pishevari at

Tabriz to discuss the possibilities of proclaiming a Kurdish Republic. Qazi Muhammed returned to Mahabad and upon his arrival announced publicly that he intended to open a Kurdish National Assembly. He furthermore brought up various demands which were similar to those of the Azeris. In both cases, the framework was that of autonomy and the maintenance of the integrity of Iran. As the head of the KDP, Qazi Muhammed officially proclaimed before a great number of Kurds, among them several tribal and religious leaders from Mahabad and from surrounding areas gathered at *Chw%r-Chir%* square in Mahabad, the establishment of the republic in January 22, 1946. In his address, Qazi Muhammed reviewed Kurdish history. He lamented the Kurdish policy of Reza Shah which had aimed at the assimilation of the Kurds. Qazi Muhammed called upon the Kurds to recognise and seize the historical opportunity which was now before them. He emphasised the importance of Kurdish unity to the achievement of their goals.<sup>83</sup> Qazi Muhammed did not mention which position the Soviets had regarding the establishment of the republic. Besides Qazi Muhammed, a number of notables, most of them tribal chiefs, also held speeches. Among these were two women who underlined the female role in the preservation and development of the republic.<sup>84</sup> After the proclamation of the PRK, Qazi Muhammed became the republic's president and a cabinet was formed with Haji Bāba Shaikh as Prime Minister.<sup>85</sup> The PRK sent observers to the Azerbaijan parliament but insisted on maintaining a separate identity from the Azerbaijan government in Tabriz.<sup>86</sup>

The Kurdish cabinet reflected both the dominance of the upper classes in Mahabad and its surroundings as well as the considerable role given to urban elements. The Ministry of War, one of the most important departments, operated in consultation with the most influential tribal chieftains, such as the chiefs of Shikāk and Herkī.<sup>87</sup> The Barzani tribe was especially important in this context, as the Barzanis had various experiences in rebellions and had earlier been involved in war with the regular Iraqi army. Mulla Mustafa, the head of the Barzani tribe, was one of the influential military leaders and his *Hēz-ī Barzan* (the Barzan force) was responsible for the most important part of the front, the Saqiz front.<sup>88</sup>



Although the PRK was short-lived, the Kurdish government was able to implement several achievements. The Kurdish government wished to be as economically independent from Tehran as possible, and the “Developing Company of Kurdistan” was established for this purpose. This company was founded mainly with the support of the upper class of Mahabad.<sup>89</sup> The Department of Culture decided that education would be mandatory for both genders. Orphans should be provided with social care by the authorities. One of the foremost objectives of the KDP and the Kurdish government was to develop education in the Kurdish area. The vitality of the Kurdish language was emphasised in Qazi Muhammed’s proclamation speech. Education was to be conducted in the Kurdish language which would be given special space in all levels of education. New schools were built in the cities of Shino (Ashnawia), Bokeran and Mahabad.<sup>90</sup> The theme of language was also related to the role played by the Imams of Masjid (mosque), especially in the Friday prayer which was to be held in Kurdish. The role of Masjid was also stressed in the mobilisation of people to strengthen the position of the republic. The masses were to be advised and their unification encouraged, they would learn to respect the rule of law and order and would be taught of the history of the Kurds and the ancient civilisations of Kurdistan.<sup>91</sup> A broadcasting station, which was a Soviet gift to the republic, was also established in Mahabad in May 1946. Although the station did not broadcast beyond Mahabad and its immediate vicinity, it nevertheless served an important function. The establishment of a National Library in Mahabad was also significant.<sup>92</sup>

The KDP’s forces, which had been created before the establishment of the republic, formed the core around which the army of the republic was organised. Since there were no professionally educated officers, military ranks were given to the KDP’s cadres and tribal chiefs. For example, all members of the Central Committee of the KDP obtained the rank of major. The only professional elements of the Kurdish army were Iraqi Kurdish officers who had been educated at the Iraqi military academy.<sup>93</sup> There is no precise information on the number of the Kurdish troops. In a speech, the Minister of War of the republic rather exaggeratedly estimated the size of the Kurdish army at about 45,000 armed men.<sup>94</sup> William Eagleton has in his turn claimed the number to be approximately 12,750.<sup>95</sup>

The features of the republics of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan and the question of how the two entities were perceived by various actors are important in this context. The assumption which prevailed in the US administration was that the Kurdish and Azerbaijan republics were Soviet puppet political entities.<sup>96</sup> The Americans therefore watched the two republics with particular concern and were especially negative to the autonomous republic of Azerbaijan. The American Ambassador in Tehran, Murray, expressed the dominant US view as he maintained that the republic was a direct challenge to the Iranian central government and was not based on constitutional premises.<sup>97</sup> On the other hand, the Americans were aware of the fact that Iran's constitution provided for Provincial Councils. Such councils were to be established in accordance with a law of the *Majlis* and would operate within the framework of national legislation. Legislation on elections and the conduct of the Provincial Councils was passed in a 1907–1908 session of the *Majlis*. The councils were to have no legislative authority and no right to handle political matters. In accordance with this law, the Shah was permitted to dismiss council with the approval of the Minister of the Interior. Elections would be ordered by the Shah and organised under the direct control of the central government. Murray's view was that the National Congress of Azerbaijan was by no means acting in accordance with the constitution or the *Majlis* law, and that the declaration of the ARA on November 23, was an action outside of the provisions allowed by the constitution. The Ambassador particularly emphasised the use of the word “nationalist” rather than “provincial” by the leadership in Azerbaijan.<sup>98</sup> However, the use of the words “nationalist” and “nation” by the ADP and the local government probably did not allude to Azerbaijan as an independent state. The terms were most likely employed with reference to their nationalist significance.

The Iranian government also maintained that the existence of an Azerbaijan government was contrary to the principles of the Iranian constitution. Certain scholars have uncritically espoused the same argument, viewing the autonomous movement of Azerbaijan as inconsistent with the Iranian constitution. Manoucher Vahdat has argued that the autonomous government of Azerbaijan was inconsistent with Iranian constitutional law,<sup>99</sup> and this claim is questionable. In characterising the movement as contrary to Iran's Constitution, Vahdat neglects two important facts: first, the Azeri leaders consistently maintained that their government was established with respect for the Iranian constitution; and secondly, the Iranian central government *itself* accepted to negotiate with the Azeri

leaders in order to come to an agreement, which was indeed reached in April 1946. The negotiations and the agreement reflect some type of recognition of the autonomous Azeri entity by the central government in Tehran. Furthermore, in an interview on December 29, 1945 Pischevari stated that his principal ambition was to preserve Azerbaijan within an integrated Iran. He also asserted that the government of Azerbaijan had intentionally chosen not to have a foreign minister, and that the Azeri authorities should not be viewed as more than self-governing.<sup>100</sup>

When Robert Rossow, the American Vice Consul in Tabriz, met with Pischevari, this meeting caused severe irritation at the Department of State although the American Embassy in Tehran had emphasised the need for such contacts.<sup>101</sup> In a conversation between Rossow and Pischevari, the latter expressed his wish to negotiate treaties with foreign governments, to which the Consul replied that only sovereign nations could do so. Pischevari thereupon asserted that the Azeris had no other alternative, and claimed that seeking negotiations with foreign governments did not imply that the government of Azerbaijan wanted Azerbaijan to be a sovereign state.<sup>102</sup> Furthermore, the Central Committee of ADP, calling itself “National Congress of Azerbaijan” in its manifesto of November 23, 1945 claimed that the main desire of the Azerbaijan population was self-government within the national boundaries of Iran. In other words, the integration of Iran was clearly asserted.<sup>103</sup>

Certain observers have claimed that the establishment of the two republics was but one step towards eventually joining the Soviet Union.<sup>104</sup> Numerous officials, both Iranian and American, felt that this would ultimately materialise. Wallace Murray was especially anxious over any development which implied a growing distance between the Azerbaijan local authorities and the central government in Tehran. Such a progression would, among other things, cause international complications. Moreover, Murray advised Ibrahim Hakimi, Iran’s Prime Minister, that the Iranian government should try to establish communication with “Azerbaijan dissidents.” The Ambassador stressed that if the central government declined to negotiate with the Azeris, then the latter would be given a pretext for seceding from Iran and for requesting Soviet protection.<sup>105</sup> The driving American concern was to prevent the Soviets from maximising their influence in Iran via Azerbaijan. Murray maintained that while the central authorities in Tehran were certainly not concerned in establishing contacts with the Azeris, Pischevari had a special interest in seeking communication with Tehran.<sup>106</sup>

As to the PRK, Robert Rossow claims that a less known ambition of the Kurdish leadership was that the republic would function as a nucleus for a great Kurdish nation, comprising the whole of Iranian, Iraqi, “Turkish” and also Syrian Kurdistan. The area would extend to Alexandretta on the Mediterranean.<sup>107</sup> Rossow thought that this would increase the Soviet possibility of consolidating its influence. Rossow concluded that if the Soviet Union manipulated Azerbaijan as a bridge and if this bridge were maintained, “then serious concern must be given to the prospect that, by extending the same method to Kurdish areas beyond Iran, the dream of Qazi Muhammed’s great Kurdish nation might have a serious chance of Soviet-manipulated realisation.”<sup>108</sup> While it is possible that Qazi Muhammed had visions of a united Kurdistan, this was never formulated in the articulated positions of neither Qazi Muhammed’s nor the Kurdish leadership. Moreover, the Kurds in Iran, as Qazi Muhammed expressed, did not wish to collaborate with the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey in sending a joint delegation to any peace conference at which the Kurdish question was to be discussed. The leadership of the KDP and the PRK hoped that a true democratic development in Iran and respect for various national minorities would form the basis for a settlement of the Kurdish problem.<sup>109</sup>

However, the Americans continued to scrutinise the ambitions of the PRK leadership with skepticism, still fearing the creation of a greater Kurdistan. As has been mentioned, this skepticism was based partly on the assumption that such actions might be supported by the Soviet Union. Certain American reports spoke of Kurdish plans and Soviet measures for military operation in the direction of Turkey and Iraq. According to these reports, the Kurds aimed at asserting their claims on Turkey’s Kurdistan.<sup>110</sup> Rossow noted that the PRK had proclaimed rights of sovereignty over the extensive Kurdish-populated areas of southern and eastern Turkey.<sup>111</sup> Although there is no evidence confirming Rossow’s contention, the Americans did anticipate this scenario in connection with reports that Soviet troops in northern Iran were marching southward into the Kurdish areas, towards the Iraquo-Turkish borders.<sup>112</sup> Soviet and Kurdish actions were placed together into a single context, based on the alleged Soviet desire for the reduction of Turkey, which together with other Soviet activities was considered by American officials in Tabriz as indicating the magnitude of Soviet intentions.<sup>113</sup> Rossow’s and other American officials’ views were generally identical to those of the Iranian government, and especially to those of the Shah. The Shah claimed that the “Communists” wanted the PRK to become a Soviet satellite and that the Kurdish entity

would be extended to comprise the Kurds of Iraq and Turkey. Following this argument, such a state would be used as bridgehead to expand Communism into the Arab World and Africa.<sup>114</sup>

Given the absence of evidence that the PRK leadership was systematically preparing for the establishment of a greater Kurdistan, information of any Soviet troop movement was most likely exaggerated. The British Foreign Office, which also closely followed the development, did not receive any reports of significant Soviet troop movements. Baghdad also declared that it had no information regarding the reported troop movements. However, Rossow claims that this was due to the fact that the British were slower than the Americans in their communications.<sup>115</sup>



A confusion existed regarding the legal status of the Kurdish administration. On the one hand, the leaders of the republic chose the denomination *Jamhur-ī Khud-mukhtār/Kōmār-ī Khud-mukhtār* (autonomous republic) and maintained that the Kurdish entity was a practical interpretation of the Iranian constitution. Instead of employing the terms *Wazārat* (department), and *Wazīr* (minister), the words *'Idāra* (office), and *Ra'is-ī 'Idāra* (head of office), were commonly applied. In order to avoid contradicting the Iranian constitution which did not grant the right of legislation to the Provincial Councils, the KDP, instead of the government, was responsible for legislation. On the other hand, there were some contradictions regarding the very existence of the republic. Since the whole political system of Iran was based on constitutional *monarchy*, the Kurdish government used the denomination *republic*.<sup>116</sup> Yet there is no doubt that in both its political programme and its first manifesto, the KDP made it clear that Iranian Kurdistan would remain a part of Iran. On a number of occasions and without reservation, Qazi Muhammed confirmed that the goal of the Kurds in Iran was autonomy within the state of Iran. He furthermore underlined that the Kurds in Iran had have no option but to establish their own government, since the central government in Tehran had failed to show any sign of acquiescence to the demands of the Kurds.<sup>117</sup>

In conclusion, by connecting the existence of the Kurdish republic to real or alleged Soviet expansionism into the area and to politically unformulated visions of a united independent Kurdistan on the other, the PRK was placed in a context which was not intended by its leadership.

## *Relations with the Central Government*

In November 1945, shortly preceding the proclamation of the republic, a Kurdish delegation consisting of Qazi Muhammed and several tribal chiefs visited Tehran. The aim of the delegation was to demonstrate its loyalty to the central government, but also, as reports maintained, to persuade the government in Tehran to recognise Kurdish demands presented as follows: a legitimate Kurdish administration; the Kurdish language to be allowed in schools in the Kurdish areas; and improved health service and communications.<sup>118</sup> This effort proved fruitless and the Kurds consequently resigned themselves to proclaim their own government despite the opposition of the Iranian government.

However, even after the declaration of the republic, negotiations between Kurdish representatives and the central government continued in the quest for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem, albeit without positive result.<sup>119</sup> The Kurdish leadership continued to express its willingness to peacefully and by means of negotiation come to an agreement with the central government.

Gerald Doohar, American Vice Consul in Tabriz, met with Qazi Muhammed and asked what kind of relations the Kurdish government in Mahabad wished to have with the central government. Qazi Muhammed replied that the status of the PRK would be identical to that of the government of Azerbaijan, namely home rule within the Iranian state. On the question of whether there were any negotiations between the Kurds and the central government, Qazi Muhammed claimed that while there were no ongoing negotiations with the central government, an Azerbaijani commission would shortly initiate deliberations in Tehran also in the name of the Kurds.<sup>120</sup> Before the negotiations between the government in Tehran and the Azerbaijani commission opened, the former declared its proposals for the solution of "Azerbaijani question."<sup>121</sup> In this proposal of seven points, which was allegedly based on the law of 1907 authorising the election of Provincial Councils, the Kurds were not once mentioned by name.<sup>122</sup> The American Embassy informed the Secretary of State that Ahmed Qavam al-Saltaneh (henceforth Qavam), the Iranian Prime Minister, felt that the Kurdish problem would be solved without difficulty upon settlement of the Azerbaijani question. Qavam apparently attempted to marginalise the Kurdish factor in Iranian affairs.<sup>123</sup>

After the agreement between the central government and the Azeri representatives was reached, the Kurds concluded that they had not been dealt with fairly in the terms of the agreement. Therefore, hoping to gain some concessions from the central government, a Kurdish delegation vis-

ited Tehran and met with Qavam.<sup>124</sup> Qavam informed the Kurdish delegates that Kurdistan was a part of Azerbaijan, and the Kurds should thus negotiate with the Azerbaijan government. As Nader Entessar has put it, the “Kurds were now placed in double jeopardy, as an ethnic minority in the Iranian state and as a minority in an Azeri state.”<sup>125</sup>

### *The People’s Republic of Kurdistan and the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan*

After the revolt of the ADP in November 1945, a delegation of five Kurds representing the KDP, among them the party leader Qazi Muhammed, offered their congratulations and cultural and economic co-operation to the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan. They simultaneously made it clear that the Kurds in Iran would shortly have their own National Assembly and referred to an “autonomous Iranian Kurdistan (Khud-mukht%r-§ Kurdist%n [Kurdist%n-§] Iran).”<sup>126</sup> Nevertheless, there was a certain tension between the Azerbaijan government and the Kurds concerning the status of the Kurdish autonomy to be established. The Azeris wished to subordinate the Kurds and to confine Kurdish autonomy to the town of Mahabad. In a conversation with Rossow before the PRK was proclaimed, Pischevari had expressed his ideas on the future of an autonomous Kurdish Republic, which he recognised would be declared sooner or later. However, Pischevari stated that the Kurds were not yet capable of self-government, and that instead of building an independent National Assembly, that the Kurds be granted five seats in the ANA and a Provincial Council under the Tabriz government. Pischevari also stressed that the reason for his friendship with the Kurds was that the central government might otherwise use this group as a disruptive factor in Azerbaijan.<sup>127</sup> However, in establishing their own republic, the Kurds did not take into consideration the position of the government of Azerbaijan whatsoever. The Kurds did not accept subordination to the Azerbaijan régime and this fuelled tensions between the Kurds and the Azeris. The Soviet position on the conflict between the autonomous governments was initially unclear.<sup>128</sup> There were still in late February 1946 signs that Pischevari had not renounced his attempts to subordinate the Kurdish autonomous government to that of Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, Qazi Muhammed and the Kurdish leadership continued to insist on complete independence in relation to Azerbaijan.<sup>129</sup> Pischevari later made a statement which indicated modifications in the position of the Azerbaijan government since the meeting of January. Asked by Rossow if the Kurdish

government was necessarily to be subordinated to the Tabriz government, Pischevari replied that this would depend on the will of the Kurds. Pischevari added that the desire of the Kurds to have their own government was quite understandable and that the Kurdish claims were just. In Rossow's opinion the altered stance of the Azerbaijanis was a result of Soviet pressure which would favour Kurdish autonomists at the expense of Azerbaijan.<sup>130</sup> While there is a lack of evidence in this context, it appears unlikely that the change depended on this alleged Soviet pressure. There might have been a conviction among both the leadership of Azerbaijan and the Soviets that the Kurds would proclaim their own republic despite opposition from Azerbaijan to such an undertaking. Both the Soviets and the Azeris stood to gain from a friendly Kurdish entity.

After the PRK was declared and following a period of tension between the Azerbaijan government and the Kurds, a dialogue was opened between representatives of both sides. Negotiations were proceeding between Pischevari and Qazi Muhammed already in February 1946: the Kurdish government in Mahabad sought to extend the jurisdiction of the Kurdish autonomous region to areas disputed on, particularly to the Rezaieh district. According to Rossow, there were Kurdish plans to make the town of Rezaieh rather than Mahabad the seat of the Kurdish government. On the other hand, the Azeris were not willing to surrender Rezaieh to the Kurds but continued to control and administer the district through a governor appointed by Tabriz. Yet the Kurds did not obey the Azeri administration of Rezaieh, and made claims to not only Rezaieh but also to several other cities.<sup>131</sup> It was evident that negotiations concerning territories had collapsed by late February. The Azeris refused to recognise the territorial claims made by the Kurds, and tension between the Azeri and the Kurdish governments increased.<sup>132</sup> On March 1946, it was reported that the area around the town of Rezaieh was completely under Kurdish control and that Kurdish patrols with a "Republic of Kurdistan" emblem on their arms had been observed in the area.<sup>133</sup> Deliberations between high level Azeri and Kurdish representatives were initiated in April. A Soviet General also participated in these meetings. Following negotiations between Pischevari, Qazi Muhammed and Soviet representatives, a Kurdish-Azerbaijani treaty was signed on April 23, 1946, which provided for military alliance, fair treatment of minorities, exchange of diplomatic missions, and common diplomatic action towards the Tehran government.<sup>134</sup>

The agreement was published in the *Azerbaijan* newspaper of May 5, 1946. The provisions were as follows: representatives were to be exchanged between the two and the text was translated by the British

Embassy in Tehran. The provisions were as follows; in parts of Azerbaijan inhabited by Kurds, Kurds would take part in administrative work, and Azeris living in Kurdish areas would do the same; an economic commission would be formed to deal with economic problems of joint interest to both parties; military co-operation would be organised; any negotiation with Tehran should be undertaken only upon agreement between the two parts; Kurds in Azerbaijan and Azeris in Kurdistan would be given the opportunity to develop their language and culture; and both parts were committed to punish any party seeking to destroy the friendship of the two republics.<sup>135</sup>

### *The Policy of the Great Powers vis-à-vis the People's Republic of Kurdistan*

The Soviets recognised that relations with both the Iranian left-wing movement, particularly the *Tudeh* party, and with ethno-national minorities such as the Azeris and the Kurds might be beneficial to their own aims in Iran.

As mentioned above, the nature of Soviet policy towards the Kurds became more evident as the USSR made progress in the war against Germany. Soviet political officers and agents had thoroughly infiltrated the Kurdish region in Iran by 1944,<sup>136</sup> and Soviet authorities took further steps to consolidate their influence in the *Komala* in 1945. The Soviets had also already established various Iranian-Soviet Cultural Relation Societies. A similar body, the *Anjuman-ī Farhang-ī Kurdistān-u Shurawī* (Kurdistan-Soviet Cultural Society), was also established in Mahabad, and the *Komala* co-operated with this organisation.<sup>137</sup>

When the war ended it became clear that the Soviet Union sought to amplify its influence in Iran through, among other things, the encouragement of autonomist movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.<sup>138</sup> It has been concluded that the autonomous republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, which were more or less under Soviet influence, were to lead to the creation of Soviet satellite republics, as had been the case in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>139</sup> Scholars maintain that Kurds and Azeris were manipulated by the Soviet Union and exploited as political instruments, and that this was reflected in the activities of the Red Army and traditional diplomatic methods during the period 1941–1946. The Soviets intensified their efforts in 1945–1946: in addition to conventional leverage, the USSR now began employing the instrument of subversion. After unsuccessful attempts to gain concessions in the petroleum-rich region of northern Iran

in autumn 1944, the Soviets began exerting a more concrete type of pressure by agitating upheavals in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.<sup>140</sup> However, the conclusion that the Kurds and Azeris were instruments of Soviet policy is not convincing per se, and would imply adherence to the official view of the central Iranian government. For instance, the Shah of Iran maintained that the Kurdish nationalist movement had been fostered by the British during the First World War and by the Communists in the Second World War.<sup>141</sup> However, a more balanced view would be that the Soviet Union and the two nationalist movements in question exploited one another in order to enhance their own positions in the political arena.<sup>142</sup> Those who have asserted the primacy of the Soviet role in the context have neglected the historical background to the problem of nationalist minorities in Iran, and have ignored the genuine grievances of these groups against the government in Tehran as well as their aspiration to national rights. Certain observers and diplomats noted that the plight and goals of the ethno-national minorities could not be excluded from the context. For instance, Baxter, Head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, pointed out that there had long been special treatment of the minority populations in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan by the central power.<sup>143</sup> On the other hand, Baxter did not discard the significance of Soviets support to the Azerbaijanis and the Kurds. He noted that at least one objective behind Soviet support of the Azeris and the Kurds was to bring pressure onto Turkey and Iran.<sup>144</sup> British officials informed the central government in Tehran that tensions between the Iranian authorities on the one hand and the Kurds and Azeris on the other could not be attributed strictly to Soviet activities, and recalled the long history of special treatment of the Kurds and Azeris.<sup>145</sup>

The fact is that the Kurds and the Azeris had long been neglected by the central government in Tehran<sup>146</sup>, and that their movements embodied reactions to Tehran's minority policy. The Kurds' relationship to the Soviets was rooted in changes on the international arena. Shifts in the balance of power among the Great Powers had made it possible for the Kurds to approach the Soviets for support. As a British official observed in 1946, "another equally great power has appeared on the arena and is knowing itself, if not officially, at any rate privately sympathetic to the Kurdish aspirations and at least to the extent of encouraging them."<sup>147</sup> Meanwhile, it was clear from experiences that the British were not prepared to support the Kurds. As has earlier been stated, the Kurds thus approached the Soviets not due to some ideological affiliation but primarily since they had no hope of British assistance.<sup>148</sup> In fact, Great Britain was often bitterly criticised by educated Kurds, who claimed that

the British had hailed the principles of the Atlantic Charter regarding the right of self-determination, yet were now forsaking them.<sup>149</sup>

Given this critical time in Iranian history, the Kurds sought to attain their nationalist objectives by engaging Soviet sympathies. An important factor in discussing the Soviet stance on the Azeri and the Kurdish movements was that the Kurds and the Azeris did not have their own states. This would have enabled them to conduct traditional diplomatic relations with the USSR and other states. To conclude, the Soviets did not construct the nationalist movements of the Azeris and the Kurds, but rather supported and exploited them.

Prior to the proclamation of the PRK Qazi Muhammed met with Soviet representatives at Tabriz. The details of this meeting remain unclear, and it is not evident to what extent Qazi Muhammed succeeded in securing Soviets support and approval.<sup>150</sup> On the other hand, only days before the proclamation of the PRK, Qazi Muhammed was still working to obtain a definite Soviet statement in favour of the declaration of an autonomous Kurdish republic. The two Soviet officials whom Qazi Muhammed approached to this end did not object.<sup>151</sup>

The Soviets had in fact already provided Kurds with rifles and a printing press with all essential equipment. However, there are many misleading perceptions concerning the Soviet attitude towards the PRK. For instance, Ghobad Irani claims that the Soviets had immediately granted recognition to the newly created republic.<sup>152</sup> Archie Roosevelt claims that Soviet agents were actively working to enlist Kurds to the Kurdish nationalist movement and to mobilise the local tribal chiefs.<sup>153</sup> Nasrollah Fatemi has argued that the Soviets had a role in mobilising the Kurds in favour of the Kurdish nationalist movement and that Kurdish villages were surrounded by the Red Army who instructed the chiefs to support the insurgents. He furthermore maintains that Kurds who were loyal to the Iranian central government were deprived of most of their arms and that their chiefs were arrested or threatened by the Red Army.<sup>154</sup> The picture provided by these authors is misleading. The authors have not been able to base their assumption on any material. There was in reality no Soviet recognition of the PRK. Although there was some limited Soviet support to the Kurds, the suggestion that the Red Army and Soviet diplomats were heavily involved in the mobilisation of Kurds for the tasks of the Kurdish nationalist movement is quite unconvincing. A major portion of the Kurdish area, including Mahabad, was not under direct Soviet control, and this undermines the validity of Archie Roosevelt and Nasrollah Fatemi's claims. Contrary to the conclusions of these authors, the Soviet authorities in Iran felt that the Kurdish act of declaring a republic was at the very least

premature.<sup>155</sup> Thus, it seems that the intensified political activities and the nationalist sentiments among Kurds which were stimulated by developments both within the Kurdish community in Iran and in the international arena, fostered a situation in which the Soviets had no other alternative than to accept the Kurdish demands. The Soviets were in fact concerned that Kurdish ambitions might upset Soviet strategy in Iran.<sup>156</sup>

There is conflicting evidence regarding the Soviet view on possible support of the Kurds throughout Kurdistan. The British Embassy in Moscow was informed that Soviet agents had assured Kurdish leaders that the Soviet government would support the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq in creating an autonomous republic similar to that of Azerbaijan.<sup>157</sup> However, it was later remarked that no broad Soviet scheme existed for the whole of Kurdistan.<sup>158</sup>

In the Cold War context, it seems that the Truman administration's policies of supporting Iran and of antagonising the Soviets was rather counter-productive. These policies only served to provoke the Soviets to more actively back the autonomist movements of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, especially during the critical months of December 1945 and January 1946.<sup>159</sup>



The prevalent assumption among American officials concerning political activities in Kurdistan and the establishment of the PRK was that these developments were Communist-oriented.<sup>160</sup> It was in the interest of the Iranian government to depict the Kurdish régime as *Communist* and the republic as a *Soviet* republic. The Iranian government could thus identify the Kurdish entity with the Soviet Union and with real or alleged Communist expansionism.<sup>161</sup> The reality was that both Kurdish political activities prior to the establishment of the PRK and the republic itself reflected Kurdish nationalist aspirations.<sup>162</sup> The leaders of the republic were not Communist but nationalist, and were not eager to find themselves under a permanent Soviet tutelage.<sup>163</sup> Moreover, the political objectives declared by the *Komala* and by the KDP were consistently linked to questions of Kurdish national rights and of relations between the Kurds in Iran and the Tehran government. Revolutionary or radical reforms were not mentioned, nor were there signs of Communist ideology in the formulations.<sup>164</sup>

The Americans supported the central government in Iran in its conflict with Azerbaijan and Kurdistan despite a certain appreciation of the grievances of nationalist groups in Iran. Indeed, certain American officials

remarked that the central government in Iran was oppressive of minority groups and that there was a sincere demand for autonomy and ample cause for upheaval.<sup>165</sup> However, the official stance of the US administration continued to entail unconditional support of the central power. This was seemingly dictated by the strategic and political considerations of the US government. According to Walter Smith, the Ambassador in Moscow, the Soviet Union pursued an ambiguous policy towards Iran, maintaining “correct” relations with the central authorities while simultaneously using Azerbaijan as an instrument to disrupt the central power. Smith also argued that Soviet support of the autonomous local government in Azerbaijan was geared towards the ultimate absorption of the region as an integral part of the Soviet Union.<sup>166</sup>

It was in the interest of both the leadership of PRK and the American envoy in Tabriz to maintain mutual contact. For instance, during his visit to Tabriz in February 1946, Qazi Muhammed was asked three times by Rossow to meet with him, but Qazi Muhammed declined.<sup>167</sup> Yet Qazi Muhammed eventually received Dooher at the temporary Kurdish headquarters which lay adjacent to the American Consulate in Tabriz. Qazi Muhammed proved to be most interested in the nature of US policy towards the Kurds and in whether the Americans were willing to employ their influence to bring democracy to the Iranian government. Dooher replied that the policy of the US was to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and that domestic Iranian problems should be solved by the people of that country. Qazi Muhammed then made an “astonishing statement that Kurds would welcome American interference; that US Govt would gain in prestige among Kurds by taking up cudgels for minority peoples of Iran.”<sup>168</sup> Qazi Muhammed also stressed the significance of good relations with the Americans, reasserting that the only demand of the Kurds in Iran was *autonomy* within the framework of a united Iran. He furthermore wished to discuss the possibility of American support to the PRK in the fields of industry, agriculture and education.<sup>169</sup> However, Qazi Muhammed did not receive a positive reaction from the American Vice Consul. By meeting with leaders of the KRP, the Americans most likely wished to gain knowledge of developments in Kurdistan through direct contacts.

Qazi Muhammed’s willingness to meet the American Vice Consul was probably due to a shift in the Soviet attitude, linked to the Iranian crisis. There were signs of conciliation between Iran and the Soviet Union, and of a resolution of the Iranian crisis and a normalisation of Soviet-Iranian relations. This development might have entailed the consequent withdrawal of the Soviet forces, which might have been an important factor in leading

Qazi Muhammed to approach the Americans. Qazi Muhammed and the republic's leadership must have understood the critical development of the political climate within Iran, particularly in regard to Soviet-Iranian relations. Dooher stated that Qazi Muhammed's approach might have been due to the failure of the Soviets to supply the Kurdish government with heavy military equipment.<sup>170</sup>

The position of the Americans towards the PRK should be put in the context of American strategic concerns in the Middle East in general and in Iran in particular. The US view of the Soviet attitude and policy in the region is of particular interest since it reveals the Kurdish factor in Soviet-American rivalry during the early Cold War.

In early 1946, there were American concerns regarding alleged Soviet plans to aggress Turkey in order to erect bases on straits and a friendly régime in Ankara. However, George Kennan, the US Chargé d'Affaires to Moscow, felt that there were no indications of such a scheme. Yet Kennan did state that "Soviet-armed Kurds" were a potential source of trouble to the Turkish government on the Irano-Turkish frontier. Such activities could be cited as grounds for Soviet interference.<sup>171</sup> Kennan furthermore underlined that the situation in respect to Soviet aims and activities in Iraq was unclear. He maintained that there was, however, some evidence suggesting that Soviet-armed Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan were to occupy the northern Iraqi province of Mosul. According to Kennan, this Kurdish action would be backed by Soviet forces, who would at the request of the Kurds arrive and be engaged in the operations. Although the Soviets saw the British as an obstacle in this context, they were prepared to take risks to pursue whatever course of action in the Middle East they deemed necessary. In Kennan's words, the Soviets were ready "to face very serious diplomatic and political difficulties but to attain their objectives they will try to gauge their action."<sup>172</sup> Kennan stated that the Soviets were not aware of the risks entailed in their involvement in the activities in question. Their actions might generate a series of problems that the Soviets had originally not anticipated.<sup>173</sup>

These fears must have reflected existing American concerns that a Soviet advance in Iran could have repercussions on US objectives in the region. The American aspirations in relation to Iran were identified as: 1) to encourage Iran's amicable relations with all states, and to thus secure Iran's independence; 2) to create a condition of internal security in order to prevent foreign interference into Iranian domestic affairs; 3) to work towards a developed economy both internally and in economic relations on an international scale; and finally, the promotion of democratic institutions in the country.<sup>174</sup> Given the existence of US strategic concerns in Iran, it

seems that American policy had inevitably to appreciate the magnitude of the Kurdish question, in terms of both the internal and international complications surrounding the issue.

There were several relevant issues in the context of American strategy concerning Iran. These questions were formulated in a memorandum to the Secretary of State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, and included the manner in which US strategic interests might be affected by:

- (a) A division of Iran into a Soviet sphere in the north and a British sphere of influence in the south;
- (b) Permanent Soviet control of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan;
- (c) The creation of a Soviet-dominated autonomous Kurdish state which might include contiguous portions of northwestern Iran and northern Iraq;
- (d) Soviet domination of the whole of Iran.<sup>175</sup>

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee contended that in terms of both offensive and defensive considerations, Iran was an area of major interest to the United States. Iran and the Eastern Mediterranean-Middle East were strategically essential in preventing a Soviet offensive against the entire Middle East.<sup>176</sup> Greater Kurdistan constituted the core of the Eastern Mediterranean-Middle Eastern area. Due to the geographic location of Kurdistan and the mountainous nature of the land, the Soviets would be faced with the maximum potential of difficult terrains if they wished to advance in the Middle East. Furthermore, the presence of Kurdish nationalist movements in four of the Middle Eastern countries and potential Kurdish activities could be exploited for strategic and political purposes in any confrontation in the area.

In a response to question (c) above, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee stated that the formation of a Kurdish state owing its existence to the Soviets would be detrimental to US interests, since the Soviets might exploit this entity to generate disturbances in the Near and Middle East. Furthermore, a Kurdish state would encompass the sources of British oil including those in the Kirkuk area. This would entail that the revenues which now went to Iraq for the use of these oil resources would instead fall into Kurdish hands. The situation was likely to result in the fall of the present Iraqi government, to be succeeded by a government more friendly to the Soviets than to the western powers. Given the fact that Iraq stretched to the Persian Gulf and that the Abadan oil refineries lay in proximity to Iraq, US resources in this area would be seriously compromised.<sup>177</sup>

Not long before the declaration of the PRK, the British Ambassador in Tehran stressed that the British were following the same course which had been agreed upon by the British legation in Tehran and the Foreign Office in October 1941.<sup>178</sup> The main features of this understanding were once again highlighted, this time in greater detail. One argument for denying assistance to tribes and abstaining from involvement in tribal affairs was based on the British experience of Kurdish and Arab tribes in Iraq in the 1920s. It was also asserted that British war efforts and interests in Iran could be best served by adhering to the central government.<sup>179</sup>

The establishment of a Kurdish government required the support of the Great Powers. In late December 1945, a Kurdish delegation authorised by Qazi Muhammed approached the British Consul in Tabriz to establish official relations between an anticipated autonomous Kurdistan, and Great Britain and other Western powers. The response of the British Consul was vague and left the delegation unsatisfied.<sup>180</sup> The British reaction is not surprising, given the nature of British policy towards the Kurds since the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in August 1941.

On the one hand, the British recognised the Kurdish question as a chronic source of concern. The establishment of the PRK had implications for numerous parties and for future developments in Iranian affairs, and not least for complications on the international arena. Suggestions were made that the British should counter the Soviets by adopting their own plan for the Kurdish nationalist movement. On the other hand, there were contentions that so-called Kurdish nationalism was primarily tribal in character and that the idea of a Kurdish state lacked a solid basis.<sup>181</sup> The British in Iraq were closely scrutinising the political development in Iranian Kurdistan, given the potential impact of events in Iranian Kurdistan on the Kurds in Iraq, and the possibility of Soviet exploitation of the situation. The British Embassy in Baghdad claimed that it was taking each opportunity available to persuade the Iraqi government of the need for immediate action to remedy the valid grievances of the Kurds in Iraq. It was also contended that the Kurds saw a new power in the Soviet Union and were “very willing to be off with the old love [of the British] and on with the new,” and that the Kurds did not understand that the British government was working on their behalf yet refrained from making promises which it might not be able to keep.<sup>182</sup> These assumptions were mainly based on observations made by H. M. Jackson, the Deputy Assistant Political Adviser to the British Force at Arbil. Jackson conducted a three-day tour of Iraqi Kurdistan north of Arbil in the direction of the

Iraq-Iran border. He observed that the hopes of the Kurds in the Rawanduz area were increasingly directed towards fellow Kurds in Iran.<sup>183</sup> It was also noted that the majority of the Kurds on the Iraqi side of the border recognised three points:

- (i) that one of the issues of the Azerbaijan struggle was Kurdish independence,
- (ii) that one of the great powers of the world, the USSR, was an active sympathiser in this struggle and
- (iii) that Mulla Mustafa and his followers were key participants in the struggle for freedom.<sup>184</sup>

With the prospect of an Allied victory in sight, the relationship between the British and the Soviets in Iran transformed into one of rivalry which was manifested in, among other things, the form of each party's assistance to conflicting Iranian groups.<sup>185</sup> Generally speaking, Great Britain's policy was to support and to reinforce the central government as a counter-weight to Russian support of the nationalist movements of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and of the left-wing forces, particularly the *Tudeh* Party.<sup>186</sup> However, British policy vis-à-vis both the tribes and the central government was flexible and at times contradictory. In early 1946, there were reports that Shaikh Khazal of Mohammera, who had lived in exile in Iraq and was a British protégé, had gathered a force of Arabs and led raids in Khozistan. This was understood as a British attempt to sponsor separatist movement in southern Iran and as a British counter-move to the Soviet supported Azerbaijan and Kurdish autonomous movements in the northern part of the country.<sup>187</sup> The British validated their actions by stating that the aspirations of the tribes in Iran were partly rooted in discontent with the government in Tehran, which was allegedly showing subservience to the Soviet government and to its supporter in Iran, the *Tudeh* Party.<sup>188</sup>

## Chapter Eight

### THE DEMISE OF THE REPUBLIC

Another attempt was made to arrange a settlement with the government in Tehran prior to the initiation of the military campaign against the PRK. The central government sent an emissary to meet with the Kurdish leadership in Mahabad in September. However, the emissary failed to present any proposals that might have persuaded the Kurdish leadership to compromise.<sup>1</sup> In October, the Shah instructed Qavam to break with the *Tudeh* Party and also issued a decree for the organisation of elections throughout Iran.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, Qavam reformed his government to exclude any notable participation of the *Tudeh* Party. US support was also secured, primarily by the Shah, for a plan to re-establish central control in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan.<sup>3</sup> At the beginning of November it was evident that the Iranian government was determined and ready to occupy by force the city of Zenjan, which was under the control of the Azerbaijan government. As King and Commander-in-Chief, the Shah personally instructed the Iranian troops to crush the two autonomous régimes of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.<sup>4</sup> Zenjan, located mid-way between Tabriz and Tehran, fell to the Iranian army on November 16. The take-over signalled an alarming development in the power struggle between Tehran and the two republics. In early December, a delegation from the Kurdish government visited Rezaieh to discuss the situation with Hashimov, the Soviet consul there. The delegation was assured that by sending forces to Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, the Iranian government intended to organise elections and the Iranian army's action would be limited to that end. However, the Kurdish leadership assumed that the situation was grave and that the fate of their republic was in danger. Qazi Muhammed therefore reacted by forming a war council on December 5, which included himself and other leaders of the Kurdish government. A meeting was subsequently organised in a mosque in the city of Mahabad, which drew a great number of KDP members. When the meeting closed, the participants had not been able to agree on a plan of action. It was, however, emphasised that the fate of the PRK would depend on the development in Azerbaijan and the reaction of the Great Powers. The collapse of Azerbaijan seemed imminent by December 11, and the Iranian army entered Tabriz on December 13.<sup>5</sup>

With the first indications of the fall of Azerbaijan, the Shikāk and HerkŞ tribes were preoccupied with their own affairs and moved towards the cities of Rezaieh and Tabriz, in order to, as William Eagleton puts, “claim their share of the Iranian victory.”<sup>6</sup> In connection with the fall of Tabriz, certain members of the KDP and officials of the Kurdish administration, including three Qazis (Qazi Muhammed, Sadri Qazi and Saifi Qazi) and Haji Bāba Shaikh, began submitting to the Iranian army while others prepared to leave Mahabad. The forces of the central government entered the city on December 17, thus bringing to an end the PRK. Qazi Muhammed, Hussein Saifi Qazi and Haji Bāba Shaikh had surrendered to General Homyuni, Commander of Iran’s 4th Army of Kurdistan on December 16, in Miandoab.<sup>7</sup> Concerned over the population of Mahabad and fearing the Iranian army’s retaliation on the Kurds, Qazi Muhammed returned to Mahabad to evacuate the Kurdish forces and to prepare for the entry of the Iranian army into the city. Qazi Muhammed used the short time available to give the remaining arms and ammunition to Mulla Mustafa’s followers, who were determined to not submit and to fight the forces of the central government. Colonel G. D. Pybus, the Military Attaché of the British Embassy in Tehran, condemned Qazi Muhammed’s conduct as treacherous.<sup>8</sup> Paradoxically, although Qazi Muhammed was quite certain that the Iranian authorities would punish him, possibly with death, he insisted in staying in Mahabad. In fact, many parties had advised him not to submit. While Azerbaijan was collapsing, for example, Ja‘far Pishevari contacted Qazi Muhammed and recommended that he leave Mahabad, but Qazi Muhammed replied that it was unhonourable to leave the population at the mercy of the Iranian army.<sup>9</sup> An additional reason to why Qazi Muhammed submitted, as he himself phrased it, was that “he was alone and that there was not any one around him.”<sup>10</sup>

### *The Internal and Iranian Connections*

The collapse of the Azerbaijan government and the hasty flight of the republic’s leadership left the PRK demoralised, facing the Iranian army alone.

The fall of the republic was precipitated by the fact that the Iranian state had retrieved the power which it had lost in connection with the Anglo-Soviet invasion. During the war years after the invasion, the Iranians had strengthened both their military forces and their ability for diplomatic action. In other words, the weakness of the central power in Tehran, which had once fostered the evolution of the Kurdish nationalist movement, had

now been redressed. However, had the Soviet troops remained in northern Iran, the Iranian army would most probably not have had the opportunity to proceed with their campaign against the PRK.

One important aspect in the collapse of the republic was the role played by tribes. Many tribal chieftains had decided to abandon the republic already some time prior to its fall. Already in early November 1946, Dooher and Allen visited Qavam and assured him that Kurdish tribal leaders, especially ‘Amer Khan of Shik%k, would soon relinquish their support of the PRK. According to Dooher, tribal leaders were opposed to Communism and were deeply disappointed with the failure of the Soviet authorities to materially assist the PRK as had earlier been promised. A precondition for the tribal leaders’ abandonment of the republic and for their co-operation with the central government was that the latter renounce the oppressive policy which Reza Shah’s programme of modernisation entailed against the tribes.<sup>11</sup> As has already been noted, the tribes were a major element in Kurdish society and had played an important part in the make-up of the KDP and of the PRK. Generally speaking, the tribes had worked against the central government in Tehran, had encouraged the establishment of the republic, and had played a key role in one of the most significant institutions of the republic, namely the army. However, the tribes also contributed to the downfall of the republic.<sup>12</sup> Discontent among the Kurdish tribes, particularly during the final days of the PRK, was an important factor in the collapse of the republic.<sup>13</sup> Paradoxically, the rapid mobilisation of the leadership of the KDP and of the republic was made possible by the support of tribal chieftains.<sup>14</sup> Popular support was also dependent on the tribes since tribesmen followed the actions of their chieftains.

One reason for the weakness and the rapid collapse of the republic lies in the fact that many tribes shifted from support of the republic to a position of hostility. Numerous scholars have focused on this aspect in the analysis of the weaknesses of the Kurdish nationalist movement. For instance, Fereshteh Koohi-Kamali has argued that the lack of real unity among the Kurds was caused by tribal fragmentation within Kurdish society. The state of conflict between the tribes was a severe barrier hampering the Kurdish nationalist movement. One dominant feature of tribal relations is the decisive influence of the chieftains upon the tribesmen concerning which power to support. Furthermore, the chieftains have been motivated in their choices primarily by the desire to safeguard their own interests.<sup>15</sup>

Tribal chiefs have traditionally resisted the influence of central governments,<sup>16</sup> and have strived to preserve the tribal socio-political

organisation as well as to consolidate their own power both within the tribe and in relation to other tribes. Rivalry between different tribes is another dimension of the tribal mode of social and political organisation. The combination of these two factors contributed to tribal support of the PRK. On the other hand, certain tribes broke with the republic. For instance, elements of M%ash and Mangur tribes near Mahabad fled to Iraq. A particularly important tribe was the Shik%k and its influential chief 'Amer Khan, who, as mentioned above, before the assault of the Iranian army on Azerbaijan and Kurdistan had contacted the central government seeking a separate deal with Tehran.<sup>17</sup>

Another problem in the PRK was the absence of an experienced political organisation and a capable and trained leadership to guide the Kurds in Iran at this critical time.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, the republic also suffered from serious economic and political weaknesses, and this was essentially the consequence of the policy of the central government towards the Kurdish areas. Furthermore, in a period of less than one year, the republic could not be made militarily, economically, and politically strong enough to resist the Iranian government's effort to restore its control over Kurdistan. The fall of the republic of Azerbaijan undeniably served to demoralise the Kurdish leadership. In addition, since the PRK remained a domestic Iranian issue and no power or international body had recognised the republic, the Iranian government was relatively free to undertake its campaign.

Popular support for the Azerbaijan régime in Tabriz was quite limited despite the Azerbaijan government's claims to the contrary. This reality was observed by Rossow already in February 1946, a short time after the ARA was declared. Rossow alleged that only five percent of the population were active members of the DPA, and that the existence of the Azerbaijan government was to a large extent dependent on the presence of Soviet troops in northern Iran.<sup>19</sup> It may in fact be true that the existence of the two republics required the presence of Soviet forces and the protection which these forces offered. On the other hand, Rossow acknowledged the fact that the Azerbaijan government had initiated various reforms which were truly popular with the people, i.e. land reforms for the benefit of the peasants; workers' welfare measures; public works; and the improvement of educational facilities.<sup>20</sup> However, as Richard Cottam has concluded, there was a major difference between the situation in Azerbaijan and that in Kurdistan in the sense of mobilisation. In the former, separatist propaganda attracted little interest, while the Kurdish nationalist movement could in fact speak for the Kurds, particularly for settled and urbanised sectors.<sup>21</sup> In fact, even Najafgholi Pisyany, the correspondent of the official

Iranian newspaper *Itila'at*, maintained that the government of Qazi Muhammed enjoyed a high degree of popularity compared to that of Pishvari. One reason for this was that Qazi Muhammed was a member of a well-known family of Mahabad, which had at least since the turn of the century enjoyed social and political status not only in Mahabad, but also in Iranian Kurdistan.<sup>22</sup> However, this did not influence the US stance towards the Kurdish nationalist movement. The US adhered to its determined course of action, abstaining from expressions of sympathy for the Kurdish nationalist movement or for the PRK.

### *The Iranian Diplomacy and the International Connections*

The issue of withdrawal of Soviet forces from Iran was one of the questions which involved the interaction of various elements in the Iranian crisis of 1945–1946. The matter must be seen primarily within the context of the relationship of Iran to the Great Powers, and to the USSR in particular; the interaction between Iran's domestic and foreign policies; relations among the Great Powers themselves; and the issue of the existence and fate of the autonomous republics of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. The withdrawal of Soviet forces was a decisive factor behind the collapse of the two republics.

The two main elements in the Iranian crisis of 1945–1946 were the retreat of the Soviet Union from Iran and Soviet *interference* in Iranian affairs, in the form of Soviet support to the establishment of autonomous entities in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. The crisis was, however, exacerbated by British and American support to Iran.<sup>23</sup> As a matter of fact, the Iranian central government was from 1942 until the end of the war in May 1945, preoccupied with the issue of Soviet interference. By the end of the war, the withdrawal of Soviet forces and Soviet interference into Iranian affairs were two interwoven questions which seriously concerned the Iranian government.

One important dimension in this context was the Iranian success in attracting American involvement in the two mentioned issues. Already in early 1943, American officials brought up the subject of post-war developments, including the question of British and Soviet withdrawal from Iran.<sup>24</sup> At the Tehran Conference,<sup>25</sup> held on December 1, 1943, the Big Three agreed on a declaration regarding Iran, which stated: "The Governments of the US, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity

of Iran.”<sup>26</sup> The Tehran declaration, issued at the suggestion of the US, served several purposes. First, the declaration secured US support of Iranian sovereignty,<sup>27</sup> and second, it assured the Iranians of economic assistance.<sup>28</sup> The declaration also symbolised the new American conviction that the US had a vital interest in Iran’s future.<sup>29</sup>

At the end of 1943, the Iranian government had officially expressed to the Allies that they should withdraw their troops from Iran as soon as the war came to an end. The Iranians became more intransigent on this point over time, and the government demanded that the withdrawal of Allied troops begin at an earlier date than what had been agreed upon in the Tri-Partite Treaty. Iran justified its request by asserting that:

(a) All Axis agents have been eliminated from Iran. (b) There is no longer any threat of any enemy invasion of Iran. (c) Iran has joined the United Nations.<sup>30</sup>

However, the view of the American Legation in Tehran and of many prominent American generals was that all harmful Axis agents had not been eliminated in Iran, and that the Iranian forces could not assure the internal security of the country without assistance. The Kurds and the Qashqais were specifically mentioned as posing a major threat to the internal security of Iran.<sup>31</sup>

In January 1945, Muhammed Shayesteh, the Iranian Minister in Washington, informed American officials of the Iranian government’s concerns at the coming Yalta Conference of the Big Three about the Soviet occupation.<sup>32</sup> The retreat of British and Soviet troops from Iran was discussed in British diplomatic circles. The withdrawal of British troops would largely depend upon the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from the country. At this time, the British were supposing a *pari passu* withdrawal with the Soviets. Both the British Foreign Secretary and the British Ambassador to Tehran were particularly anxious over what they considered to be Soviet attempts to establish a stranglehold on northern Iran. There were two alternatives at hand: either both the British and the Soviets would evacuate their troops from Iran, or there would be a partition of Iran into two zones of influence, one British and one Soviet, following the 1907 pattern.<sup>33</sup> In a memorandum by Loy Henderson, the director of NEA, it was suggested that at the upcoming Moscow Conference, the Foreign Ministers of the Big Three should maintain that: 1) the foreign troops in Iran were no longer required and should be withdrawn; 2) that the Iranian government was authorised as a sovereign government to move its forces throughout its territory; 3) that the Iranian government is fully free to grant or withhold concessions.<sup>34</sup>

Immediately upon the end of the war in Europe, the Iranian government requested that the Allies withdraw their forces from Iran within six months. Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Iran had in the terms of the 1942 Tri-Partite Treaty agreed that Allied occupation forces were to be withdrawn within six months after the cessation of hostilities.<sup>35</sup> Four days after the surrender of Japan, on September 6, Anushirvan Siphahbodi, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that the Iranian government itself was responsible for the country's internal security. He related this issue to the withdrawal of Allied forces from Iran and expressed the desire of the Iranians to be represented at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in London (11 Sep.–2 Oct. 1945).<sup>36</sup> However, already in May 1945, there were assertions from the Iranian government that the Iranians wanted the Americans to remain in Iran until the withdrawal of the British and the Soviet forces was completed.<sup>37</sup> On November 29, while presenting his credentials to President Truman, the new Iranian Ambassador in Washington renewed his country's call for American support in hurrying the withdrawal of Soviet and British forces from Iran. The Ambassador stated that the US continued to stand for the independence and integrity of Iran and that only the US could "save" Iran.<sup>38</sup>



The Allies had agreed to hold a conference at Moscow in December 1945, in order to discuss a number of problems. At the conference, Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, suggested that a *Three-Power Commission*<sup>39</sup> be created with the approval of the Iranian government, in order to deal with Iran's problems both at the national and the international levels. This involved developments in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan and their correlation to the presence of Soviet troops in Iran. It was suggested that the creation of *Provincial Councils*, as provided for in Iran's constitution, would be one of the principal tasks of the Commission.<sup>40</sup>

The purpose of the proposed Commission was to advise and assist the Iranian government in resolving the problem of the provinces by supervising the first elections of Provincial Councils. The Commission would also make recommendations to Iran's government regarding the manner of resolving ethnic minority problems, i.e. by the use of minority languages such as Kurdish, Turkish and Arabic.<sup>41</sup> The aim of the British in proposing the Commission was to enable the central government in Tehran to re-establish its control over Azerbaijan and Kurdistan by means of "satisfactory relations." In order to acknowledge Iranian grievances regarding the presence of Allied forces in Iran, the Americans proposed a

section regarding the withdrawal of Allied troops. The Americans stressed that Iranian domestic issues would thus not dominate the work of the Commission.<sup>42</sup> The American Ambassador in Tehran was instructed to inform the Iranian Prime Minister of the proposal for an Anglo-American-Soviet Commission. It was to be maintained that the US would co-operate with such a Commission. The Iranians would also be informed that it was in their interest to co-operate with the proposed Commission.<sup>43</sup> The Shah saw this measure as positive and stated that Iran should co-operate with the Commission for a practical reason, namely that the Commission would ensure American assistance to Iran.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, certain Iranian statesmen, such as Muhammed Mossadeq (*Majlis* deputy), and American officials, such as Murray, feared that such a Commission would ultimately entail a *de facto* carving up of Iran, as had been the case in 1907.<sup>45</sup> Moreover, there was considerable opposition to the proposed Commission within the *Majlis*, because it was viewed as an expanded version of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.<sup>46</sup> It was argued that the British were prepared to strike a deal which would grant the Soviets free hand in the north, while the British would consolidate their own position in the south.<sup>47</sup>

The Americans were not wholly in agreement with the British, because they preferred that the Iranians bring their case before the UN Security Council.<sup>48</sup> Although the British and the Americans generally maintained close collaboration concerning Iran, American officials were struck by the “frantic urgency of British action in trying to persuade Iranians not to raise issue in the UNO.”<sup>49</sup>

The Iranians did not conceal their anxiety over the possible repercussions of the proposed Commission’s activities. For instance, Hussein ‘Ala, the Iranian Ambassador in Washington, met Loy Henderson, the director NEA, wishing to know the exact position of the Americans regarding the Three Power Commission. ‘Ala asked Henderson whether the proposed Commission was originally a British idea, to which Henderson replied that Ernest Bevin had originated such a proposal at the Moscow Conference, but that the Americans and Soviets had made modifications of the draft. Although they had agreed to the formation of such a Commission, the Soviets were not willing to discuss it further at the time. Molotov was not willing to collaborate in the establishment of a Commission since he expected further concessions from the Iranians through bilateral negotiations.<sup>50</sup> The Iranians also wished to express their concerns about the proposed Commission. ‘Ala, for instance, stressed that several dangers to Iran could be anticipated if Iran agreed to the formation of the Commission.<sup>51</sup>

Meanwhile, the British advised the Iranians not to appeal to the UN since the British feared that this might prompt a Soviet refusal to join the suggested Commission on Iran.<sup>52</sup> Thus, under instructions of the Foreign Office, Reader Bullard persuaded Ibrahim Hakimi to immediately ask Hassan Taqizadeh, the Iranian Ambassador to London and head of the Iranian delegation to the UN, to withdraw from the UN agenda the previous Iranian request for a discussion of the Iranian question. The British likewise sought to persuade the Americans to appeal to the Iranians not to present their case before the UN. Yet the American Ambassador to Tehran, the Secretary of State, the American Ambassador to London and other American officials proved unwilling to comply with these demands, since the US still anticipated that the Soviets would consent to the creation of the Commission. However, the Soviets ultimately declined.<sup>53</sup>

The Iranians were apparently concerned with the sovereignty and integrity of Iran, since the Commission might have paved the way for future Great Power interference into Iranian internal affairs. The Iranian government was most likely sensitive to certain elements of the proposed Commission, i.e. the recognition by the Iranian central government of cultural rights of ethno-national minorities in Iran. There was little chance that the Iranian government and the *Majlis* would agree to the establishment of the Commission, and this was primarily due to reservations over the clause providing for the use of minority languages. In fact, the government denied the existence of any ethno-national minority problem in Iran.<sup>54</sup> It is most likely that if the Commission had become a reality, the minorities in Iran would have obtained quasi-international status.

On January 19, 1946, two days after the opening of the first meeting of the Security Council, the Iranian Ambassador in London presented an appeal to the UN. The Soviet Union was thereby charged with interference into Iran's internal affairs by support to Kurds and Azeris, and of refusal to withdraw its troops from Iran. The Ambassador argued that these Soviet measures could foster a situation that might trigger international conflict.<sup>55</sup> In pointing out Soviet interference in Kurdish areas, the Iranian delegation referred to a three day visit of the Soviet Consul General in Rezaieh and eleven Soviet officers to Mahabad. The aim of the visit, Hassan Taqizadeh stated, was to provoke Kurdish chieftains against the central government.<sup>56</sup> The Soviet delegate, Andrey Vyshinsky, admitted that the Soviets were denying Iranian troops entrance into the Soviet occupation zone, but pointed out that the movement for autonomy reflected the true will of the population there, and that the Azeris and the Kurdish movements had no connection to the presence of Soviet troops in northern Iran. Vyshinsky

accused the Iranian government of having an indifferent attitude towards anti-Soviet propaganda in Iran. He additionally claimed that Baku was threatened by organised hostile action.<sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, the UN decided at the end of January 1946, that the Iranian question would be solved by bilateral negotiations between the Soviet and the Iranian governments.<sup>58</sup>



The Kurdish and Azerbaijan autonomous governments were crucially dependent on the presence of the Soviet forces in northern Iran. In fact, it was generally assumed that if the Soviet troops withdrew, the Azeri and Kurdish governments would undoubtedly collapse.<sup>59</sup> Already in February 1945, the American Consul in Tabriz wrote that the future of Azerbaijan was entirely dependent on the nature of Soviet policy towards Iran and the decisions of the Soviet government.<sup>60</sup> The Iranian government was likewise convinced that the PRK would fall if the Soviet protection ceased.<sup>61</sup>

The official American view was that the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Iran was the result of US firmness on the issue. The official Iranian interpretation, associated mainly with the Shah, was based on this same assumption.<sup>62</sup> It has been contended that American decision-makers commonly believed that the Soviets had withdrawn their forces from Iran as a result of mounting American pressures.<sup>63</sup> A generally accepted notion among the American envoys in Iran was that the Soviets, the Iranians and the Azeris were convinced that the US would in fact unwaveringly support Iranian sovereignty.<sup>64</sup> Rossow, for instance, concludes that the Soviet Union was forced to retire from Iran and failed to achieve its objectives because of the determined position of President Truman and American representatives in the area.<sup>65</sup>

In fact, when the Azerbaijan government collapsed, numerous representatives of the Iranian cabinet, the *Majlis* and other high level officials visited the American Embassy in order to express their gratitude and appreciation to the US for “giving back Azerbaijan to Iran.” Azerbaijan was depicted by some Iranian officials as the Stalingrad of the western democracies and as symbolising the “turn of the tides against Soviet aggression throughout the world.”<sup>66</sup> However, George Allen argued that the Iranians had themselves regained Azerbaijan.<sup>67</sup> Bruce Kuniholm concludes that the US was most likely neither willing nor prepared to commit troops to the Balkans and to Iran.<sup>68</sup> Allen maintained that:

Soviet failure to send combat units to support Azerbaijan may have resulted from the fact that Azerbaijan regime collapsed too fast, from internal

consideration in USSR, from broader questions of foreign policy connected with Europe, from fear of SC [Security Council] and world opinion censure, or combination of all of them.<sup>69</sup>

The Soviet Ambassador in Tehran paid a visit to the Shah when the Iranian army marched into Azerbaijan. During the meeting, the Ambassador spoke in threatening tones and protested that the Iranian military campaign against Kurdistan and Azerbaijan was endangering international peace. The Ambassador demanded that the Shah withdraw his forces from Azerbaijan.<sup>70</sup> However, the Soviets themselves had neither the time nor the opportunity to take any measures of their own. While the Soviet Ambassador was expressing his country's objections to the Shah, the latter presented him with a telegram confirming that the forces of Azerbaijan had unconditionally surrendered.<sup>71</sup> It is likely that even limited resistance from the forces of Azerbaijan republic might have provided the Soviets with more time to react.

The available evidence suggests that the Soviets might have overestimated the internal strength of the Azerbaijan republic, while underestimating Qavam's diplomatic skills in employing American support when it was needed to pressure the Soviets.<sup>72</sup>

Both the Kurds and the Azeris were deeply disillusioned when the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Iran. Many observers and statesmen of the time, including the Shah and Qavam, anticipated that the Soviet Union would support the two republics to a further extent than it did.<sup>73</sup> The Shah maintained that the Soviets were convinced that the US was quite determined in its position, and thus retreated in their position.<sup>74</sup> The sudden collapse of the republics and the indifferent role of the Soviets came as a surprise to everyone else, including to Qavam and to the Shah.<sup>75</sup> The American Ambassador felt that the entire Azerbaijan affair had been poorly handled by the Soviets.<sup>76</sup>

To sum up, the Soviet Union exited the Iranian territory as a result of the interplay of several factors. While the role of US and UN pressures was considerable, other components likewise contributed. Iranian diplomacy and especially the role of Qavam were important in this context. As a result of the Irano-Soviet agreement, the Soviets felt that they had at least attained one of their primary goals in Iran, namely the obtaining of oil concessions in northern Iran. Furthermore, the Soviets not only remained militarily passive while the Iranian army advanced towards Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, but in fact abandoned all support to the republics both politically and morally.<sup>77</sup> Upon their withdrawal from northern Iran, the Soviet forces repossessed artillery which they had given to the Azeris. In

addition, it was later disclosed that the Soviets had advised the Azeri leadership not to resist Iranian military attempts to assert control over Azerbaijan.<sup>78</sup> The Kurds, who had been faced with the increasingly aggressive stance of the Iranian government, found themselves virtually isolated facing the Iranian campaign. Despite Soviet promises of aid and material, the PRK remained without either heavy artillery or trained men, or indeed any effective army at all.<sup>79</sup>



The significance of British and US support to the Iranian campaign against the republics has often been emphasised.<sup>80</sup> There were, however, certain distinctions between the positions of the two powers. Thus, it seems that the generalisation *western support* to the Iranians provides an inadequate depiction of the American and British roles.

While there is no clear evidence as to whether the British actively supported the Iranian governmental campaign against Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, it is apparent that the US whole-heartedly backed the Iranians. The Americans actively exerted pressure on the Soviets to withdraw their forces from Iran, both through direct pressure on the Soviet Union and through the American role in the UN. There is evidence indicating that the Americans supported the Iranian central government in its quest to terminate the PRK. For instance, George Allen played an important part in managing contacts between the Iranian Prime Minister Qavam and ‘Amer Khan before the campaign against the PRK was implemented. The aim of the Ambassador was to neutralise the powerful tribe of the Shik%ks in case of an Iranian military campaign against the two republics.<sup>81</sup> The US sought to strengthen the position of the Iranian government and thus enable it to successfully confront challenges within the country, primarily the Azeri and Kurdish dilemmas. Already in October 1944, the Secretary of State wrote to the Secretary of War that an elementary consideration in US policy towards Iran was to strengthen the country for enabling it to maintain *internal security*. The Iranian government was accordingly to be supported in order to avoid the possible “disintegration” of the country. A practical implementation of this policy entailed reinforcing the Iranian army. In December of 1944, the Secretary of State remarked that it was in accordance with US policy to furnish the Iranian army with essential supplies.<sup>82</sup> In fact, American military missions played a critical role in strengthening the position of the Iranian government. The ability of the Iranian government to deal with the Kurdish upheaval, for instance, was in part due to the existence of a loyal army.<sup>83</sup> It has been asserted that

developments in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan prompted the US to shift its policy from one which promoted the Iran economy, to one which involved direct steps to maximise Iran's ability to fend off *internal* and *external challenges*.<sup>84</sup> The Americans were emphatic in their request that the Iranian authorities be permitted to dispatch troops to Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. The American position was adopted in line with the interpretation of the principle of national "sovereignty."<sup>85</sup> Both prior to and during the implementation of the military campaign, the Americans appeared rather unconcerned over the possible consequences of such actions on the Kurdish and the Azerbaijan republics. The Americans could have appealed to the Iranian government and its army to respect the safety and security of the population in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. There is no evidence in the diplomatic records concerned which would indicate that the Americans were concerned over the fate of the Azeris and the Kurds. The Americans were to successfully expel the Soviets from Iran; to safeguard US interests in Iran and throughout the region; and to make Iran free from Soviet influence or from alleged internal Communist-oriented elements.

The US continued supporting Iran's quest for control over Azerbaijan and Kurdistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In October 1946, Dean Acheson, then the Deputy Secretary of State, received the Iranian Ambassador Hussein 'Ala, who appealed to the US to seek a reopening of the Iranian case at the UN, and asked that the Americans supervise elections in Azerbaijan. Acheson's response, with the approval of the President and the Secretary of State, was that the US could not act for but only in support of the Iranian government. Additionally, Acheson underlined that any elections in Azerbaijan without the Iranian authorities being established there would be an error. Therefore, the Iranian government was to first regain control over Azerbaijan before any elections to the *Majlis* would be held.<sup>86</sup> However, the Iranian government simply wished to legitimise its military campaign against the two republics, and thus claimed that forces would be sent to Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in order to supervise elections.



As has been mentioned above, the withdrawal of Soviet forces was not exclusively the result of Great Power policy implications. The role which Iranian diplomacy played in the ultimate withdrawal must also be appreciated. Iran's role should be seen in the light of its tactics in dealing with the UN and the Great Powers. The Iranians acted skilfully in: 1) attracting US involvement in pressuring the Soviet Union, both within the

framework of the UN or in direct relationships between Great Powers, and 2) parallel to the exertion of pressures on the Soviets, the Iranian government was engaged in direct bilateral negotiations with the Soviet government itself.

Already in early December 1945, there were reports that Iran's Prime Minister Ibrahim Hakimi was to resign within a short time and would be succeeded by Qavam.<sup>87</sup> The first reaction to these claims were allegations that Qavam was a pro-Soviet, and, as the Iranian Ambassador in London expressed it, that "the Russians always wanted him in office."<sup>88</sup> By the end of January, Qavam was appointed as Iran's Prime Minister<sup>89</sup> and was immediately faced with a dual crisis: the refusal of the Soviets to withdraw their forces from northern Iran, and the two Soviet-supported autonomous republics in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.<sup>90</sup> Qavam's reaction to the latter problem was to initiate direct negotiations with both the Soviet Union and with the Azeris.<sup>91</sup> However, Qavam proved unwilling to recognise the National Assembly declared by the ADP, although he agreed to grant the Azeris a Provincial Council.<sup>92</sup>

On February 19 1946, Qavam arrived to Moscow as the head of an Iranian delegation to negotiate with the Soviet government. During his stay of three weeks in Moscow, Qavam met with Stalin twice and with Molotov four times, yet was unable to make any progress in his deliberations with the Soviet leadership. The Soviets persisted on three main points: that the Iranian government should recognise Azerbaijan's autonomy; that a joint Iranian-Soviet oil company should develop the oil resources of the northern provinces; and that a number of Soviet troops should remain in Iran for an undetermined amount of time. Declining to reach an agreement on these terms, Qavam returned to Tehran on March 10, 1946.<sup>93</sup> The Soviet proposals had thus been rejected. Meanwhile, the Iranian question continued to be dealt with at the UN Security Council. However, Qavam was convinced that oil concessions in northern Iran represented the top Soviet priority.<sup>94</sup> Qavam felt that although the Soviets would prefer to meet their objectives in regards to both oil and Azerbaijan, they would prioritise the oil if forced to choose.<sup>95</sup>

The US was closely observing the situation. Several factors contributed to determining the view of high American officials, who placed the question of Soviet-Iranian relations in a wider context. In an address delivered on February 9, Stalin stressed the incompatibility of Communism and Capitalism and the inevitability of future wars.<sup>96</sup> At the same time, several notable Americans demanded an uncompromising policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. These critics gave intellectual validity to George Kennan's dispatch of February 22, in which Soviet post-war objectives

were analysed.<sup>97</sup> After Qavam returned from Moscow, the American officials in Tehran were anxious to meet with him in order to express US support of the Iranian position in negotiations with the Soviets. The American Ambassador in Tehran, Murray, met with Qavam and gave him encouraging signals to bring the Iranian matter before the Security Council. On an earlier occasion, before the return of Qavam from Moscow, Murray had also encouraged the Shah to stand firm in the face of any Soviet pressure.<sup>98</sup>

Qavam faced a particularly difficult and most challenging situation. He had to deal with numerous actors simultaneously.<sup>99</sup> Qavam consulted with the Americans and the British parallel to his negotiating efforts with the Soviet Union. In a conversation between an emissary from Qavam and the American and British Ambassadors in Tehran, the emissary showed interest in the nature of the US and British views and even asked the Ambassadors for advice. The American and the British Ambassadors abstained from making concrete suggestions, but felt that Iran's case would be "gravely prejudiced" if she did not herself speak up soon, since the Soviets were likely to exert greater pressure on the Iranian government in conjunction with a Security Council meeting in order to force Iran to keep silent. The Soviets would then claim that Iran's silence was an indication that all was well.<sup>100</sup> However, Great Britain's position was clarified in favour of supporting Iran at the Security Council.<sup>101</sup> A similar position was adopted by the Americans. In a letter to the Secretary General, Secretary of State Stettinius proposed that the Iranian case be discussed at the Security Council.<sup>102</sup> Recognising the American role in encouraging the Iranians to present their case to the UN Security Council, Molotov remarked that the Soviet Government felt itself subjected to an anti-Soviet campaign which exaggerated the gravity of the Iranian situation, and that the Security Council being used as a forum to further the campaign.<sup>103</sup>

While the Iranian government sought to formulate a plan to present its grievance to the Security Council, the Soviet government, through its Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran, expressed its concerns that the Iranian complaint might be regarded as a hostile act which might result in unfortunate consequences for Iran.<sup>104</sup> However, on March 18, 1946 Hussein 'Ala requested that the Iranian question be placed on the agenda of the Security Council which was due to meet on March 25.<sup>105</sup> Trygve Lie, the Secretary General of the UN, preferred that the Iranian issue be discussed in direct negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union. Lie argued that although he was disturbed by delays in the evacuation of Soviet forces, a discussion of the issue was likely to intensify rather than mitigate the problem. The Secretary General was convinced that Soviet withdrawal

from Iran could best be assured by private negotiations.<sup>106</sup> The Soviets were worried about the possible discussion of the Iranian question at the UN. On March 19, the Soviet delegation to the UN demanded the postponement of the discussion on Iran to April 10, on the grounds that Irano-Soviet negotiations were already in progress. The new Soviet Ambassador in Iran, Ivan Sadchikov, had initiated discussions with Qavam. The British and the Americans were concerned about the Soviet request for postponement, and the Americans were adamant in their opposition to it.<sup>107</sup> The Iranians rejected the Soviet suggestion only when it became evident that the US government would support the plan to discuss the Iranian question at the Security Council.<sup>108</sup>

Qavam drafted fresh proposals to which Ivan Sadchikov responded positively. With respect to oil concessions, Sadchikov delivered Moscow's counter-proposals.<sup>109</sup> Meanwhile, Qavam stressed that the Azerbaijan question should remain an internal Iranian concern to be dealt with by Iranian authorities. Qavam had correctly remarked that the question of oil concessions would ultimately prove more important to the Soviets than the fate of the Azerbaijan autonomous republic.<sup>110</sup>



The last British troops exited Iran on March 2, 1946 and the American forces had retired in January of that same year. The departure of the American and British troops from Iran deprived the Soviet Union of a pretext to maintain its own forces in the country. Yet while withdrawing from north-eastern Iran, the Soviet forces insisted that they would remain in Azerbaijan and in Kurdish areas until the state of affairs was further clarified. The situation was, as Bullard concluded, “clarified” as Iran's Prime Minister agreed to a written “promise” on April 4, 1946<sup>111</sup> prepared by Qavam and Sadchikov. According to this agreement, the Soviet troops were to retire from Iran within 5 or 6 weeks. Terms concerning oil were also agreed upon, and the Azerbaijan issue was described as *a purely Iranian internal* affair. The agreement was to be introduced in a bill to the *Majlis* within seven months.<sup>112</sup> The Kurds and the fate of the PRK were not mentioned in the text, since the Kurds were most likely viewed as an integrated element in the Azerbaijan question. On the same day as the Qavam-Sadchikov agreement was reached, the Security Council adopted a resolution in which it was stated that “the Council defer further proceedings on the Iranian appeal until 6 May, at which time the USSR Government and the Iranian Government are requested to report to the

Council whether the withdrawal of all USSR troops from the whole Iran has been completed.”<sup>113</sup>

The Americans interpreted the provisions of this agreement as a major concession to the Soviets, one which would eventually undermine the *sovereignty* of Iran. It was also stated that Qavam granted the Soviets concession upon concession because of the American inability to take direct steps to economically or politically assist Iran.<sup>114</sup> Acting Secretary of State Acheson expressed his concerns when he instructed Allen that conversing with Qavam, he

should continue to impress upon him that, if his foreign policy persists in preference for a single great power and apparent disregard for those powers which are truly interested in future welfare of Iran, there is dangerous possibility that Iran will be deprived of its status as an independent nation, either by being absorbed into Soviet orbit of satellite states or by being divided into foreign-dominated spheres of influence.<sup>115</sup>

The Irano-Soviet understanding did result in the Iranian withdrawal of its appeal from the UN, and the Soviet Union ultimately began withdrawing its troops from Iran.



As mentioned above, Qavam had an interesting approach in dealing with the Soviet Union in order to hurry the withdrawal of its troops from Iran. Qavam intended to negotiate with the Soviet authorities and to simultaneously send a mission to Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.<sup>116</sup> Qavam wanted to convey to the Soviets that his government was capable of settling internal problems without external interference. By negotiating with the Azeris, Qavam probably also strove to deprive the Soviets of the possibility of further using the Azerbaijan question in their deliberations with the Iranians. However, no agreement between the governments of Iran and Azerbaijan was reached before an understanding was achieved between Moscow and Tehran. Relations between the central government and the local government in Azerbaijan improved after the Qavam-Sadchikov agreement, and negotiations between Tehran and Tabriz were initiated already in April. The central government's plan for a peaceful settlement of the Azerbaijan question included the establishment of a Provincial Council (assembly in the Azeri interpretation of the word) which would be granted extensive authority, and recognition of the Azeri language which would be used in elementary schools.<sup>117</sup> The Iranian government referred to provisions in Iran's constitution regarding the

regulation of relations between the central government and the provinces, as based on the election of Provincial Councils. In accordance with its constitutional principles, the central government would allow a certain degree of local autonomy in Azerbaijan.<sup>118</sup> The Iranian Government, represented by Mozzafar Firuz, and the Azeris, represented by Ja'far Pischevari, signed an agreement on June 13, according to which the Iranian government acknowledged the existing National Assembly of Azerbaijan as the Provincial Council; agreed to choose a Governor General of Azerbaijan from a list suggested by the Provincial Council; would accept regular and volunteer Azerbaijani forces into the Iranian Army and gendarmerie; and agreed that 75 per cent of government proceeds in Azerbaijan would be appropriated for local expenditures, with the rest going to Tehran. These provisions were made applicable also to the Kurds, Assyrians, and the Armenians residing in Azerbaijan.<sup>119</sup>

The agreement was a success for both Qavam and Iran in the country's efforts to survive the crisis of 1945–1946. Yet the Americans were concerned over the possible consequences of the agreement in the Iranian and international contexts. Allen concluded that “instead of Azerbaijan returning to Iran the province [Azerbaijan] seems likely to take over the country, especially since so-called Democratic Party of Azerbaijan will remain in full control there.”<sup>120</sup> Allen and certain observers also claimed that by his agreement with the Azeris, Qavam had “gone so far to the pro-Soviet camp he cannot retract.”<sup>121</sup> However, later developments suggested that Qavam had acted skilfully and in favour of his government's interests.

Although it has been claimed that the agreement of June 13, between Tabriz and Tehran was to also apply to Kurdistan,<sup>122</sup> the Kurds were in fact not included. The leadership of the PRK was left to act on its own to reach a similar arrangement with the central government. A Kurdish delegation visited Tehran and met with Qavam, who informed the delegation that they should negotiate with the Azeris since, according to Qavam, Kurdistan was a part of Azerbaijan. Qavam furthermore stated that even if the Kurds were to be allowed their own province, they would have to agree with the Azeris on the matter.<sup>123</sup> Qavam thereby implied that the Kurdish issue was a secondary one and was subordinated to the Azerbaijan question. It is also probable that Qavam wished to invoke the deterioration in the relations between the Azerbaijan and Kurdistan governments.

## *The Aftermath*

Immediately after the collapse of the two autonomous republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, Colonel Pybus paid a visit to Kurdish areas. The Colonel remarked that life in the town of Mahabad was rapidly returning to normal. He observed that after the collapse of the local government of Kurdistan, the only serious remaining problem was that of Mulla Mustafa and his followers, who would not submit to the Iranian army.<sup>124</sup> Fearing that the presence of armed Barzanis posed an acute threat to stability and to the poorly mobilised Iranian troops, the Iranian government attempted to disarm the Barzanis first by peaceful means. Shortly after the march of the army into Mahabad, General Homyuni received an appeal from Mulla Mustafa that he be allowed to meet with him. The meeting took place in Mahabad on December 20, and Mulla Mustafa wrote a letter of surrender to the Iranians.<sup>125</sup>

Mulla Mustafa and a number of his men subsequently visited Tehran where the rebel leader undertook negotiations with the Iranian government. The deliberations continued for over one month, from the end of January to the end of February 1947. Mulla Mustafa met with Qavam and the Shah, yet despite Iranian proposals to Mulla Mustafa, the talks did not result in any agreement between the parties. The Iranian government suggested that Mulla Mustafa and his followers would be allowed to settle at Varamin, 30 miles south-east of Tehran, or in Hamadan, where land would be made available free of charge. The Barzanis would also receive other types of assistance from the authorities. However, if this proposal were rejected, all Barzanis would be expelled to Iraq.<sup>126</sup> Mulla Mustafa was convinced that even if he accepted the suggested terms, this solution would be only temporary and the Barzanis would still eventually return to Iraq. Mulla Mustafa felt that the only option, although not the best, was that women and children be sent back to Iraq and that the men seek asylum in the Soviet Union. However, he believed that the USSR would also prove to be a temporary residence and that the Barzanis would some day return to Iraq.<sup>127</sup>

The best alternative available to Mulla Mustafa and his followers was to return to Iraq and to be assured the right to live in their area (Barzan) in Iraqi Kurdistan. According to reports, the Iraqi government was accommodating and was willing to grant amnesty to all Barzanis except to Mulla Mustafa and more than 110 of his men who were considered by the Iraqi government as “criminals.” The British seemed to sympathise with Iraqi apprehensions of Mulla Mustafa and his men.<sup>128</sup> In December, the British Embassy in Baghdad, at the request of the Iraqi government,

appealed to the British Embassy in Tehran to press the Iranian government to “take energetic action”, since the Iraqi government did not wish to “let these men [Mulla Mustafa and his followers] slip through their fingers.”<sup>129</sup> The Iraqi government forwarded a similar letter to the Foreign Office.<sup>130</sup> The Foreign Office, however, had advised the Embassy in Tehran not to become involved in matters concerning Mulla Mustafa. The Embassy even refused a request from Mulla Mustafa at the end of December 1946 to meet officials at the British Embassy in Tehran.<sup>131</sup> The Foreign Office preferred to allow the two governments of Persia and Iraq to settle the matter between themselves. On the other hand, the Foreign Office was reluctant to press the Iraqi government to grant Mulla Mustafa a pardon.<sup>132</sup> The British Ambassador in Baghdad affirmed this by stating: “I think it would be unreasonable for us to suggest this [amnesty].”<sup>133</sup>

The Foreign Office furthermore maintained that the Iraqi and Persian governments would be able to agree on some solution, such as forced residence in another part of Iran.<sup>134</sup> At the same time, the Foreign Office sought to convince the Department of State to avoid involvement in this affair.<sup>135</sup>

The British continued to persist in not receiving Mulla Mustafa, although with the approval of the Iranian government, Mulla Mustafa succeeded in contacting the British Embassy in Tehran. However, Le Rougetel (the Ambassador), acting according to instructions by the Foreign Office, declined to see him. After numerous appeals to both the Iranians and the British, Mulla Mustafa realised that an understanding was impossible with the Iranian government. Being denied amnesty by the Iraqis, Mulla Mustafa had no choice but to fight his way back to Iraq. In an effort to attract American involvement into Barzani affairs, Mulla Mustafa first met with George Allen at the home of the American Embassy’s Military Attaché, Colonel Sexton. Allen’s impression was that Mulla Mustafa wished for the US to appeal to the Iraqi and British authorities on his behalf. Allen informed Mulla Mustafa that there was nothing the American government could do in this matter,<sup>136</sup> and that the US had no interest in convincing the Iraqi government to revise their decision.<sup>137</sup> On the other hand, the American envoys in Iran were concerned over the affair and wished to be kept informed of the issue. Accordingly, Allen contacted with the Shah and discussed this matter with him. Allen pointed out that Iraq had certain responsibilities and was able to resolve the problem of the Barzanis, since they were Iraqi citizens and had their land included in Iraq. Allen’s concerns were based on the fear that Mulla Mustafa and his men constituted an element of instability in two ways. Firstly, the problem might have negative effects on the whole of Kurdistan and secondly,

foreign [Soviet] intrigues might further complicate the issue.<sup>138</sup> However, the prospects of Soviet involvement in Kurdish affairs by supporting Mulla Mustafa were, as Loy Henderson put it, very slim, for Mulla Mustafa was not a Communist and was not relied upon by the Soviets.<sup>139</sup>

The theme was also discussed in Washington between Loy Henderson and J. Balfour, the British Ambassador to the US. Henderson pointed out that Mulla Mustafa was “a veteran troublemaker” and he suggested that it was better to have Mulla Mustafa in Iraq rather than in Iran. He furthermore stated that Mulla Mustafa was a serious threat to peace and stability in Iran. Paradoxically, while undermining the grievances of the Kurds in Iran against the central government, Henderson stressed that the Kurds in Iraq had certain valid complaints against the Iraqi government. Henderson suggested that it was thus in the interest of the Iraqi government and of peace in the Near East that the Iraqi Government adopt a more enlightened attitude towards the Kurds.<sup>140</sup>

The American representatives in Iran were also following developments in Kurdistan with particular concern. Dooher visited Kurdish areas and met with Kurdish tribal chiefs and reported that the tribal chiefs were in general agreement about the policy to be followed towards the central government. He was rather astonished at the level of unity among the Kurdish chiefs in accepting the leadership of ‘Amer Khan, who functioned as a symbol of unity against the central government. After discussions with Iranian officials and tribal chiefs, Dooher observed that the task of disarming the tribes would not be easy. The Kurdish tribal chiefs feared that the disarmament of their tribesmen would be followed by oppression rather than by reform.<sup>141</sup>

The Kurdish tribal chiefs were nearly united on the question of how to deal with the central government concerning the fate of Qazi Muhammed. For example, ‘Amer Khan, speaking in the name of several tribal chiefs, made it clear that “we have decided that if the Army touches a hair on the head of Qazi Muhammed, they may expect the Kurds to fight”,<sup>142</sup> although ‘Amer Khan admitted that Qazi Muhammed made an error when he accepted support from the Soviets. However, he noted that Qazi Muhammed had thereby sought to help the Kurdish people and that the important thing was that Qazi Muhammed was supported by the Kurdish people.<sup>143</sup> The hostility of ‘Amer Khan to Soviet influence in Kurdistan was so firm, that he thanked the American Ambassador for the US part in extracting Soviet influence from the life of the Kurdish people.<sup>144</sup>

Qazi Muhammed’s fate was discussed between the Shah and George Allen. The Shah remarked that the army was receiving telegrams from Kurdish chiefs recommending rather bizarre punishments for Qazi

Muhammed and his collaborators in the government of the PRK. Conversely, Dooher confirmed that both tribal chiefs who had collaborated and those who had been in conflict with Qazi Muhammed did not wish for him to be executed. Allen asked whether the telegrams emanated from Abdul Ilkhanizadeh, who was the chief of the D7bokr§ tribe and was supported by the Mangur and M%omash tribes who had long been in conflict with the Qazi family.<sup>145</sup> Colonel Sexton, Military Attaché of the American Embassy in Tehran, was later informed by Ilkhanizadeh that the telegrams mentioned by the Shah were not sent by Ilkhanizadeh himself but by his subchiefs under pressure from the Iranian army.<sup>146</sup>

After the collapse of the PRK, the tribal chiefs gained an important role vis-à-vis the central government. Due to its weakness, the central government had no choice but to hear the Kurdish tribal chiefs and to take their position into consideration. In early February, the tribal chiefs of northern Kurdistan, from the Soviet border to Mahabad, held a conference at 'Amer Khan's headquarter at Zemadasht. The purpose of the conference was to draft a general policy towards the Iranian government. Among the topics on the agenda were methods of forcing the release of Qazi Muhammed; distribution of arms captured in connection with the collapse of the Azerbaijan republic; and the selection of one chief who would negotiate with Tehran in the name of the participating tribes.<sup>147</sup>



Qazi Muhammed, Hussein Saifi Qazi and Sadri Qazi were all judged by a military court-martial in Mahabad and were hung at 5:00 a.m. on March 31, 1947 in the *Chwār-Chirā* circle of Mahabad, where the PRK had once been proclaimed. The Qazis were charged with attempts to establish an autonomous government on the Iranian territory under the influence of a foreign power (the Soviet Union), and for having instigated armed revolt against the central government.<sup>148</sup> The executions were performed without prior public knowledge. However, it was generally known in diplomatic and Iranian circles that Qavam did not intend to exact the death penalty. Thus, the sentence was most likely carried out directly by the army and the Shah.<sup>149</sup> It has often been asserted that tensions between Qavam on the one hand and the Shah and the army on the other were particularly manifest at this time.<sup>150</sup> In a letter to army headquarters in Kurdistan, General Homayuni stressed that Qazi Muhammed, Sadri Qazi and Hussein Saifi Qazi were sentenced to death by a military tribunal and that the sentence was carried out with the approval of the Shah.<sup>151</sup>

A number of American officials expressed their malcontent over the executions on several occasions to Iranian officials. The American Consul at Tabriz stated that “whatever their faults, these men [the Qazis] were respected leaders of their people.”<sup>152</sup>



Despite the collapse of the PRK, both the US administration and Great Britain continued to have concerns over the situation in Kurdistan and to speculate on possible developments in the area. Viewing the question in an international context, the Department of State urgently required information particularly on the Kurdish tribes. The Department of State instructed the American Embassy in Tehran to respond to a number of questions regarding the attitudes and the endeavours of Kurdish tribes, particularly the Shikāk, Jalālī, Herkī, Begzāda and Dēbokrī. The following were the most pressing questions. Was there any evidence indicating Soviet efforts to mobilise these tribes against the central government in Tehran, and if so, what would the position of the tribes be? If Soviet forces violated the Iranian border, would these tribes support the Soviets or the central government? What was the military potential of these tribes?<sup>153</sup> Allen argued that there were no indications of Soviet communication with the tribes in question. He furthermore emphasised that despite their lack of confidence in the central government, the tribes would not accept being mobilised by the Soviets since they recalled the bitter experience of the Soviet role in the aborted Kurdish Republic.<sup>154</sup> ‘Amer Khan had together with other tribal chiefs agreed to support the central government if Soviet forces violated the Iranian borders. A Soviet invasion of Iran or any Soviet military activity on the border might result from an anticipated rejection by the *Majlis* of the provisions on oil in the Qavam-Sadchikov agreement. Allen was also convinced that the Kurds would not support the Soviet Union in the case of hostilities between Iran and the Soviet Union.<sup>155</sup>

British apprehensions did not subside upon the collapse of the PRK, and continued to involve the question of Soviet influence on the Kurds. The Foreign Office re-evaluated British policy towards the Kurds in autumn 1947, and noted that the Kurds had initially favoured Great Britain but that British policy had sought to dissuade them. The Foreign Office maintained that Great Britain should persuade the governments of the countries with Kurdish populations to adopt a more constructive policy in this matter; to admit that the policy of assimilation pursued by the governments concerned only served to aggravate the situation; and to agree that if the Kurds were granted certain rights, they could act as good citizens

of the states they were inhabiting. These measures would allegedly render the Kurds more immune to Communist propaganda.<sup>156</sup> The Foreign Office wished to convince the governments of Turkey, Iran and Iraq to take heed of Kurdish grievances and to introduce reforms. This would serve to counter Soviet influence and to stop the Kurdish problem from being exploited to compromise stability in the Middle East.<sup>157</sup>



Having exhausted all possible options for staying in Iran, Mulla Mustafa and his followers decided to return to Iraq. While trying to cross the Iraqo-Iranian border, they were drawn into several clashes with the Iranian army.<sup>158</sup> There was close co-operation between the Iraqi and the Iranian governments in this matter. Military representatives from the two countries met and agreed on joint measures to deal with the Barzanis. At the same time, the Turkish Department of Foreign Affairs, through Turkey's Embassy in Tehran, informed the Iranian authorities that the Turks were willing to co-operate with the Iranians in combating the Barzanis. Turkey dispatched reinforcements to the areas where the Iraqo-Iranian-Turkish borders meet.<sup>159</sup> However, the Barzanis were able to exit Iranian territories and enter Iraq after a number of struggles. At the border, all of the women and children and some of the men, among them a few Iraqi Kurdish ex-officers and three of Mulla Mustafa's brothers, surrendered to the Iraqi authorities. Mulla Mustafa and some 500 armed men chose to proceed to the Soviet Union, crossing the Iraqo-Turkish border and travelling from Turkey back to Iranian Kurdistan.<sup>160</sup> The Iranian authorities informed Mulla Mustafa that he must immediately submit to the Iranians.<sup>161</sup> Mulla Mustafa thereupon moved towards Maku, close to the point where the Iranian, Turkish and Soviet borders meet. His forces were drawn into a number of struggles with Iranian troops, and ultimately crossed the Aras river into Soviet Azerbaijan on June 17, 1947.<sup>162</sup>

## Chapter Nine

# CONCLUSIONS

The land of the Kurds has been divided and redivided throughout history. The most recent and decisive partitioning of Kurdistan occurred in connection with peace settlements in the early 1920s. The first half of this decade witnessed two trends which ultimately conflicted. First, there appeared the opportunity to establish a Kurdish independent state, or to settle the Kurdish problem by the formation of several Kurdish autonomies. Secondly, a process of state formation spread through the Middle East and resulted in the emergence of several new states, among them Iraq, Turkey and Syria. The state of Iran, previously designated as Persia, already existed.

These developments ran counter to Kurdish nationalist ambitions. The new states were internationally recognised entities with clearly demarcated boundaries, and the Kurds were partitioned accordingly and thus left to confront several states simultaneously. Kurdish language, culture and nationalism were all negatively affected by this. The Kurds found themselves in a geopolitical predicament which posed a severe obstacle to Kurdish unity in regards to a nationalist programme and strategy.

Kurdish nationalism progressed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries as a result of several interwoven factors, namely 1) developments within the Kurdish community(ies); 2) regional factors, i.e. the process of state formation in the Middle East; and 3) international processes, which entailed a decisive role for the Western Great Powers, and mainly Great Britain. These powers could have chosen to promote the idea of establishing a Kurdish state, but instead supported the above-mentioned states.

The interaction of traditional social forces with urban elements, primarily the middle classes and the intelligentsia, constituted the most important mechanism within the development of Kurdish nationalism. The urban influence in the Kurdish nationalist movement was enhanced through the formation of cultural and political associations and parties, and through the publishing of newspapers and other literary materials. However, the dynamics between the traditional and urban forces involved both antagonism and co-operation.

The Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in August 1941, had a profound impact on the political affairs of the country. Among the many elements which were affected were the Iranian political opposition and the ethno-national minorities. During the war years, as of the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, the Kurds in this country found themselves caught in a complex web of developments which involved relations between the Iranian government and the Big Three; relations among the Big Three themselves; the altered political climate and power structure in Iran; and the flourishing of the most liberal climate in modern Iranian history that led to modifications in the political life of Kurds in Iran.

During the period of 1943–1945, several developments prompted changes in both the attitudes and policies of the Big Three, the Iranian government, and the situation of the Kurds. First, the balance of the war shifted in favour of the Allies. This implied the relaxation of an urgent state of affairs and culminated in the Allied victory over Germany. Secondly, Soviet influence escalated markedly in northern Iran, at least from the point of view of the Americans, British and Iranians. Thirdly, suspicion was rapidly growing among the Big Three over one another's activities and attitudes, as was the tension between the Soviet Union and Iran. The oil crisis and events in Iranian Kurdistan must be seen as two significant factors that generated a rise in tensions and an acceleration of suspicion among the parties involved.

To sum up, Soviet policy in Iran from autumn 1944 through 1945 and a part of 1946 was characterised by three main features. The Soviets attempted to gain oil concessions in northern Iran; they supported the Azeri and the Kurdish nationalist movements and the two autonomous republics in Iran; and they wished to bring about a government in Tehran which would be friendly to the USSR. These three elements were interrelated in a rather organic connection: each of them affected and was in turn affected by the other elements in various ways. When the Soviets abandoned the two republics, they retreated by one step in their policy in Iran. The Soviets had by now also played their political trump card, namely to exert pressure on the Iranian government to permit enhanced Soviet influence within the central power by means of elements amenable to the USSR, and to allow for oil concessions in northern Iran.



In regards to the Kurds in Iraq, the uprising led by Mulla Mustafa in Barzan was initially quite isolated from political Kurdish activities. The revolt itself was not mainly a manifestation of the Kurdish nationalist

movement in Iraq since its aims were confined to the local arena. However, Mulla Mustafa eventually made efforts at some type of coalition with urban elements via co-operation with Kurdish political organisations and by seeking to recruit Kurdish officers in the Iraqi army to his cause. Urban nationalist elements must nevertheless have been equally interested in co-operating with this uprising which basically represented a “localist” and traditionalist mode of opposition to the central government. A symbiosis thus developed between the urban and politically conscious nationalist elements on the one hand and the traditional elements on the other. Mulla Mustafa did not only make the emergence of this symbiosis possible, but indeed personified and later became a symbol for it.

The British were of the opinion that the best option for the Kurds in Iraq was for them to behave as “good Iraqis.”<sup>1</sup> In addition to the Barzan uprising, various Kurdish initiatives came from different directions and were often characterised by a lack of co-ordination and harmony. Kurdish nationalists suffered from the absence of a well-articulated strategy for political demands and methods of action. This was a central reason for the failure of the endeavours of Sherif Pasha and other similar efforts. Sherif Pasha had once headed the Kurdish delegation to the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War to represent a divided Kurdish nationalist movement.<sup>2</sup> Now, some twenty years later, he continued to represent a limited segment of the Kurds and symbolised the fragmented interests within the Kurdish nationalist movement.



This study has sought to fit the Kurdish question into the framework of Great Power politics and to relate the subject to Iranian domestic and foreign policies.

It is an over-simplification of matters and a falsification of history to consider the development of the Kurdish nationalist movement and the establishment of the PRK as the result of Soviet manipulation of events. In order to understand the development, it is imperative to take into consideration a number of factors, namely, the long-standing grievances of the Kurds who resented being marginalised by the policies of the central government in Tehran; the development of the Kurdish nationalist movement; the weakness of the central government and resulting power vacuum in Iranian Kurdistan which facilitated the rise of the movement; and finally, the role of the Soviet authorities in their occupation zone.

During the initial phase of the occupation of Iran, the Soviets aimed at establishing amicable relations with various Iranian groups, both political

and ethno-national. This dissertation has presented evidence indicating that the Kurds drew closer to the Soviets mainly due to the rejection, or caution, demonstrated by the US and particularly by Great Britain towards the Kurdish cause. The two western powers apparently preferred to support the central governments in Tehran, Baghdad and Ankara. However, the British did at times express their hope that the ethno-national minority problems in Iran would be solved by conciliatory means.

The Soviets refused to withdraw their troops from Iran as had been agreed upon in January 1942, and were furthermore involved in the establishment of the two republics of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. This combination of events laid the foundation for the Iranian and international crises of 1946.

The Americans in their turn pursued a clear policy of supporting Iran in the preservation of the country's integrity and sovereignty, and frequently alluded to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. However, the US neglected an equally central principle of the Charter which spoke of "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live..."<sup>3</sup> Kurdish parties, organisations, and personalities appealed to the Great Powers and the UN to support their national demands in accordance with the Atlantic Charter, but their call was not heard. It could be concluded that the principles of the Atlantic Charter were applied to legitimise specific political activities favouring US interests.



The ARA received more attention than the PRK, and the Kurdish question in Iran was often considered by several parties as subordinate to the Azerbaijan issue. However, the Kurdish predicament was in fact potentially more explosive. Kurdish minorities resided in Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Syria and the USSR. Had the Soviets exploited Kurdish nationalism throughout greater Kurdistan, a major international upheaval involving many states might have resulted.

Despite many similarities with that of Azerbaijan, the Kurdish question in Iran held peripheral significance to both the Soviet Union and to Iran. The government in Tehran was convinced that if it could cope with the Azerbaijan nationalist movement and republic, it would be able to terminate the PRK with relatively little trouble. Compared with Kurdistan, Azerbaijan was thus considered a far tougher problem.<sup>4</sup>

Soviet interests in the Kurdish question also appear to have been of peripheral character at the time. The Kurdish question was perceived to as a "sub-antagonism" to be dealt with within the framework of the

Azerbaijan question or as a bi-product of that issue. This is confirmed by the fact that matters concerning the Kurds were primarily handled from a “Soviet periphery,” i.e. Soviet Azerbaijan. However, it is unlikely that the authorities in the periphery dealt with the Kurdish question without the knowledge of the Moscow leadership or outside of the framework of a Soviet grand strategy and its centrally determined foreign policy. There is, nevertheless, no evidence indicating that the Kurdish question was discussed between Qavam and the Soviet authorities, while Azerbaijan was among the primary issues at hand. Furthermore, a section of the Sadchikov-Qavam Agreement of April 4, 1946 was devoted to Azerbaijan while the Kurds were not explicitly named. The Kurdish question in Iran was not only peripheral in the Iranian and the Soviet perspectives: the ADP and the government of Iranian Azerbaijan likewise sought to suppress the PRK and to seize control over political developments in Iranian Kurdistan.

The Soviets thus considered the Kurdish question and Kurdish aspirations to autonomy as matters of marginal importance compared to that of Iranian Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, they wished to prevent their own Kurds from becoming involved in Kurdish affairs beyond Soviet borders. Such contacts might foster political complications on both the domestic and foreign arenas of Soviet policy.

However, the Kurds in Iran were a political factor long before the Azerbaijan question became an Iranian and an international concern. The Kurds were a significant component involved in the relations between Iran and the Allies already immediately after the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, as well as in relations among the Allies themselves. This study has demonstrated that the Kurdish factor must be appreciated in any serious analysis of the background of the Cold War in Iran and in the Middle East. Kurdish uprisings in Iranian Kurdistan together with political developments in the area, and the establishment of the PRK and its downfall were connected to the relationships and rivalry between the Big Three in many ways: Soviet support to the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran; the involvement of the Big Three in the Iranian domestic affairs; and the dispute over the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Iran. The most important dimension of the presence of Soviet troops in Iran was that these troops prevented Iranian forces from moving into Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. The Iranian government insisted that it was necessary to send forces to those areas in order to quell both the Kurdish and the Azeri nationalist movements and later the PRK and the ARA. A close analysis of the American Policy in Iran during the period under study reveals the origins of an active and articulated Soviet-American rivalry in the Iranian arena. The Kurds in Iran occupy a place in this context.

The view of Great Britain towards the Kurds proved relevant to British relations with both the Soviets and the Iranians. Placing the Kurdish question within the general context of the Second World War, the British paid particular attention to the strategically important areas of Iranian and Iraqi Kurdistan. The Soviet position towards the Kurds also had an impact on Big Three relations as well on the relations of these powers to Iran. The British attitude towards the Kurds was largely dictated by their concerns over a monopoly on Iranian and Iraqi oil; the transportation and communications route within Iran and to India; the preservation of British interests and strategic considerations in the Middle East; and the war effort.

The British consistently exercised caution in the Kurdish question, although they generally appreciated the grievances and national demands of the Kurds. Thus, Great Britain adopted a policy of supporting the central governments of Iraq, Iran and Turkey, since British interests in the region could thus best be served.

The Americans failed to demonstrate any degree of interest in the Kurdish cause, and this reality was recognised by Kurdish nationalists. Moreover, as Soviet-Iranian relations deteriorated during the war and as rivalry and tension came to dominate the Soviet relationship to its two western Allies, it is understandable that Kurdish nationalists chose to co-operate with the Soviets. It is most unlikely that ideological factors determined the relations of the Kurds in Iran to the Soviets. The collaboration was rather a pragmatic choice for both parties, rooted in the conflicts of power politics in Iran and throughout the region.

The Americans primarily wished to enable the central government in Tehran to tighten its control over the Kurdish and other areas, even if this implied the use of force by the Iranian authorities. US involvement in the internal affairs of Iran was to a great extent encouraged by the Iranians themselves. The central government was weak, and Iran thus hoped that the Americans would serve as a counter-weight to the Soviets and the British.

Each of the three powers might have obtained a degree of leverage in Iranian affairs through the establishment of a Three Power Commission. If successful in its purposes, the proposed Commission could have had significant repercussions on developments in Iran. Concerning the question of ethno-national minorities, mainly Kurds and Azeris, the Commission could have suggested a constructive option to settling the problem and could also have granted the ethno-national minorities in Iran quasi-international status. The participants of the Commission, i.e. the Big Three,

might have acted to secure the implementation of any provisions concerning the relations of the central government in Tehran to the ethno-national minorities. The conditions would entail the establishment of Provincial Councils, designed to result in the decentralisation of administration, and the right of minorities to the use of their own language.



Kurdish nationalism in Iran reached its climax when the PRK was established in January 1946. The republic has been seen as a symbol of the success of Kurdish nationalism not only in Iran, but also in the remaining states which embody greater Kurdistan. The symbolic significance of the PRK is well-known. Despite the fact that the PRK exercised its authority over no more than 30 per cent of Iranian Kurdistan<sup>5</sup>, the republic remains a key point of reference for Kurdish nationalist movements throughout Kurdistan. Kurdish populations, parties and nationalists hail the establishment of the republic as a glorious event in their history. The collapse of the republic has become the enduring symbol of the obstacle posed by the central governments of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria to the aspirations of the Kurds.

The Kurdish government was not structured according to the stipulations of the Iranian constitution, despite the PRK's claims to the contrary. The Kurdish administration did not reach the status of a *de jure* political entity, and was unable to obtain the recognition of the Iranian central government or of the international community. There is in fact no evidence suggesting that the leadership of the republic approached either a Great Power or the UN to appeal for international recognition. The Kurdish government assured all parts that the Kurdish administration had been established in accordance with the Iranian constitution. However, this issue was a matter of debate and a question of interpretation. The Kurdish government did not have a constitution of its own, nor are there indications that it sought to draft one. The Kurdish government remained a *de facto* administration.

Criticism has been directed at the leadership of the PRK for accepting a position of dependence on the Soviet Union. Noshirwan Emin, a leader within the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK, 1976- ), contends that the Kurds committed an error in allowing their republic to become dependent on Soviet support and military presence in northern Iran.<sup>6</sup> However, it has been shown in this study that the Kurds made a number of attempts to gain the sympathy and support of the US and particularly of Great Britain. These efforts proved futile since the interests of these two powers were

best served by amicable relations with the central governments of Turkey, Iraq and Iran. The international dimension of the Iranian crisis should also be taken into consideration in this context. The crisis was an important factor which prompted the Kurds to approach the Soviets and to fall on the Soviet side in the initial phase of what became the Cold War. The Kurds in Iran represented a political power factor which could be exploited, and this generated increased Soviet interests in this context. Moreover, the Kurds are in all parts of Kurdistan extremely geopolitically disfavoured. The Kurds in Iran were surrounded by three states manifestly hostile to Kurdish nationalist demands. These states were together capable of immediately countering any Kurdish attempt to pursue nationalist objectives. The anxiety of Iraq and particularly of Turkey was evident in each minor event in Iranian Kurdistan.<sup>7</sup> The geography of Kurdistan combined with the hostile attitude of the central governments of the states partitioning Kurdistan indicates the precarious situation of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iranian Kurdistan. At a critical time and in the face of physical threats by the Iranian central government, the Kurds' sole remaining source of support was the Soviet Union. The Kurds in Iran and the PRK in particular were drawn into the Great Power conflict in the early Cold War years, and were a part of the complex relations between the Great Powers and Iran.

The weakness of the leadership must also be noted. Given the social, cultural and political circumstances prevailing in Iranian Kurdistan at the time, the Kurdish leadership represented diverse social categories of the Kurdish community. Tribal chiefs, landlords, and influential families played the central role, although a still weak but politically well-articulated urban middle class also figured. However, there were various shortcomings in the construction of the Kurdish leadership. For instance, the fusion which resulted from the formation of the KDP was a coalition of both traditional elements, mainly all tribal chiefs and landlords, and urban elements. However, if the leadership had comprised only one of the mentioned elements the result would have been a further weakness. The development of the Kurdish nationalist movement of the time and the social and political structure of Kurdish society of the time necessitated this coalition. The dialectical interrelation between the traditional and the urban elements reflected, both the *strength* and the *weakness* of the leadership. The construction of the Kurdish leadership could best be described by the term *symbiosis*, rather than by only that of *contradiction* which is employed by Jalal Talabani<sup>8</sup>. It is the conviction of this author that the fusion was a reaction to a certain reality, and was thus a necessary stage in the development of the Kurdish nationalist movement. In other

words, the traditional elements needed the urban elements and vice versa. The former had the ability to mobilise the masses, while the latter could articulate the framework and objectives of the movement. It could furthermore establish political and nationalist organisations and institutions, by which people could be mobilised within a *formal* framework. The nationalist movement was thus given a modern character. The development of the Kurdish nationalist movement in various times in different parts of Kurdistan can be understood as the evolution of such a symbiosis. In Iranian Kurdistan, the symbiosis emerged primarily during the first half of the 1940s although the traditional elements maintained the crucial role.<sup>9</sup>

However, tribal chiefs began to switch sides, becoming neutral or even taking the side of the Iranian government already prior to the collapse of the republic. The central government made effective use of these shifts. It seems that the tribes were mainly concerned with the preservation of their interests, whether by supporting the central government or by backing the nationalist movement and its concrete achievement, the PRK. Although there were both modern and traditional intellectual elements in the leadership of the republic, the tribal chiefs exercised actual power, particularly within the army.

# NOTES

## *Chapter One* *Introduction*

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Chaliand, 1980, p. 11; Sluglett, 1986, p. 177. The Kurds are the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East after the Arabs, Persians and Turks. See Izady, 1992, p. 118.

<sup>2</sup> While the names Iraq, Syria and Iran are not ethnically based, Turkey is. To refer to the Kurds in Turkey as “Turkish Kurds” and Kurdistan in Turkey as “Turkish Kurdistan” is problematic, since Turkey means “the land of the Turks.” See Izady, 1992, p. 199. We therefore prefer to speak of Turkey’s Kurdistan.

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion see Jwaideh, 1960, pp. 853–854.

<sup>4</sup> Concerning the limitation of the period under study, see p. 15f.

<sup>5</sup> Izady, 1992, p. 201.

<sup>6</sup> Lenczowski, 1949, p. 249.

<sup>7</sup> Argyle, 1976, pp. 50–51.

<sup>8</sup> There are other denominations for the republic such as the Mahabad Republic, the People’s Republic of Kurdistan, the Democratic Republic of Kurdistan and the Kurdish Republic. In this study we will use the term People’s Republic of Kurdistan.

<sup>9</sup> Vahdat, 1958, p. 1. See also Ghods, 1989, p. x.

<sup>10</sup> See Irani, 1978, p. 17. Varying explanations can be found among scholars, observers, and statesmen who were involved in some way in the policy-making of their countries in the period during which the Iranian crisis developed. There are four categories of explanations: first, those who have explained the entire Azerbaijan affair only in terms of Soviet policy, and this was the official Iranian and US positions; secondly, while not discarding the role of Soviet policy in the crisis, certain authors assert the popular element in the movements of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan as expressions of genuine complaint against the central government; thirdly, Iranian writers, a good deal of them of left-wing persuasion, have highlighted the popular character of the upheavals in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and had down-played the role of the Soviet Union; fourthly, the Soviet version has been that the movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan were a national struggles for liberation. See Fawcett, 1988, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup> See Nagel, 1980, pp. 279–281.

<sup>12</sup> Hechter, M. *Internal Colonialism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). Frank Young discusses movements mobilised in peripheries in terms of “reactive subsystems,” which are partly dependent on policies adopted by the centre towards the periphery, and partly on the ability of the ethnic group in the periphery to mobilise forces against the centre. See Young, F. “Reactive Subsystems,” in *American Sociological Review*, No. 35, 1970, pp 297–307. Concerning, “reactive collective actions” Tilly *et al* have discussed the reaction of the peripheral group to encroachment in the periphery by the centre. See Tilly, C., Tilly, L.

and Tilly, R. *The Rebellious Century: 1830–1930*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). For a critical discussion of the centre-periphery theory, see, for example, Tägil, 1984, p. 32.

<sup>13</sup> For further discussions on centre and periphery see Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 8, 1971, and Sivert Langholm, “On the Concept of Center and Periphery,” in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 8, 1971.

<sup>14</sup> On penetration as a cause of ethnic conflict and condition for the rise of ethno-nationalist movements, see Tilly *et al*, *The Rebellious Century: 1830–1930*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). Regarding the reaction of the peripheral ethnic group as result of penetration, see Young, 1976, pp. 522–523.

<sup>15</sup> Nagel, 1980, p. 282.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. The mode of organisation among the Kurds has been either “informal”, for instance tribes, religious orders, villages, clans and families, or “formal”, e.g. political parties and other social or political associations. For a detailed discussion on the mobilisation of ethnic groups into organisations, see Nagel, 1980, pp. 282–285. For a discussion on the patterns of organisation in the Middle East, see Bill, & Springborg, 1990, p. 88.

<sup>18</sup> Kellas, 1991, p. 148. In discussing a state’s international relations, Kellas asserts that one necessary pre-condition to a successful foreign policy is solid internal support of the central power. The multi-national state often risks being unable to secure the support of its national minorities, unless the central government has been successful in its minority policy. Otherwise, assimilation or authoritarian policies are employed to gain support. See Kellas, 1991, p. 169.

<sup>19</sup> A study of the international dimension of ethnic conflicts is provided in Björn Hettne’s *Etniska Konflikter och Internationella Relationer*, (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1992).

<sup>20</sup> Snider, 1979, pp. 203–204.

<sup>21</sup> Taylor, 1984, p. 20.

<sup>22</sup> Bjöl, 1976, p. 11; Taylor, 1984, p. 20.

<sup>23</sup> Taylor, 1984, pp. 3–4. Erling Bjöl maintains that group actors in world politics are states, political movements, and transnational and international organisations, although individuals act as representatives of states, movements and organisations. Bjöl, 1976, p. 86. Nader Entessar maintains that “the rise of ethnic consciousness and the political demands of many minorities or ethnic groups for self-determination has run against the perceived interest of the state as the dominant actor in global politics.” Entessar, 1992, p. 1.

<sup>24</sup> Taylor, 1984, pp. 4–6, 219.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>26</sup> In many cases, people belonging to tribes have common economic interests. For instance, pasture land is jointly held and thus functions to secure solidarity within the tribe. See Bruinessen, 1992, p. 306.

<sup>27</sup> Bruinessen, 1992, p. 7. The main point of Martin van Bruinessen’s study (*Agha, Shaikh and State: the Social and Political Structure of Kurdistan*, 1992, 2nd ed.) is his analysis of the effects of religious and tribal loyalties on politics of nationalism in Kurdistan. In his “Peasant classes and primordial loyalties,” *Journal of Peasant Studies Vol. 1, No. 1, 1973*.) Alavi has labelled these loyalties *mortal loyalties*.

<sup>28</sup> *Agha*, *Beg*, and *Khan* are notations for tribal chieftains, and may also be used as titles for landlords. However, in different parts of Kurdistan one of these titles may be more common than the others. In Iranian Kurdistan, for instance, *Khan* is most commonly used to designate tribal chieftains. The term *Beg* refers both to tribal chieftains and landlords.

<sup>29</sup> Shaikhs are the popular “mystics” or saints who are also leaders of religious brotherhoods, and hold a variety of roles. Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 6, 210.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>31</sup> McDowall, 1991, p. 279.

<sup>32</sup> Eagleton, 1988, p. 16. William Eagleton also emphasises that a parallel development took place during the Arab political renaissance. While it is not clear when exactly the “merge” took place according to Eagleton, he asserts that “Barzani revolts of the late 1920s began more as an assertion of local rights than as a Kurdish national struggle.” Eagleton, 1988, p. 16. It is our conviction that the “merge” took place during the first half of the 1940s as the political scope of the Barzani revolts extended past the local level.

<sup>33</sup> Martin van Bruinessen has argued that this type of political conduct, namely approaching “external” powers, is not typical only of Kurdish tribal chieftains but is a common tribal phenomenon. See Bruinessen, 1992, p. 205. This tribal behaviour is the result of rivalry between tribes; while one chieftain allies with the central government, another who is in quarrel with the first seeks a partnership with enemies of the government. See McDowall, 1991, p. 298. This enemy has often been the Kurdish nationalist movement.

<sup>34</sup> McDowall, 1991, p. 296.

<sup>35</sup> Bruinessen, 1992, p. 7.

<sup>36</sup> For details see Tägil, 1993, pp. 7ff; Tägil, 1984, pp. 17ff.

<sup>37</sup> Tägil, 1984, p. 17.

<sup>38</sup> Fredrik Barth states that ethnic identity is a question of borders. See Fredrik Barth, “Introduction,” in Fredrik Barth (ed.) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, (London, Oslo: Universitets Forlaget, George Allen & UNWIN, 1969).

<sup>39</sup> Enloe, 1986, p. 15; Tägil, 1984, p. 17; see also Barth, 1969, p. 11.

<sup>40</sup> Enloe, 1986, p. 39.

<sup>41</sup> Smith, 1983, p. 61.

<sup>42</sup> Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 51, 306.

<sup>43</sup> Kellas, 1991, p. 2.

<sup>44</sup> Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 5.

<sup>45</sup> Eriksen, 1992, p. 220.

<sup>46</sup> Kellas, 1991, p. 2.

<sup>47</sup> Østerud, 1984, p. 20.

<sup>48</sup> Alter, 1989, p. 10.

<sup>49</sup> See, for example, Tägil, 1984, p. 17; Tägil, 1993, p. 8; Eriksen, 1992, p. 220; Østerud, 1984, p. 12.

<sup>50</sup> Johansson, 1993, pp. 16–17 and literature there in reference.

<sup>51</sup> Alter, 1989, p. 11.

52 Tägil, 1993, p. 8; For a detailed discussion concerning state, nation, nationality and nationalism see Johansson, 1993, pp. 15ff.

53 Alter, 1989, p. 14.

54 Alter, 1989, pp. 17–18, 21. In discussing nation and nationalism in relation to terms such as “cultural” and “political,” it may be difficult to characterise what is political and what is not. Kellas, 1991, p. 21. This may be nearly impossible in situations where central governments perceive each cultural activity of a given ethnic group as a challenge or an actual political threat.

55 Shils, 1962, p. 207.

56 Kellas, 1991, p. 81. The decisive role of the nationalist élite is discussed, for instance, by Anthony D. Smith, who asserts that nationalism is hardly ever a mass movement. Smith, 1976, p. 7.

57 Kellas, 1991, p. 83.

58 Kellas, 1991, p. 20. Peter Alter states that the current linguistic usage defines nationalists as individuals whose consideration and action prioritise their own nation’s interests over those of other nations. Alter, 1989, p. 6.

59 See Rönquist, 1990, p. 26.

60 Kellas, 1991, pp. 78, 81.

61 Smith, 1976, p. 22. See also Østerud, 1984, p. 35.

62 Alter, 1989, p. 7.

63 Johansson, 1993, p. 20. See also Østerud, 1984, p. 33.

64 Kellas, 1991, p. 37. James Kellas asserts that although ethnicity and ethnocentrism are equivalent to nation and nationalism, there is at least one important difference between them in the sense “that ethnic group is more narrowly defined than nation and ethnocentrism is more rooted in social psychology than is nationalism which has explicitly ideological and political dimensions.” Kellas, 1991, p. 4.

65 Alter, 1989, p. 21.

66 Kellas, 1991, pp. 51–52. For details on different kinds of nationalism see Johansson, 1993, pp. 22ff.

67 Smith, 1976, p. 2. Anthony Smith claims that in a nationalist movement, a process of evolution among middle-scale leaders, institutions and organisations must take place. These institutions and organisations can act as “proto-states when independence is achieved.” Smith, 1976, p. 7.

68 Snider, 1979, p. 241.

69 Eagleton, 1963, p. v.

70 This article has been republished in Gerard Chaliand, (ed.) *People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan*, (London: Zed Press), 1980.

71 See Roosevelt, Archie Jr. “The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad,” in *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (July 1947).

72 Dehkordi, 1986, p. 107.

73 *Ibid.*, p. 108.

74 Vahdat, 1958, p. 7.

<sup>75</sup> We prefer to use the term “Iranian crisis” rather than “Azerbaijan crisis”, since the crisis involved many components besides the Azerbaijan problem. Fawcett published her dissertation as a book: *Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

## *Chapter Two*

### *The Kurds: A General Background*

<sup>1</sup> Hussein, 1985, p. 28; Entessar, 1984, p. 911; Izady, 1992, pp. 28–29; for other details about the Medes see al-Karadaghi, 1992, pp. 6–67.

<sup>2</sup> Elphinston, 1946, p. 92; Hazen 1979, p. 50; Arfa, 1966, p. 3; Izady, 1992, pp. 30–31.

<sup>3</sup> Jawad, 1981, p. 1; Hazen, p. 50; Burton, 1944, p. 66; see also Barth, 1979, pp. 11–12.

<sup>4</sup> Eagleton, 1988, p. 9.

<sup>5</sup> Elphinston, 1946, p. 92.

<sup>6</sup> Westermann, 1946, p. 679.

<sup>7</sup> Zakie, 1939, p. 312.

<sup>8</sup> Edmonds, 1971, p. 88. An abrupt change may be observed along the line running from Mosul up to Rawanduz Gorge to Lake Urmia in Iranian Kurdistan. Eagleton, 1988, p. 10.

<sup>9</sup> Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 21–22; and see Hussein, 1985, pp. 29–30.

<sup>10</sup> Sim, 1980, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> Kreyenbroek, 1992, p. 68. See also Eagleton, 1988, p. 10.

<sup>12</sup> For details, see Kreyenbroek, 1992, pp. 68–72.

<sup>13</sup> Laanatza, 1984, p. 22.

<sup>14</sup> Edmonds, 1971, p. 88; Entessar, 1992, pp. 4, 86; Izady, 1992, p. 188.

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, Kreyenbroek, 1992, pp. 68–69

<sup>16</sup> Izady, 1992, p. 119, table, 4A, and the sources there referred to. For other estimations, see, for example, Sim, 1980, p. 3, and Bruinessen, 1992, 15.

<sup>17</sup> Chaliand, 1980, p. 11; Sluglett, 1986, p. 177.

<sup>18</sup> Whitley, 1980, p. 246. This situation changed in 1990, when the Turkish government began allowing the public use of Kurdish.

<sup>19</sup> Entessar, 1992, p. 3; Eagleton, 1988, p. 9.

<sup>20</sup> Izady, 1992, p. 117, table 3. The total population of Iran was approximately 17,000,000. Naamani, 1951, p. 208.

<sup>21</sup> Ghassemlou, 1965, p. 24.

<sup>22</sup> Hussein, 1985, p. 29.

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, Burton, 1944, p. 66.

<sup>24</sup> Entessar, 1984, p. 912.

<sup>25</sup> Entessar, 1989, p. 86.

<sup>26</sup> The foremost account of the social and political organisation of Kurdistan is provided in Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social and Political Structures of*

*Kurdistan*, (London. New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd. 1992, 2nd ed.); on social and political organisation in southern Kurdistan (Iraqi Kurdistan), consult Fredrik Barth, *Principles of Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan*, (New York: AMS Press, 1979).

<sup>27</sup> See, for example, Westermann, 1946, p. 681.

<sup>28</sup> Eagleton, 1988, p. 10.

<sup>29</sup> Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 14.

<sup>30</sup> Bruinessen, 1992, p. 16.

<sup>31</sup> Harris, 1977, p. 114.

<sup>32</sup> Yalda, 1980, pp. 104–105.

<sup>33</sup> Sim, 1980, p. 2.

<sup>34</sup> Izady, 1992, p. 192. This type of loyalty is “directed inward.” Ghods, 1989, p. xi.

<sup>35</sup> Chaliand, 1980, p. 11; Sluglett, 1986, p. 177.

<sup>36</sup> Ghassemlou, 1965, p. 14.

<sup>37</sup> See, for example, Barth, 1979, p. 11; Eagleton, 1988, p. 7.

<sup>38</sup> Izady, 1992, p. 200; for a discussion on the vitality of the Kurdish element on the border regions of the mentioned states, see Sheikmous, 1992, pp. 136–137.

<sup>39</sup> Hazen, 1979, p. 51.

<sup>40</sup> Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 14.

<sup>41</sup> Ghassemlou, 1965, p. 85; Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 13–24.

<sup>42</sup> Arfa, 1966, p. 16.

<sup>43</sup> A detailed account of the history of the Kurdish principalities until the end of the 16th century is provided in *Sharafnameh*, written in Persian (Farsi) in 1596 by Sharaf-ed-Din, Khan of Bitlis.

<sup>44</sup> Kinnane, 1970, pp. 22–23; Entessar, 1992, pp. 3–4; Sheikmous, 1992, p. 137. Bidlisi became one of the main advisors to Sultan Salim the Grim.

<sup>45</sup> See, for example, Othman, 1989, p. 45; McDowall, 1991, p. 296.

<sup>46</sup> Arfa, 1966, pp. 22–23.

<sup>47</sup> Entessar, 1984, p. 912.

<sup>48</sup> Edmonds, 1971, p. 106.

<sup>49</sup> Kinnane, 1970, p. 23; Talabani, 1970, p. 38; ‘Ali, 1986, p. 46.

<sup>50</sup> Kinnane, 1970, p. 23.

<sup>51</sup> ‘Ali, 1986, pp. 44–46. See also Sherko, 1987, pp. 42–43. For further details see Talabani, 1970, p. 33ff.

<sup>52</sup> Othman, 1989, p. 51.

<sup>53</sup> Edmonds, 1971, p. 88.

<sup>54</sup> Tägil, 1984, p. 24.

<sup>55</sup> Zeidner, 1959, p. 24; Catudal, 1976, p. 1025; Hazen, 1979, p. 61; ‘Abdul-Ra0a, 1975, p. 8; Elphinston, p. 94; Hussein, 1985, pp. 31–32.

<sup>56</sup> Edmonds, 1971, p. 89; Kendal, 1980, p. 55.

<sup>57</sup> Ahmed, 1984, pp. 102–103. Elphinston, p. 94.

- 58 Kinnane, 1970, p. 25; ‘Abdul-Ra0a, 1975, pp. 39–40; Talabani, 1970, pp. 48–52.
- 59 For details, see Othman, 1989, pp. 48–50. James Kellas has noted that “without nationalist activists, organised in nationalist parties and political organisations, nationalism would be largely ineffective politically.” Kellas, 1991, p. 78.
- 60 For further details, see Ahmed, 1984, pp. 94ff; O’Balance, 1973, p. 19; Sherko, 1987, p. 55.
- 61 Emerson, 1960, p. 26. For details see Østerud, 1984, pp. 93–110, 76.
- 62 Emerson, 1960, p. 25.
- 63 For an account of the peace settlements regarding the national minority problems, see Harold W. V. Temperly, (ed.) *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) Vol. I, pp. 129–194. For the impact of the Fourteen Points on Kurdish nationalism, see, for example, Ahmed, 1984, pp. 319–320, and Edmonds, 1971, p. 90.
- 64 Entessar, 1992, p. 12; Sheikhmous, 1992, p. 131. This aspect will be dealt with later in greater detail.
- 65 Othman, 1989, p. 39.
- 66 Eriksen, 1992, p. 220
- 67 Gurr, 1992, p. 68.
- 68 Entessar, 1992, p. 1.
- 69 See Cottam, 1964, p. 68.
- 70 Sheikhmous, 1992, p. 135
- 71 For a detailed discussion, see Nabaz, 1985, pp. 9–11.
- 72 Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” *FO. 371/40219, Persia 1944*.
- 73 Ahmed, 1984, pp. 64–65.
- 74 Jwaideh, 1960, pp. 399–400.
- 75 Kinnane, 1970, p. 35.
- 76 Ashkenazi, 1946, p. 165; Perash, 1986, p. 16.
- 77 Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” *FO 371/52369. Iraq 1946*.
- 78 Foster, 1936, p. 152.
- 79 Gavan, 1958, p. 21.
- 80 Ibid.
- 81 Noel, 1919, p. 1.
- 82 Kinnane, 1970, p. 36.
- 83 Ibid.
- 84 Noel, 1919, p. 1.
- 85 For details on the Kurdish question in regard to the Treaty of Sèvres, see, for example, Safrastian, 1948, pp. 77–78; Ahmed, 1984, 344–348; Jwaideh, 1960, pp. 374–383.
- 86 Olson, 1992, p. 2; Ahmed, 1984, p. 345.
- 87 For further details about the Baku Congress, see, for example, Seton-Watson, 1960, pp. 128–130; and Ahmed, 1984, pp. 195–239.

- <sup>88</sup> Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” *FO 371/52369. Iraq 1946*; for further details on this development, see Olson, 1992, pp. 4–5.
- <sup>89</sup> Izady, 1992, pp. 201–202; for details about the Mosul question, see Beck, 1980, pp. 256–277.
- <sup>90</sup> Zeidner, 1959, pp. 24–25; Ahmed, 1984, p. 350; Alexandrove, 1986, pp. 403–411.
- <sup>91</sup> Foster, 1936, p. 152.
- <sup>92</sup> Izady, 1992, pp. 198–202. See also Bruinessen, 1992, p. 13. Concerning the importance of the oil of the Kurdish areas in Iraq, see *Central Office of Information*, 1948, p. 11.
- <sup>93</sup> Gavan, 1958, p. 24.
- <sup>94</sup> The most reliable census conducted by the Iraqi government, 1922–1924, reveals the following; Kurds 494.007; Arabs 166.941; Turks 38.652; Christians 61.336; Jews 11.897; Yezidis 26.257. Report of the Commission of the League of Nations, p. 31, cited in Foster, 1936, p. 161.
- <sup>95</sup> Report of the Commission of the League of Nations, p. 78, cited in Foster, 1936, p. 163.
- <sup>96</sup> Foster, 1936, p. 174.
- <sup>97</sup> For further details about the Mosul question and its effects on the Kurdish question, see for example, Ghassemlou, 1965, pp. 64–65; and Foster, 1936, pp. 142–177.
- <sup>98</sup> Hazen, 1979, p. 50.
- <sup>99</sup> British Intelligence Command in Iraq, Baghdad, June 3, 1942, “Kurdish Nationalism – the Khoybun Society,” Enclosure to despatch No. 1939 of June 3, 1942, from the American Legation in Baghdad, *Department of State’s Decimal File* (henceforth *DSDF*), 890G.00/625, NA.

### *Chapter Three*

#### *The Kurds in Iran until 1941*

- <sup>1</sup> Azimi, 1989, p. 4.
- <sup>2</sup> Koohi-Kamali, 1992, p. 175.
- <sup>3</sup> For further details, see Arfa, 1966, pp. 61–64.
- <sup>4</sup> Entessar, 1992, pp. 12–13.
- <sup>5</sup> Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 21.
- <sup>6</sup> Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” *FO 371/40219, Persia 1944, PRO*.
- <sup>7</sup> The British had supported Reza Shah in his coup d’état in 1921. See Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 21. One scholar even maintains that the Pahlavi régime was “established” by the British. Fatemi, 1980, p. 6.
- <sup>8</sup> Koohi-Kamali, 1992, p. 175.
- <sup>9</sup> Bruce Kuniholm places this into a greater context involving the Greeks, the Turks and the Iranians. Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 3, 131.
- <sup>10</sup> There are various ways of defining the concept of modernisation. According to Cynthia Enloe, modernisation is a process that entails, “for example, secularization, mobilization, mass participation, functional bureaucratization.” Enloe, 1986, p. 9. Danwart Rustow views

modernisation as a process of “rapidly widening control over nature through closer cooperation among men.” Rustow, 1967, p. 3.

<sup>11</sup> Enloe, 1986, p. 3. For further discussion, see pp. 67, 266–267.

<sup>12</sup> Hechter, 1975, p. 7. For a theoretical discussion on the relationship between modernisation and communal politics, see, for example, Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, 1970, pp. 1112–1130. On modernisation related to ethno-regional conflicts see Tägil, 1984, p. 34. For an interesting discussion on modernisation and political development in the Middle East context, see Bill, & Springborg, 1990, pp. 1–31.

<sup>13</sup> For a detailed discussion on the concepts state-nation and nation-state see Johansson, Rönnquist, & Tägil, 1993, pp. 20–22.

<sup>14</sup> Abrahamian, 1982, p. 140. For a study on modernisation in Iran, see Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran, 1921–1941*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1961).

<sup>15</sup> Ramazani, 1975, p. 419.

<sup>16</sup> Cottam, 1988, p. 57

<sup>17</sup> Catudal, 1976, p. 1027. For further details, see Lambton, 1953, pp. 283–294.

<sup>18</sup> Koohi-Kamali, 1992, p. 173.

<sup>19</sup> Lenczowski, 1949, p. 247. For details see Banani, 1961, pp. 127–129. However, others have argued that Reza Shah’s attempts to bring the tribes under control were in fact successful and that this was one of the Shah’s “principal achievements.” See memo by Wallace Murray, the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (NE), Jan. 6, 1942, *FRUS, 1943*, Vol. IV, p. 223.

<sup>20</sup> Banani, 1961, p. 127.

<sup>21</sup> Abrahamian, 1982, p. 142.

<sup>22</sup> Ghassemlou, 1988, pp. 22–24; Ghods, 1989, p. 107.

<sup>23</sup> Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 23; Entessar, 1992, p. 13.

<sup>24</sup> Ghods, 1989, p. 7.

<sup>25</sup> Entessar, 1992, p. 6.

<sup>26</sup> For details on ethnic inequality in Iran, see Akbar Aghajanian, “Ethnic Inequality in Iran: An Overview,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2, May, 1983.

<sup>27</sup> For details, see Khashan & Harik, 1992, pp. 150–152.

<sup>28</sup> Izady, 1992, p. 197.

<sup>29</sup> Ghods, 1989, pp. 107, 108–109.

<sup>30</sup> Ghassemlou, 1988, pp. 22–24.

<sup>31</sup> Kirk, 1952, pp. 129–130; Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 137–139.

<sup>32</sup> Rezun, 1981, p. 30.

<sup>33</sup> Morrell, 1946, p. 46.

<sup>34</sup> Bullard, 1951, p. 130. In an attempt to impress the Iranians, the Reich Cabinet issued a decree in 1936 in which the Iranians were protected from the Nuremberg Racial Laws as pure-blooded Aryans. Linczowski, 1949, p. 160. Nazi Germans also drew parallels between Reza Shah, Hitler, Mussolini and Atatürk, highlighting the role of the “Führerprinzip.” This was well met among Iranian “nationalists”. Moreover, in seeking to promote cultural ties with Iran, German lecturers delivered speeches and held conferences in Iran on racial subjects.

However, it seems that Reza Shah himself found these activities to be disturbing. Thus, by the end of 1937, he forbade the publication of the “Nazi-inspired” journal *Iran-e-Bastan* (the Ancient Iran). In addition, Reza Shah did not allow the creation of any Nazi-inspired party in Iran. See Rezun, 1981, p. 29.

<sup>35</sup> Bullard, 1951, p. 130. The closing of American and British schools could also be seen as a measure by the Shah aimed to minimise the British and US influences in Iran.

<sup>36</sup> Tabari, 1967, p. 11; Morrell, 1946, p. 71; Mark, 1975, pp. 52–53; Azimi, 1989, p. 64. Woodward asserts that during the two first years of the war, Iranian opinion was quite impressed by the German victories. Germany was regarded as “the potential deliverer of Iran from Russian and British domination.” Woodward, 1971, p. 24.

<sup>37</sup> From the Acting Secretary of State to Louis Dreyfus, the American Minister in Tehran, June 23, 1941, *FRUS, 1941*, Vol. III, p. 383.

<sup>38</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, June 28, 1941, *FRUS, 1941*, Vol. III, pp. 383–384.

<sup>39</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, July 29, 1941, *FRUS, 1941*, Vol. III, 1941, p. 385.

<sup>40</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, Aug. 18, 1941, *FRUS, 1941*, Vol. III, p. 403; Fawcett, 1990, p. 186.

<sup>41</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, Aug. 22, 1941, *FRUS, 1941*, Vol. III, p. 408.

<sup>42</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, Aug. 24, 1941, *FRUS, 1941*, Vol. III, p. 411.

<sup>43</sup> Bullard, 1951, p. 130; Rezun, 1981, pp. 31–32;

<sup>44</sup> *Central Office of Information*, 1948, p. 16.

<sup>45</sup> Bullard, 1951, pp. 112–113.

<sup>46</sup> Bullard, 1951, pp. 130–131. The Kurds refrained from partaking in hostilities against the British forces in events related to the Rashid ‘Ūli al-Gaiylani revolt of April 1941. The Kurds expected to be somehow rewarded by the British for this. From the American Legation in Baghdad to Washington, Feb. 17, 1943, *DSDF, 890G.00/655, NA*.

<sup>47</sup> Grant, 1945, p. 32.

<sup>48</sup> Morrell, 1946, pp. 25–26; see also Lenczowski, 1949, p. 162.

<sup>49</sup> Howell, 1965, pp. 350–351.

<sup>50</sup> For details, see US Department of the Army, 1955, p. 110.

<sup>51</sup> Kirk, 1952, p. 13.

<sup>52</sup> Lenczowski, 1949, p. 169.

<sup>53</sup> Bullard, 1961, p. 226–227; Woodward, 1971, p. 24.

<sup>54</sup> Woodward, 1971, p. 24. By 1938 the number of Germans in Iran had increased. A growing number of Germans were employed as specialists, technicians, doctors, hospitals administrators, teachers and engineers. Many Germans also entered Iran as tourists and commercial merchants. Already in December 1940, the Foreign Office had instructed Sir Reader Bullard, British Minister in Tehran, “to speak strongly to the Iranian government about the number of Germans – some 2,000 – in the country.” Woodward, 1971, p. 24.

<sup>55</sup> Bullard, 1951, p. 132.

<sup>56</sup> Woodward, 1971, p. 25.

<sup>57</sup> Memo of conversation by Paul Alling, the Assistant Chief of the NE, *FRUS, 1941*, Vol. III, p. 386. On the other hand, it has been argued that the Iranian Ambassador to Moscow,

Muhammed Sa'ad, told his American colleague that the British were the instigators of these diplomatic pressures. Avery, 1965, p. 331.

<sup>58</sup> Bullard, 1951, p. 132.

<sup>59</sup> Bullard, 1951, pp. 167–168; Churchill, 1950, V. III, pp. 484–485; Motter, 1952, p. 388; Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 137–140. The number of Germans present in Iran was, according to Iranian sources, 690 individuals and according to the British sources, 2,000. The question of the expulsion of the Germans seems to have been a pretext for the occupation of Iran: there were some 2590 British individuals in Iran at the time, thus far exceeding the number of Germans in the country. See Azimi, 1989, p. 35.

<sup>60</sup> From the Shah to President Roosevelt, Aug. 25, 1941, in Alexander & Nanes, (eds.) 1980, pp. 77–78.

<sup>61</sup> Alexander & Nanes, (eds.) 1980, p. 77. For other details about the official US position see *FRUS, 1941*, Vol. III, pp. 446–447.

<sup>62</sup> Memo by Murray the Chief of the NE, Aug. 26, 1941, in Alexander & Nanes, (eds.) 1980, p. 78.

<sup>63</sup> Rubin, 1980A, p. 18. Winston Churchill writes: “The need to pass munitions of all kinds to the Soviet Government and the extreme difficulties of the Arctic route, together with further strategic possibilities, made it eminently desirable to open the fullest communication with Russia through Persia. The Persian oil fields were a prime war factor. An active and numerous German mission had installed itself in Tehran and German prestige stood high. The suppression of the revolt in Iraq and the Anglo-French occupation of Syria, achieved as they were by narrow margins, blotted out Hitler’s Orient plan. We welcomed the opportunity of joining hands with the Russians and proposed to them a joint campaign.” Churchill, 1950, Vol. III, p. 423. For further details, see Grant, 1945, p. 32; Bryson, 1981, pp. 49–50; Morrell, 1946, p. 26; Woodward, 1971, p. 23. One should in fact note the vitality of the wartime supply route by which the Red Army had received over 4 million tons of Lend-Lease war materials by 1944. See, for example, Rossow, 1956, p. 17. For further details about the amount and significance of the supplies see Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 145–146.

<sup>64</sup> Woodward, 1971, p. 25. Prior to the invasion, Soviet officials made declarations directed to the Middle Eastern governments, and assurances were made that the Soviet Union had no territorial ambitions in the Middle East. On August 10, 1941, for example, Turkey was assured that the Soviet government was prepared to “respect the territorial inviolability of the Turkish Republic.” Soviet Ambassador in Ankara to Turkish Foreign Minister M. Sarajoglu, in Vingogradov, 1946. Vol. I, p. 86. The Allied occupation of Iran was, however, decided upon without any regard to Iran’s declared determination to remain neutral.

<sup>65</sup> Memo of conversation by Secretary of State, Aug. 22, 1941, in Alexander & Nanes, (eds.) 1980, p. 79; Kimche, 1976, p. 127; from Steinhardt, the American Ambassador in the Soviet Union, to the Secretary of State, Aug. 24, 1941, *FRUS, 1941*, Vol. III, pp. 412–413.

<sup>66</sup> Lenczowski, 1949, p. 169.

<sup>67</sup> Kuniholm, 1980, p. 140. For the path used by the occupying forces, see Lenczowski, 1949, pp. 168–169.

<sup>68</sup> Lenczowski, 1949, pp. 169–175.

<sup>69</sup> Mark, 1975, p. 53; Hull, 1948, Vol. II, p. 1503.

<sup>70</sup> Rubin, 1980B, p. 75. Iran’s independence and integration were the two most central elements of US policy in Iran during the period of the Anglo-Soviet occupation and the early

post-war era. This reflected the US attitude in dealing with Great Britain and the Soviet Union on the position of the Big Three in Iran. What is most relevant for our purposes is that the American determination to maintain the independence and integrity of Iran worked against the wishes of the minorities, primarily the demands of the Kurds and the Azeris for self-determination. Such demands were considered by the Iranian government as a threat to the integration of the country.

<sup>71</sup> McFarland, 1980, p. 336; Avery, 1965, p. 231. For the text of the treaty see Hurewitz, 1956, Vol. II, pp. 232–234; Lenczowski, 1949, pp. 319–322. The Iranian government asked that the United States should accede to the treaty, but the Americans were not interested in doing so. Woodward, 1971, p. 57.

<sup>72</sup> Kirk, 1952, p. 157; Lenczowski, 1949, pp. 163–164; Avery, 1965, p. 363; Thomas, & Frye, 1952, p. 230. George Lenczowski speaks of three German agents: two of them, Franz Mayer, who was living in hiding during the winter of 1941–1942, and Roman Gamotta, went to Iran as secret service men in October 1940. They were followed by another agent, Major Julius Berthold Schulze, who arrived in Tabriz as a consular secretary in April 1941. See Lenczowski, 1949, p. 163. See also Bullard, 1961, pp. 250–251.

<sup>73</sup> These are valuable documents such as notes, reports and correspondence about the activities of Franz Mayer and his associates during the period of February–October 1942. The documents were found by the British authorities in Iran in a house in which Mayer had been hiding. RG 59, 891.00/2050. June 4, 1943, Department of State, National Archives. Although this material was given to the Americans by the British, the author was not able to find the above information in the archives of the PRO.

<sup>74</sup> The American critique of the British presentation of the documents was in part generated by the confusion and the absence of chronological sequence of the documents. According to American officials, there were no clear reactions from the Soviets in Iran regarding the documents. The Soviets gave no support to the British in the arrest of persons involved in the pro-German activities, or refused to deliver Iranian pro-German activists who had taken refuge in the Soviet occupation zone. From Dreyfus, the American Minister in Tehran to the Department of State, March 25, 1943, *DSDF*, 891.00/2008-495, *NA*.

<sup>75</sup> John G. Ondrick, Assistant Military Attaché at the American Legation in Tehran, March 25, 1943, *DSDF*, 891.00/2008-495, *NA*.

<sup>76</sup> See, for example, Kirk, 1952, p. 157; Lenczowski, pp. 163–164; Avery, 1965, p. 363. German activities in Kurdish areas proceeded in different ways: on several occasions, German agents were parachuted into those areas, but these missions were not very successful. Both Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan were subject to such German activities. Kirk, 1952, p. 157; Lamb, 1946, p. 400. The German appeal did not, however, evoke the desired response among the Kurds. As the war continued, the Germans carried out a large-scale propaganda campaign designed to win over the Kurds and other groups. Kirk, 1952, p. 451. Nevertheless, Nazi propaganda had some effects on certain Kurds. See *Nishtiman*, October–November, 1943, p. 9.

<sup>77</sup> Legation of the United States in Tehran, Enclosure No. 3. Document No. 49. *DSDF*, 891.00/2008-495, *NA*.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, Document No. 153.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, Document No. 153.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, Document No. 121.

81 The American Legation in Tehran, Enclosure, No. 3, Document No. 76a, *DSDF*, 891.00/2008-495, NA.

82 Ibid.

83 Different prominent leaders of the movement have drawn different conclusion about the successes of the movement. On September 21, 1942, Vaziri, a leading figure of the *Millšyun*, wrote that “my patience is gradually being exhausted.” On October 1, he wrote that “one year has passed, one has much, experienced much, done much, but without results or success.” Legation of the United States in Tehran, Enclosure, No. 3, Document No. 50, *DSDF*, 891.00/2008-495, NA. However, on October 15 Franz Mayer sent a message to the German Embassy at Ankara, to be sent to the Foreign Office in Berlin, stating that the gendarmerie (rural police force) and tribes were organised together in the *Millšyun*. He added that throughout Iran “they are ready to strike.” The American Legation in Tehran, Enclosure No. 3, Document No. 50, *DSDF*, 891.00/2008-495, NA. It would seem, however, that Mayer made the situation look more favourable than it actually was.

84 The Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran immediately fuelled concerns in Turkey over the possible repercussions of this new state of affairs. Turkey now had their neighbour, the Soviet Union, as a belligerent to the east as well as to the north. The main concern of the Turkish government was the question of the Kurds in Turkey, who would be affected by developments in Iranian Kurdistan. Bullard, 1951, p. 135.

85 Kuniholm, 1980, p. xv.

86 From the German Ambassador in Moscow to the German Foreign Office, Nov. 26, 1940, in Magnus, 1969, p. 56; see also Weaver, 1958, pp. 30–31; Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 137–138.

87 Grant, 1945, p. 32; Tabari, 1967, p. 12; Ghods, 1989, p. 122.

88 Grant, 1945, p. 32.

89 Lenczowski, 1949, pp. 194–206; Fatemi, F. 1980, p. 34–40; Roosevelt, 1947, p. 248; Thomas, & Frye, 1952, p. 229.

90 Vahdat, 1958, p. 50; Ladjevardi, 1983, p. 225.

91 Fawcett, 1988, p. iv.

92 See Ladjevardi, 1983, p. 226.

93 Lenczowski, 1949, p. 247; from the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, Feb. 2, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1827, NA; McFarland, 1980, p. 335. Besides tribal elements, economic, political, and religious forces also came to the fore. Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 140–141.

94 Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” *FO 371/40219, Persia 1944, PRO*.

95 Elphinston, 1946, p. 97; Westermann, 1946, p. 683; Koohi-Kamali, 1992, p. 177.

96 Koohi-Kamali, 1992, p. 177.

97 Roosevelt, 1947, p. 248.

98 The political organisations which appeared in Iranian Kurdistan will be discussed later in this dissertation.

99 Eagleton, 1963, p. 14.

100 Lenczowski, 1949, p. 248.

101 For details on these tribal actions, see Eagleton, 1963, pp. 17–19.

<sup>102</sup> Most of the information on the Kurdish tribes in this paragraph is based on William Eagleton's study *The Kurdish Republic of 1946*. For more details on Kurdish tribes in the whole of Kurdistan see Izady, 1992, pp. 73–86. For the geographical location of Kurdish tribes mentioned in this chapter see map 2.

<sup>103</sup> Eagleton, 1963, p. 16.

<sup>104</sup> The Jalālīs are found on both sides of the Turkish-Iranian frontier. Most of them inhabiting Iranian Kurdistan have crossed the border into Iran as of the 1920s. See Eagleton, p. 17.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> These names will appear later in this study when dealing with the role of tribal chiefs in events during the period under study.

<sup>107</sup> Eagleton, 1963, p. 18.

<sup>108</sup> Although the Sayyids of Shemdinan do not constitute a specific tribe, many prominent nationalist leaders have appeared among them due to their religious influence. For details see Eagleton, 1963, pp. 18–19.

<sup>109</sup> Eagleton, 1963, pp. 20–21

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

## *Chapter Four*

### *The Great Powers and the Kurds: The First Phase 1941–1943*

<sup>1</sup> Rezun, 1981, p. 82, n. 74.

<sup>2</sup> Memo, NE, Department of State, March 19, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1827, NA.

<sup>3</sup> Lenczowski, 1949, p. 250.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” March 22, 1946, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.

<sup>6</sup> In British diplomatic records, the terms tribes and ethnic minorities have often been used interchangeably. The British use of the term tribe is rather confusing, but most probably refers to the Kurdish people or the tribes as a group of individuals whose internal relations were based on tribal patterns, and above all on kinship.

<sup>7</sup> Elphinston, 1946, p.97; Westermann, 1946, p. 683.

<sup>8</sup> *FO 371/27244, Persia 1941, PRO*; Bullard, 1961, p. 232.

<sup>9</sup> Bullard, 1961, pp. 232–233. However, as has been argued by George Lenczowski, this policy could be placed within the framework of the British policy in the context of the Allied war efforts, Great Britain's own interests and British policy vis-à-vis Iran. Lenczowski, 1949, p. 254.

<sup>10</sup> Bullard, 1961, P. 233.

<sup>11</sup> Bullard, 1951, p. 143.

<sup>12</sup> From the Foreign Office to the British Legation in Tehran, Aug. 1, 1943, *FO 371/35072, Persia 1943, PRO*

<sup>13</sup> Bullard, 1961, p. 233.

- 14 From Maisky the Soviet Ambassador in London, to Eden, Jan. 4, 1942, *FO 371/31388, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, Jan. 9, 1942, *FO 371/31388, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Ibid. The “third part” alluded to the Axis powers.
- 20 From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, Jan. 15, 1942, *FO 371/31388, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- 21 From Eden to Bullard, Jan. 21, 1942, *FO 371/31394, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, Jan. 22, 1942, *FO 371/31388, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- 25 From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, Jan. 15, 1942, *FO 371/31388, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- 26 From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, Jan. 22, 1942, *FO 371/31388, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- 27 From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, April 23, 1942, *FO 371/31414, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- 28 From Bullard to Eden, March 16, 1942, *FO 371/31390, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- 29 From Bullard to Eden, April 3, 1942, *FO 371/31390, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- 30 Azimi, 1989, pp. 55–56.
- 31 From Bullard to Eden, June 23, 1943, *FO 371/35072, Persia 1943, PRO*.
- 32 From Bullard to Eden, April 20, 1943, *FO 371/35070, Persia 1943, PRO*.
- 33 From Bullard to Eden, May 6, 1943, *FO 371/35071, Persia 1943, PRO*.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 See chapter six.
- 36 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the British Legation in Tehran, *FO 371/27244, Persia 1941, PRO*.
- 37 Lenczowski, 1949, p. 249.
- 38 Indeed, the Second World War witnessed a modification of the “Soviet Kurdish policy”. Yet the Soviet policy towards the Kurds during the first year and a half of the Soviet presence in Iran was cautious and flexible. Howell, 1965, p. 353.
- 39 From the Foreign Office to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, March 18, 1947, *FO 371/61678, Iraq 1947, PRO*. George Lenczowski argues that in the early stages of the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran, there were signs of profound discrepancies between the British and Soviet policies in Iran. While the British considered their presence in Iran as only temporary, the Soviets appeared to have launched a “long-range policy” in the country. See Lenczowski, 1949, p. 194.

- <sup>40</sup> From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, Jan. 14, 1942, *FO 371/31388, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- <sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>42</sup> From Eden to Bullard, Jan. 21, 1942, *FO 371/31394, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- <sup>43</sup> From Maisky to Eden, Jan. 4, 1942, *FO 371/31388, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- <sup>44</sup> Bullard, 1961, p. 239. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou has stated that the basic aim of the trip to Soviet Azerbaijan was of a cultural nature, and that the Soviets primarily wished to become more familiar with the Kurds. Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 62.
- <sup>45</sup> Ghassemlou, 1988, pp. 60–61; Eagleton, 1963, p. 23.
- <sup>46</sup> See Eagleton, 1963, p. 23; Emin, 1993, pp. 44–45.
- <sup>47</sup> Bullard, 1961, p. 235.
- <sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>49</sup> Lenczowski, 1949, pp. 248–249.
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 247.
- <sup>51</sup> Eagleton, 1963, p. 15.
- <sup>52</sup> See, for example, Mark, 1975, p. 58; Avery, 1965, pp. 384–385.
- <sup>53</sup> Cottam, 1988, p. 65, n. 24; Pisyany, 1949, p. 19.
- <sup>54</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, Jan. 5, 1942, *DSDF, 891.00/1822, NA*.
- <sup>55</sup> From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, Jan. 9, 1942, *FO 371/31388, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- <sup>56</sup> From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, Jan. 10, 1942, *FO 371/31388, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- <sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>58</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, May 1, 1942, *FRUS, 1942, Vol. IV, p. 319*; from Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, May 6, 1942, *DSDF, 891.00/1880, NA*.
- <sup>59</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, May 3, 1942, *FRUS, 1942, Vol. IV, p. 320*.
- <sup>60</sup> From Steinhardt the American Ambassador in Turkey to the Secretary of State, May 4, 1942, *FRUS, 1942, Vol. IV, pp. 320–321*.
- <sup>61</sup> From the Department of State to the American Embassy in Moscow, May 5, 1942, *DSDF, 891.00/1862, NA*; from the Secretary of State to Standley the American Ambassador in Moscow, May 6, 1942, *FRUS, 1942, Vol. IV, pp. 321–322*.
- <sup>62</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, May 1, 1942, *FRUS, 1942, Vol. IV, pp. 318–319*.
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*; From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, May 3, 1942, *FRUS, 1942, Vol. IV, pp. 319–320*. On one occasion the Soviet Consul General in Tabriz denied any type of Soviet support for the Kurds. He stressed that ‘the Fascists’ were responsible for the allegation that the Soviets were supporting the Kurds and providing them with arms and ammunition. The Consul General stated that there were instances in which Soviets themselves had been attacked by Kurds. From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, May 16, 1942, enclosure: note from Kuniholm, the American Consul in Tabriz, to the American Legation in Tehran, May 9, 1942, *DSDF, 891.00/1885, NA*.
- <sup>64</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, May 8, 1942, *FRUS, 1942, Vol. IV, p. 322*.

- <sup>65</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, May 12, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1871, *NA*. This dispatch is published in *FRUS*, 1942, Vol. IV, p. 323.
- <sup>66</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, May 15, 1942, *FRUS*, 1942, Vol. IV, p. 323; from Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, May 16, 1942, *FRUS*, 1942, Vol. IV, p. 323.
- <sup>67</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, May 16, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1875, *NA*.
- <sup>68</sup> From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, Oct. 7, 1942, *FRUS*, 1942, Vol. IV, p. 323.
- <sup>69</sup> Both American and British diplomatic reports indicate that the Soviet troops in the area had indeed been reduced. From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, Oct. 7, 1942, *FRUS*, 1942, Vol. IV, p. 323.
- <sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>71</sup> From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, May 3, 1942, *FO 371/31414*, *Persia 1942*, *PRO*; from Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, May 16, 1942, enclosure: note from Kuniholm to the American Legation in Tehran, May 9, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1885 *NA*; see also from the Department of State to the American Embassy in Moscow, May 5, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1862, *NA*. There were concerns that if the Soviets suffered setbacks in the Caucasus, then the whole of Iranian Azerbaijan would fall under attack by the Kurds. From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, May 1, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1862 *NA*. This dispatch is published in *FRUS*, 1942, Vol. IV, p. 318.
- <sup>72</sup> From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, May 16, 1942, enclosure: note from Kuniholm to the American Legation in Tehran, May 9, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1885, *NA*. A few days earlier Kurdish chiefs had met the General Governor of Azerbaijan at Paveh and demanded that a subsidy be granted to the tribes; that the Iranian government provide funds to maintain a peace force of 200 tribesmen; and that two tribal chiefs held in Tehran be released. From Dreyfus to the Secretary of State, May 6, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1880, *NA*.
- <sup>73</sup> From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, May 4, 1942, *FO 371/31414*, *Persia 1942*, *PRO*.
- <sup>74</sup> From the American Embassy in London to the Department of State, May 5, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1868, *NA*.
- <sup>75</sup> From S. H. Taqizadeh, the Iranian Minister in London, to the Foreign Office, May 5, 1942, *FO 371/31414*, *Persia 1942*, *PRO*.
- <sup>76</sup> From the American Embassy in Ankara to the Department of State, May 4, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1867, *NA*.
- <sup>77</sup> From the British Embassy in Ankara to the Foreign Office, May 6, 1942, *FO 371/31414*, *Persia 1942*, *PRO*.
- <sup>78</sup> From the British Embassy in Ankara to the Foreign Office, May 8, 1942, *FO 371/31414*, *Persia 1942*, *PRO*.
- <sup>79</sup> From Ankara to London, March 12, 1942, *FO 371/31390*, *Persia 1942*, *PRO*.
- <sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>81</sup> From the British Embassy in Ankara to the Foreign Office, May 8, 1942, *FO 371/31414*, *Persia 1942*, *PRO*.
- <sup>82</sup> From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, May 6, 1942, *FO 371/31414*, *Persia 1942*, *PRO*.
- <sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, March 6, 1942, *FO 371/31390, Persia 1942, PRO*.

<sup>85</sup> From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, April 3, 1942, *FO 371/31390, Persia 1942, PRO*.

<sup>86</sup> From the American Embassy in London to the Department of State, May 20, 1942, *DSDF, 891.00/1876, NA*.

<sup>87</sup> Naamani, 1951, pp. 208–209.

<sup>88</sup> From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, May 6, 1942, *DSDF, 891.00/1880, NA*.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>90</sup> From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, April 3, 1942, *FO 371/31390, Persia 1942, PRO*.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> From the British Consulate in Kermanshah to the British Legation in Tehran, April 16, 1942, *FO 371/31390, Persia 1942, PRO*.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, May 12, 1942, *DSDF, 891.00/1871, NA*.

<sup>95</sup> From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, May 6, 1942, *DSDF, 891.00/1880, NA*, emphasis in original.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> From the American Consul in Tabriz to the Secretary of State, May 5, 1944, *DSDF, 891.00/3053, NA*; from the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, May 6, 1942, *DSDF, 891.00/1880, NA*.

<sup>98</sup> From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, May 6, 1942, *DSDF, 891.00/1880, NA*.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>101</sup> From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, Aug. 31, 1942, *DSDF, 891.00/1919, NA*; from the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, May 6, 1942, *DSDF, 891.00/1880, NA*; from the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, Dec. 29, 1943, *DSDF, 891.00/2095, NA*. This dispatch is published in *FRUS, 1943, Vol. IV, p. 427*.

<sup>102</sup> From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, Nov. 10, 1943, *DSDF, 891.00/2066, NA*.

<sup>103</sup> Pfau, 1975, pp. 192–193. For details on the strategy of *Movāzaneh* see, for example, Ramazani, 1975, pp. 70–72; McFarland, 1980, pp. 334–337.

<sup>104</sup> It has even been asserted that most of the incidents in the Kurdish areas occurred in sections that were never under Soviet occupation. From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, Oct. 14, 1944, *DSDF, 891.00/10–1444, NA*.

<sup>105</sup> From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, May 16, 1942, enclosure: note from Kuniholm to the American Legation in Tehran, May 9, 1942, *DSDF, 891.00/1885, NA*.

106 Eagleton, 1963, p. 67; Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 63.

107 From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, May 6, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1880, NA.

108 Ibid.

109 From the American Embassy in London to the Department of State, May 20, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1876, NA. There were indications that the US would be prepared to send a military mission to Iran to reorganise the Iranian Army. From the Department of State to the American Legation in Tehran, May 27, 1942, *FRUS*, 1942, Vol. IV, p. 236.

110 From the American Embassy in London to the Department of State, May 20, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1876, NA.

111 Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 144–145.

112 Mark, 1975, p. 51.

113 From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, Sep. 30, 1941, *FRUS*, 1941, Vol. III, p. 465. The Soviet forces were initially instructed not to engage in close relations with the British forces, and this reflected some tensions in Soviet-British relations, at least at the local level. See Bullard, 1961, p. 227.

114 From the American Legation in Tehran to Department of State, Oct. 29, 1941, *FRUS*, 1941, Vol. III, p. 474.

115 From the Department of State to the American Legation in Tehran, Oct. 29, 1941, *FRUS*, 1941, Vol. III, pp. 378, 374–377.

116 From Steinhardt to the Secretary of State, Oct. 11, 1941, *FRUS*, 1941, Vol. III, pp. 471–472.

117 From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, Oct. 9, 1941, *FRUS*, 1941, Vol. III, p. 470.

118 From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, Sep. 28, 1941, *FRUS*, 1941, Vol. III, pp. 464–465.

## Chapter Five

### *The Great Powers and the Kurds: The Second Phase 1944–1945*

<sup>1</sup> Bruce Kuniholm *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). See also Kuniholm, B. “The End of the Cold War in the Near East: What It Means for Historians and Policy Planners,” in *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 16, No. 1, (Winter 1992), p. 105.

<sup>2</sup> Warner, 1990, p. 15.

<sup>3</sup> Lawson, 1989, p. 307. On the other hand, as Geoffrey Warner concludes, “any study of Cold War origins which confines itself to a particular region is bound to be incomplete. The Cold War was a global phenomenon.” Warner, 1990, p. 16.

<sup>4</sup> Nasrollah Saifpour Fatemi, *Oil Diplomacy: Powderkeg in Iran*, (New York: Whittier Books, 1954), Preface by Wallace Murray, vii–xi, Murray was the former Chief of the NE, Department of State and former Ambassador in Iran. Robert Rossow, Jr., “The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946,” in *Middle East Journal*, 10 (1956), pp. 17–32. Robert Rossow was in charge of the United States Consulate in Tabriz from December 1945 through June 1946, and

the Chief of Political Section of the American Embassy in Tehran until January 1947; George Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918–1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1949), foreword by George V. Allen, pp. vii–viii. Allen was Assistant Secretary of State, formerly United States Ambassador to Iran. Michael Kahl Sheehan, *Iran: the Impact of United States Interests and Politics 1941–1954*, (Brooklyn: N. Y: THEO. GAUS' SONS, INC., 1968), pp. 27–32.

<sup>5</sup> Messer, 1977, pp. 297–319.

<sup>6</sup> Hess, 1974, pp. 117–146. In evaluating the Cold War historiography, Louise L'Estrange Fawcett has criticised the dominant bipolar perspective and underlines the role of Great Britain in the initial epoch of the Cold War in relation to the Iranian crisis. Fawcett argues that British policy was a major factor leading to the Cold War. Fawcett, "Invitation to the Cold War: British Policy in Iran, 1941–1947," in Ann Deighton, (ed.) *Britain and the First Cold War*, (London: Macmillan, 1990).

<sup>7</sup> Leoyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion; Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949*, (Chicago, 1970), 211–215; Joyce Kolko & Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954*, (New York...: Harper & Row 1972), pp. 235–242; Barton J. Bernstein, "American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," in Barton J. Bernstein, (ed.) *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration*, (Chicago, 1970), pp. 40–41; David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War*, (New York, 1971, rev ed.), pp. 83–84; D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917–1960*, (Garden City, New York, 1961) Vol. II, pp. 340–348.

<sup>8</sup> McFarland, 1980, p. 333.

<sup>9</sup> Cottam, 1988, p. 67.

<sup>10</sup> Fawcett, 1990, p. 184.

<sup>11</sup> Gasiorowski, 1991, p. 46.

<sup>12</sup> Campbell, 1958, p. 23.

<sup>13</sup> Fawcett, 1988, p. iii.

<sup>14</sup> American advisers were used by the Iranian government shortly after the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 on Iran and the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 led to further American wishes to amplify their presence in Iran by increasing the activity of American advisers in the country. The first American mission, under Morgan Shuster, was sent to Iran at the end of 1911. The main task of this mission was to reorganise the Iranian gendarmerie in order to maintain order in that country. The mission, however remained in Iran for less than a year. Ramazani, 1975, pp. 70, 371; Fawcett, 1988, pp. 245–246.

<sup>15</sup> See, for example, Grant, 1945, pp. 33; Bryson, 1981, p. 48; Sheehan, 1968, pp. 28–29. Iran's foreign policy during the Second World War basically reflected Reza Shah's pattern of preserving Iran's independence and territorial integrity vis-à-vis Great Britain and the Soviet Union. This was possible only by "involving a third power, with the United States replacing Germany after the Anglo-Russian invasion in 1941." Ramazani, 1975, p. 109; Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 136–137; Avery, 1965, p. 382.

<sup>16</sup> Memo by Murray, Chief of the NE, Nov. 5, 1941, *FRUS, 1941*, Vol. III, p. 273.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 274.

<sup>18</sup> Bullard, 1961, p. 238.

<sup>19</sup> Alexander, & Nanes, (eds.) 1980, p. 75. The arrival of the American troops in Iran led the Iranian government to request the American Minister in Tehran to come to an agreement about the presence of American troops on the Iranian soil. See Fatemi, 1954, p. 223; Avery, 1965, p. 351. However, American officials opposed the Department of State's plan to reach an agreement with Iran. Fatemi, 1954, p. 223; Avery, 1965, p. 351.

<sup>20</sup> Lenczowski, 1949, pp. 271–279; Hurewitz, 1953, pp. 21–24.

<sup>21</sup> Bullard, 1961, p. 235. The arrival of the American troops in Iran in 1942 and the subsequent establishment of the Persian Gulf Service Command (PGSC) in 1943, has been seen as an acceleration of US involvement in Iran. However, the American engagement began with the outbreak of the Second World War and especially with the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941. PGSC was headed by Major General Donald H. Connolly who established his headquarters at Amirabad near Tehran. See Lenczowski, 1949, pp. 273–276; Samii, 1987, p. 44. The American troops were originally known as the Iraq-Iran Service Command of United States Army Forces in the Middle East (USAFME). The troops had reached the Persian Gulf region late in 1941. This force was renamed to PGSC. Bryson, 1981, p. 50. The American troops had been in Iran for more than one year without being officially recognised by the Iranian government. See from Brigadier General Patrick J. Hurley to President Roosevelt, Dec. 21, 1943, *DSDF*, 891.00/3037, NA. The American Minister in Tehran asserted that the Americans should not have entered Iran without previous approval from the Iranian authorities. From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, March 9, 1943, *FRUS*, 1943, Vol. IV, p. 339.

<sup>22</sup> Thomas, & Frye, 1952, p. 247.

<sup>23</sup> Hull, 1948, Vol. II, p. 1599.

<sup>24</sup> Memo of conversation by John D. Jernegan, the Third Secretary of the American Legation in Tehran, Sep. 21, 1943, in Alexander, & Nanes, (eds.) 1980, p. 105. There is a dialectic relationship between the two “ideological” and the “practical” dimensions. They complement each other and can in a sense both be seen as “practical”: if Iran lost its independence, this would entail foreign control of Iran, which might prove detrimental to US interests. In other words, so-called ideological notions also stemmed from self-interest. The United States, as Murray maintained, had a vital interest in the fulfilment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Murray emphasised that it was “to the advantage of the United States to exert itself to see that Iran's integrity and independence are maintained.” Memo by Murray, the Adviser on Political Relations, Feb. 11, 1943, *FRUS*, 1943, Vol. IV, pp. 330–331. Murray also pointed out that the assertion of Iranian independence and integrity was related to the assumption that “both the Russians and the British will seek to utilize the occupation as a means of strengthening their economic ties with Iran.” Memo by Murray, Nov. 5, 1941, *FRUS*, 1941, Vol. III, p. 374. For a background of the struggle of Americans for oil in Iran and in the Middle East in the inter-war period, see Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 178–181.

<sup>25</sup> Lenczowski, 1949, p. 279.

<sup>26</sup> Memo of conversation between American officials in Iran and the Shah, by Richard Ford the American Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran, Nov. 6, 1943, *FRUS*, 1943, Vol. IV, pp. 408–410

<sup>27</sup> Cordell Hull to President Roosevelt, in Alexander & Nanes, (eds.) 1980, p. 104. and see Memo of conversation by Jernegan, Sep. 21, 1943, *FRUS*, 1943, Vol. IV, pp. 387–388. The US priorities in regard to Iran were: first, winning of the war; second, extending economic and political support to strengthen Iran “in the face of British and Russian efforts to curtail”

Iran's sovereignty; and third, Department of State support to oil companies in their efforts to gain further concessions. Bryson, 1981, p. 49.

<sup>28</sup> Kuniholm, 1980, p. 186.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 185.

<sup>30</sup> From the Department of State to the American Legation in Tehran, March 13, 1942, *DSDF*, 891.00/1837, NA.

<sup>31</sup> From the Department of State to the American Legation in Tehran, Aug. 21, 1942, *FRUS*, 1942, Vol. IV, p. 247; Motter, 1952, p. 163.

<sup>32</sup> Memo "American Policy in Iran," by John D. Jernegan of the NE, Jan. 23, 1943, in Alexander & Nanes, (eds.) 1980, p. 94. One historian has argued that US policy against Iran was defined as early as January 1943, as the US formulated "an official policy of maintaining Iran's independence from Russia and Britain, and was in fact directing much of Iran's affairs." Kolko, 1968, p. 299.

<sup>33</sup> Mark, 1975, p. 52; Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 157–158. Phillip Baram argues that "up to early 1944 there was hardly any formally articulated departmental policy addressed to the issue of influence, real and potential, of either the Communist ideology or the Soviet government in the Middle East." See Baram, 1978, p. 110. This position is, however, difficult to agree with.

<sup>34</sup> From Murray to the Secretary of State, Sep. 25, 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 418.

<sup>35</sup> From the Department of State to the American Legation in Tehran, Aug. 16, 1943, *DSDF*, 891.00/1920, NA.

<sup>36</sup> From Hull to President Roosevelt, Aug. 16, 1943, *FRUS*, 1943, Vol. IV, pp. 377–379; and see Hess, 1974, pp. 117–146; for further details see memo by Jernegan of NE, Jan. 23, 1943, *FRUS*, 1943, Vol. IV, pp. 331–332, 334.

<sup>37</sup> Tabari, 1967, pp. 61–62.

<sup>38</sup> Motter, 1952, pp. 462–465.

<sup>39</sup> Fawcett, 1990, p. 189.

<sup>40</sup> Report from Brigadier General Patrick J. Hurley, Tehran, to President Roosevelt, Dec. 21, 1943, *DSDF*, 891.00/3037, NA. The report was written as a response to the President's suggestion and the directive of the Secretary of State.

<sup>41</sup> From President Roosevelt to the Department of State, Jan. 12, 1944, *DSDF*, 891.00/3037, NA.

<sup>42</sup> From the Department of State to President Roosevelt, Feb. 18, 1944, *DSDF*, 891.00/3037, NA. As a result of the President's determination to make Iran a test case, the American Legation in Tehran was raised to the status of an Embassy. Bryson, 1981, p. 60.

<sup>43</sup> From the Secretary of State to John Winant, the American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Aug. 27, 1942, *FRUS*, 1942, Vol. IV, pp. 29–30. There is no official text of the Atlantic Charter in the form of a signed copy in the British and American archives. Roosevelt and Churchill accepted a text which was given to the press. See Woodward, 1971, p. 202.

<sup>44</sup> From the Secretary of State to Winant, Aug. 27, 1942, *FRUS*, 1942, Vol. IV, pp. 29–30; see also Department of State Bulletin, July 25, 1942, p. 639.

<sup>45</sup> Views were expressed in favour of a post-war United Nations Organization with American participation and leadership. The planners within the Department also favoured institutionalising the principles of the Atlantic Charter for self-determination to the dependent areas. Baram, 1978, pp. 15–17.

- <sup>46</sup> For details see Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 160–164.
- <sup>47</sup> Hess, 1974, p. 119; McFarland, 1980, p. 340.
- <sup>48</sup> See, for example, Mark, 1975, p. 58; Fawcett, 1988, pp. 213–216.
- <sup>49</sup> Fawcett, 1990, pp. 190–91; Tabari, 1967, p. 79; Vahdat, 1958, pp. 46–49; McFarland, 1980, p. 341; Nash, 1968, p. 171.
- <sup>50</sup> Nash, 1968, p. 171.
- <sup>51</sup> Lenczowski, 1949, pp. 216–218.
- <sup>52</sup> Hess, 1974, p. 121. The US wartime policy towards Iran was in part motivated by a growing need to find new petroleum sources. Kolko & Kolko, 1972, p. 236; Kirk, 1952, pp. 24, 367–369, 474.
- <sup>53</sup> These negotiations, which aimed at signing a treaty on oil in the Middle East, continued into 1947 without result. See Nash, 1968, pp. 174–179.
- <sup>54</sup> For details of the negotiations, see Tabari, 1967, pp. 83–91.
- <sup>55</sup> In October 1944, the Soviets, via Sergei I. Kavtaradze, Vice People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, in the name of the Soviet government officially asked for oil concessions in northern Iran (an area of 200,000 square kilometres stretching from Azerbaijan to Khorasan.) For details on the Soviets demands for oil concessions and their complications for Iran’s domestic and foreign affairs, see Tabari, 1967, pp. 93–101 and Rubin, 1980B, pp. 97–101.
- <sup>56</sup> Fawcett, 1990, pp. 190–91; McFarland, 1980, p. 340. For details of the development of oil crisis, see, for example, Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 192–202; Pfau, 1975, pp. 185–216; Bryson, 1981, pp. 61–66. The Russians had long been interested in the oil of northern Iran. See, for example, Pfau, 1975, pp. 185–186.
- <sup>57</sup> Pahlavi, 1961, p. 88.
- <sup>58</sup> Vahdat, 1958, p. 5.
- <sup>59</sup> McFarland, 1980, p. 340.
- <sup>60</sup> See, for example, Eagleton, 1963, pp. 23–24; Mark, 1975, pp. 58–59; Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” March 22, 1946, *FO 371/52369. Iraq 1946, PRO*; see also Avery, 1965, p. 389.
- <sup>61</sup> From the American Consulate in Tabriz to the Secretary of State, July 13, 1944, *DSDF, 891.00/7-1344, NA*.
- <sup>62</sup> For details see Hess, 1974, pp. 117–146. For a similar assumption see Nikki Keddie, “The End of the Cold War and the Middle East,” in *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 16, No. 1, (Winter 1992), p. 95.
- <sup>63</sup> Ramazani, 1975, p. 111.
- <sup>64</sup> Mark, 1975, p. 61.
- <sup>65</sup> From Kennan to the Secretary of State, Nov. 7, 1944, *FRUS, 1944*, Vol. V, pp. 470–71.
- <sup>66</sup> Ramazani, 1975, p. 3.
- <sup>67</sup> Eagleton, 1963, p. 73.
- <sup>68</sup> From Murray to the Secretary of State, Sep. 25, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. VIII, p. 418. Wallace Murray was appointed Ambassador to Iran on February 20, 1945, but did not present his credentials and assume charge of the Embassy until June 1945.
- <sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

- <sup>70</sup> From Winant to the Secretary of State, Nov. 21, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. VIII, p. 440.
- <sup>71</sup> Rossow, 1956, p. 17.
- <sup>72</sup> From Kennan to the Secretary of State, March 17, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 362–363.
- <sup>73</sup> Memo of conversation by Harold Minor, the Assistant Chief of the Division of Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs (MEI), Nov. 19, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. VIII, p. 434.
- <sup>74</sup> Fawcett, 1988, p. vii; Lenczowski, 1971, p. 26.
- <sup>75</sup> Kuniholm, 1980, p. 203.
- <sup>76</sup> This activation of the Soviet role was, according to Jon Kimche, generated by the “oil-rush” from British and American oil companies and from the Soviet Union. First, a representative from British Shell arrived at Tehran. He was followed by agents of two American companies, Standard-Vacuum-Oil Company and the Sinclair Oil Company. The latter was especially interested in gaining oil concessions in northern Iran which was virtually under Soviet occupation. The Soviet government was likewise interested in the Iranian oil in the territory occupied by the Soviet forces. See Kimche, 1976, pp. 131–132.
- <sup>77</sup> Bullard, 1951, p. 139; Kimche, 1976, pp. 130–131.
- <sup>78</sup> From the British Legation in Tehran to the Foreign Office, Jan. 15, 1942, *FO 371/31388, Persia 1942, PRO*.
- <sup>79</sup> Tabari, 1967, p. 41; Fawcett, 1988, p. 193. One historian has concluded that the historic rivalry between Great Britain and the Soviet Union came to the fore after the battle of Stalingrad. The American involvement in Iranian affairs was an additional dimension to the conflict. Furthermore, “cooperation in Iran became less important” now that the Soviet Union had won the battle. Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 142, 147, 154. See also Bullard, 1951, p. 141.
- <sup>80</sup> Baram, 1978, p. 109.
- <sup>81</sup> From Leland Morris, the American Ambassador in Iran, to the Secretary of State, Feb. 22, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. VIII, pp. 361–362. Leland Morris was the American Ambassador in Iran between February and June 1945.
- <sup>82</sup> Morris to the Secretary of State, March 19, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. VIII, pp. 366–367; Morris to the Secretary of State, May 5, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. VIII, pp. 367–368.
- <sup>83</sup> Ramazani, 1975, p. 110. Bullard, 1961, p. 266.
- <sup>84</sup> From Winant to the Secretary of State, Nov. 21, 1945. *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. VIII, p. 440.
- <sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>86</sup> From Morris to the Secretary of State, May 5, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. VIII, pp. 367–368.
- <sup>87</sup> *Ibid.* Since the Iranian authorities were not able to restore order in the Kurdish areas by means of force, other means were employed. For example, in early October 1944, the Iranian government appointed a Kurdish chieftain, Hama Rashid Khan, and put him in charge of security in the Baneh and Marivan districts. The appointment was criticised by the well-known Iranian newspaper *Keihan*, which claimed that the Iranian government’s appointment of Hama Rashid Khan was equal to “a declaration of independence for these two towns.” *Keihan*, October 5, 1944. According to the American Embassy in Tehran, the appointment was considered by most Iranians as a British intrigue because the appointment had not occurred without British approval. From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, Oct. 14, 1944, *DSDF, 891.00/10-1444, NA*. Hama Rashid Khan was, however, later involved in armed conflict with Iranian forces. He was forced to withdraw to the Iraq-Iranian

border when Iranian forces and Kurdish tribesmen hostile to Hama Rashid Khan co-operated in the campaign. Commenting on the confrontation with Hama Rashid Khan, the American Ambassador in Tehran pointed out that “while the incident in itself is not particularly important, since few lives have been lost and the security of the country not seriously menaced, it has deep significance in emphasising the ever present problem of the Kurds and in stirring up local feeling against Iraq.” From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, Oct. 14, 1944, *DSDF*, 891.00/10-1444, *NA*.

<sup>88</sup> From Morris to the Secretary of State, May 5, 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 368.

<sup>89</sup> Hess, 1974, p. 123.

<sup>90</sup> From Tehran to London, March 26, 1945, *FO 371/45447*, *Persia 1945*, *PRO*. The Foreign Office was at this time, however, not on the same firm ground as was the Department of State. From Foreign Office to Tehran, March 29, 1945, *FO 371/45447*, *Persia 1945*, *PRO*.

<sup>91</sup> From Murray to the Secretary of State, Sep. 25, 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 418–419.

<sup>92</sup> From the Iranian Foreign Minister to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, Nov. 17, 1945, *UN, OR, Supplement* No. 1, p. 55. For details concerning Mulla Mustafa’s retreat to Iranian Kurdistan see chapter six and seven.

<sup>93</sup> *The New York Times*, 1 December, 1945.

<sup>94</sup> Report by Henderson the Director of the NEA, Nov. 19, 1945, *DSDF*, 891.00/11-1945 *OS/D*, *NA*.

## Chapter Six

### *The Kurdish Question in Iraq during the Second World War*

<sup>1</sup> Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” *FO 371/40219*, *Persia 1944*, *PRO*.

<sup>2</sup> Gavan, 1958, pp. 33–34; Shaways, 1985, p. 8. Nuri Shaways was a notable political personality who played an important role in the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq from 1930s to the early 1980s.

<sup>3</sup> O’Balance, 1973, p. 24; Arfa, 1966, p. 119.

<sup>4</sup> Naamani, 1966, p. 288; Harris, 1977, p. 118. For further details, see Longrigg, 1953, pp. 193–196, 324–327.

<sup>5</sup> For further details, see Shaways, 1985, pp. 8–18.

<sup>6</sup> Edmonds, 1971, p. 95.

<sup>7</sup> Majid Mustafa, for instance, advocated this, and worked for “the special task of appeasing the Kurdish areas and redressing their administrative grievances.” From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, “Review of events in Iraq during 1943,” Jan. 13, 1944, *FO 371/40041*, *Iraq 1944*, *PRO*. Majid Mustafa was the Minister without portfolio in the cabinet of Nuri al-Sa’id at the time. Daud al-Haydari, a Kurdish notable Iraqi official, had a similar approach to the Kurdish question and held various ministerial posts in different Iraqi governments during the 1940s. Al-Haydari maintained that there were three alternatives for the Kurds in Iraq. They should either be represented at a Peace Conference in connection with an end of the Second World War and achieve the right to self-determination within Iraq, in accordance with the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the UN; or, if the Kurds were

denied the right to this, they would rise in revolt and seek incorporation of their land into Turkey; or, the Kurds in Iraq might become part of a Kurdish Soviet Republic, stretching from the Caspian sea to the Syrian desert. Al-Haydari claimed that the Kurds were positive to the Communist missionary and that the Soviets also were popular among the Kurds in Iran. From the American Legation in Baghdad to the Department of State, Feb. 17, 1943, *DSDF, 890G.00/655, NA*; from the American Legation in Baghdad to the Department of State, March 29, 1945, *DSDF, 890G.00/3-2945, NA*.

<sup>8</sup> For instance, American officials maintained that disunity among Kurds was the decisive factor in the inability of the Kurds to act in unison. From the American Legation in Baghdad to the Department of State, Feb. 17, 1943, *DSDF, 890G.00/655, NA*.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, "Review of events in Iraq during 1943," Jan. 24, 1944, *FO 371/40041, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

<sup>11</sup> "The Kurdish Question," *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

<sup>12</sup> From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, June 2, 1944, *FO 371/40041, Iraq 1944, PRO*; from the Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Baghdad, Jan. 24, 1944, *FO 371/40041, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

<sup>13</sup> Mulla Mustafa and many other members of his clan (Barzani) had spent some time in forced residence in the Kurdish city of Sulaimaniya. However, Mulla Mustafa and several of his men fled into the mountains on the night of July 12–13 1943, leaving behind a letter in which he stated that "penniless from this long exile, he preferred death to his present condition." From the American Legation in Baghdad to the Department of State, Oct. 13, 1943, *DSDF, 890G.00/669, NA*.

<sup>14</sup> "The Kurdish Question," *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, "Review of events in Iraq during 1943," Jan. 24, 1944, *FO 371/40041, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*; from the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Dec. 31, 1944, *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*; for the text of Mulla Mustafa's letter to the British Embassy in Baghdad, dated Dec. 25, 1943, see *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

<sup>19</sup> From the British Embassy to the Foreign Office, "Review of events in Iraq during 1943," Jan. 24, 1944, *FO 371/40041, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

<sup>20</sup> From the American Legation in Baghdad to the Department of State, Nov. 13, 1943, *DSDF, 890G.00/674, NA*.

<sup>21</sup> From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, "Review of events in Iraq during 1943," Jan. 24, 1944, *FO 371/40041, Iraq 1944, PRO*; from the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Feb. 19, 1944, *FO 371/40041, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

<sup>22</sup> From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, "Review of events in Iraq during 1943," Jan. 24, 1944, *FO 371/40041, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> From the American Legation in Baghdad to the Department of State, Nov. 13, 1943, *DSDF, 890G.00/674, NA*.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 From the American Legation in Baghdad to the Department of State, Dec. 30, 1943, *DSDF, 890G.00/679, NA*. The Iraqi government now tried to exert pressure on Mulla Mustafa via consultations with his brother Skaikh Ahmed Barzani. Shaikh Ahmed was brought to Baghdad from his residence forcée at Hilla. The Shaikh agreed to send his son with a message ordering Mulla Mustafa to surrender his arms and to send his followers home; Mulla Mustafa himself would disappear into the mountains until the Spring of 1944, whereupon he could return “with immunity” to Barzan; Shaikh Ahmed Barzani would be permitted by the Government to go to Barzan. However, Shaeikh’s attempt proved futile. From the American Legation in Baghdad to Department of State, Dec. ?, 1943, *DSDF, 890G.00/679, NA*.

29 Majid Mustafa was one of the members of the Kurdish Hīwā party (1939–1945), but was on good terms with the British in Iraq and the Iraqi government. See Nabaz, 1985, p. 19.

30 From the British Embassy in Baghdad the Foreign Office, Jan. 15, 1944, *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

31 The text of the report is to be found in, from the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Feb. 15, 1944, *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

32 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, June 16, 1944, *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, June 28, 1944, *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

38 Ibid.

39 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, July 30, 1944, *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Besides efforts to reach a peaceful settlement, other attempts were also made to resolve the conflict with Mulla Mustafa, although these proved fruitless: Major Izzat Abdul Aziz, himself a Kurd and once a personal aid of the Crown Prince made such an effort, as did Lt-Colonel Amin Rawanduzi, Qaimmaqam (sub-governor of province) of Rawanduz. Eagleton, 1963, p. 52.

43 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, June 28, 1944, *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

44 Ibid.

45 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1944, *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

46 Ibid.

47 From the American Legation in Baghdad to the Department of State, Dec. 8, 1944, *DSDF, 890G.00/12-844, NA*.

<sup>48</sup> From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1944, *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> Planners within the Department of State were also concerned about the existing Kurdish movement in Iraq, which was perceived as fostering instability, fragmentation in the region and antagonism against the Arabs in the same manner as the Zionist aspirations did in Palestine. The Americans concerns over internal instability in Iraq were quite acute, and led to the American reluctance to undertake any bilateral arrangements with Iraq. See Baram, 1978, pp. 176, 181 n. 22.

<sup>51</sup> Al-‘Umari discussed Kurdish nationalism in Iraq in relation to Arab Nationalism, which promoted Arab unity. He stressed that Kurdish nationalism was an obstacle in the way of Arab unity. He also pointed out that Kurdish nationalism experiencing interesting developments in two categories: first, tribal chiefs were using the notion of Kurdish nationalism to enhance their power and prestige at the expense of other groups; secondly, Kurdish intellectuals were concerned over the welfare of the Kurdish people and the idea of establishing an independent Kurdistan. Among these were young intellectuals who were interested in wresting power from tribal chiefs. According to al-‘Umari, the tribal chiefs and the “nationalist-conscious Kurds” were co-operating to rid Iraqi Kurdistan of the central authorities. Memo of conversation between Loy W. Henderson, the American Minister in Baghdad and Arshad al-‘Umari, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aug. 14, 1944, *DSDF, 890G.00/8-1644, NA*.

<sup>52</sup> From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Aug. 1, 1945, *FO 371/45340, Iraq 1945, PRO*.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Aug. 13, 1945, *FO 371/45340, Iraq 1945, PRO*; from the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Aug. 29, 1945, *FO 371/45340, Iraq 1945, PRO*; Memo of conversation between Loy W. Henderson, the American Minister to Baghdad and G. H. Thompson, the British Chargé d’Affaires in Baghdad, Aug. 14, 1944, *DSDF, 890G.00/8-1644, NA*.

<sup>56</sup> The campaign was delayed upon the suggestion from the British military advisers. The operation was launched on September 4, 1945.

<sup>57</sup> From the Department of State to the American Legation in Baghdad, Sep. 7, 1945, *DSDF, 890G.00KURDS/9-745, NA*.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> Memo of conversation between Geoffrey H. Thompson, the British Chargé d’Affaires in Baghdad and Robert G. Memminger, the Second Secretary at the American Legation in Baghdad, Sep. 18, 1945, *DSDF, 890G.00 KURDS/9-1845, NA*.

<sup>60</sup> Memo of conversation between Thompson and Memminger, Sep. 13, 1945, *DSDF, 890G.00 KURDS/9-1345, NA*.

<sup>61</sup> From the Foreign Office to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, March 18, 1947, *FO 371 61678, Iraq 1947, PRO*.

<sup>62</sup> Tafrishian, 1976, p. 87.

<sup>63</sup> Memo of conversation between Thompson and Memminger, Sep. 13, 1945, *DSDF, 890G.00 KURDS/9-1345, NA*.

- 64 Memo of conversation, Sep. 28, 1945, *DSDF, 890G.00 KURDS/9-2845, NA*; Research Department, Foreign Office, "The Kurdish Problem," March 22, 1946, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.
- 65 From the American Legation in Baghdad to the Department of State, Oct. 12, 1945, *DSDF, 890G.00 KURDS/10-1245, NA*.
- 66 *Ibid.*
- 67 Research Department, Foreign Office, "The Kurdish Problem," March 22, 1946, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.
- 68 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Nov. 28, 1945, *FO 371/45346, Iraq 1945, PRO*.
- 69 From the American Legation in Baghdad to the Department of State, March 22, 1945, *DSDF, 890G.00/3-2245, NA*.
- 70 From the American Legation in Baghdad to the Department of State, Oct. 12, 1945, enclosure translation of the "Kurdish Petition." *DSDF, 890G.00 KURDS/10-1245, NA*.
- 71 Memo from the *Rizgārī* party to the UN, Jan. 18, 1946, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*. The Atlantic Charter, like President Wilson's 14 points, had an immediate popular appeal. See Woodward, 1971, p. 203.
- 72 Memo from the *Rizgārī* Party, to the UN, Jan. 18, 1946, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.
- 73 Memo from the *Rizgārī* Party, to the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.
- 74 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, *FO 371/31350, General, 1942, PRO*.
- 75 *Ibid.*
- 76 *Ibid.*
- 77 Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq, Baghdad, July 2, 1944, *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*.
- 78 *Ibid.*
- 79 *Ibid.*
- 80 From the American Legation in Baghdad to the Department of State, March 22, 1945, *DSDF, 890G.00/3-2245, NA*.
- 81 Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq, Baghdad, July 2, 1944, *FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944, PRO*.
- 82 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, May 3, 1945, *FO 371/45346, Iraq 1945, PRO*, emphasis added.
- 83 Memo of conversation between Henderson and Thompson, Aug. 14, 1944, *DSDF, 890G.00/8-1644, NA*.
- 84 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, May 3, 1945, *FO 371/45346, Iraq 1945, PRO*.
- 85 *Ibid.*
- 86 For the text of the Aide Memoire, see *ibid.*
- 87 From the British Embassy in Cairo to the Foreign Office, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.
- 88 *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> From the Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Cairo, *FO 371/45346, Iraq 1945, PRO*.

<sup>90</sup> From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.

<sup>91</sup> From the British Embassy in Cairo to the Foreign Office, Nov. 26, 1945, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.

<sup>92</sup> From British Embassy in Cairo to the Foreign Office, Nov. 26, 1945, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.

## Chapter Seven

### *The Establishment of the People's Republic of Kurdistan 1946*

<sup>1</sup> Entessar, 1992, p. 14.

<sup>2</sup> Iranian scholars have generally used the term “Komaleh,” because the word is pronounced in this way in Persian language (Farsi). In the *Komala's* newspaper *Nishtiman* the abbreviation “J.K.” respectively *Komala-y J.K.* have been used as designation for the *Komala-y Zhānawa-y Kurd*. However the use of *J.K.* or *Komala-y J.K.* is problematic. Furthermore, in most scholarly works the notation *Komala/Komaleh* has been used. We will therefore use the notation *Komala*, precisely as the word is pronounced in Kurdish, as an abbreviation for the *Komala-y Zhānawa-y Kurd*.

<sup>3</sup> Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 25.

<sup>4</sup> Mulla Izzat, 1986, p. 61; Nabaz, 1985, p. 30; Hemn, 1974, p. 20; see also Emin, 1993, p. 57.

<sup>5</sup> It is generally known that Mahabad was an important centre of Kurdish nationalist activities even before the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. See, for example, Entessar, 1992, p. 16. One characteristic of the changing political climate in Iran after the invasion and the dismissal of Reza Shah's régime was the intensification of political activity. During 1943 some 15 political parties appeared on the political horizon of Tehran. Lenczowski, 1949, pp. 185–187, 224; Gasiorowski, 1991, pp. 43–44.

<sup>6</sup> Roosevelt, 1947, p. 250; Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 28; Mulla Izzat, 1986, p. 63.

<sup>7</sup> Mulla Izzat, 1986, p. 66.

<sup>8</sup> *Nishtiman*, July 1943, pp. 1–2.

<sup>9</sup> Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 47.

<sup>10</sup> Arfa, 1966, p. 73. The *Komala* adopted a “peaceful” and “civilised” method in its struggle and dissociated itself from armed struggle. The *Komala* realised that there was a major imbalance in the military power between the Kurds and the central governments in the countries which the Kurds inhabited. *Nishtiman*, July 1943, p. 3.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in Hussami, 1986, pp. 59–60.

<sup>12</sup> An American agricultural adviser to the Iranian government, Albert G. Black, emphasised that the living conditions of the population in Kurdistan constituted the primary factor behind revolt. Blum, 1973, p. 554. For a similar assumption see Mulla Izzat, 1986, pp. 38–39.

<sup>13</sup> Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 27; Mulla Izzat, 1986, p. 64; Hussami, 1986, p. 43.

<sup>14</sup> Arfa, 1966, p. 73.

<sup>15</sup> Dehkordi, 1986, p. 32; Emin, 1993, pp. 72–73. The *Komala* was interested in establishing contacts with the leadership of the Barzan uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan. In a letter sent from the *Komala* to Mulla Mustafa, the leader of the uprising, the *Komala* mainly wished to be informed of the objectives of the Barzan uprising. It was also made evident in the letter that the *Komala* was willing to co-operate with the uprising. For the text of the letter see Emin, 1993, pp. 78–80.

<sup>16</sup> Eagleton, 1963, p. 36; Mulla Izzat, 1986, p. 67.

<sup>17</sup> Roosevelt, 1947, p. 250.

<sup>18</sup> Mulla Izzat, 1986, p. 67. For further details about the representatives, see Eagleton, 1963, p. 36; Dehkordi, 1986, p. 32.

<sup>19</sup> Roosevelt, 1947, p. 250.

<sup>20</sup> Eagleton, 1963, p. 35.

<sup>21</sup> Howell, 1965, p. 362.

<sup>22</sup> Roosevelt, 1947, p. 250; Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 40. There are articles speaking favourably of both the Soviet Union and Great Britain in different issues of *Nishtiman*. However, far more space was devoted to positive depictions of the Soviet Union than of Great Britain. See, for example, *Nishtiman*, November-December 1943 and *Nishtiman*, February-March 1943. As Jamal Nabaz has asserted, this suggests that in order to meet its objectives, *Komala* did not hesitate in approaching different powers espousing differing ideologies. See Nabaz, 1985, p. 38.

<sup>23</sup> The *Tudeh* signifies “masses”. It has been argued that the Soviets cultivated the establishment of the *Tudeh* Party 1941. See, for example, Hess, 1974, p. 119; Kirk, 1952, pp. 466–473; Lenczowski, 1949, pp. 193–215. Yet although the *Tudeh* Party was “officially” established in October 1941, Communist activities existed in Iran as far back as the 1920s, and the Persian Communist Party (PCP) was in fact founded in 1920. The PCP had a strong ideological and organisational influence on the formation of the *Tudeh* party. Ghods, 1990, p. 506. One important reason for the establishment of the *Tudeh* Party precisely at that time was, of course, the abdication of Reza Shah. Reza Shah had from 1926 to 1941 suppressed Communists and other political activities and had jailed 53 Communist leaders to sentence in 1937. Upon his abdication, the 53 persons were released and became the vanguard of the formation of the *Tudeh* Party. The establishment of the Party, as is the case for other political parties, was favoured by the power vacuum and the dismantling of central controls which were precipitated by the occupation. Tabari, 1967, pp. 16–17, 42–43 and Lenczowski, 1949, p. 223.

<sup>24</sup> From Tehran to London, July 26, 1945, *FO 371/45450, Persia 1945, PRO*.

<sup>25</sup> Samadi, 1981, pp. 16–17.

<sup>26</sup> Eagleton, 1963, p. 42; Fawcett, 1988, p. 192; Howell, 1965, p. 360.

<sup>27</sup> Douglas, 1952, p. 58.

<sup>28</sup> Samadi, 1981, pp. 16–17.

<sup>29</sup> Howell, 1965, p. 361. Qazi Muhammed belonged to the well-known Qazi family which enjoyed cultural, religious, political and social influence in the city of Mahabad. Qazi Muhammed himself was respected not only in Mahabad, but also generally in Kurdistan.

<sup>30</sup> See Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 28.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*; Mulla Qadir Mudarrisi, one of the founders of the *Komala*, stresses that Kurdish traditional leaders were not allowed to rise to the position of chairman of the organisation, although they could become members of it. See Mudarrisi’s statements in, Samadi, 1981, p. 10

<sup>33</sup> For a further discussion on the term symbiosis as a synthetic constituency of Kurdish nationalist élite or nationalist movement, see Yassin, 1992A, pp. 128, 154–155. William Eagleton argues that the followers of certain tribal chiefs joined the *Komala* since their chiefs had joined the organisation in 1944. See Eagleton, 1963, p. 35.

<sup>34</sup> Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” March 22, 1946, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.

<sup>35</sup> Dehkordi, 1986, p. 50; Ramazani, 1975, p. 113.

<sup>36</sup> Dehkordi, 1986, p. 50.

<sup>37</sup> For comparison of the principles of the two organisations see pp. 15, 15f.

<sup>38</sup> Talabani, 1970, p. 72.

<sup>39</sup> There is disagreement among scholars regarding the date on which the KDP was founded. Eagleton, Roosevelt and others claim that the KDP was erected in September 1945 after Kurdish leaders returned from their trip to Baku in Soviet Azerbaijan. Others assert that the party was established on August 16, 1945. see Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 33; Mulla Izzat, 1986, p. 74. It is interesting to note that the writers who argue that the KDP was founded in September 1945 are inclined to assume that the party was established as “an implement of Soviet suggestion for the creation of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan.” Howell, 1965, p. 366. Evidence indicating that the party was created in August 1945 is the fact that the first manifesto of the party was delivered on August 16 1945. For the text of the manifesto see Mulla Izzat, 1992, pp. 17–19; see also *Kurdistan*, No. 1, December 6, 1945.

<sup>40</sup> Ghassemlou, 1965, p. 76. One could scarcely apply the term “patriotic tribe,” as Ghassemlou has done, in discussing the attitude of tribes as pro or anti-Kurdish nationalist movement. The tribes have traditionally acted according to the interests of the tribal chiefs in obtaining concessions from one side or the other. For a discussion regarding this theme, see Yassin, 1992B, pp. 46–48.

<sup>41</sup> Talabani, 1970, p. 75.

<sup>42</sup> Eagleton, 1963, p. 56; Roosevelt, 1947, p. 252; Arfa, 1966, p. 79. Howell agrees with Eagleton in arguing for a clear influence of the Soviet authorities on the establishment of the KDP and on the politics of the party. See Howell, 1965, p. 366. Nariman Yalda, an Iranian scholar claims that the establishment of the KDP was proclaimed in November, 1945 after advice from the Soviets. See Yalda, 1980, p. 155.

<sup>43</sup> Roosevelt, 1947, 255; Howell, 1965, p. 366.

<sup>44</sup> Kuniholm, 1980, p. 275.

<sup>45</sup> Mulla Izzat, 1986, p. 75.

<sup>46</sup> Roosevelt, 1947, 255. Concerning the eight-point declaration of the KDP at its founding meeting, see also Arfa, 1966, pp. 79–80; Ghassemlou, 1988, pp. 35–38; Mulla Izzat, 1986, pp. 75–78; Hussami, 1986, pp. 58–59; Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” March 22, 1946, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.

<sup>47</sup> Entessar, 1992, p. 20.

- <sup>48</sup> Arfa, 1966, p. 80. Entessar also argues that the fear of the central government was justified, because the KDP did establish a republic in Mahabad. see Entessar, 1992, p. 20.
- <sup>49</sup> Mulla Izzat, 1986, pp. 75–76; Ghassemlou, 1988, pp. 35–39. For the original text of the manifesto see Mulla Izzat, 1992, pp. 17–19.
- <sup>50</sup> For the text of the party programme of the KDP issued in December 1945, see Mulla Izzat, 1986, pp. 78–81.
- <sup>51</sup> Howell, 1965, p. 363. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union towards Iran after the 1917 revolution was largely conditioned by the same geopolitical factors as during the time of the Tzars. Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf and land transportation would permit the Soviet Union “all-weather” access to international trade routes. See, for example, Vahdat, 1958, p. 2; Byrnes, 1947, p. 281; Pfau, 1977, p. 360.
- <sup>52</sup> Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 64.
- <sup>53</sup> For details about the trip to Soviet Azerbaijan, see Eagleton, 1963, pp. 43–46. The names of the delegates can be found in Eagleton, 1963, p. 43; Hussami, 1986, p. 93.
- <sup>54</sup> Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 65. It seems that it was in the interest of the authorities in Soviet Azerbaijan to “neutralise” the visit of the delegation in order to minimise the risk of complications of the trip. It was thus stated that the delegation was invited to Baku to witness “the developments accomplished by the Soviet administration.” From Samuel G. Ebling the American Consul in Tabriz, to the Secretary of State, Jan. 27, 1945, *DSDF, 891.00/1-2745 OS/EG, NA*.
- <sup>55</sup> Howell, 1965, p. 364.
- <sup>56</sup> Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” March 22, 1946, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.
- <sup>57</sup> Eagleton, 1963, p. 44.
- <sup>58</sup> Howell, 1965, p. 365. Some observers have argued that it was the Soviets who created the Republic of Mahabad. See, for example, Taylor, 1984, p. 228. But the above-mentioned negotiations between the Kurdish delegation and Baghirov, among other indications, reveals that the Kurds were able to obtain *some* Soviet support only after difficult dealings with Soviet officials.
- <sup>59</sup> Howell, 1965, p. 364.
- <sup>60</sup> Fatemi, 1980, pp. 77–78; Kimche, 1976, pp. 132–133; Pisyani, 1948, pp. 9, 15.
- <sup>61</sup> Entessar, 1992, p. 16.
- <sup>62</sup> Roosevelt, 1947, p. 260; Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 66.
- <sup>63</sup> Ghassemlou, 1988, p. 66. The rifles were acquired by the Soviets from three sources: firstly, by capture from the disintegrated Iranian army in August 1941. The Persian government then admitted that it had lost about 80,000 rifles, and a considerable portion of these fell into Soviet hands; secondly, purchase of 100,000 with cartridges from the Persian government (with British money in 1941); thirdly, under a contract by which an unwilling Persian government was compelled to make rifles, machine guns and small arms ammunition for the Soviets at prices below cost; about 40,000 rifles were delivered under this contract. *FO 371/52667, Persia 1946, PRO*, March 1946, quoted in Dehkordi, 1986, p. 56.
- <sup>64</sup> From the Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Tehran, Dec. ?, 1945, *FO 371/45440, Persia 1945, PRO*. As will later be discussed in this book, Mulla Mustafa’s name eventually

became connected with the most dramatic events of the last days of the PRK. For other details, see Pisyany, 1949, pp. 24–45.

<sup>65</sup> Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iraq (KDP-I), 1982, p. 1.

<sup>66</sup> *FO 371/45459, Persia 1945, PRO*, Oct. 1945, as quoted in Dehkordi, 1986, p. 57.

<sup>67</sup> *The New York Times*, December 3, 1945.

<sup>68</sup> From Ebling to the Secretary of State, Feb. 9, 1945, *DSDF, 891.00/2-945 OS/EG, NA*; from Ebling to the Secretary of State, Feb. 24, 1945, *DSDF, 891.00/2-2445 OS/EG, NA*.

<sup>69</sup> From Ebling to the Secretary of State, May 4, 1945, *DSDF, 891.00/5-445 OS/D, NA*. It has usually been pointed out that the Soviets prevented Iranian troops from entering the Soviet occupation zone. Concerns were often expressed by the Iranian government in the form of allegations against the Soviets. The Iranian concerns were also generated by Soviet activities in their occupation zone, namely: preventing the Iranian army and gendarmerie from operating in the Soviet Occupation zone; interference in the Iranian administration; and supporting the *Tudeh* party and the Azeri and the Kurdish nationalist movements. See, for example, Hess, 1974, p. 119; Kirk, 1952, pp. 466–473; Lenczowski, 1949, pp. 193–215.

<sup>70</sup> From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, May 5, 1945, *DSDF, 891.00/5-545 OS/D, NA*.

<sup>71</sup> Tafrişian, 1976, p. 73. Abu al-Hassan Tafrişian was one of the Azerbaijan republic's army officers who did not surrender when the Azerbaijan government collapsed. He initially led a small but symbolically significant force and moved towards Mahabad, hoping to assist the PRK. Even after the collapse of the PRK, he and five other Azeri officers followed Iraqi Kurds, the large majority of them being Barzanis, in leaving Iran. However, Tafrişian surrendered to the Iranian authorities within a few months upon assurances of amnesty. See Tafrişian, 1976, pp. 77–79.

<sup>72</sup> See, for example, Abrahamian, 1982, p. 400; Sheehan, 1968, pp. 27–28.

<sup>73</sup> From Ebling to the Secretary of State, Nov. 26, 1945, *DSDF, 891/11-2645, NA*; From Ebling to the Secretary of State, Nov. 27, 1945, *DSDF, 891.00/11-2745, NA*.

<sup>74</sup> Weaver, 1958, p. 65; Menken, 1946, pp. 21–22.

<sup>75</sup> Nollau, & Wiehe, 1963, pp. 31–32. Ja'far Pishevari was Minister of the Interior in 1921 in the short-lived Gailan Republic in northern Iran. After the collapse of the republic, he returned to the Soviet Union. Pishevari, under the pseudonym Sultan-zadeh, served the Comintern in the Middle East during the 1920s. He returned to Iran in 1936 claiming that he was a refugee from the Soviet Union. Pishevari was one of the founders of the *Tudeh* Party. See Thomas, & Frye, 1952, p. 236; Kuniholm, 1980, p. 274.

<sup>76</sup> Robert Rossow, the American Vice Consul in Tabriz, states that the Kurds aided the forces of the ADP, although the local press reported that the Kurds had supported the Iranian Army. From Murray the American Ambassador in Tehran, to the Secretary of State, Jan. 2, 1946, *FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, p. 292*.

<sup>77</sup> Hussami, 1986, p. 51.

<sup>78</sup> Research Department, Foreign Office, "The Kurdish Problem," March 22, 1946, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.

<sup>79</sup> From Murray to the Secretary of State, Dec. 15, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 495*.

<sup>80</sup> From Ebling to the Secretary of State, May 4, 1945, *DSDF, 891.00/5-445 OS/D, NA*.

<sup>81</sup> From Murray the Secretary of State, Nov. 19, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 432, 438*.

<sup>82</sup> Eagleton, 1963, pp. 60-61; Dehkordi, 1986, p. 62. Events in Iranian Kurdistan resounded throughout Kurdistan, and the Iraqi government immediately expressed anxiety over the implications of these developments. *New York Times*, December 19, 1945.

<sup>83</sup> *Kurdistan*, No. 10, February 4, 1946; *Kurdistan*, No. 11, February 6, 1946, and see Eagleton, 1963, p. 257.

<sup>84</sup> *Kurdistan*, No. 13, February 11, 1946.

<sup>85</sup> The rest of the cabinet was as follows: Minister of War and Vice President, Hussein Saifi Qazi; Minister of Education and Special Assistant to the President, Muhammed Manaf Karimi; Minister of the Interior, Muhammed Amin Mo'ini; Minister of Health, Sayyid Muhammed Ayubian; Minister of Roads, Isma'il Agha Ilkhanizadeh; Minister of Communication, Karim Ahmadian; Minister of Labour, Khalil Khosrawi; Minister of Agriculture, Mahmud Walizada; Minister of Justice, Mulla Hussein Majdi; Minister of Commerce, Hajī Mustafa Daudi. There is some disagreement among observers concerning the formation of the first Kurdish cabinet. For the names of the cabinet members, see Eagleton, 1963, p. 768–71; Mulla Izzat, 1986, pp. 102–103; Hussami, 1986, pp. 75–76; from the American Vice Consul in Tabriz, Rossow, to the Secretary of State, Jan. 2, 1946, *DSDF*, 891.00/1-246, NA.

<sup>86</sup> Lenczowski, 1949, p. 291.

<sup>87</sup> Ghods, 1989, p. 163–164; Dehkordi, 1986, p. 64. There is no agreement among observers and scholars whether the members of the cabinet were members of the dissolved *Komala* or not. See, for example, Hussami, 1986, p. 76; Dehkordi, 1986, p. 64.

<sup>88</sup> See generally Mahmud Mulla Izzat, 1992, *The Government of the Kurdistan Republic: Letters and Documents*, 1992. The Iranian army concentrated its forces on the Saqiz front, partly to intercept any advancement of the forces of the PRK in the direction of Sina (Sanandaj) and Kermanshah, and partly to use the Saqiz front as a point of departure for a possible offence against the PRK. See Emin, 1993, p. 171.

<sup>89</sup> *Kurdistan*, No. 14, February 13, 1946.

<sup>90</sup> *Kurdistan*, No. 24, March 13, 1946; *Kurdistan*, No. 11, February 6, 1946.

<sup>91</sup> *Kurdistan*, No. 10, February 4, 1946. It is noteworthy that the Imams would play an important role in imparting the people with a good deal of information while the majority of the people was illiterate, and that the Masjid provided an appropriate meeting-place.

<sup>92</sup> *Kurdistan*, No. 25, March 17, 1946.

<sup>93</sup> Eagleton, 1963, pp. 78–79; Emin, 1993, pp. 171–172.

<sup>94</sup> *Kurdistan*, July 18, 1946, as cited in Emin, 1993, p. 174.

<sup>95</sup> Eagleton, 1963, pp. 91–92.

<sup>96</sup> Rossow, 1956, pp. 18, 21. Observers have also held a misleading perception of the actual status of the two republics, in presenting the republics as “independent”. See, for example, Irani, 1978, p. 22.

<sup>97</sup> From Murray to the Secretary of State, Dec. 6, 1945. *FRUS*, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 480–481.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.* While the Soviets felt that the National Congress was authorised to speak in the name of the population of Azerbaijan, the Americans on the other hand disagreed. From Murray to the Secretary of State, Dec. 6, 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 480. However, the British were examining the possibility of the creation of Provincial Councils as a positive option. Bullard writes that by the creation of Provincial Councils, the Iranian government could probably “give satisfaction in all provinces and at the same time reduce the problem of the

Soviet-occupied part of Western Persia to its proper proportions.” On the other hand, Bullard maintained that advocating such an option was not his “business, except in so far as the prosperity and happiness of Persia were, as they long had been, a British interest.” Bullard, 1961, p. 252. Iranian officials believed that the creation of Provincial Councils would “forestall wider demands from such areas as Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.” Bullard, 1961, p. 252.

<sup>99</sup> Vahdat, 1958, p. 79.

<sup>100</sup> From Rossow to the Secretary of State, Dec. 29, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. VIII, p. 520.

<sup>101</sup> From George Kennan, Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow, to the Secretary of State, Jan. 8, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 297–298; from Murray to the Secretary of State, Jan. 14, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 302–303.

<sup>102</sup> From Rossow to the Secretary of State, Feb. 4, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 328–330.

<sup>103</sup> See, for example, from Murray the American Ambassador in Tehran to the Secretary of State. Nov. 25, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. VIII, p. 455.

<sup>104</sup> Sheehan, 1968, p. 28.

<sup>105</sup> From Murray to the Secretary of State, Jan. 21, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 305.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 305–306.

<sup>107</sup> From Rossow to the Secretary of State, Jan. 2, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/1-246, NA*.

<sup>108</sup> From Rossow to the Secretary of State, Jan. 2, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/1-246, NA*.

<sup>109</sup> From Gerald Dooher to the Secretary of State, April 26, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/4-2646, NA*.

<sup>110</sup> From Rossow to the Secretary of State, March 5, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 340.

<sup>111</sup> Rossow, 1956, p. 21.

<sup>112</sup> From Rossow to the Secretary of State, March 5, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 340, 342–43; from Kennan to the Secretary of State, March 15, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 356. However, British reports indicated that the information about the march of Soviet troops was exaggerated. From the Secretary of State to Rossow, March 15, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 359–360; Pahlavi, 1961, p. 116.

<sup>113</sup> Rossow, 1956, p. 21.

<sup>114</sup> Pahlavi, 1961, p. 114.

<sup>115</sup> Rossow, 1956, pp. 22–23.

<sup>116</sup> Emin, 1993, p. 138.

<sup>117</sup> See, for example, *Kurdistan*, No. 50, May 27, 1946; Emin, 1993, pp. 170–171.

<sup>118</sup> Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” March 22, 1946, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.

<sup>119</sup> Dehkordi, 1986, p. 62.

<sup>120</sup> From Dooher to the Secretary of State, April 26, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/4-2646, NA*.

<sup>121</sup> The term “Azerbaijani question” has by observers and diplomats been used as synonym for both the Azerbaijan question *and* the Kurdish question during the period under study.

<sup>122</sup> For the text of the proposals, see, from the American Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of State, April 26, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/4-2646, NA*.

<sup>123</sup> From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of State, April 27, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/4-2746, NA*.

- 124 The delegation arrived in Tehran after General ‘Ali Razmara had established contact with most of the Kurdish chiefs and had succeeded in persuading Qazi Muhammed to come to Tehran for consultations. Razmara understood from his contacts with Mulla Mustafa that an amnesty from Iraq’s authorities could lead to the returning of Mulla Mustafa. From the British Embassy in Tehran to the Foreign Office, July 1, 1946, *FO 371/52702, Persia 1946, PRO*.
- 125 Entessar, 1992, p. 23.
- 126 Research Department, Foreign Office, “The Kurdish Problem,” March 22, 1946, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*. Kurds were represented in the first Congress of the ADP in Tabriz on October 2, 1945.
- 127 From Rossow to the Secretary of State, Jan. 2, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/1-246, NA*.
- 128 From Rossow to the Secretary of State, Jan. 26, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/1-2646, NA*; from Rossow to the Secretary of State, Feb. 11, 1946, *FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, pp. 332–334*.
- 129 From the British Consul in Tabriz to the British Embassy in Tehran, *FO 371/52702, Persia 1946, PRO*.
- 130 From Rossow to the Secretary of State, Feb. 6, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/2-646, NA*.
- 131 From Rossow to the Secretary of State, Feb. 20, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/2-2046, NA*; from the British Consul in Tabriz to the British Embassy in Tehran, *FO 371/52702, Persia 1946, PRO*.
- 132 From Rossow to the Secretary of State, Feb. 28, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/2-2846, NA*.
- 133 From the British Embassy in Teheran to the Foreign Office, 2nd March, 1946, *FO 371/52702, Persia 1946, PRO*.
- 134 From Dooher to the Secretary of State, April 25, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/4-2546, NA*; from Dooher to the Secretary of State, April 26, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/4-2646, NA*; Lenczowski, 1949, p. 291. The agreement has been viewed as a sign of the independent status of the PRK in relation to Azerbaijan. See, Thomas, & Frye, 1952, p. 237.
- 135 From the British Embassy in Tehran to the Foreign Office, *FO 371/52702, Persia 1946, E 4156, PRO*, the text of the treaty was translated by the British Embassy in Tehran. For another version of the treaty, see, from the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, undated (incoming telegram May 8, 1946 Department of State, *DSDF, 891.00/8-746 (RECD), NA*; see also Pisman, 1949, pp. 98–99.
- 136 Douglas, 1952, p. 58. Archie Roosevelt mentions the name of two of those agents, “Abdullahov” and “Hajiov”. Roosevelt, 1947, p. 251.
- 137 Douglas, 1952, p. 58. One example of the Kurdish national propaganda, an opera called *D%§k-§ Nishtiman* (“Mother Native Land”), was presented. In this opera, the heroine was Kurdistan; the villains were Iraq, Iran, and Turkey; the heroes were the Kurds, the sons of the native motherland. See Roosevelt, 1947, p. 252; Douglas, 1952, p. 58. William Eagleton states that when the opera was presented in the Soviet zone of Kurdistan in July 1945, the script had been altered to show that the Soviet Union was aiding the Kurds in their dramatic rescue of the heroine. See Eagleton, 1963, p. 40. The American consul in Tabriz also reported that a pageant was arranged “showing a Kurdish Woman, dressed in black, bound with chains bearing the inscription ‘Iran, Turkey, and Iraq’. At an appropriate moment the chains were removed and replaced with a red banner on which was written ‘Long live Stalin’”. From Ebling to the Secretary of State, May 4, 1945, *DSDF, 891.00/5-445 OS/D, NA*.
- 138 Kimche, 1976, p. 132.

139 Weaver, 1958, p. 44.

140 Chubin, & Zabih, 1974, pp. 37–39; Fawcett, 1988, p. v; Ramazani, 1975, pp. 110–113. However, Ramazani does not neglect the genuine nationalist movements of the Kurds and the Azeris, nor does he discard the dissatisfaction of both groups with the central government. Ramazani, 1975, pp. 110–116.

141 Pahlavi, 1961, p. 114. The claim that the Kurdish nationalist movement was constructed by foreign powers has been typical among people taking a hostile attitude to the Kurds, primarily the ruling élites in countries where the Kurds reside.

142 There is a clear connection between domestic conflicts and intervention, especially from neighbouring states. In general, intervening power and the domestic actors exploit one another. See Ryan, 1988, p. 171. Certain Kurdish leaders realised that they could exploit unique international circumstances, particularly the rivalry between the Great Powers. For instance, Mulla Mustafa asserted that the particular international conditions of the time were the main reason for Soviet support of the Kurds in Iran. He maintained that the Soviets needed the Kurds in the region in order to reach their own goals, and the Kurds could likewise utilise the Soviet presence to their own advantage. Mulla Mustafa argued that the establishment of a united Kurdistan served the interests of the Soviet Union in the region. Tafreshian, 1976, pp. 85, 87.

143 From the American Embassy in London to the Department of State, Nov. 21, 1945, *DSDf*, 891.00/11-2145, *NA*.

144 *Ibid.* Another important point in this context is that of the consequences of the collapse of the two autonomous republics. Jon Kimche has concluded that the collapse of the two republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan together with the fact that the US “stepped in to underwrite Turkey and Greece and help Persia... [was] catastrophically” discouraging to Soviet prestige in the Middle East. With the disappearance of the two republics, the Soviet Union had “played almost all its cards” in their struggle for the Middle East. This was, as Kimche has put it, the main factor which led the Soviets to support the Jewish state. The Soviet therewith wanted to create a state in the Middle East which would be friendly to them. Kimche, 1976, pp. 85–86.

145 From Winant, the American Ambassador in the United Kingdom, to the Secretary of State, Nov. 21, 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 440.

146 Ramazani, 1971, pp. 408–409.

147 Deputy Assistant Political Adviser, Arbil, “Tour Notes Rawanduz-Rayah, 6–9 January, 1946,” *FO 371/52369*, *Iraq 1946*, *PRO*.

148 Nabaz, 1985, pp. 19–20.

149 Deputy Assistant Political Adviser, Arbil, “Tour Notes Rawanduz-Rayah, 6–9 January, 1946,” *FO 371/52369*. *Iraq 1946*, *PRO*.

150 Dehkordi, 1986, pp. 62–63.

151 Eagleton, 1963, p. 61.

152 Irani, 1978, p. 22.

153 Roosevelt, 1947, p. 256.

154 Fatemi, 1954, p. 274.

155 Howell, 1965, p. 368.

156 *Ibid.* For details on Soviet activities in Kurdish areas, see Eagleton, 1963, pp. 64–67.

- 157 From the British Embassy in Moscow to the Foreign Office, March 2, 1946, *FO 371/52702, Persia 1946, PRO*.
- 158 Research Department, Foreign Office, "The Kurdish Problem," March 22, 1946, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.
- 159 See Lawson, 1989, p. 321.
- 160 Scholars have also used the misleading denomination "Communist republic" to the Kurdish republic. See, for example, Fuller, Graham *The 'Center of Universe': The Geopolitics of Iran*, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press), 1991, p. 211.
- 161 See, for example, Rossow, 1956, p. 17; Fawcett, 1988, p. 278; Irani, 1978, p. 17; Pahlavi, 1961, pp. 114–115.
- 162 Lenczowski, 1971, p. 26. See also Ghods, 1989, p. 143.
- 163 Eagleton, 1988, p. 17.
- 164 For the texts of the objectives of the *Komala* and the KDP see p. 15, 15f.
- 165 From the Department of State to certain American Missions, Dec. 12, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/12-1246, NA*.
- 166 *Ibid.*
- 167 From Rossow to the Secretary of State, Feb. 20, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/2-2046, NA*.
- 168 From Doohar to the Secretary of State, April 26, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/4-2646, NA*.
- 169 From the British Embassy in Tehran to the Foreign Office, April 28, 1946, *FO 371/52702, Persia 1946, PRO*.
- 170 From Doohar to the Secretary of State, April 26, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/4-2646, NA*.
- 171 From Kennan to the Secretary of State, March 17, 1946, *FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, p. 363*.
- 172 *Ibid.*, pp. 363–364.
- 173 *Ibid.*
- 174 Policy and information statement on Iran prepared by the Department of State, July 15, 1946, *FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, p. 507*.
- 175 Memo by Major General John H. Hilldring, the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, to A. D. Reid, of the Secretary of State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Sep. 26, 1946, *FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, p. 515*.
- 176 Memo by A. D. Reid to John H. Hilldring, Oct. 12, 1946, *FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, pp. 529–532*.
- 177 *Ibid.*
- 178 Regarding the course which had been agreed upon, see chapter four.
- 179 From the British Embassy in Tehran to the Foreign Office, May 17, 1945, *FO 371/45448, Persia 1945, PRO*.
- 180 Eagleton, 1963, p. 61.
- 181 From the American Embassy in London to the Department of State, May 14, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/5-1446, NA*.
- 182 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Jan. 18, 1946, *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.

183 Deputy Assistant Political Adviser, Arbil, "Tour Notes Rawanduz-Rayah, 6–9 January, 1946," *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*.

184 *Ibid.*

185 Tabari, 1967, p. 6.

186 Lenczowski, 1949, p. 304.

187 *Ibid.*

188 Bullard, 1951, p. 143.

## *Chapter Eight*

### *The Demise of the Republic*

<sup>1</sup> Eagleton, 1963, pp. 108–109.

<sup>2</sup> Pahlavi, 1961, p. 117. When the Soviet troops were to be withdrawn from northern Iran, the Soviets were not relinquishing their goal of influence in the Middle East, but would simply assume a different course. The Soviets were, as Jon Kimche puts it, aiming directly at the heart of the issue, that is the increase of the role of *Tudeh* in both the *Majlis* and the government, as three *Tudeh* prominent members were appointed on August 2, 1946 as ministers in Qavam's cabinet, and by getting rid of elements friendly to the British. The Soviet endeavours aimed at the creation of a government in Tehran which would be friendly to the Soviets. However, the British were successful in instigating tribal revolt among the Qashqai and the Bakhtiari tribes against the mentioned appointments. The revolt gained the support of Mullas and led to the exclusion of the *Tudeh* members from the cabinet on October 17, 1944. Kimche, 1976, pp. 134–135.

<sup>3</sup> Ghods, 1989, pp. 154–155; Ramazani, 1975, 150.

<sup>4</sup> From Allen, the American Ambassador in Tehran, to the Secretary of State, Nov. 8, 1946, *FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII*, p. 545; Pahlavi, 1961, p. 117. George V. Allen was appointed Ambassador to Iran in May 1946 and assumed charge of the Embassy in June 1946.

<sup>5</sup> Eagleton, 1963, pp. 107–112

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112.

<sup>7</sup> The Iranian government had promised Qazi Muhammed's brother Sadri Qazi that if the former submitted to the Iranian authorities, he would not be subjected to any harm. See KDP-I, 1982, p. 9.

<sup>8</sup> From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, enclosure: Report, by Colonel G. D. Pybus, the Military Attaché of the British Embassy in Tehran on trip through Azerbaijan, Jan. 15, 1947, *DSDF, 891.00/1-1547, NA*. General Homyuni claimed that the Qazis (Qazi Muhammed, Saifi Qazi and Sadri Qazi) had been forceably arrested. From F. Laster Sutton the American Consul in Tabriz to the Department of State, April 19, 1947, enclosure No. 2, letter by General Homyuni, *DSDF, 891.00/4-1947, NA*. On the other hand, almost all sources assert that the Qazis submitted to the Iranian army: they hoped that negotiations would be arranged between them and the central government in Tehran, and particularly wished to avoid civilian bloodshed in the city of Mahabad. See, for example, Pisyani, 1949, p. 8.

<sup>9</sup> Tafrihi, 1976, pp. 96–97; KDP-I, 1982, p. 9.

- <sup>10</sup> KDP-I, 1982, p. 9.
- <sup>11</sup> From Allen to the Secretary of State, Nov. 8, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 545.
- <sup>12</sup> Koohi-Kamali, 1992, p. 178.
- <sup>13</sup> Roosevelt, 1947, pp. 264–266.
- <sup>14</sup> The most influential tribal chiefs in Iranian Kurdistan at the time, ‘Amer Khan, Zero Beg and Rashid Beg, were Central Committee members of the KDP. See, for example, Pisyani, 1949, p. 158.
- <sup>15</sup> Koohi-Kamali, 1992, pp. 177–178. For further discussion see Dehkordi, 1986, p. 109–111.
- <sup>16</sup> Bozarlsan, 1992, p. 96.
- <sup>17</sup> Eagleton, 1963, pp. 108–109.
- <sup>18</sup> See, for example, Ghassemlou, 1988, pp. 135–137; Talabani, 1970, p. 76; Koohi-Kamali, 1992, p. 178; Dehkordi, 1986, p. 108.
- <sup>19</sup> From Rossow to the Secretary of State, Feb. 11, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/2-1146, NA*. However, in describing the interrelation between Soviet intentions and their support to the nationalist movements of the Kurds and the Azeris, Rossow had in an earlier report concluded that these movements would probably collapse without Soviet protection. But he also asserted that these movements enjoyed substantial popular support and were seen as expressions of genuine grievances against the central government. From Rossow to the Secretary of State, Nov. 28, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. VIII, p. 456. Tafrişian emphasises that the Azerbaijan government could not gain the sympathy of the majority of the population in the province. If the Azerbaijan government had been able to mobilise the masses, the fall of Azerbaijan republic might not have occurred so easily. See Tafrişian, 1976, pp. 73–74, 83.
- <sup>20</sup> On the other hand, Rossow emphasises another feature of the Azerbaijan government, namely that of terrorism which involved assassinations, imprisonment, etc. See Rossow, 1956, p. 19. See also Avery, 1965, p. 399.
- <sup>21</sup> Cottam, 1988, pp. 66–67
- <sup>22</sup> For details see Pisyani, 1949, pp. 18, 152–153.
- <sup>23</sup> Acheson, 1969, p. 197.
- <sup>24</sup> Memo by John D. Jernegan of the NE, Jan. 23, 1943, *FRUS, 1943*, Vol. IV, p. 334.
- <sup>25</sup> The Conference was held in Tehran at the highest level by the Big Three, Great Britain, Soviet Union and the US. The conference should not, however, be viewed as an Allied expression of particular respect for Iran or its causes. The Allies selected Iran as the location for the conference without previously informing the Iranian government. Lenczowski, 1949, p. 176.
- <sup>26</sup> US Department of State, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents, 1941–1949*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 24; the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 11, 1943, Vol. IX, No. 233, pp. 209–210; the complete text of the declaration is published in e.g., *Soviet War News: Published by the Press Department of the Soviet Embassy in London*, No. 732, December 7, 1943, and in Grenville, 1974, p. 210. At the Tehran Conference there were, however, discussions between Stalin and Roosevelt about possible Soviet access to an open port, i.e. the Persian Gulf as it was suggested by Stalin. Blum, 1973, p. 280; MacFarland, 1980, p. 337.
- <sup>27</sup> Lenczowski, 1949, p. 280.
- <sup>28</sup> Thomas, & Frye, 1952, p. 231.

<sup>29</sup> Fawcett, 1990, p. 190.

<sup>30</sup> From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, Dec. 29, 1943, *DSDF, 891.00/2095, NA*. In Article V of the Tri-Partite Treaty, it was made clear that “the forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier.” From the Secretary of State to Kennan, March 5, 1946, *FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, p. 341*

<sup>31</sup> From the American Legation in Tehran to the Department of State, Dec. 29, 1943, *DSDF, 891.00/2095, NA*.

<sup>32</sup> Memo of conversation by Stettinius, Jan. 18, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 360*; Memo of conversation by Murray, Jan. 18, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 361*. Cordell Hull resigned as Secretary of State on November 27, 1944 and Edward R. Stettinius was appointed as his successor.

<sup>33</sup> From Anthony Eden to W. Churchill, Jan. 1, 1945, *FO 371/45462, Persia 1945, PRO*.

<sup>34</sup> Memo by Loy Henderson to the Secretary of State, Dec. 11, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 489–490*. Although British policy favoured the withdrawal of all Allied forces from Iran, a compromise with the Soviets was not impossible. Bevin argued at the Moscow Conference that if the Soviets refused to retire from Iran, they would not be permitted to extend their influence beyond the northern zone. Lenczowski, 1949, p. 304.

<sup>35</sup> See, for example, Memo by Minor, Acting Chief of the Division of the Middle Eastern and Indian Affairs (MEI) to Acting Secretary of State, June 2, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 375–378*.

<sup>36</sup> Kuniholm, 1980, pp. 275–276.

<sup>37</sup> Pfau, 1975, p. 231.

<sup>38</sup> The Iranian Ambassador in Washington, Hussein ‘Ala’s remarks to President Truman, Nov. 29, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 461*. Diplomatic sources in Moscow said that at the turn of November the Soviet Union had rejected a proposal from the US suggesting that the Allied troops be withdrawn from Iran by January 1, 1946. See *The New York Times*, December 3, 1945.

<sup>39</sup> The term Tri-Partite Commission has also been used. See, for example, Fawcett, 1990, pp. 193–194.

<sup>40</sup> Bullard, 1961, p. 267; Fawcett, 1990, pp. 193–94. The British were especially interested in finding a solution to the Kurdish and Azerbaijan questions within the framework of the Iranian constitution, that is the creation of Provincial Councils. See Bullard, 1961, pp. 252, 266–267.

<sup>41</sup> From Harriman, the American Ambassador in Moscow to the Secretary of State, Dec. 28, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 518–519*. And see James Byrnes’ Report on the Moscow Meeting, Dec. 30, 1945, in *A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents, 1941–1949, p. 72*. For further discussions about the proposed Commission see Tabari, 1967, pp. 226–235.

<sup>42</sup> From Harriman to the Secretary of State, Dec. 28, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, pp. 518–519*; Bullard, 1961, p. 267.

<sup>43</sup> From Acting Secretary of State to the American Ambassador in Tehran, Dec. 29, 1945, *FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, PP. 521–522*.

- <sup>44</sup> From Murray the American Ambassador in Tehran to the Secretary of State, Jan. 1, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 291.
- <sup>45</sup> Mossadeq, *Parliamentary Proceedings*, 14th Majlis, January 9, 1946, as cited in Abrahamian, 1982, p. 222; from Murray to the Secretary of State, Jan. 10, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 214.
- <sup>46</sup> See Fatemi, 1980, p. 95.
- <sup>47</sup> From Murray to the Secretary of State, Jan. 10, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 299–300.
- <sup>48</sup> Memo of conversation by Acheson, the Under Secretary of State, Jan. 3, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 294.
- <sup>49</sup> From Murray to the Secretary of State, Jan. 10, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 301.
- <sup>50</sup> Fawcett, 1988, p. 230. While Stalin was “non-committal” concerning the creation of a commission, Molotov had privately told the Secretary of State, James Byrnes, that the British proposals were “generally acceptable”. However, later at the conference, Molotov said that the Iranian question could not be considered. A reason for this change of the Soviet position, as Bullard writes, was that the materialisation of the proposals would lead to the weakening of the position of the Soviet Union in relation to the Iranians. Bullard, 1961, p. 267.
- <sup>51</sup> Memo of conversation by Loy Henderson, Jan. 4, 1945, *DSDF, 891.00/1-446, NA*.
- <sup>52</sup> Memo of conversation by Acheson, Jan. 3, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 293.
- <sup>53</sup> From Murray to the Secretary of State, Jan. 4, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/1-446, NA*; memo by Loy Henderson, Jan. 3, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/1-246 OS/H, NA*; memo of conversation by Loy Henderson, Jan. 4, 1945, *DSDF, 891.00/1-446, NA*; memo of conversation by Acheson, Jan. 3, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/1-346 OS/VJ, NA*.
- <sup>54</sup> From Murray to the Secretary of State, Jan. 10, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 299–300.
- <sup>55</sup> For the text of the letter, dated Jan. 24, 1946, see UN, *OR*, First Year: First Series, *Supplement* No. 1, (henceforth UN, *OR*), pp. 16–19, and see pp. 25–73. For further discussions see Tabari, 1967, pp. 235–238; Thomas, & Frye, 1952, p. 237. The Iranian notification was made in accordance with the Article 35 paragraph 1 of the UN Charter.
- <sup>56</sup> UN, *OR*, *Supplement* No. 1. pp. 25, 40.
- <sup>57</sup> Nollau, & Wiehe, 1963, pp. 32–33.
- <sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- <sup>59</sup> From Rossow to the Secretary of State, Feb. 11, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 333.
- <sup>60</sup> From Ebling to the Secretary of State, Feb. 9, 1945, *DSDF, 891.00/2-945 OS/EG, NA*; from Ebling to the Secretary of State, Feb. 24, 1945, *DSDF, 891.00/2-2445 OS/EG, NA*.
- <sup>61</sup> From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Secretary of State, April 27, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/4-2746, NA*.
- <sup>62</sup> See Cottam, 1988, p. 77. Certain scholars have made the same assumption, claiming that the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Iran as a result of American firmness. See, for example, Kuniholm, Bruce “Retrospect and Prospect: Forty Years of US Middle East Policy,” in *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 41, No. 1, (Winter 1987), p. 11.
- <sup>63</sup> Rystad, 1982, p. 64.
- <sup>64</sup> Acheson, 1969, p. 198. At a news conference on April 24, 1952, Truman emphasised the significance of the firmness of the US administration to the Soviet withdrawal from Iran. See Sheehan, 1968, p. 33. Scholars argue that the firm stand of the Americans on Iran led to the

Soviet withdrawal from Iran, which, among other things, resulted in the collapse of the republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. See, for example, Campbell, 1958, p. 33; Vahdat, 1958, p. 145.

<sup>65</sup> Rossow, 1956, pp. 17–32. The American inflexibility vis-à-vis the Soviets indicated a reorientation that entailed getting tough with the Soviet Union. For details see Messer, 1977, pp. 297–319. The American position regarding Iran was nothing but a move in a series of several critical decisions in 1946 to prevent Soviet progression into the Middle East. The Americans sent the battleship “Missouri” to Istanbul, rejected Soviet demands in Greece and also rejected Soviet demands for a new régime for the Turkish straits. Campbell concludes, “the policy of firmness took shape during 1946 as a series of reactions to specific Soviet demands and threats in the Middle East.” See Campbell, 1958, pp. 33–34. The British representative at the UN told the Soviet representative that “he would not allow the Iranian situation to be dropped by the Security Council, leaving Great Britain to stand alone in the dock on the Greek and Indonesian Matters.” From Stettinius, the US representative in the UN to the Secretary of State, Jan. 29, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 320.

<sup>66</sup> From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, Dec. 17, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/12-1746, NA*.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Kuniholm, 1980, p. 186.

<sup>69</sup> From Allen to the Secretary of State, Dec. 23, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, vol. VII, p. 565.

<sup>70</sup> Pahlavi, 1961, p. 117.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 117–118.

<sup>72</sup> Pfau, 1977, p. 371

<sup>73</sup> From Allen to the Secretary of State, Dec. 23, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 565.

<sup>74</sup> From Allen to the Secretary of State, Dec. 17, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 563.

<sup>75</sup> From Allen to the Secretary of State, Dec. 23, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 565.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>77</sup> Koohi-Kamali, 1992, pp. 177–179.

<sup>78</sup> Tafrihian, 1976, p. 77.

<sup>79</sup> Roosevelt, 1947, pp. 264–66.

<sup>80</sup> See, for example, Koohi-Kamali, 1992, pp. 177–179; Jwaideh, 1960, p. 851.

<sup>81</sup> Memo of conversation by Allen, enclosure to Dispatch No. 312, Feb. 27, 1947, *DSDF, 891.00/2-2547, NA*.

<sup>82</sup> Motter, 1952, p. 473.

<sup>83</sup> See Fawcett, 1988, p. 296. It was evident that American self-interests were the decisive factor behind US support of a strong Iran. In a memorandum by Byrnes, the Secretary of State stated that “by increasing the ability of the Iranian Government to maintain order and security, it is hoped to remove any pretext for British or Soviet intervention in Iran’s internal affairs and, accordingly, to remove such future threat to Allied solidarity and international security. The stabilisation of Iran, moreover, will serve to lay a sound foundation for the development of American commercial, petroleum, and aviation interests in the Middle East.” Memo by Byrnes, the Secretary of State, to Patterson the Secretary of War, Washington, Oct. 17, 1945, in Alexander, & Nanes, (eds.) 1980, p. 153. Within Iran’s political élite, the Shah

deliberately sought to create the impression that a strong Iran would serve US interests. The Shah effectively played the card of the *Communist threat*. See Fawcett, 1988, pp. 301–302.

<sup>84</sup> Lawson, 1989, p. 315.

<sup>85</sup> Memo by Loy Henderson to the Secretary of State, Dec. 11, 1945, *FRUS, 1945*, Vol. VIII, p. 489.

<sup>86</sup> Acheson, 1969, p. 197.

<sup>87</sup> Both Qavam and Hakimi had the same basic attitude towards the Azeri and the Kurdish movements, as the movements were by the both men considered as treacherous plans and aggressions against the Iranian government. However, the two had considerably different approaches/tactics in dealing with the movements. Ramazani, 1975, p. 116.

<sup>88</sup> *The New York Times*, December 2, 1945.

<sup>89</sup> After his resignation in February 1943, Qavam had not given up attempts to return to power.

<sup>90</sup> Azimi, 1989, pp. 147–148.

<sup>91</sup> The role of Qavam in contributing to the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the collapse of the Azerbaijan and Kurdish republics must be noted in this context.

<sup>92</sup> From Murray to the Secretary of State, Jan. 28, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, VOL. VII, pp. 315–316; Nollau, & Wiehe, 1963, p. 33.

<sup>93</sup> See , for example, Lenczowski, 1949, pp. 295–296; Azimi, 1989, p. 148; *New York Times*, February 9, 12, and 18, 1946.

<sup>94</sup> From Allen to the Secretary of State, Sep. 6, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 514.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup> Hess, 1974. p. 133.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>98</sup> From Murray to the Secretary of State, March 10, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 346. Iran confronted another problem during these difficult times: the Fourteenth *Majlis* would come to an end on March 11, 1946. Before this date, however, the *Majlis* passed a bill which: 1) prevented any Iranian high official from conducting negotiations with a foreign company or government on oil concessions; 2) provided that there could be no new elections to the *Majlis* until the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran was complete. Vahdat, 1958, p. 114.

<sup>99</sup> Qavam's attitude was ambiguous in dealing with the Soviets, since he occasionally seemed to firmly oppose the Soviet Union, and at times appeared to act on behalf of the Soviets. See Thomas & Frye, 1952, p. 238. Among the Americans, there were initially fears that Qavam would serve the Soviet cause. Later, the Americans appeared convinced that Qavam was the best person to fill the prime ministerial post during this critical time of the history of Iran. Allen maintains that Qavam had many characteristics which were well-adapted for the position he held at the time. From Allen to the Secretary of State, Nov. 2, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 542.

<sup>100</sup> From Kennan to the Secretary of State, March 15, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 357.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*

- 103 Memo of conversation by Charles Bohlen (Counsellor of the US delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers), political adviser to the delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers, April 28, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 441–443.
- 104 From Kennan to the Secretary of State, March 15, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 357.
- 105 UN, *OR, Supplement* No. 2, p. 43.
- 106 Lie, 1954, pp. 74–75
- 107 UN, *OR, Supplement* No. 2, p. 44. See also Hess, 1974, pp. 137–138.
- 108 UN, *OR, Supplement* No. 2, pp. 44–45.
- 109 “1. Since Iran proposed to furnish no capital other than value of land, USSR could not accept equal participation of two countries and must insist on 51 per cent Russian holdings. 2. Western Azerbaijan [northern Kurdistan] must not be excluded. 3. Instead of requiring Majlis approval within 3 months of its reassembly, agreement must call for Majlis approval within 6 months after March 24 (date of commencement of Red army evacuation of Iran).” From Murray to the Secretary of State, March 30, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 400.
- 110 Mark, 1975, pp. 61–62.
- 111 In almost all references, the arrangement between the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran and Iranian Prime Minister has been labelled as a “treaty” between the two parts. The Soviets were pleased with Qavam more than with his predecessors. From Angus Ward the Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran, to the Secretary of State, April 25, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 437–440. This might have been an important factor that paved the way for and helped Qavam to be on good terms with the Soviets and therewith became able to bring about an understanding with the Soviet Union.
- 112 For details see, from Murray to the Secretary of State, April 4, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 405–406; Bullard, 1951, p. 142. The agreement “was generally welcomed by the left,” at the same time it was viewed “by pro-Western politicians to be too high a price to pay.” The agreement paved the way to further closeness between Qavam and the *Tudeh*, an act that provoked the British. Azimi, 1989, p. 148.
- 113 UN, *OR, Supplement* No. 2, pp. 50–51.
- 114 Memo by Loy Henderson to Acheson, Oct. 8, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 524.
- 115 From Acting Secretary of State to Allen, June 20, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 502.
- 116 From Allen to the Secretary of State, Feb. 8, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 331–332.
- 117 Azimi, 1989, p. 149; Cottam, 1988, p. 74; Nollau, & Wiehe, 1963, p. 34.
- 118 For the provisions of the proposals of the central government on the resolution of the Azerbaijan question, see from Ward, the Chargé d’Affaires in Tehran to the Secretary of State, April 23, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 434–435.
- 119 From Allen to the Secretary of State, June 10, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, pp. 497–498; Mahdawi, 1990, pp. 430–431.
- 120 From Allen to the Secretary of State, June 17, 1946, *FRUS, 1946*, Vol. VII, p. 500.
- 121 *Ibid.*
- 122 Cottam, 1988, p. 74
- 123 Pisyany, 1948, p. 174.

124 From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, enclosure: Report, by Colonel G. D. Pybus, the Military Attaché of the British Embassy in Tehran on trip through Azerbaijan, Jan. 15, 1947, *DSDF, 891.00/1-1547, NA*.

125 Eagleton, 1963, pp. 116.

126 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, March 31, 1947, *FO 371/61986, Persia 1947, PRO*; Tafrihian, 1976, pp. 89–91. For details see Eagleton, 1963, p.117; see also Pisyanyan, 1949, pp. 45–46.

127 Tafrihian, 1976, p. 89.

128 From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, Jan. 28, 1947, *DSDF, 891.00/1-2847, NA*; from Baghdad to Washington, Feb. 21, 1947, *DSDF, 891.00/2-2047, NA*; from the British Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office, Feb. 8, 1947, *FO 371/61986, Persia 1947, PRO*; from the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, enclosure: Report, by Colonel G. D. Pybus, Jan. 15, 1947, *DSDF, 891.00/1-1547, NA*; from the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, Jan. 28, 1947, *DSDF, 891.00/1-2847, NA*. According to the Iraqi authorities these individuals in their absence had been condemned to death, the majority of whom were deserters from the Iraqi army who took arms against their own king. From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, March 31, 1947, *FO 371/61986, Persia 1947, PRO*.

129 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the British Embassy in Tehran, Dec. 13, 1946, *FO 371/61986, Persia, PRO*.

130 From the Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington, Feb. 17, 1947, *FO 371/61986, Persia 1947, PRO*.

131 *Ibid.* Following the same line, the Military Attaché at the British Embassy in Tehran also refused to see Mulla Mustafa, who had sought British support to guarantee him and his followers amnesty from the Iraqi government. From the British Embassy in Tehran to Eastern Department, Foreign Office, Jan. 24, 1947, *FO 371/61986, Persia 1947, PRO*.

132 From the Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington, Feb. 17, 1947, *FO 371/61986, Persia 1947, PRO*.

133 From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office, March 31, 1947, *FO 371/61986, Persia 1947, PRO*.

134 From the Foreign Office to the British Embassy in Washington, Feb. 17, 1947, *FO 371/61986, Persia 1947, PRO*.

135 *Ibid.*

136 From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, Jan. 28, 1947, *DSDF, 891.00/1-2847, NA*. Barzani was considered by the Americans to be no more than a tribal chieftain. From Tehran to Washington, Jan. 28, 1947, *DSDF, 891.00/1-2847, NA*.

137 From the British Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Office, Feb. 8, 1947, *FO 371/61986, Persia 1947, PRO*.

138 From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, Jan. 28, 1947, *DSDF, 891.00/1-2847, NA*.

139 Memo of conversation, from Washington to Tehran and Baghdad, Feb. 8, 1947, *DSDF, 891.00/1-2847, NA*.

140 *Ibid.*

- 141 From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, Feb. 25, 1947, "Policy of the northern Kurds towards the Iranian government," by Dooher, *DSDF*, 891.00/2-2547, *NA*.
- 142 From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department State, Feb. 25, 1947, "Policy of the northern Kurds towards the Iranian government," by Dooher, *DSDF*, 891.00/2-2547, *NA*.
- 143 Memo of conversation by Allen, enclosure to Dispatch No. 312, Feb. 27, 1947, *DSDF*, 891.00/2-2547, *NA*.
- 144 "Recent development in Iranian tribal politics," by Dooher, March 26, 1946, *DSDF*, 891.00/3-2647, *NA*.
- 145 "Policy of the northern Kurds towards the Iranian government," by Dooher, from Tehran to Washington, Feb. 25, 1947, *DSDF*, 891.00/2-2547, *NA*; Pisyan, 1949, p. 166.
- 146 "Policy of the northern Kurds towards the Iranian government," by Dooher, from Tehran to Washington, Feb. 25, 1947, *DSDF*, 891.00/2-2547, *NA*.
- 147 *Ibid*.
- 148 From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, April, 1947, *DSDF*, 891.00/4-147, *NA*. At the court, the Qazis were forced to choose a lawyer among the officers who were present in Mahabad at the time. However, Qazi Muhammed pointed out that the court was unlawful because he was a civilian and that he should be judged by a civil court. He also complained that the court had forced the Qazis to choose an officer as a lawyer, yet the Qazis were not given enough time to do so. For details see Pisyan, 1949, pp. 167–168 and Eagleton, 1963, pp. 121–129.
- 149 From Sutton to the Department of State, April 19, 1947, *DSDF*, 891.00/4-1947, *NA*.
- 150 From the American Embassy in Tehran to the Department of State, June 7, 1947, *DSDF*, 891.00/6-747, *NA*.
- 151 From Sutton to the Department of State, April 19, 1947, enclosure No. 2, letter by General Homayuni, *DSDF*, 891.00/4-1947, *NA*.
- 152 *Ibid*.
- 153 From the Department of State to the American Embassy in Tehran, Oct. 2, 1947, *DSDF*, 891.00/10-247, *NA*.
- 154 From Allen to the Secretary of State, Nov. 22, 1947, *DSDF*, 891.00/1-2247, *NA*.
- 155 *Ibid*.; from Allen to the Secretary of State, Sep. 30, 1947, *DSDF*, 891.00/9-3047, *NA*.
- 156 From the Foreign Office to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, March 18, 1947, *FO 371 61678, Iraq, 1947, PRO*.
- 157 *Ibid*.
- 158 For details see Pisyan, 1949, pp. 48–149.
- 159 *Ibid*., pp. 98–99.
- 160 For further details see KDP-I, 1982, pp. 9–21.
- 161 From the British Embassy in Tehran to the British Embassy in Baghdad, June 3, 1947, *FO/371 61986, Persia 1947, PRO*.
- 162 From the British Embassy in Tehran to the Foreign Office, June 17, 1947, and June 21, 1947, and June 26, 1947, *FO/371 61986, Persia 1947, PRO*; KDP-I, 1982, pp. 21–27.

## Chapter Nine

### Conclusions

<sup>1</sup> From the British Embassy in Baghdad to the Foreign Office. *FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946, PRO*. See also chapter six.

<sup>2</sup> Othman, 1989, pp. 54–55.

<sup>3</sup> For the complete text of the Atlantic Charter, see , for example, Grenville, 1974, pp. 198–199.

<sup>4</sup> Pahlavi, 1961, p. 115.

<sup>5</sup> *Kurdistan*, No. 50, May 27, 1946; Ghassemlou, 1965, p. 82.

<sup>6</sup> Emin, 1993, 209. Noshirwan Emin could equally be criticised since he was the second most powerful man after Jalal Talabani within the PUK (Kurdistan’s Patriotic Union), which was dependent on support from Iran through much of the Iraq-Iran War. In general, the issue of dependence on outside actors has often been one of the preconditions of the Kurdish nationalist movement at different times and in various parts of Kurdistan. For a discussion concerning the “state of dependence” particularly in regard to the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq, see Yassin, 1992A, pp. 127–155.

<sup>7</sup> For instance, as to the reaction of Turkey as a regional power, the declaration of the PRK also resulted in serious concerns among Turkish authorities. The information given by the Turkish General Staff to the American Military Attaché reveals that the Turkish government was anxiously observing the development in Iranian Kurdistan. The role of the Soviet Union in giving the Kurds in Iran support was also one important factor which fuelled concerns among Turkish authorities. From the Military Attaché, Ankara to the War Department, March 9, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/3-946, NA*. However, it seems that the picture presented by the Turks on developments in Iranian Kurdistan was based on inadequate information received from their diplomatic representatives in Iran. From the American Embassy to the Department of State, March 11, 1946, *DSDF, 891.00/3-1146, NA*. It is also probable that a further cause for the hyper-sensitivity of the Turkish state to events in Kurdistan was the potential repercussions of those developments on the Kurds in Turkey.

<sup>8</sup> Talabani, 1970, p. 75.

<sup>9</sup> The diversity that has existed in nationalist movements has also been described as the distinction between “traditionalists” and “modernists.” For a discussion on this, see, for example, James S. Coleman, 1962, pp. 167–194; Thom Hodgkin, 1962, pp. 49–56. John Kautsky makes a rather optimistic assumption in claiming that “the difference between the traditionalist and the modernist elements of the politically conscious population do not destroy the unity of the nationalist movement.” Kautsky, 1962, p. 54.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

#### *PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE (PRO), LONDON*

##### *FO 371 series (Diplomatic Correspondence), 1941-1947:*

FO 371/24582, Iraq 1942.  
FO 371/27155, Persia 1941.  
FO 371/27244, Persia 1941.  
FO 371/31350, General 1942.  
FO 371/31388, Persia 1942.  
FO 371/31390, Persia 1942.  
FO 371/31394, Persia 1942.  
FO 371/31414, Persia 1942.  
FO 371/35070, Persia 1943.  
FO 371/35071, Persia 1943.  
FO 371/35072, Persia 1943.  
FO 371/40219, Persia 1944.  
FO 371/40038, Iraq 1944.  
FO 371/40041, Iraq 1944.  
FO 371/45340, Iraq 1945.  
FO 371/45346, Iraq 1945.  
FO 371/45440, Persia 1945.  
FO 371/45447, Persia 1945.  
FO 371/45448, Persia 1945.  
FO 371/45450, Persia 1945.  
FO 371/45459, Persia 1945.  
FO 371/45462, Persia 1945.  
FO 371/52369, Iraq 1946.  
FO 371/52667, Persia 1946.  
FO 371/52702, Persia 1946.  
FO 371/61678, Iraq 1947.  
FO 371/61986, Persia 1947.

#### NATIONAL ARCHIVES (NA), WASHINGTON, D.C.

Department of State, Decimal File (DSDF),  
Record Group 59, 1941-1947.

### ***Published Documents and Official Publications***

*Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Diplomatic Papers, The British Commonwealth, The Near East and Africa, 1941*, Vol. III. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959.

*Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Diplomatic Papers, The Near East and Africa, 1942*, Vol. IV. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963.

*Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Diplomatic Papers, The Near East and Africa, 1943*, Vol. IV. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964.

*Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Diplomatic Papers, The Near East and Africa, 1945*, Vol. VIII. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.

*Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Diplomatic Papers, The Near East and Africa, 1946*, Vol. VII. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.

*Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Diplomatic Papers, The Near East and Africa, 1947*, Vol. V. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971.

U.S. Department of State, (1950) *A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, (Washington, Government Printing Office).

The Department of State *Bulletin*, December 11, 1943, Vol. IX, No. 233.

U.S. Department of the Army, (1955), "The German Campaign in Russia-- Planning and Operations (1940-1942). *Department of the Army Pamphlet*, No. 20-261a, (Washington D.C. March 1955).

U.N., Security Council, *Official Records*. First Year: First Series, *Supplement* No. 1.

---. *Official Records*. First Year: First Series, *Supplement* No. 2.

Paiforce, (1948), *The official Story of the Persia and Iraq Command 1941-1946*, (London: His Majesty's Stationary office).

KDP-Iraq, (1982), *Al-Masirah al-Tarikhiah ila al-Itihad al-Soviati*, [The Historical March to the Soviet Union].

### Books and Articles

Abd-Alradha, M. (1975), *Al-Qadhiah Al-Kurdiah Fi Al-Iraq [The Kurdish Question in Iraq]*, (in Arabic), (Baghdad: Tariq al-Sha`b Publications).

Abrahamian, E. (1982), *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

Acheson, D. (1969), *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.).

**Ahmed, K. (1984), *Kurdistan Kilal Sanawat al-Harib al-Alamyah al-Ula [Kurdistan Durin the Years of the First World War]*, (in Kurdish), (Baghdad: 2nd ed.**

Alexander, Y. & Nanes, A. eds. (1980), *The United States and Iran: A Documentary History*, (London: Aletheia Books).

Alexandrov, V. (1986), *A Contemporary World History 1917-1945*, (Moscow: Progress Publications).

Ali, K. (1986), *Biri Natawa-yi Wa Damazrandni Dawlatek-i Nasiunal [The Nationalist Consiousness and the Establishment of a Nation-State]*, (in Kurdish), in *Charcira*, No. 1, (February, 1968).

Alter, P. (1989), *Nationalism*, (London: Edward Arnold).

Arfa, H. (1966), *The Kurds: A Histoical and Political Study*, (London: University Press).

Argyle, W. (1967), "Size and Scale as Factors in the Development of Nationalist Movement", in Adam D. Smith, (ed.) *Nationalist Movements*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd.).

Ashkenazi, T. (1946), "Kurdistan for the Kurds", in *Asia and the Americas*, No. XLVI, April, 1946.

Avery, P. (1965), *Modern Iran*, (London: Ernest Benn Ltd.).

Azimi, F. (1989), *Iran: The Crisis of Democracy*, (New York: St. Martin's Press).

Baram, P. (1978), *The Department of State in the Middle East, 1919-1945*, (University of Pennsylvania Press).

Barth, F. (1979), *Principles of Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan*, (New York: Ams Press), 2nd ed.

Barth, F. (1969), "Introduction", in Fredrik Barth *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, (London, Oslo: Universitets Forlaget , George Allen & UNWIN).

Beck, P. (1981), "'A Tedious and Perilous Controversy': Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926", in *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2, (April, 1980).

Bill, J. & Springborg, R. (1990), *Politics in the Middle East* (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman), 3rd ed.

Bjöl, E. (1976), *Internationell Politik: Vilka Faktorer Styr Världen?*, (Stockholm: Bonniers boktryckeri).

Blum, J. (ed.) (1973), *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company).

Bozarslan, H. (1992), "Political aspects of the Kurdish problem in contemporary Turkey", in G. P. Kreyenbroek, & S. Sperl, (ed.) *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, (London and New York: Routledge).

Bruinessen, M. van, 1992; *Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social Political Organization of Kurdistan*, (London. New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd.), 2nd ed.

Byrnes, J. (1947), *Speaking Frankly*, (New York and London: Harper and Brothers).

Bryson, T. (1981), *Seeds of Mideast Crises: The United States Diplomatic Role in the Middle East During World War II*, (Jefferson. North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc.).

Bullard, R. (1951), *Britain and The Middle East: From the Earliest Times to 1950*, (London: Hutchinson House).

Bullard, R. (1961), *The Camels Must Go: An Autobiography*, (London: Faber and Faber).

Burton, H. (1944), "The Kurds", in *The Journal of the Central Asian Society*, Vol. XXXI, part 1, (January 1944).

Campbell, J. (1958), *Defence of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy*, (New York: Harper & Brothers).

Carmichael, J. (1962), "The Nationalist-Communist Symbiosis in the Middle East", in John H. Kautsky, (ed.) *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries; Nationalism and Communism*, (New York. London: John Wiley and Sons, INC., 1962, Reprinted from *Problems of Communism*, VIII, No. 3 (May-June 1959).

Catudel, H. (1976), "The war in Kurdistan: End of a Nationalist Struggle", in *International Relations*, Vol. V, No. 3, (May 1976).

- Chaliand, G. (1980), "Introduction", in Gerard Chaliand (ed.) *People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan*, (London: Zed Press).
- Chubin, S. and Zabih, S. (1974), *The Foreign Relations of Iran*, (Berkeley, Losangeles, London: University of California Press).
- Churchill, W. (1950), *The Second World war: The Grand Alliance*, Vol. III, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company).
- Coleman, J. (1962), "Nationalism in Tropical Africa", in John H. Kautsky, *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries; Nationalism and Communism*, (New York. London: John Wiley and Sons, INC., 1962, Reprinted from *the American Political Science Review*, XLVIII, No. 2 (June 1954), 404-426.
- Conner, W. (1967), "Self-Determination", in *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 1, (October 1967).
- Cottam, R. (1988), *Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study*, (London: University of Pittsburgh Press).
- Cottam, R. (1964), *Nationalism in Iran*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press).
- Dehkordi, F. (1986), *The Republic of Kurdistan: Its Rise and Fall*, (Unpublished Ma. Dissertation, University of Oxford).
- Douglas, W. (1952), *Strange Lands and Friendly People*, (New York: Harper).
- Eagleton, W. Jr. (1988), *An Introduction to Kurdish Rugs and Other Weavings*, (New York: Interlink Books).
- Eagleton, W. Jr. (1963), *The Kurdsih Republic of 1946*, (London: Oxford University Press).
- Edmonds, C. J. (1971), "Kurdish Nationalism", in *Journal of Contemporary History*, (Great Britain) Vol. 6, No. 1, 1971.
- Elphinston, W. (1946), "The Kurdish Question", in *International Affairs*, Vol. XXII, No. 1, (January 1946).
- Emerson, R. (1960), *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Determination of Asien and African People*, (Massachusets: Harvard University Press).
- Enloe, C. (1986), *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development*, (Lanham. New York. London: University Press of America).
- Entessar, N. (1992), *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, (Boulder. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

Entessar, N. (1989), "The Kurdish mosaic of discord", in *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (October, 1989).

Entessar, N. (1984), "The Kurds in Post Revolutionary Iran and Iraq", in *Third World Quarterly*, No. 6, 1984.

Eriksen, T. (1992), "Ethnicity and Nationalism: Definitions and Critical Reflections", in *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1992.

Fatemi, F. (1980), *The U.S.S.R. in Iran: The Background of Russian and Anglo-Russian Conflict in Iran, Its Effects on Iranian Nationalism, and the Fall of the Shah*, (London: Thomas Yoselff).

Fatemi, N. (1954), *Oil Diplomacy: PowderKeg in Iran*, (New Yor: Whittier Books).

Fawcett, L. (1990), "Invitation to the Cold War: British Policy in Iran, 1941-1947", in Ann Deighton, (ed.) *Britain and the First Cold War*, (London: Macmillan).

Fawcett, L. (1988), *The Struggle for Persia: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946*, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oxford).

Foster, H. (1936), *The Making of Modern Iraq: A Product of World Forces*, (London: Williams and Norgate).

Gasiorowski, M. (1991), *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran*, (Ithaca. London: Cornell University Press).

Gavan, S. (1958), *Kurdistan: a Divide Nation of the Middle East*, (London: Lowrence & Wishant).

Gellner, E. (1986), *Nations and Nationalism*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd).

Grant, C. (1945), "Iran: Test of Relations between Great and Small Nations", in *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. 21, No. 3, (April 15, 1945).

Ghassemlou, A. ( 1988), *Chil Sal Khabat la Penawi Azadi: Kurtayak la Medzju-i Hizbi Dimokrati Kurdistan. (Forty Years of struggle for Freedom: A Brife History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party)*, (in Kurdish) Vol. 1, 2nd ed.

Ghassemlou, A. (1965), *Kurdistan and the Kurds*, (London. Prague: ?).

Ghods, M. R. (1990), "The Iranian Communist Movement Under Reza Shah," in *Middle East Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 4, (October, 1990).

Ghods, M. R. (1989), *Iran in the Twentieth Century: a Political History*, (London: Adamantine Press Ltd.).

- Grant, C. (1945), "Iran: Test of Relations between Great and Small Nations", in *Foreign Policy Reports*, (April 15, 1945).
- Grenville, J. (1974), *The Major International Treaties 1914-1973: A History and Guide With Texts*, (London: Methuen & Ltd.).
- Gurr, T. (1992), "Third World Minorities at Risk Since 1945", in Sheryl J. Brown, & Kimber M. Schraub, (eds) *Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era*, (United States: Institute of Peace Press).
- Harris, G. (1977), "Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds", in *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, No. 433, 1977.
- Hazen, W. (1979), "Minorities in Revolt: The Kurds of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey", in R. D. McLaurin, (ed.) *The Political Role of Minority Groups in the Middle East*, (New York: Praeger Publisher).
- Hechter, M. (1975), *Internal Colonialism. The Celtic Fringe in British national development 1536-1966*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
- Hemn (pseudonym). (1974), *Tarik-u Ron [Darkness and Light]*, (in Kurdish), (Baghdad: ?).
- Hess, G. (1974), "The Iranian Crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold war", in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 89, No. 1, (March 1974).
- Hodgkin, T. (1956), *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, (London: Fredrick Muller).
- Honigman, G. (1982), "British Petroleum Politics, Arab Nationalism and the Kurds", in *Middle East Review*, Vol. 15, No. 1-2 (Fall/Winter 1982).
- Howell, W. Jr. (1965), *The Soviet Union and the Kurds: A Study of National Minority Problems in Soviet Policy*, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia).
- Hull, C. (1948), *The Memories of Cordell Hull*, (New York: The Macmillan Co.), Vol. I & II.
- Hurewitz, J. (1953), *Middle East Dilemmas: The Background of United States Policy*, (New York: Harper and Brothers), Vol. I & II.
- Hurewitz, J. (1956), *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, 1914-1956*, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.), Vol. 1 & 2.
- Hussami, K. (1986), *Komar-i Demokrat-i Kurdistan ya Khodmukhtari? [Democratic Republic of Kurdistan or Autonomy?]*, (Stockholm: Azad Publishing Center), 2nd ed.
- Hussein, F. (1985), *The Legal Concept of Self-Determination and the Kurdish Question*, (Amsterdam: Luna).

Irani, R. (1978), *American Diplomacy: An Option Analysis of the Azerbaijan Crisis, 1945-1946*, (Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College).

Izady, M. (1992), *The Kurds: A Concise Handbook*, (Washington. Philadelphia. London: Taylor & Francis International Publisher).

Jawad, S. (1981), *Iraq and the Kurdish Question 1958-1970*, (London: Ithaca Press).

Johansson, R. (1993), "Nationer och Nationalism: Teoretiska och Empiriska Aspekter", in Sven Tägil, (ed.) *Den Problematiska Etniciteten: Nationalism, Migration och Samhällsomvandling*, (Lund: Lund University Press).

Johansson, R., Rönquist, R. & Tägil, S. (1993), "Territorialstaten i Kris? Integration och Uppsplittning i Europa", in Sven Tägil, (ed.) *Europa - historians återkomst*, (Hedemora: Gidlunds Bokförlag), 2nd ed.

Jwaideh, W. (1960), *The kurdish natioanl Movement: Its Origins and Development*, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University).

Kautsky, J. (1962), "An Essay in the Politics of Development", in John H. Kautsky, (ed.) *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism*, (New York. London: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.).

Kellas, J. (1991), *The Politics of Nationalism*, (London: Macmillan).

Kendal, (1980), "Kurdistan in Turkey", in *People Without a Country: Kurds and Kurdistan*. (London: Zeed Press).

Khashan, H. & J. Harik, (1992), "The Plight of the Kurds", in *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1992.

Kimche, J. (1976), *The Seven Pellars: The Middle East, 1945-1952*, (New York: Da Capo Press)

Kinnane, D. (1970), *The kurds and Kurdistan*, (London: Oxford University Press), 2nd ed.

Kirk, G. (1952), *Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946: The Middle East in the War*, (London: Oxford University Press).

Kolko, G. (1968), *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945* (New York).

Kolko, G. & Kolko, J. (1972), *The Limits of Power: The United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954*, (New York).

Koohi-Kamali, F. (1992), "Nationalism in Iranian Kurdistan," in Philip G. Kreyenbroek, & Stefan Sperl, *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, (London. New York: Biddles Ltd.).

- Kreyenbroek, P. G. (1992), "On the Kurdish language," in Philip G. Kreyenbroek, & Stefan Sperl. *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, (London. New York: Biddles Ltd.).
- Kuniholm, B. (1980), *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Tuirkey, and Greece*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Laanatza, M. (1984), "Kurdish Identification in Iraqi Perspective", in Sven Tägil, (ed.) *Regions in Upheaval: Ethnic Conflict and Political Mobilization*, (Kristianstad: Esslete Studium).
- Ladjevardi, H. (1983), "The Origins of U.S. Support for an Autocratic Iran", in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. No. 15, 1983.
- Lamb, H. (1946), "Mountain Tribes of Iran and Iraq", in *National Geographic Magazine*, LXXXIX, (March 1946).
- Lambton, A. (1953), *Landlord and Peasant in Persia: A Study of Land Tenure and Land Revenue Administration*, (London: Ely House).
- Lawson, F. (1989), "The Iranian Crisis of 1945-1946 and the Spiral Model of International Conflict", in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 21, 1989.
- Lenczowski, G. (1971), *Soviet Advance in the Middle East*, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research).
- Lenczowski, G. (1949), *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948: A Study in Big Power Rivalry*, (New York: Ithaca Press).
- Lie, T. (1954), *In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years in the United Nations*, (New York).
- Longrigg, S. (1953), *Iraq: 1900 to 1950, a Political, Social, and Economic History*, (London: Oxford University Press).
- Magnus, R. (ed.) (1969), *Documents on the Middle East*, (Washington, D.C.).
- Mahdawy, A. (1990), *Tarikh Rawabit Kharidji Iran: Az Ibtidaye Dawrane Safaviah ta Payan Jang Duham Djihani, [The History of Iran's foreign Relations: From the Beginning of the Safavi Era to the End of the Second World War]*, (Tehran: Amir Kabir), 4th ed.
- Mark, E. (1975), "Allied Relations in Iran, 1941-1947: The Origins of a Cold War Crisis", in *Wisconsin Magazine of Hisitory*, No. 59, (Autumn 1975).
- McDowall, D. (1991), "The Kurds: An Historical Perspective", in *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 2, Part, III, 1991.

- McFarland, S. (1980), "A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-1947", in *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1980.
- Melson, R. & H. Wolpe, (1970), "Modernization and Communal Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective", in *the American Political Science Review*, Washington D.C. Vol. LXIV, No. 4, 1970.
- Menken, J. (1946), "Britain and the Persian Question", in *The National Review*, No. 126, (January, 1946).
- Messer, R. (1977), "Paths Not Taken: The United States Department of State and Alternatives to Containment, 1945-1946", in *Diplomatic History* Vol. I, No. 4, (Fall 1977).
- Morrell, S. (1946), *The Spheres of Influence*, (New York: Books for Libraries Press).
- Motter, T. (1952), *U.S. Army in World War II. The Middle East Theater: The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*, (Washington).
- Mulla Izzat, M. (1992), *Dawlat-i Jimhur-i Kurdistan: Nama u Dokument, [The Government of the Kurdistan Republic: Letters and Documents]*, (Stockholm: Azad-i).
- Mulla Izzat, M. (1986), *Komar-i Mill-i Mahabad: Le Kolinawayak-i Siasy-u Mezhuy-ia, [The People's Republic of Mahabad: A Historical and Political Investigation]*, (in Kurdish), (Stockholm: Jamal Tahir), 2:nd ed.
- Mustafa, al-Karadaghi (1992), "Summary of Kurdish History", in *Kurdistan Times, A Quarterly Political Journal*, No. 2, (Summer 1992).
- Naamani, I. (1966), "The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determination", in *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 20, No. 3, (Summer 1966).
- Naamani, I. (1951), "Iran and Her Problems", in *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol. II, No. 6-7, (June-July, 1951).
- Nabaz, J. (1985), *Govari Nishtiman, Tammuzi 1943 - maysi 1944, Ziman-i Hal-i Komalayi Zhekaf-U Idolozhi Hurda Borzhuay Rawshanbiri Nasionalist la Kurdistan da*, (Stockholm: Binkay Chapamany Azad).
- Nagel, J. (1980), "The Conditions of Ethnic Separatism: The Kurds in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq", in *Ethnicity*, Vol. 7, No. 3, (September, 1980).
- Nash, G. (1968), *United States Oil Policy*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press).
- Noel, Major E. (1919), *Diary on Special Duty in Kurdistan: From June 14th, to September 21th, 1919*, (Basra: Government Press, Basrah).

Nollau, G. & H. Wiehe, (1963), *Russia's South Flank: Soviet Operations in Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan*, (London. Dunmow: Pall Mall Press).

O'Balance, E. (1973), *The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970*, (London: Faber and Faber).

Olson, R. (1992), "The Creation of a Kurdish State in the 1990's?", in *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol, XV, No. 4, (Summer 1992).

**Olson, R. (1991), "Five Stages of Kurdish Nationalism: 1880-1990", in *Journal of Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 2, (July 1991).**

Olson, R. (1989), *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism And the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925*, (Austin: University of Texas Press).

Othman, S. (1989), "Kurdish Nationalism: Instigators and historical Influence", in *American review*, Vol. 42, No. 1/165, (Spring 1989).

Pahlavi, M. R. Shahanshah of Iran, (1961), *Mission for my Country*, (London: Hutchinson & Co.).

Perash, (pseudonym) (1986), *Al-Iraq: Dawlah Bil `Unf [Iraq: A State by Force]*, (in Arabic), (Kurdologia Publications, No. 2.).

Pisyan, N. (1949), *Az Mahahabade Khunin ta Karanehahe Aras [From Blood-stained Mahabad to the Shores of Aras]*, (Tehran: Sharkate Sahami Chap).

Pisyan, N. (1948), *Marg Bud Baz Gasht Ham Bud [There Was Both Death and Retreat]*, (Tehran: Sharkat Sahami Chap).

Pfau, R. (1977), "Containment in Iran, 1946: The Shift of an Active Policy", in *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 1, No. 4, (Fall 1977).

Pfau, R. (1975), *The United States and Iran, 1841-1947: Origins of Partnership*, (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Virginia)

Ramazani, R. (1988), *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East*, (Baltimore. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 2nd ed.

Ramazani, R. (1975), *Iran's Foreign Policy 1941-1973: A study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations*. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia)

Ramazani, R. (1971), "The Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Peoples Republic: Their Rise and Fall", in *Studies on the Soviet Union*, (West Germany), Vol. 11, No. 4, 1971.

Rezun, M. (1981), *The Soviet Union and Iran: Soviet Policy in Iran from the Beginning of the Pahlavi Dynasty Until the Soviet Invasion in 1941*, (Genève: Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publisher BV Alphen aan den Rijn).

Roosevelt, A. Jr. (1947), "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad", in *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (July 1947).

Rossow, R. (1956), "The Battle of Azerbaijan," in, *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. X, No. 1, (Winter 1956).

Rubin, B. (1980A), *Paved With Good Attention*, (New York: Penguin Books).

Rubin, B. (1980B), *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947: The Road to the Cold War*, (London: Frank Cass).

Rustow, D. (1967), *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization*, (Washington, D.C.: The Brikings Institution).

Ryan, S. (1988), "Explaining Ethnic Conflict: The Neglected International Dimension", in *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1988.

**Rystad, G. (1982), *Prisoners of the Past? The Munich Syndrome and the Makers of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era*, (Lund).**

Rönquist, R. (1990), *Skotsk Etno-Territorialitet i ett Historiskt Perspektiv*, (Lund: Lund University Press).

Safrastian, A. (1948), *Kurds and Kurdistan*, (London: Harvill Press).

Samadi, S. M. (ed.) (1981), *Zhe Kaf: Chi bu? Chi Dawist? Wa Chi le Ba Sarhat? [Zhe Kaf: What Was It? What Did It Want? and What Did Happen to It?]*, (Mahabad)

Samii, K. (1977), *Involvement by Invitation: American Strategies of Containment in Iran*, (London: The Pennsylvania State University Press).

Seton-Watson, H. (1977), *Nations and States. An Enquiry into the origins of Nations and the politics of Nationalism*, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.).

Seton-Watson, H. (1960), *The Pattern of Communist Revolution: A Historical Analysis*, (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.), 2nd ed.

Shaways, N. (1985), *Min Muzakkarat-i* [From My Memories], (in Arabic), (Kurdistan's People Democratic Party's Publications).

Sheehan, M. (1968), *Iran: The Impact of United States Interests and Politics 1941-1954*, (Brooklyn. New York: THEO. GAUS' SONS, INC.).

- Sheikhmous, O. (1992), "The Kurdish Question in Regional Politics: Possible Peaceful Solutions", in Kumar Rupesinghe *Internal Conflict and Governance*, (London: St. Martin's Press).
- Sherko, B. (1987), *Al-Qadhiah Al-Kurdiah "The Kurdish Question"*, (in Arabic), (Beirut: Dar al-Katib), 2nd ed.
- Shils, E. (1962), "The Intellectuals in Political Development", in John H. Kautsky, (ed.) *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism*, (New York. London: John Wiley and Sons, INC.). The article is reprinted from *World Politics*, Vol. XII, No. 3, (April 1960).
- Sim, R. (1980), "Kurdistan: The Search for Recognition", in *Conflict Studies*, No. 124, (November 1980).
- Sluglett, P. (1986), "The Kurds", in CARDRI (Committée Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq), (ed.) *Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction*, (London: Zed Press).
- Smith, A. (1986), *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Smith, A. (1976), "The formation of nationalist movements", in Anthony D. Smith, (ed.) *Nationalist Movements*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd.).
- Snider, L. W. (1979), "Minorities and Political Power in the Middle East", in R. D. McLaurin, (ed.) *The Political Role of Minority Groups in the Middle East*, (London: Praeger).
- Tabari, K. (1967), *Iran's Policies Towards the United States During the Anglo-Russian Occupation, 1941-1946*, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University).
- Tafreshian, A. (1976), *Qiam Afsaran Khorasan [The Upheaval of Khurasan's Officers]*, (? , ? ).
- Talabani, J. (1970), *Kurdistan Wa al-Harakah al-Qawmiyah al-Kurdiyah [Kurdistan and the Kurdish Nationalist Movement]*, (in Arabic), (Baghdad: Manshurat al-Nur).
- Taylor, P. (1984), *Nonstate Actors in International Politics From Transregional to Substate Organizations*, (Boulder. London: Westview Press).
- Thomas, L. & R. Frye, (1952), *THE UNITED STATES and Turkey and Iran*, (Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).
- Tilly, C., Tilly, L., and Tilly, R. (1975), *The Rebelious Century: 1830-1930*. (Cambridge: Harvarad University Press).

- Tägil, S. (1993), "Den 'Problematiska' Etniciteten: Nationalism, Migration och Samhällsomvandling", in Sven Tägil, (ed.) *Den Problematiska Etniciteten: Nationalism, Migration och Samhällsomvandling*, (Lund: Lund University Press).
- Tägil, S. (1984), "Ethno-Regionalism as a Problem of Conflict Theory", in Sven Tägil, (ed.) *Regions in Uppheaval: Ethnic Conflict and Political Mobilization*, (Kristianstad: Esselte Studium).
- Vahdat, M. (1958), *The Soviet Union and the Movement to Establish Autonomy in Iranian Azerbaijan*, (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Indiana University).
- Vinogradov, S.A. (1946), *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials*, (London: Hutchinson), Vol. 1.
- Warner, G. (1990), "The Study of Cold War Origins", in *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 1, No. 3, (November, 1990).
- Weaver, P. (1958), *Soviet Strategy in Iran 1941-1957*, (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, The American University).
- Westermann, W. (1946), "Kurdish Independence and Russian Expansion", in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 4, (July 1946).
- Whitley, A. (1980), "The kurds, Pressures and Prospects: Lack of Leadership in Search of Nationalhood", in *Round Table*, (Great Britain), No. 279, 1980.
- Woodward, L. (1971), *History of British Foreign Policy in the World War*, (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office), Vol. 2.
- Yalda, N. (1980), *Federalism and Self-Rule for Minorities: A Case Study of Iran and Kurdistan*, (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertaion, Claremont Graduate School).
- Yassin, B. (1992A), "Kurderna i Irak och Konfliktutvecklingen vid Persiska Viken, 1958-1991," in, Sven Tägil, (ed.) *Konflikt och Samarbete Vid Persiska Viken*, (Lund: Lund University Press).
- Yassin, B. (1992B), "Chand Sarnjek Darbara-yi Khabat-i Chakdar-i Julanawa-i Natawa-yi Kurd la Kurdistan-i Bashur", [Some Remarks about the Armed Struggle of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan], (in Kurdish), in *Yekgirtin*, No. 15, (July 1992).
- Young, C. (1976), *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, (Madison. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin).
- Young, F. (1970), "Reactive Subsystems", in *American Sociological Review*, No. 35.
- Zakie, M. (1939), *Khulasat Tarikh Kurd u Kurdistan*, [Resume of the History of the Kurds and Kurdistan], (in Arabic), (Cairo: ?).

Zeidner, R. (1959), "Kurdish Nationalism and the New Iraqi Government", in *Middle East Affairs*, Vol. X, No. 1, (Januari 1959).

Österud, Ö. (1984), *Nasjonens Selvbestemmelsesrett: Sökelys på en Politisk Doktrine*, (Oslo. Bergen. Stavanger. Tromsö: Universitetsforlaget).